govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_89-cr-00389-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNITED STATES 
v. 
JORGE CINTRON 
CRIMINAL ACTION 
NO. 89-389 
HODGE, J
. December 30, 2025 
MEMO
RANDUM 
Pending be
fore the Court are Defendant Jorge Cintron’s (“Defendant”) motion for 
reduction of sentence (ECF No. 192), motion to apply retroactive guideline amendments (ECF 
No. 194), and motion to challenge the legality of his sentence (ECF No. 202), as well as the 
Government’s opposition to the motions (ECF Nos. 197, 209). All three of Defendant’s motions 
were filed pro se. For the reasons below, the Court denies Defendant’s motions. 
I. BACKGROUND
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Defend
ant was the leader of the Hancock and Cambria cocaine organization in North 
Philadelphia. On September 21, 1989, a federal grand jury issued an indictment charging 
Defendant with one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine, one count of continuing criminal 
enterprise, 27 counts of distribution of cocaine, 27 counts of distribution of cocaine near a 
school, and 18 counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. In March 1990, the jury 
found Defendant guilty of all but two counts.
2 (ECF No. 197 at 1-2.) 
The Court determined that Defendant’s offenses involved 34.65 kilograms of cocaine, 
producing an offense level of 34. The Court applied a two-level enhancement for gun possession, 
1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system. 
2 Defendant was acquitted of one count of distribution of cocaine and one count of distribution of 
cocaine near a school. 

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a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, and a four-level enhancement for leadership 
role, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 42. Defendant was in criminal history category II 
and his guideline range was 30 years to life imprisonment. (ECF No. 209 at 2.) 
On August 27, 1991, the Court sentenced Defendant to 30 years’ incarceration to be 
served consecutive to a life sentence imposed by a Pennsylvania state court. (ECF No. 191 at 1.) 
At the time, with the sentence guideline range for Defendant’s offenses being 30 years to life 
imprisonment, the Court was obligated to impose a sentence within the guideline range. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1991). (Id. at 1-2.) Defendant remains in state custody at SCI Phoenix and has 
not yet begun serving his federal sentence. (ECF No. 209 at 1.) 
Defendant has filed numerous post-conviction motions seeking a reduction in sentence. 
On January 3, 2008, Defendant submitted a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (ECF No. 178.) On February 24, 2011, Defendant 
submitted a second motion for reduction of sentence invoking the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. (ECF No. 182.) On July 27, 2011, the Court denied both 
motions. (ECF No. 191.) 
As relevant here, on September 14, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for sentence reduction 
based on Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 505, which became effective in November 1994 
and reduced the base offense levels applicable to drug offenses. (ECF No. 192.) On November 
18, 2011, Defendant filed a second motion for a sentence reduction based on the Fair Sentencing 
Act. (ECF No. 194.) Additionally, on June 16, 2014, Defendant filed a motion for relief under 
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2014), which held that a fact increasing a defendant’s 
statutory minimum sentence must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury. (ECF No. 
202.) 

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II. DISCUSSION 
A district court generally cannot modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed, but a defendant may be eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c) under 
certain circumstances. Section 3582(c) allows for a reduction if two requirements are met: (1) the 
sentence was "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission," and (2) the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission." § 3582(c)(2); see also United States v. Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 
(3d Cir. 2013). A sentence reduction is inconsistent with stated Sentencing Commission policy 
if, for example, the newly retroactive Guidelines amendment relied on by the defendant "does 
not have the effect of lowering [his] applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). 
As to Defendant’s September 2011 motion, Amendment 505 does not have the effect of 
lowering his applicable guideline range. See § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Amendment 505 imposed a base 
offense level of 38 for offenses involving 150 kilograms or more of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(c) (Drug Quantity Table). Because Defendant was accountable for only 34.65 kilograms 
of cocaine, Amendment 505 does not alter his relevant base offense level or lower his sentencing 
range, and therefore, he is not eligible for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2). 
However, Defendant is entitled to relief under Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, 
which became effective in November 2014 and adjusted the Drug Quantity Table such that the 
base offense level for 34.65 kilograms of cocaine is now 32. This new base offense level reduces 
the total offense level to 40 and the sentencing range to 324 to 405 months, thus lowering 
Defendant’s applicable guideline range. See § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). While the Government states its 
lack of objection to the Court exercising its discretion under § 1B1.10(a)(1) and (b)(2)(A) to 
reduce Defendant’s sentence to no shorter than 324 months, the Government submits that such a 

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reduction is “seemingly [] of no consequence given the state [life] term.” (ECF No. 209 at 2-3.) 
The Court agrees and declines to reduce Defendant’s sentence on this basis. 
As to Defendant’s November 2011 motion, Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, made retroactive the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced 
the sentencing disparity between crack and powdered cocaine. However, Defendant was not 
convicted or sentenced for an offense involving crack cocaine. Accordingly, the Court cannot 
reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act. 
Lastly, as to Defendant’s 2014 motion, the Government argues that this motion lacks 
merit because “Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review.” (ECF No. 209 at 2.) 
The Court agrees. See United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that "the 
Supreme Court has not chosen to apply Alleyne's new rule retroactively to cases 
on collateral review"); United States v. Winkelman, 746 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that "Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review"). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for reduction of 
sentence (ECF No. 192), motion to apply retroactive guideline amendments (ECF No. 194), and 
motion to challenge the legality of his sentence (ECF No. 202). An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 BY THE COURT: 
 
 /s/ Kelley B. Hodge 
 
 HODGE, KELLEY B. , J. 
 

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