govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_22-cr-00248-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 
: 
v. : CRIMINAL NO. 22-248-1 
 : 
HUSSEIN NAKCHBANDI : 
 
MEMORANDUM 
KENNEY, J. JUNE 10, 2026 
Defendant Hussein Nakchbandi moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that his familial circumstances and rehabilitation constitute “extraordinary 
and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. See ECF No. 55 at 2–6, 11. The Government 
opposes any reduction of Defendant’s sentence. See ECF No. 57. For the reasons set forth below, 
the Court will DENY Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 55). 
I. BACKGROUND 
In December 2021, agents received information from an informant that Defendant was 
selling cocaine from his residence in Philadelphia. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. On December 20, 2021, 
and February 28, 2022, Defendant sold cocaine to the informant for $500. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12; see also 
ECF No. 57 at 1; PSR ¶¶ 19–20. After receiving a search warrant for Defendant’s residence, on 
March 3, 2022, authorities recovered about two kilograms of cocaine, 432.95 grams of ketamine, 
950 grams of marijuana, four loaded firearms, about $44,000 in cash, and packaging materials 
from his home. See ECF No. 57 at 1; see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 13. Defendant was subsequently 
charged with two counts of knowingly and intentionally distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more 
of cocaine, and ketamine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 

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(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E); and one count of possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See ECF No. 20 at 1–4. 
On September 1, 2022, Defendant appeared before this Court and pled guilty to Counts 
One through Four of the Information. See ECF Nos. 23, 25. On September 21, 2023, the Court 
sentenced Defendant to sixty-two months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a four-year term of 
supervised release, a $400 special assessment, and a $15,000.00 fine. See ECF No. 45 at 1–3, 6. 
Defendant was ordered to self-surrender by March 1, 2024 to begin his term of imprisonment. See 
ECF No. 48. 
To date, Defendant has served about twenty-nine months of his term of imprisonment at 
FCI Petersburg Low. See ECF No. 57 at 2. He has also earned about two months of credit for 
good conduct, rendering his total time served to about thirty-one months’ imprisonment. Id. 
During his term of imprisonment, Defendant has received two disciplinary infractions in 2025 
related to the possession of unauthorized items, which “result[ed] in time in disciplinary 
segregation and other penalties.” Id. 
On May 5, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion for Compassionate Release (the “Motion”), 
citing his familial hardship, rehabilitation, his purported low risk of recidivism, and a clinical 
recommendation as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant early release from prison. 
See ECF No. 55 at 2–6, 11. Defendant bases much of his Motion on the negative psychological 
consequences of his incarceration on his two daughters, who are eight and thirteen years old. Id. 
at 4. Defendant states that his daughters are experiencing confusion and anxiety from his 
imprisonment, and he highlights the long-term adverse effects of paternal absence on young 
children. See id. at 4–5. In addition, he explains that his eighty-three-year-old mother has a history 
of medical complications that require constant support. See id. at 5–6; see also ECF 55-2 at 2–11. 

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Defendant also attached letters from friends, family, and a psychoanalyst that speak to his character 
and growth as a result of his efforts towards rehabilitation. See ECF No. 55 at 3–4, 6; see also 
ECF No. 55-1 at 2–26. 
In its Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, the Government argues that Defendant has not 
proffered any extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release. See ECF 
No. 57 at 1. For instance, the Government asserts that the hardship Defendant’s immediate family 
is experiencing is a “sadly ordinary” consequence of his imprisonment. Id. at 8. In addition, the 
Government contends that Defendant has not shown his elderly mother to be incapacitated or 
completely devoid of assistance, given that two of Defendant’s siblings live in Philadelphia, where 
his mother also resides, and that Defendant’s sister joined her for her medical appointments in 
2026. Id. at 8–9; see also PSR ¶ 51. Moreover, the Government argues that, even if Defendant 
had provided “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release, the sentencing 
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of a reduction of Defendant’s sentence. 
ECF No. 57 at 10. According to the Government, it would not serve the “interests of justice” to 
grant Defendant’s requested relief based on the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes, the Court’s 
imposition of a “reasonable sentence” that was “well below the guideline range[,]” and the fact 
that he “has served only half of [his] sentence.” Id. at 7, 10. 
Defendant’s Motion is fully briefed and before the Court. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 Granting compassionate release is a “purely discretionary decision” guided by 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). United States v. Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2023). 
By allowing for the reduction of an imposed term of imprisonment, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) 
provides a narrow “exception to the default rule that a federal defendant will serve his entire 

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sentence.” United States v. Bryant, 144 F.4th 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2025). Under Section 
3582(c)(1)(A), a district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed” unless it finds that (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a reduction; (2) 
“a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission;” and (3) the traditional sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support 
relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A defendant filing a motion for compassionate release must 
have “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring 
a motion on the defendant’s behalf” or have experienced a “lapse of 30 days from the receipt of 
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier[.]” Id. 
 While Congress has not specified what “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant 
compassionate release, it “authorize[d] the [Sentencing] Commission to promulgate policy 
statements that ‘describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for 
sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.’” 
Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1327 (2026) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
994(t)). Pursuant to this authorization, the Sentencing Commission issued a policy statement in 
2023 that identified specific “extraordinary and compelling reasons” permitting compassionate 
release: (1) a defendant’s medical circumstances; (2) a defendant’s age; (3) a defendant’s family 
circumstances; (4) being a “victim of abuse”; (5) “other reasons”; and (6) an “unusually long 
sentence.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).1 For example, a defendant’s family circumstances may 
warrant compassionate release in the event of “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the 
defendant’s minor child[,]” “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse[,]” or “[t]he 
 
1 Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that the Commission’s unusually long sentences 
category “exceed[ed] the Commission’s authority.” Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ----, 146 
S. Ct. 1292, 1304 n.5 (2026) (citing Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1334–35). 

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incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver 
for the parent.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A)–(C). In addition, “rehabilitation of the defendant is 
not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason” that warrants compassionate release, but 
“may be considered in combination with other” factors. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); see also United 
States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 405–06 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (finding that a combination of 
defendant’s rehabilitative efforts, health issues, nearness of release date, and the fact that he had 
“served the vast majority of his sentence” warranted compassionate release). “While the terms 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ leave room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass 
any consideration” whatsoever. Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1332. 
 Even if a defendant presents “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate 
release, the court must also weigh the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to 
determine if early release is warranted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors are: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant; 
 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
. . . [and] 
 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[.] 
 

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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2), (6). The burden rests on the defendant to demonstrate entitlement to 
compassionate release. See United States v. Rashid, No. 20-2840, 2023 WL 1813598, at *2 (3d 
Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (citing United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant moved for compassionate release based on his familial circumstances and his 
rehabilitative efforts while in prison. See ECF No. 55 at 2–6. The Court will deny Defendant’s 
Motion on the basis that he failed to satisfy his burden of establishing “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons” for compassionate release. In any event, the sentencing factors set forth in 
Section 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of releasing Defendant halfway through his sentence. 
A. Defendant Has Not Demonstrated Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons for 
Compassionate Release 
 First, Defendant argues that his daughters are suffering as a result of his imprisonment and 
explains that “[r]eunification would allow [him] to resume meaningful caregiving involvement[.]” 
ECF No. 55 at 4, 6. He highlights the harmful psychological impact of long-term paternal absence 
on his daughters’ development as an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying his early 
release. See id. at 4–5. In its Opposition, the Government explains that familial hardship 
unfortunately is an expected consequence of a parent’s incarceration. See ECF No. 57 at 8. 
Moreover, the Government contends that the hardship Defendant’s family is experiencing does 
not meet the criteria set forth in the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines for a sentence reduction, 
which limit relief to “truly extraordinary circumstances[.]” Id. 
Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3), a defendant’s family circumstances may warrant 
compassionate release if the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child passes away or becomes 
incapacitated. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A). Here, Defendant has not asserted or presented 
any evidence that his daughters’ mother is incapacitated and can no longer care for their children. 

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The emotional suffering that his children and their mother are experiencing in his absence, though 
unfortunate, does not qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release 
under the relevant guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, No. 16-cr-403-2, 2025 WL 
3033898, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2025) (denying compassionate release where a defendant failed 
to demonstrate that her mother, who was the primary caregiver for defendant’s minor daughter, 
was incapacitated and no longer capable of caring for herself and defendant’s daughter); United 
States v. Walker, No. 20-cr-216, 2024 WL 3678972, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2024) (denying 
compassionate release in part because defendant did not prove his child’s caregiver was 
incapacitated); United States v. Major, Nos. 09-cr-434 & 09-cr-435-1, 2023 WL 8188445, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2023) (explaining that “the inherent benefits a child gains from having a parent 
at home . . . do[] not [alone] justify release”). 
 Second, Defendant’s argument that his mother’s ill health constitutes an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for compassionate release fails for similar reasons. See ECF No. 55 at 5–6. 
Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C), a defendant may receive a sentence reduction if the defendant 
is the “only available caregiver” for an incapacitated parent. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C). Here, 
Defendant argues that his mother is elderly and “demonstrates age-related functional limitations 
that reduce her ability to live independently and require consistent emotional and practical 
support.” ECF No. 55 at 5–6. But Defendant failed to establish that his mother’s medical condition 
has left her incapacitated—that is, “completely disabled or unable to carry on any self-care[.]” 
United States v. Rooks, Nos. 21-cr-038 & 21-cr-043, 2022 WL 267899, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 
2022), aff’d, No. 22-1332, 2022 WL 2964805 (3d Cir. July 27, 2022) (per curiam) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted); see also United States v. Cruz-Rivera, No. 11-cr-43, 2020 WL 
5993352, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2020) (finding that a defendant failed to demonstrate that his 

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wife’s diabetes and breast cancer diagnoses rendered her incapacitated). Moreover, Defendant is 
not “the only available caregiver” for his mother. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C). The Government 
points out that Defendant has two siblings who also live in Philadelphia, see ECF No. 57 at 9 
(citing PSR ¶ 51), and medical records indicate that one of them joined his mother for her medical 
appointments in 2026. See id.; see also ECF No. 55-2 at 6–7. Accordingly, Defendant has not 
met his burden of proving that his mother’s medical issues provide an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for compassionate release consistent with the relevant guideline. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13(b)(3)(C); see also United States v. O’Brien, No. 25-1729, 2025 WL 3013125, at *3 (3d 
Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming denial of defendant’s request for compassionate release 
because defendant did not show that his elderly, ill mother had no other available caretakers). 
 Third, Defendant argues that he has engaged in multiple rehabilitative efforts while 
imprisoned. See ECF No. 55 at 2–3. Defendant contends that he presents a low risk of recidivism 
and has “shown himself to be a man of kindness, loyalty, and genuine decency[,]” as demonstrated 
by character letters attached to his Motion. Id. at 4. Defendant blames his criminal activity in part 
on “the unique pressures of the COVID-19 shutdown[,]” during which time he lost his jewelry 
business. Id. at 3. In addition, Defendant attached a letter from Dr. Anthony Tereo, a licensed 
psychoanalyst, who recommends “a structured re-entry plan” that would consist of “bi-weekly 
contact” for two years to appropriately monitor Defendant’s behavior upon release. Id. at 6; see 
also ECF No. 55-1 at 10–12. 
The Court reviewed the letters from friends and family, and clinical recommendation for 
reintegration into society that purportedly speak to Defendant’s rehabilitation and low risk of 
recidivism. While the Court commends Defendant on his progress to date, it is well-settled that 
rehabilitation alone does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate 

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release. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); see also United States v. Bledsoe, No. 22-
2022, 2022 WL 3536493, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2022) (per curiam) (finding that rehabilitation 
“standing alone” did not qualify as either “‘extraordinary’ [or] ‘compelling’ for purposes of the 
compassionate-release standard” because rehabilitation was “expected” (citations omitted)); 
United States v. Godinez, No. 22-2195, 2023 WL 4363019, at *1 (7th Cir. July 6, 2023) (affirming 
denial of compassionate release in part because a defendant’s efforts towards rehabilitation, such 
as attending classes and maintaining a positive disciplinary record, did not qualify as extraordinary 
and were “expected” (citation omitted)); United States v. Martines, No. 94-cr-127-3, 2022 WL 
837243, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022) (denying compassionate release to a defendant who 
presented letters of support and a progress report in part because “[b]ehaving and rehabilitating 
while incarcerated is expected”). Even if Defendant’s efforts towards rehabilitation are considered 
in combination with his other proffered bases for relief, as explained above, his family 
circumstances do not satisfy the relevant guidelines, and he has not presented other considerations 
that weigh in favor of granting compassionate release. See United States v. Gonzalez Jose, No. 
14-cr-652-10, 2025 WL 3530153, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2025) (denying compassionate release 
because defendant’s “arguments considered individually or collectively” did not qualify as 
extraordinary and compelling). 
Accordingly, Defendant has not met the “demanding standard” of presenting 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release. Fernandez, 146 S. Ct. at 1302. 
B. Defendant’s Motion Also Fails Under the Section 3553(a) Sentencing Factors 
 Even if the reasons proffered by Defendant qualified as “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons” for compassionate release (they do not), the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 3553(a) do not support a sentence reduction.2 In the Third Circuit, even where a defendant has 
presented “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” courts have nonetheless denied motions for 
compassionate release if, for example, the defendant presents a danger to the community, or where 
a sentence reduction would discourage respect for the law. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 833 
F. App’x 934, 935 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (affirming denial of compassionate release, despite 
defendant’s numerous health issues, because the defendant had “substantial time remaining to be 
served on [his] sentence[,]” had a violent criminal history, and had “institutional infractions”); 
United States v. Norwood, 841 F. App’x 495, 498 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (affirming denial of 
compassionate release in part because of the seriousness of defendant’s crimes of armed robbery 
and carjacking); United States v. Gilbert, No. 18-cr-00095, 2021 WL 492536, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 10, 2021) (holding that a defendant presented extraordinary and compelling reasons, but 
denying compassionate release because defendant, “a career offender[,]” “remain[ed] a danger to 
the community” and “[r]eleasing him after serving less than half of his sentence would fail to 
reflect the seriousness of his offense, promote respect for the law[,] or provide just punishment”). 
Here, Defendant has served about half of his sixty-two-month term of imprisonment. See 
ECF No. 57 at 2. When a court imposes a term of imprisonment, it is generally anticipated that 
the defendant will serve the entire sentence. See Bryant, 144 F.4th at 1127. Defendant pled guilty 
to serious drug-related offenses, including distribution of cocaine, as well as possession with intent 
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and ketamine, and marijuana. See ECF No. 25 at 1. 
Moreover, authorities seized four loaded firearms from his residence, which were in close 
proximity to bulk quantities of drugs and a large amount of cash, see ECF No. 24 at 9–10; ECF 
 
2 The Court notes that Defendant failed to properly address the application of the Section 3553(a) 
factors in his Motion. 

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No. 57 at 1, and he pled guilty to possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 
See ECF No. 25 at 1. While Defendant argues that he has engaged in many rehabilitative efforts, 
see ECF No. 55 at 2–3, the record also reflects that last year, he committed two serious disciplinary 
offenses related to the possession of unauthorized items, which led to “time in disciplinary 
segregation and other penalties.” See ECF No. 57 at 2. 
Given this history and the gravity of his offenses, Defendant failed to demonstrate how 
releasing him just over two-and-a-half years into an approximately five-year sentence reflects the 
seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, and adequately 
deters criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2); see also United States v. Thomas, No. 
24-2789, 2024 WL 5074893, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 11, 2024) (per curiam) (affirming denial of 
compassionate release where the district court “reasonably” found that “the seriousness of 
[defendant’s] crimes and the need to provide punishment for [defendant’s] conduct outweighed 
[his] good behavior while incarcerated”); United States v. Redman, No. 23-1121, 2023 WL 
3721206, at *2 (3d Cir. May 30, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming denial of compassionate release 
where the Section 3553 factors weighed against the defendant due to his disciplinary record in 
prison and criminal history); United States v. Blackwell, 857 F. App’x 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2021) (per 
curiam) (affirming denial of compassionate release in part because defendant “had only served 
approximately half of her sentence” for a drug-related conviction). For these reasons, Defendant’s 
Motion also fails upon reexamination of the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendant has not presented “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate 
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Moreover, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of his early release. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s 
Motion (ECF No. 55). An appropriate Order will follow. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 /s/ Chad F. Kenney 
 
 CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE 

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