govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-1_26-cv-03439-0

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
JOSE ANTONIO S.R.,1 
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
No. 1:26-cv-03439-TLN-CKD 
 
A# 244-744-264 
 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jose Antonio S.R.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 10). 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 
No. 1) and Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 10). Respondents are ordered to 
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner. 
/// 
 
1 The Court omits Petitioner’s full name to protect sensitive personal information. See 
Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United 
States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-
suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 2 
 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
This matter arises out of Petitioner’s challenge to the lawfulness of his civil immigration 
detention without a hearing. Petitioner has resided in the United States for almost two years, 
since his entry in October 2024. (ECF No. 9-1 at 3.) Petitioner and his wife came to this country 
to seek protection from the violent criminal cartels in their hometown of Morelos, Mexico. (ECF 
No. 8-1 at 2.) On October 5, 2024, Petitioner was arrested at the San Ysidro, California, Port of 
Entry, where he was served an I-862 (Notice to Appear) and paroled into the United States 
pending an immigration hearing. (ECF No. 9-1 at 3.) Petitioner and his wife have applied for 
asylum; those applications are still pending with the government. (ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) 
Petitioner has developed strong ties to his community. He settled with his family in 
Nampa, Idaho, to be near his grandparents, who are Lawful Permanent Residents of the United 
States. (Id.) Additionally, Petitioner has maintained gainful employment as a cook. (ECF No. 8 
at 6.) He is the sole provider for his for his eight-months-pregnant wife and his disabled father. 
(Id.) 
On November 26, 2025, Petitioner was charged with driving under the influence, reckless 
driving, and consuming or possession of an alcoholic beverage as a driver. (ECF No. 9-1 at 3.) 
The charges are still pending. (Id.) On March 24, 2026, the United States Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”) detained Petitioner after locating a court record showing Petitioner’s pending 
charges. (Id. at 2.) 
Petitioner has now been detained for almost three months. Petitioner challenges his civil 
detention without a hearing through the instant Petition. 
II. STANDARD OF LAW 
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 
(citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 
 
2 The facts are not disputed. 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 3 
 
 
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 
corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 
protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 
district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Petitioner claims his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. (ECF Nos. 1, 8.) In opposition, Respondents contend 
Petitioner is subject to the mandatory detention scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF Nos. 5, 
9.) The Court addresses each claim in turn. 
A. Immigration and Nationality Act 
Section 1226(a) of the INA “provides the general process for arresting and detaining 
[noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. 
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). The statute affords the Government broad 
discretion whether to release or detain the individual. Id. It also provides “extensive procedural 
protections” including several layers of review of the initial custody determination, “an initial 
bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to 
present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances 
materially change.” Id. at 1202. Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“§ 1225(b)(2)”)) mandates 
detention during removal proceedings for “applicants for admission” who are “seeking 
admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 
(2018). Until the U.S. Department of Homeland Security changed its policy in July 2025, the 
Government consistently applied § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the 
United States who were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal. 
This Court has agreed with Petitioner that the text and legislative history of the INA 
demonstrates that § 1226(a) governs his detention, not § 1225, and he is entitled to the process 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 4 
 
 
§ 1226(a) requires, including a bond hearing.3 (ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) Respondents argue Petitioner 
is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) without a bond 
hearing. (ECF No. 5 at 1.) This Court and many others have repeatedly found that § 1225(b) 
applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens 
like Petitioner who were detained within the United States. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 
1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this 
Court’s reasons for taking this position). To reiterate, absent a higher court order holding 
otherwise, this Court finds Petitioner is not an applicant “seeking admission” subject to 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is therefore 
entitled to the process that statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, 
Respondents have not provided any hearing to Petitioner either pre- or post-detention. 
Respondents further offer no substantive opposition to these arguments. (See ECF Nos. 5, 9.) 
The Court accordingly finds Respondents violated Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA. 
B. Fifth Amendment Violation 
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 
individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; 
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to 
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including noncitizens, whether their presence here is 
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (2001). These due 
process rights extend to immigration proceedings, including detention and deportation 
proceedings. Id. at 693–94; see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 
Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 
Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 
 
3 Unless otherwise noted, citations to statute refer to sections of Title 8 of the U.S. Code. 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 5 
 
 
the question remains what process is due.”). 
i. Liberty Interest 
“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
“Even where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person may retain 
a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. 25-CV-
00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025). Liberty interest may be 
strengthened over time. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) 
(noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five 
years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 
The Court finds Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued freedom protected 
by the Due Process Clause. Petitioner was released into the United States and, since that time, he 
has established ties with his community, started a family, pursued immigration relief, and 
maintained gainful employment. Moreover, “the government’s decision to release an individual 
from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty 
‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. 
Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 
482) (modifications in original). Even if he is subject to removal or his freedom could be revoked 
by statute, Petitioner’s liberty is still protected by the Due Process Clause. See Hernandez, 872 
F.3d at 993, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
ii. Procedures Required 
As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three 
factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
First, as explained above, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in his own liberty 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 6 
 
 
that is unquestionably affected by Respondents’ actions detaining him. Despite his interest in 
maintaining his liberty, Petitioner has now been detained for almost three months, separated from 
his family and community, unable to work, without any opportunity to be heard as to his 
detention. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest 
has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD 
(HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly). 
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable. 
Because civil immigration detention is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect,” a “special 
justification” must outweigh Petitioner’s protected liberty interest for his detention to comport 
with due process. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. While “[t]he government has legitimate interests in 
protecting the public and in ensuring that noncitizens in removal proceedings appear for 
hearings,” Petitioner has received virtually no procedural safeguards to ensure any detention is 
reasonably related to those purposes. Hernandez, 872 F.3d 976. Respondents do not argue 
Petitioner is a danger to the public or a flight risk. Petitioner has no criminal history other than 
his pending driving under the influence and reckless driving charges and has established ties to 
his community. Therefore, the risk that he is being detained without proper justification is 
exceedingly high. A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 
(E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). 
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing is low. The effort and cost required to provide Petitioner procedural 
safeguards are minimal. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Notice and custody determination 
hearings are routine processes for Respondents and are indeed the very processes required under 
§ 1226(a). Any burden associated with the provision of these processes does not outweigh 
Petitioner’s substantial liberty interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. 
Upon consideration of the Mathews factors, the Court finds Petitioner was entitled to 
notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to his detention. He received neither. 
Petitioner’s detention thus violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
/// 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 7 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. 
2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 
3. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Jose Antonio S.R. (A# 244-744-
264) from custody. At the time of release, Respondents must return all of Petitioner’s documents 
and possessions. Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this provision of 
the Court’s Order within two (2) court days from the date of this Order. 
4. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-
detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including a minimum of 
seven-days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where (a) 
Respondents show material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of 
Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that the Government’s interest in protecting the public and/or 
ensuring Petitioner appears at future immigration proceedings outweighs Petitioner’s 
constitutionally protected interest in remaining free from detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 
690; Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have 
counsel present. 
5. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order on California City 
Correctional Center. 
6. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this 
case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 9, 2026 
___________________________________ 
TROY L. NUNLEY 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Passage view · GavelSight