govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-1_26-cv-00437-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
GURPREET S.,1 
Petitioner, 
v. 
 
WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 
ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
No. 1:26-cv-00437-TLN-JDP 
(A# 246-748-808) 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Judgment.2 (ECF Nos. 
17, 20.) Respondents filed an opposition. (ECF No. 22.) Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 23.) For 
the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.3 
/// 
/// 
 
1 The Court omits Petitioner’s full name to protect sensitive personal information. See 
Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United 
States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 
2 After his re-detention, Petitioner mailed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus 
containing Petitioner’s handwritten description of the circumstances relating to his re-detention. 
(ECF No. 20.) The Court construes the filing as a document in support of Petitioner’s motion to 
enforce (ECF No. 17), rather than a second successive habeas petition. 
3 On June 5, 2026, this Court issued a minute order granting the motion and ordering 
Petitioner’s immediate release. (ECF No. 26.) This Order sets out the Court’s reasoning. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On February 19, 2026, this Court granted the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 
case after finding Respondents violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights during 
his civil immigration detention. (ECF No. 14.) The Court enjoined Respondents from re-
detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ 
notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder. (Id. at 7–8.) The next day, 
Petitioner was released from detention. (ECF No. 16.) 
Three weeks later, Respondents sought to re-detain Petitioner.4 (See ECF No. 17-1 at 14–
19.) On March 12, 2026, Respondents filed a motion in immigration court to set a bond hearing 
and mailed notice to Petitioner at an incorrect address. (Id.) Respondents listed the correct street 
and city, but the wrong street number (listing 5505 instead of 5655). (Compare id. at 19 (proof of 
service) with id. at 5–10 (proof of address).) The same day, the immigration court mailed notice 
to Petitioner — at the same faulty address — setting the bond hearing for April 2, 2026. (Id. at 
36.) About March 28, 2026, prior to the hearing, the court’s service envelope was returned from 
the U.S. Post Office as “not deliverable as addressed.” (ECF No. 17-1 at 38; ECF No. 22 at 11.) 
The parties appear to agree that error originated in a change of address form dated the day 
of Petitioner’s release. Petitioner contends the form contains scrivener’s error at the hands of an 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) official. (ECF No. 20 at 5; ECF No. 23 at 
2.) Respondents accuse Petitioner of providing the wrong address. (ECF No. 22 at 2.) 
Respondents produced the offending document: the form was sent from ICE to the immigration 
court and it was typed and signed by an ICE deportation officer. (Id. at 8.) 
It is undisputed that Petitioner did not receive actual notice of the hearing date. (See ECF 
No. 17 at 2; ECF No. 22 at 2.) As a result, neither Petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the 
April 2, 2026 bond hearing. (ECF No. 17-1 at 37.) Yet, the immigration judge (“IJ”) proceeded 
with the hearing. (Id. at 36–39.) He did not find Petitioner to be a danger to the community. 
(Id.) However, he did find Petitioner to be a flight risk, reasoning “first and foremost” that the 
 
4 Petitioner is subject to an order of removal, but he appealed and the removal order has 
now been stayed by the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 24.) 

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hearing notice was undeliverable for lack of correct address, and among other factors, he noted 
Petitioner’s failure to appear at the hearing. (Id.) The IJ ruled that Petitioner may be re-detained. 
(Id. at 38.) Thereafter, sometime in April, Respondents re-detained Petitioner. (ECF No. 17-1 at 
2–3). 
Upon learning of the hearing and Petitioner’s resulting arrest, Petitioner’s immigration 
counsel requested a second bond hearing. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) An IJ found that he lacked 
authority to reverse the April 2, 2026 order denying bond. (Id.) Ultimately, Petitioner withdrew 
his request for a second bond hearing and, instead, seeks relief from this Court to enforce its 
judgment. (Id.) 
Through the instant motion, Petitioner alleges Respondents failed to comply with this 
Court’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 14) because they failed to properly notify Petitioner of 
the bond hearing and failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a danger 
to the community or a flight risk. (ECF No. 17 at 3.) Petitioner seeks immediate release and, 
effectively, seeks the same injunction this Court has already made permanent. (See id.; ECF No. 
14 at 7–8.) The Court now considers whether Respondents’ notice complied with procedural due 
process and this Court’s Order to provide a minimum of seven days’ notice in advance of a pre-
deprivation hearing.5 (ECF No. 14 at 7.) 
II. STANDARD 
Federal courts have inherent authority to enforce their own orders, including those 
granting injunctive relief in habeas actions. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court ha[s] authority to review compliance with its earlier order 
conditionally granting habeas relief.”). A district court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its 
injunction under the court’s power of contempt. See Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet 
 
5 Because relief is warranted upon finding notice was deficient, the Court need not reach the 
IJ’s findings, although this Court is troubled by the IJ’s decision to proceed with the bond hearing 
and his apparent presumptions in favor of the Government that Petitioner was at fault for an 
address error without any evidence when it is the Government’s burden to prove Petitioner is a 
flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. See Arizmendi-Medina v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1043, 
1047 (9th Cir. 2023) (finding immigration judges may not proceed in a manner that deprives a 
noncitizen of due process). 

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Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970); Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 716–17 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Enforcement of 
an injunction through contempt proceedings must occur in the issuing jurisdiction because 
contempt is an affront to the court issuing the order.”). 
A motion to enforce judgment is the “usual method” for requesting a court interpret its 
own judgment and compel compliance. California by & through Becerra v. Dep’t of the Interior, 
No. C 17-5948 SBA, 2020 WL 13093994, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (citing Heartland 
Hosp. v. Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2004)). If petitioner has received all relief 
required by the court’s prior judgment, the motion to enforce should be denied. Heartland Hosp., 
328 F. Supp. 2d at 11. But if petitioner demonstrates that respondent “has not complied with a 
judgment entered against it, even if the noncompliance was due to misinterpretation of the 
judgment,” the motion shall be granted. Id. To prevail, the party seeking to enforce the 
injunction has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the enjoined party 
violated a “specific and definite order of the court.” FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 
1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Stone v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 1992)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Court first addresses Respondents’ threshold argument that the instant motion should 
be dismissed on prudential exhaustion grounds, before turning to the merits of whether 
Respondents provided notice of the bond hearing sufficient to comply with this Court’s judgment. 
A. Prudential Exhaustion 
Respondent argues Petitioner’s motion should be dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. (ECF No. 22 at 3–6 (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1159 
(9th Cir. 2011)) (holding a district court should ordinarily dismiss a habeas petition without 
prejudice or stay proceedings until the petitioner exhausts administrative remedies, “unless 
exhaustion is excused.”). Petitioner counters that prudential exhaustion should indeed be 
excused. (ECF No. 23 at 4 (citing Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
S.E.C. v. G.C. George Sec., Inc., 637 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1981) (waiver permissible “where 

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administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies 
would be a futile gesture, [or] irreparable injury will result.”)).) The Court primarily reviews 
Respondents’ actions for contempt with its judgment, rather than wading into the findings of an 
IJ’s adverse ruling which may be appealed, however, to the extent the same issues now before 
this Court could also be litigated through appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Court 
waives prudential exhaustion here. 
“Under the exhaustion doctrine, ‘no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or 
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.’” S.E.C., 637 
F.2d at 688 n.4 (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Co., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938)). 
“Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it 
may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential 
requirement.” Laing, 370 F.3d at 998. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners 
to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 
F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (abrogated on other grounds). However, the Ninth Circuit 
“require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and 
administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Id. 
“Courts may require prudential exhaustion if [:] ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency 
consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 
the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) 
administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the 
need for judicial review.’” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noriega-
Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). Nevertheless, “there are a number of 
exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion, covering situations such as where 
administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies 
would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would 
be void.” S.E.C., 637 F.2d at 688 n.4. 
Here, prudential exhaustion is not required under the Puga factors. 488 F.3d at 815. An 
administrative record is not necessary to resolve the due process questions presented by 

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Petitioner. Waiver of the prudential exhaustion requirement will not encourage the deliberate 
bypass of the administrative scheme in future cases because this is a unique circumstance in 
which Petitioner seeks to enforce a federal court injunction. Further, any risk of deliberate bypass 
of administrative procedures is reduced by the fact that district courts will only have jurisdiction 
in the “rare case[s]” where future petitioners allege a “colorable” constitutional or legal challenge 
to the Government’s procedures. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(citing Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
Even if exhaustion were required, waiver would be appropriate here to avoid further 
irreparable harm to Petitioner and further delay in vindicating his constitutional rights. See, e.g., 
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Petitioner is suffering 
irreparable harm as a result of a second unlawful detention, which would unnecessarily continue 
— likely for months — without waiver of exhaustion. Accordingly, the Court will not deny 
Petitioner’s request for relief for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
B. Notice 
Turning to the merits of Petitioner’s motion, the central dispute is whether Respondents 
provided adequate notice of the bond hearing sufficient to comply with this Court’s injunction 
and procedural due process. In general, the Court’s injunction required Respondents to provide a 
minimum of seven-days’ notice of any bond hearing and constitutional protections, if seeking to 
re-detain Petitioner. (ECF No. 14 at 7.) Petitioner claims Respondents failed to adequately notify 
him of the hearing because notice was mailed to an incorrect address, despite Respondents’ 
knowledge of Petitioner’s correct address — the same address where ICE conducted a home visit 
just days before notice was mailed. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) In opposition, Respondents’ brief does 
not engage with their obligations under this Court’s injunction nor their due process obligations 
(ECF No. 22), but Respondents contend they “should not be faulted” for service of notice to an 
incorrect address on file. (Id. at 3.) The Court first assesses whether notice was constitutionally 
adequate and compliant with this Court’s Order, before considering Respondents’ purported 
excuses for deficient notice. 
Actual Notice: It is undisputed that Respondents failed to provide Petitioner with actual 

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notice of the bond hearing. However, the Court’s injunction did not explicitly require actual 
notice (id. at 7), nor does due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 318 (1950) (notice must be “reasonably calculated” to reach intended recipients). 
Reasonably Calculated Notice: The essential question is whether the Government 
provided notice to Petitioner that was “reasonably calculated” to reach him. See id. In the 
immigration context, “[n]otice by the Government must be reasonably calculated to apprise 
noncitizens of the pendency of removal proceedings and to afford them the opportunity to be 
present and to participate. ‘The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their 
appearance.’” United States v. Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th 978, 989–89 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. 
denied, No. 25-972, 2026 WL 1513330 (U.S. June 1, 2026) (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 
220, 226 (2006); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). Moreover, “[w]here the Government learns that its 
notice efforts have not succeeded, that knowledge triggers an obligation on the Government’s part 
to take additional reasonable steps to effect notice, if it is practicable to do so.” Id. (citing Jones, 
547 U.S. at 234). A finding that notice was reasonably calculated must account for the 
“practicalities and peculiarities of [an individual] case.” Jones, 547 U.S. at 230–31 (quoting 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15). 
Rivera-Valdes is directly on point here. 157 F.4th 978. There, a noncitizen was ordered 
removed in absentia when he did not receive notice of his hearing because the immigration court 
mailed a single notice to the noncitizen’s last known address, but the mailer contained an error 
and the notice was returned as undeliverable. Id. at 982–983. The Ninth Circuit was clear: 
“Notice is not ‘reasonably calculated’ under the circumstances when the Government knows its 
method of service was ineffective and takes no additional steps to effect notice that are reasonably 
available to it.” Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th at 987 (citing Jones, 547 U.S. at 227, 234, 229). 
Here, just like in Rivera-Valdes, the only service of notice attempted on Petitioner that 
identified the hearing date was the notice mailed by the immigration court, which was returned as 
undeliverable prior to the hearing. See id. Thus, Respondents and the court knew that service 
was ineffective and they were required to take additional reasonable steps to effect notice to the 

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extent they were practicable. See id. “[I]it [is] not enough for the Government to throw up its 
hands and do nothing.” Id. at 993. Respondents do not provide any evidence or argument that 
they attempted to send Petitioner notice of the hearing date or otherwise reach Petitioner to notify 
him.6 Rather than take additional steps or seek additional time to notify Petitioner, Respondents 
appear to have used Petitioner’s absence to bolster their argument that Petitioner was a flight risk 
when the bond hearing proceeded without him. 
There were certainly practicable steps the Government could have taken to ensure notice 
was sufficiently provided. To suggest just a few low-burden common-sense ideas: Respondents 
could have verified the mailing address against the address in their file, they might have contacted 
the ICE official who last conducted a home visit, placed a mere phone call to Petitioner or his 
listed contact (sister) or Petitioner’s former immigration counsel.7 There are myriad small efforts 
that Respondents could have, and should have, taken to ensure that notice was reasonably 
effected. Respondents took none. Further, Respondents’ failure to act is particularly stark given 
that, on other occasions, they notified Petitioner of court dates by phone call and directly through 
his SmartLINK Mobile Application.8 (ECF No. 20 at 6.) 
Respondents’ attempt to excuse their deficient notice and shift blame to Petitioner is 
improper and troubling. Without evidence, Respondents accuse Petitioner of providing a false 
 
6 Respondents are not excused because the immigration court mailed notice to the faulty 
address. This Court enjoined Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without certain 
procedural safeguards and it was incumbent upon Respondents to ensure those procedural 
safeguards were in place or otherwise refrain from re-detaining Petitioner. 
7 There is some discussion in Respondents’ brief about the obligations of Petitioner’s 
former immigration counsel to update Petitioner’s address. (ECF No. 22 at 3.) The Court notes 
that there is nothing in this record to show that Petitioner’s former immigration counsel would 
have been made aware of the inaccurate address. Most critically, there is no evidence the court’s 
notice of hearing was ever served on former counsel. (See id. at 9–11.) Rather, Petitioner’s 
family reached out to former immigration counsel to obtain any notices or documents sent to him 
and counsel stated that he had provided all notices received (which did not include a notice of the 
April 2 bond hearing). (See ECF No. 17-1 at 2, 32.) If former counsel was counsel of record at 
the time notice was sent and the Government failed to notify counsel of record, that in itself is 
deeply concerning to this Court. 
8 ICE uses SmartLink as part of their Alternatives to Detention program. See 
https://perma.cc/2YXZ-T8JR. 

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address and chastise him for failing to update his address. (ECF No. 22.) First, a failure to 
comply with a statutory obligation to update an address does not forfeit a right to constitutionally 
sufficient notice. Rivera-Valdes, 547 U.S. at 991 (citing Jones, 547 U.S. at 232). Second, there is 
no support in the record for the contention that Petitioner provided an incorrect address, instead 
the record reflects that ICE had his correct address just days before the notice was sent. 
Respondents point to the change of address form as evidence that Petitioner provided an 
inaccurate address, even if that mattered, it is not what the document reflects — the form was 
filled out and signed by an ICE officer. (See ECF No. 22 at 8.) Respondents provide no further 
explanation or a declaration from any knowledgeable person. Therefore, on the record before the 
Court, there is no evidence that Petitioner provided the wrong address to Respondents, that he 
was even aware of the form, or that he knew of the error. 
Contrary to Respondents’ unsupported accusations, Petitioner makes a compelling 
argument, supported by evidence, that Respondents had his correct address on file at the time 
notice was mailed. Following his February 20, 2026 release from custody, an ICE officer twice 
visited Petitioner at his home.9 (ECF No. 17 at 2.) A declarant attests that she was present and 
witnessed one such home visit a mere five days after Respondents accuse Petitioner of providing 
a false address and Petitioner contemporaneously told her about another visit in March. (ECF No. 
17-1 at 12.) ICE likely has Petitioner’s current address from when he moved into his current 
residence in 2025, where he continues to reside. (ECF No. 23 at 1–2.) In light of the fact that 
ICE officers repeatedly successfully visited him at home, the Court may reasonably infer that the 
last address Petitioner provided to Respondents was his correct address. 
Under the “practicalities and peculiarities” of this case, the single notice of hearing mailed 
by the court and returned as undeliverable prior to the hearing, without any additional reasonable 
steps, was not notice reasonably calculated to reach Petitioner. See Mullane, 39 U.S. at 314, 315, 
318 (1950) (“[P]rocess which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be 
 
9 An ICE officer visited Petitioner on February 24, 2026 and in March 2026, after Petitioner 
had been released from custody but before Respondents served their motion to an incorrect 
address. (ECF No. 17-1 at 12.) 

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such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish 
it.”); Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th at 987 (citing Jones, 547 U.S. at 227, 234, 229). As a result, 
Petitioner was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to be heard as to the deprivation of his 
liberty, for a second time. 
This Court enjoined Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without providing 
constitutionally-adequate notice seven days in advance of a pre-deprivation hearing. Respondents 
did not provide sufficient notice under the Fifth Amendment or this Court’s injunction. Yet, 
contrary to this Court’s injunction, Respondents re-detained Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner has 
met his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents violated this Court’s 
February 19, 2026 injunction. For a second time, within mere months, Respondents have again 
violated Petitioner’s due process rights and deprived him of his liberty in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:10 
1. Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Judgment (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED; 
2. Respondents have been ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner (ECF No. 26); 
3. The Court’s permanent injunction stands. (ECF No. 14.) Respondents are on notice of 
Petitioner’s correct address and his immigration counsel’s address. (See ECF No. 17 at 3.) 
Therefore, Respondents shall update their records accordingly for future notices of 
immigration proceedings; 
4. If Petitioner seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs, he shall file such motion within 
fourteen days of the date of this Order; and 
5. Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 21) is DENIED as moot, as the Court has 
already appointed counsel for Petitioner in this matter (ECF No. 10) and the Federal 
Defender has represented him (ECF No. 11). 
 
10 Respondents request the Court to lift its Order not to transfer Petitioner during the 
pendency of the instant motion. (ECF No. 22 at 2.) However, with the relief granted in this 
Order, that request is now moot. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 9, 2026 
___________________________________ 
TROY L. NUNLEY 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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