govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-1_26-cv-00990-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
BAJINDER S., 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
PAMELA BONDI, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
 
No. 1:26-cv-00990-TLN-JDP 
 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Bajinder S.’s1 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s habeas petition is 
GRANTED. (Id.) 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The instant habeas action arises out of Petitioner’s arrest and detention by immigration 
authorities without notice or a hearing. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a citizen of India who arrived 
in the United States on May 17, 2024, claiming asylum due to alleged persecution in his native 
 
1 The Court omits Petitioner’s full name to protect sensitive personal information. See 
Memorandum re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United 
States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-
suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 

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country.2 (ECF No. 1 at 2.) He was released on his own recognizance by immigration authorities 
on May 20, 2024. (Id.) In his time since release, Petitioner was never arrested and developed 
deep ties to his community. (ECF No. 1 at 14.) On December 10, 2025, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) re-arrested Petitioner when he reported to ICE as instructed. He 
was detained at the California City Corrections Center. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) 
On February 5, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with a 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 
The Court issued a TRO the same day, ordering Petitioner’s immediate release and ordering 
Respondents to show cause why the Court should not grant a writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 6.) 
Respondents submitted what they styled as a Response to Order, Opposition to Injunctive Relief 
and Answer to Habeas Petition (“Response”) on February 11, 2026. (ECF No. 9.) 
II. STANDARD OF LAW 
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 
(citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 
corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 
protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 
district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Petitioner challenges his detention without notice or a hearing as violating his due process 
 
2 These facts are taken from Petitioner’s habeas petition. (ECF No. 1.) Respondents do not 
contest the accuracy of these facts. (See generally ECF No. 9.) 
 

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rights.3 (ECF No. 1 at 12–13.) 
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 
individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 
976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 
the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether 
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These due process rights 
extend to immigration proceedings, including deportation proceedings. Id. at 693–94; see 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 
Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 
Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 
the question remains what process is due.”). 
As to step one, the Court finds Petitioner gained a protected liberty interest in his 
continued freedom when he was released on his own recognizance on May 20, 2024. (ECF No. 1 
at 2.) This release was an “implicit promise” that Petitioner would not be re-detained during the 
pendency of his immigration proceedings if he abided by the terms of his release. See Morrissey, 
408 U.S. at 482. Respondents do not argue that Petitioner violated those terms. (ECF No. 9.) 
Petitioner thus has a clear interest in his continued freedom as he awaits the outcome of his 
immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) 
(noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five 
years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 
 
3 Petitioner also challenges his detention as violating the Immigration and Nationality Act 
and its implementing regulations. (ECF No. 1. at 11.) Because the Court finds Petitioner is 
entitled to relief on the basis of his constitutional claim, the Court need not consider Petitioner’s 
statutory claims. 

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As to step two, the Court has considered the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), and finds that Petitioner was entitled to notice and a hearing to 
determine whether his re-detention was warranted. First, Petitioner has a substantial private 
interest in his own freedom adversely affected by the Government’s actions to detain him. 
Second, the risk of this interest being erroneously deprived is considerable because Petitioner 
received virtually no procedural safeguards to ensure his detention was justified. Third, the 
Government has shown no legitimate interest in Petitioner’s detention absent procedural 
protections, and the cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal. Upon consideration of 
these factors, the Court finds Petitioner was entitled to notice and a hearing to determine whether 
his re-detention was warranted. He received neither. Petitioner’s detention therefore violates due 
process. 
Respondents’ only arguments in opposition to the habeas petition are ones that this Court 
has repeatedly rejected. Respondents argue Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and 
therefore subject to the mandatory detention framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (ECF No. 9 at 
2–3.) The vast majority of courts across this Circuit, including this one, have repeatedly rejected 
Respondents’ argument on the applicability of § 1225(b)(2). See e.g., Hortua v. Chestnut, No. 
1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Estrada-Samayoa 
v. Orestes Cruz, No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB, 2025 WL 3268280, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) 
(collecting cases). “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative 
history of 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a 
category that does not include noncitizens like [Petitioner], living in the interior of the 
country.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). In comparison, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of 
the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the 
relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 
1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and 
practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases). For 

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these reasons, the Court finds Petitioner is not an applicant “seeking admission” subject to 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 
Respondents state that they are “amenable to [the Court] convert[ing] the temporary 
restraining order to a preliminary/permanent injunction if the Court adds clarifying language.” 
(ECF No. 9 at 1.) Respondents request that the Court include the following in its order: 
Respondents are not enjoined and restrained from detaining 
Petitioner in the event that the immigration court issues a final order 
of removal and the Petitioner receives notice of this order. In such 
an event, Respondents may detain Petitioner for the sole and limited 
purpose of executing removal pursuant to the final order of removal. 
(Id. at 2.) 
The Court declines this request as Respondents do not explain why such language is 
necessary. 
Finally, Respondents ask that the Court “hold this matter in abeyance pending the Ninth 
Circuit’s resolution” of the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 
2025). The Court declines to delay disposition of this case due to the possibility that a future 
appellate ruling may change the outcome of one claim. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 
(1997) (“The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to 
control its own docket.”) 
Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner’s detention without notice or a hearing violates 
due process. The Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 
2. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 
Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice and a 
pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where (a) Respondents shows material 
changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence 

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that the government’s interest in protecting the public and/or ensuring Petitioner appears at future 
immigration proceedings outweighs Petitioner’s constitutionally protected interest in remaining 
free from detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990. At any such 
hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 
3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 9, 2026 
 
___________________________________ 
TROY L. NUNLEY 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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