govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-1_26-cv-03773-1

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
WILLIAN NAJERA T.,1 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 
ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
No. 1:26-cv-03773-TLN-CSK 
A# 240-770-954 
 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Willian Najera T.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) (ECF No. 1), Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
(“TRO”) (ECF No. 3), and Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 15). Respondents filed a 
response to the Petition (ECF Nos. 11, 12) and a Motion to Lift No Transfer Order (ECF No. 8). 
For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED. The Motion for TRO, Motion to Lift 
No Transfer Order, and Motion for Extension of Time are DENIED as moot. 
 
1 The Court omits Petitioner’s full name to protect sensitive personal information. See 
Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United 
States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-
suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 2 
 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This matter arises out of Petitioner’s challenge to his civil immigration detention. 
Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection on or around June 7, 
2022. (ECF No. 12-1 at 2.) On June 7, 2022, Petitioner was encountered by Border Patrol agents 
in Hidalgo, Texas. (Id.) Immigration authorities issued Petitioner an I-860 Notice to Appear, 
instituting removal proceedings, and released Petitioner. (Id. at 2.) 
Petitioner subsequently applied for asylum. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner states he has 
lived in this country peacefully, complied with all laws, and worked to provide for his family for 
the last four years. (Id. at 5–6.) Petitioner has no criminal record. (ECF No. 12-1 at 3.) 
Nevertheless, on April 1, 2026, a Florida police officer detained Petitioner during a traffic 
stop and transported him to a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) office. (Id. at 
2; ECF No. 1 at 5–6.) After being transferred into ICE custody, Petitioner asserts he spent “four 
nightmarish days enduring racist insults, beatings, mistreatment, and intimidation to force [him] 
to sign [his] deportation papers. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) 
Petitioner has now been detained for approximately two months without a bond hearing. 
(Id. at 5.) On May 8, 2026, over one month into Petitioner’s detention, an immigration judge 
denied Petitioner’s application for pre-conclusion voluntary departure, pretermitted Petitioner’s 
asylum application, and ordered Petitioner removed to Honduras, and in the alternative 
Nicaragua. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2–3.) Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his civil 
detention. (ECF No. 1.) 
II. STANDARD OF LAW 
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 
(citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 
corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 3 
 
 
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 
protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 
district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Petitioner claims his detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause. (ECF No. 1 at 16–17.) The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation 
of an individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; 
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all 
“persons” within the borders of the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas, 
533 U.S. at 693. These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. 
at 693–94. 
Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 
Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 
the question remains what process is due.”). 
i. Liberty Interest 
As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has a protectable liberty interest. 
“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
“Even where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person may retain 
a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. 25-CV-
00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025). Liberty interest may be 
strengthened over time. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) 
(noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five 
years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 4 
 
 
Petitioner has a clear liberty interest here. Since his release from immigration custody 
four years ago, Petitioner has built a life in the United States with his family. Moreover, “the 
government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon 
which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to 
the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 
2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original); see also Salcedo Aceros v. 
Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (“[A] 
noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 
remaining out of custody.”). Even if he is removable, or his liberty is revocable, his liberty is still 
protected by due process. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
Respondents argue Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(2) because an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed on May 8, 2026, and the 
order is final because Petitioner waived appeal. (ECF No. 11 at 2–3.) Section 1231(a)(2) 
mandates detention of noncitizens with final orders of removal during the removal period (the 
ninety days following the date the order becomes administratively final). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 
However, ICE detained Petitioner on April 1, 2026 — 37 days before an immigration judge 
issued an order of removal. Thus, § 1231 does not provide sufficient authority for Petitioner’s re-
detention.2 
Moreover, a final order of removal for Petitioner does not alter this Court’s finding, while 
the order may diminish Petitioner’s liberty interest, it does not defeat it. Petitioner’s 
constitutional claim does not evaporate with a shifting statutory basis for detention authority. See 
 
2 Rather, the vast majority of courts across this Circuit, including this one, have found 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to noncitizens like Petitioner who reside in the United States after the 
government releases them. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 
WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this Court’s reasons for taking this 
position and collecting cases); Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 
2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). For these reasons, and consistent 
with this Court’s numerous prior rulings, the Court finds Petitioner’s initial detention was 
governed by § 1226(a) from April 1, 2026 to at least May 8, 2026. Therefore, Petitioner was 
entitled to the process required by § 1226(a) in that 37 days, including a custody or bond hearing, 
at minimum. 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 5 
 
 
Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01206-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2996577, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (A “change in the applicable statutory authority [for detention] does not 
render moot petitioner’s due process claim”); Doe v. Becerra, 697 F. Supp. 3d 937, 943 (N.D. 
Cal. 2023) (“[J]ust as the “shall” in [§] 1226 gives way to as-applied due process challenges, so 
too must the ‘shall’ in [§] 1231(a)” (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 526 (2003)); Nielsen v. 
Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019)); Hernandez Gomez v. Becerra, No. 23-cv-01330-WHO, 2023 WL 
2802230, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2023))). “Petitioner’s rights are not limited to those laid out by 
statute.” Mohammed v. Warden of California City Det. Ctr., No. 1:26-CV-00118-DJC-CSK, 
2026 WL 192368, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (citing Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 420 
(2019)); see also Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Bd. of 
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987)) (“Governmental actions may create a liberty interest 
entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause.”). With a clear liberty interest, the Court 
next turns to the procedural safeguards that were owed to Petitioner. 
ii. Procedures Required 
As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three 
factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
First, as explained above, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in his own liberty 
that is unquestionably affected by Respondents’ actions detaining him. The four years that 
Petitioner spent at liberty underscores the gravity of its loss. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 
1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“The lengthy duration of his conditional release as well as the 
meaningful connections Petitioner seems to have made with his community during that time 
create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued liberty.”). Despite his interest in 
maintaining his liberty, Petitioner has now been detained for over two months without any 
opportunity to be heard as to the justification of his detention. Accordingly, this factor weighs in 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 6 
 
 
favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez 
v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 
2025) (finding similarly). 
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received 
any process as to his detention, either pre- or post-detention. Because civil immigration detention 
is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect,” a “special justification” must outweigh Petitioner’s 
protected liberty interest in order for detention to comport with due process. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 
at 690. Where removal is not imminent under a final order of removal, “[t]he government has no 
legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the 
community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured 
by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994. Here, at the time of his 
arrest, and at least the first month of his detention, Petitioner was not subject to a final order of 
removal. Additionally, Respondents own records show Petitioner has no criminal history (ECF 
No. 12-1 at 3), nor do Respondents contend that Petitioner is a danger to the public or a flight 
risk. Without any showing by Respondents of a legitimate interest to detain Petitioner prior to 
any order of removal, the Court finds there is a serious likelihood Petitioner was erroneously 
deprived of his liberty interest. 
Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 
Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884-
TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Notice and custody determination 
hearings are routine processes for Respondents and are indeed the very processes required under 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time to provide notice and a 
hearing would have been minimal. Any burden associated with the provision of these processes 
does not outweigh Petitioner’s liberty interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. 
The Court finds that, under these circumstances, Respondents were required to provide 
notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The United States Supreme Court “usually has held that the 
Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or 
property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). The Court 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 7 
 
 
describes post-deprivation remedies as the “special case” where those are “the only remedies the 
State could be expected to provide.” Id. at 129. Respondents have not provided any substantive 
opposition to the contrary, nor do they argue that Petitioner should be a “special case.” (See 
generally ECF Nos. 8, 11.) Yet, Petitioner was not provided notice or a pre-deprivation hearing. 
Nor was he provided a post-deprivation hearing as to his custody. Thus, Respondents violated the 
Fifth Amendment and Petitioner’s procedural due process rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Respondents detained Petitioner in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 
2. Petitioner’s Motion for TRO (ECF No. 3), Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time 
(ECF No. 15), and Respondents’ Motion to Lift No Transfer Order (ECF No. 8) are 
DENIED as moot. 
3. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Willian Najera T. (A# 240-
770-954) from custody under the same conditions he was released prior to his current 
detention. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on him, unless such 
restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. At 
the time of release, Respondents must provide a copy of this Order to Petitioner and 
return all of Petitioner’s documents and possessions. 
4. Respondents must file a notice of compliance with this Order by June 11, 2026. 
5. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with 
constitutional protections, including a minimum of seven-days’ notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show material 
changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that the government’s interest in protecting the public or ensuring Petitioner 
appears at future immigration proceedings outweighs his constitutionally protected 
interest in remaining free from detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Hernandez, 872 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 8 
 
 
F.3d at 990. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 
6. The Clerk is directed to serve the Golden State Annex with a copy of this Order. 
7. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this case. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 9, 2026 
 
 
___________________________________ 
TROY L. NUNLEY 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Passage view · GavelSight