govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-2_25-cr-00038-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
at Covington 
             
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
GREGORY KIMBLE, 
 
 Defendant. 
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Criminal Action No. 2:25-cr-00038-SCM 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER   
  
 
 
 
 
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On May 6, 2026, this Court denied Defendant Gregory Kimble’s Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea.  [Dkt. 76].  On June 5, 2026, the Defendant  filed a second 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea .  [Dkt. 84].  The Court denies this latter Motion as 
well for all the following reasons and any others discussed by the Court on the record 
during the June 9, 2026 hearing. 
The Defendant must show a “fair and just reason for requesting the 
withdrawal” of the guilty plea.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).  Rule 11(d) allows for a 
“hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone,” but 
it does not permit a defendant “to make a tactical decision to enter a plea, wait several 
weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes that he made a bad choice in 
pleading guilty.”  United States v. Carson , 32 F.4th 615, 623 –24 (6th Cir. 2022)  
(quoting United States v. Dixon, 479 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2007)).   
Whether a defendant satisfies the fair -and-just-reason standard turns on the 
totality of the circumstances, which courts evaluate using seven factors:   (1) the 
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amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it; (2) the 
presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier 
in the proceedings; (3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his 
innocence; (4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the 
defendant’s nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had 
prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the 
government if the motion to withdraw is granted.  United States v. Troutman, No. 24-
3721, 2025 WL 1144936, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025) (quoting United States v. 
Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994), superseded on other grounds by 
Guidelines Amendment as recognized in United States v. Caseslorente, 220 F.3d 727, 
734 (6th Cir. 2000)).  As the Court explained on the record before proceeding with the 
June 9, 2026 sentencing hearing  in this case , every Bashara factor weighs against 
the Defendant. 
First, the amount of time that passed still weighs against the Defendant.  Over 
60 days passed between the Defendant’s guilty plea and his first motion to withdraw.  
[Dkt. 76 at 7].   Even more time—almost a month —passed between when the Court  
denied the Defendant’s first motion  to withdraw his guilty plea  and when the 
Defendant filed his second motion.  The Sixth Circuit has said that periods as short 
as 35 days weigh against withdrawal.   See, e.g. , United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 
236, 239 (6th Cir. 1987) (35 days); see also United States v. Carson, 32 F.4th 615, 624 
(6th Cir. 2022) (59 days).  The first factor still weighs against permitting withdrawal. 
Second, the Defendant has not offered a valid explanation for why he  did not 
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move sooner.  The Defendant now argues that he was  affected by temporary 
depression because of this case and that he was not able to access the law library due 
to a jail policy because he was previously represented by counsel.  [See Dkt. 84 at 1–
2].  These proffered reasons appear to  conflict with the Defendant’s prior sworn 
testimony.  But even taken as true, they do not constitute valid explanations for the 
Defendant’s two months of inaction.  At  the Defendant’s rearraignment, the Court 
discussed both the Defendant’s option to withdraw his  plea and the difficulty of 
moving to withdraw with the Defendant.  The Defendant thus knew withdrawing was 
a possibility when he pled guilty, and he could have sought to withdraw his plea much 
sooner if he believed he was innocent.  He did not.  The lack of a “valid excuse for his 
delay” weighs against the Defendant.  United States v. Catchings, 708 F.3d 710, 718 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
Third, the Defendant has not consistently maintained his innocence.  In fact, 
he has at multiple points testified that he committed the acts of which he is accused 
and is guilty .  The Defendant now argues that he is innocent  of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm—despite admitting under oath to committing the elements of 
the offense—based on  what he referred to as a “technicality” (i.e., a proposed necessity 
affirmative defense that the Defendant never developed  and of which there is scant 
supporting evidence in the record).   In light of the Defendant’s multiple statements 
under oath that clearly acknowledge guilt upon questioning by this Court, the Court 
concludes that he has not consistently maintained his innocence.  See Dixon, 479 F.3d 
at 437 (ambiguous assertions of innocence are a “far cry from the ‘vigorous and 
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repeated protestations of innocence’ that would support a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea.’” (quoting United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir. 1996))).  This factor 
weighs against the Defendant. 
Fourth, the circumstances underlying the Defendant’s plea weigh against him.  
This Court advised the Defendant of his constitutional rights at his rearraignment.  
The Defendant testified he was  entering his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.  
The Defendant specifically denied that he  was being affected by any depression or 
anxiety and reported that he was treated for those issues while incarcerated.  The 
Defendant testified that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation and that 
he was not being forced or coerced into pleading guilty.  In short, the Defendant knew 
what he was doing when he pled guilty and understood the consequences of that act.  
The Defendant now contends that, based on his now-discharged counsel’s advice, he 
felt like he had no other good option  besides pleading guilty.  But nothing to which 
the Defendant has credibly testified establishes that the advice the Defendant  
received in this regard fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal matters .  Attorneys are allowed —and in some cases required —to advise 
their clients that it is in their interests to plead guilty based on the evidence against 
them.  That appears to be what happened here.   There is no indication that the 
Defendant was misled about the consequences of pleading guilty or that he otherwise 
could not understand what he was doing and its implications.  Because “[t]he record 
indicates that [the Defendant] understood what he was doing and the constitutional 
rights he was waiving when” he pled guilty, “[ t]he circumstances surrounding the 
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entry of the guilty plea, therefore, support . . . denial of the motion to withdraw the 
plea.”  United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2006). 
Fifth, the Defendant’s nature and background weigh against withdrawal.  The 
Defendant has a GED and took some college classes .  He testified that he has no 
significant physical or mental issues that would impair his ability to reason.   The 
Court has observed the Defendant in the courtroom several times , and he is clearly 
intelligent, articulate, and capable of understanding the consequences of his 
actions—including entering a guilty plea.  The Defendant has never claimed that his 
ability to understand the proceedings in this case was impaired.  As a matter of fact, 
the Defendant credibly testified multiple times that he knew what he was doing when 
he pled guilty.  The Court understands that the Defendant now says he feels like he 
was “coaxed” into pleading guilty by his counsel.  [Dkt. 84 at 3].  But that is irrelevant 
to the Defendant’s nature and background.  The Defendant  was capable of 
understanding the consequences of his  guilty plea and testified that he did, in fact, 
understand those consequences.  This  supports denial of the Defendant’s motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  See Ellis, 470 F.3d at 285. 
Sixth, the Defendant  has substantial experience with the criminal justice 
system.  The Defendant acknowledged under oath that he had serious prior criminal 
charges and that he is a convicted felon.  The question is not whether the Defendant 
has broad knowledge of the law , as he argues, [Dkt. 84 at 4] —it  is whether the 
Defendant generally understands the criminal justice system.  B ased on his prior 
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experience with the criminal justice system , the Defendant certainly does .1  That 
weighs against withdrawal.  Dixon, 479 F.3d at 437; Troutman, 2025 WL 1144936, at 
*2.   
Finally, the Court considers the potential prejudice to the Government if the 
Defendant’s guilty plea is withdrawn.  Because the first six factors “uniformly weigh 
against” the Defendant, the Court need not address this factor.  United States v. 
Lewis, 800 F. App’x 353, 360 (6th Cir. 2020).  However, i n the interest  of 
completeness, the Court notes that this factor also weighs against the Defendant —
albeit not so much as the preceding six factors.  Several m onths have passed since 
the Defendant’s rearraignme nt and guilty plea, which no doubt  impacts the 
availability of witnesses and the Government’s preparedness for trial.  The Court 
concludes the Government would be mildly prejudiced by needing to expend time and 
resources to prepare for trial once again. 
In sum, all seven Bashara factors weigh against the Defendant.  Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11’s provision for withdrawal of guilty pleas is designed “to 
allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone, 
not to allow a defendant to make a ta ctical decision to enter a plea, wait several 
weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes he made a bad choice in pleading 
guilty.”  Ellis, 470 F.3d at 280–81 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 
 
1 The Defendant’s allegation that the criminal justice system in northern Kentucky 
is “corrupt[]” and “discriminat[ory],” [Dkt. 84 at 4], has no relevance to this factor. 
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1004 (6th Cir. 1991)).  Having considered the Bashara factors and Rule 11’s purpose, 
the Court concludes the Defendant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Accordingly, for these reasons and a ny other reasons discussed by the Court 
on the record during the June 9, 2026  hearing, and the Court being sufficiently 
advised, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1) The Defendant ’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, [Dkt. 84], is 
DENIED. 
 Signed this 10th day of June, 2026.  
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