govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-01696-1

Adrian Jawaun Johnson 
Johnson & Associates, PC 
1 Tower Center Blvd., Suite 1510 
East Brunswick, NJ 08816 
Counsel for Plaintiff Robert A. Baker, Jr. 
 
Scott W. Parker 
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLP 
270 Davidson Ave., 5th Floor 
Somerset, NJ 08873 
Counsel for Defendant Central Loan Administration & Reporting FSB 
 
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
 
Re: Baker v. Central Loan Administration & Reporting FSB, et al. 
 Civil Action No. 25-1696 (SDW) (SDA) 
 
Counsel: 
 
 Before this Court is Defendant
1 Central Loan Administration & Reporting FSB’s 
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 19 (“Motion”)) the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff 
Robert A. Baker (D.E. 15 (“AC”)) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). 
For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED and the Amended Complaint is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
 
BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In September 2023, Plaintiff received a foreclosure notice from Defendant, a mortgage 
servicer, stating that he was six months delinquent on his mortgage. (AC ¶¶ 8, 47.) Plaintiff 
attempted to resolve the issue by providing bank statements showing the payment had been made 
and withdrawn from his account, but Defendant deemed that documentation insufficient and 
continued the foreclosure process. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) On September 19, 2023, Plaintiff was approved 
 
1 Two named Defendants, Ansetti & Associates, LLC and Vincent M. Ansetti, Esq., have not been served. 
Pursuant to this Court’s previous Opinion in this matter dated September 16, 2025 (D.E. 13) , those 
Defendants are now dismissed with prejudice. 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
 
CHAMBERS OF 
SUSAN D. WIGENTON 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
June 10, 2026 
 
MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE 
50 WALNUT ST. 
NEWARK, NJ 07101 
973-645-5903 PageID:
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for assistance from the New Jersey Emergency Rescue Mortgage Assistance Program —the grant 
was applied to his account and temporarily halted the foreclosure proceedings. (Id. ¶ 19.) 
 
In January 2024, Plaintiff enrolled in an auto-pay arrangement with Defendant. (Id. ¶ 22.) 
The arrangement worked for January and February 2024, but Defendant reversed the March 2024 
payment for insufficient funds, even though Plaintiff confirmed sufficient funds were available at 
the time of the attempted withdrawal. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff submitted his 
payment by cashier’s check at an additional fee . ( Id. ¶ 25.) As the auto -pay issues persisted, 
Defendant placed a restriction on Plaintif’s account and required that payments be made only by 
bank check or cashier’s check. ( Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff participated in a 
conference call with Defendant and provided bank statements reflecting a positive balance. (Id. ¶ 
28.) Defendant nevertheless maintained the payment restriction and did not reinstate Plaintiff’s 
preferred method of automatic payment. ( Id.) On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff mailed a letter via 
certified mail identifying himself and his account number, asserting that the account was in error 
due to improper payment reversals, requesting all documents supporting those reversals and a 
complete payment history since the September 2023 grant, and demanding that Defendant remove 
the payment restriction. (Id. ¶ 29.) 
 
Based on these events, Plaintiff asserts three claims
2 against Defendant : (1) violation of 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., based on alleged 
misrepresentations regarding the reason for the payment reversals and the use of unfair and 
unconscionable means of collecting a debt; (2) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, based on Defendant’s alleged failure to timely and adequately 
respond to his inquiry; and (3) negligence, based on the theory that Defendant owed a duty of care 
in managing Plaintiff’s mortgage account and breached that duty by reversing payments without 
valid reasons, imposing unjustified restrictions on payment methods, and failing to provide proper 
account verification. (See AC ¶¶ 37–51; 63–67.) 
 
On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint. On September 16, 2025, this Court 
granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in its entirety, with leave to amend. ( See D.E. 13.) This 
Court dismissed the Complaint because: (1) the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss 
doctrine; (2) the FDCPA claim was time -barred and failed to plead specific statutory violations; 
and (3) the RESPA claim did not identify which provision of the statute was violated or sufficiently 
allege that Plaintiff had submitted a valid Qualified Written Request. (See id. at 2–4.) On October 
16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint and Defendant again moved to dismiss. ( See 
D.E. 15, 19.) Timely briefing ensued
3. (See D.E. 20–21.) 
LEGAL STANDARD 
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 
 
2 Counts III and VI were not asserted against Defendant. 
3 Plaintiff filed his Opposition on December 14, 2025, thirteen days after the deadline, without seeking 
leave to file late. (See D.E. 20.) PageID:
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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 
Determining whether allegations are plausible is “a context -specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff,” and determine “whether [the] 
plaintiff may be ent itled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. 
Belichik, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed for failing 
to show “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2)). “[L]abels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” 
are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. FDCPA 
 
The FDCPA applies only to entities that qualify as “debt collectors”. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
The statute limits that term to entities “whose principal purpose is the collection of any debts, and 
those who regularly collect debts owed another . . .”, meaning that their primary business is 
obtaining payments on debts it acquires. Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC , 898 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir. 
2018); Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2019). A bare assertion that a 
defendant is a debt collector is insufficient to confer liability under the FDCPA. Poltrock v. NJ 
Auto. Accts. Mgmt. Co., No. 08-1999, 2008 WL 5416396, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2008); Challenger 
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 06-5263, 2007 WL 895774, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2007). 
 
Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to support a plausible inference that Defendant is a debt 
collector. The Amended Complaint merely recites the statutory definition, alleging that Defendant 
“regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”, 
without any additional factual allegations. (AC ¶ 39.) 
 
In any event, mortgage servicers like Defendant are generally not considered “debt 
collectors” under the FDCPA if they acquired the loans before default. Tutanji v. Bank of Am., 
No. 12-887, 2012 WL 1964507, at *3 (D.N.J. May 31, 2012) ; Whittingham v. Amended Mortg. 
Elec. Registration Servs., Inc., No. 06- 3016, 2007 WL 1456196, at *7 (D.N.J. May 15, 2007) . 
Here, Plaintiff’s own allegations confirm that Defendant had his mortgage before it went into 
default, as he received a foreclosure notice from Defendant stating he was six months behind on 
mortgage payments. (AC ¶ 8.) Accordingly, Defendant is not a debt collector and the FDCPA is 
inapplicable, even if Plaintiff had otherwise pleaded sufficient facts. 
 
B. RESPA 
 
To state a claim under RESPA § 2605(e), a plaintiff must allege: (1) the submission of a 
qualified written request (“QWR”) by a borrower to a loan servicer ; (2) a failure by the loan 
servicer to timely respond; and (3) actual or statutory damages. Rhodes v. Marix Servicing, LLC, PageID:
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302 F. Supp. 3d 656, 662 (D.N.J. 2018) (quoting Davis v. Deutsche Bank Nat ’l Tr. Co., No. CV 
16-5382, 2017 WL 6336473, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2017)); Bukowski v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
757 F. App’x 124, 128 (3d Cir. 2018). The statute requires that the plaintiff’s damages accrued as 
a result of the defendant’s failure to comply with the statute. Block v. Seneca Mortg. Servicing, 
221 F. Supp. 3d 559, 592 (D.N.J. 2016) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A)). 
 
Here, Plaintiff’s RESPA claim fails because the Amended Complaint lacks any facts 
showing that he is entitled to either actual or statutory damages. Plaintiff alleges actual damages 
in the form of fees incurred to obtain cashier’s checks while the payment restriction was in place, 
emotional distress, and the costs and attorney’s fees of prosecuting this action. (AC at 9 –10.) 
However, Plaintiff does not allege that he actually paid any amount that he was not already 
obligated to pay as a result of Defendant’s failure to respond to his QWR. (See id. ¶¶ 50–51.) Nor 
does he plausibly allege that the cashier’s check fees were caused by any failure to respond: he 
alleges he began incurring those fees with his March 2024 mortgage payment, which was before 
the April 11, 2024 QWR and before Defendant’s response deadline. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 28–30.) Plaintiff’s 
conclusory allegations of emotional distress likewise do not suffice to plead actual damages. See 
Schmidt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 17-01708, 2019 WL 4943756, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2019). 
Lastly, Plaintiff cannot satisfy RESPA’s actual damages requirement through litigation costs or 
attorney’s fees. Crist v. Cenlar FSB, No. 23-3448, 2025 WL 296013, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2025) 
(quoting Davis, 2017 WL 6336473, at *8)); Giordano v. MGC Mortg., Inc, 160 F. Supp. 3d 778, 
783 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 
Plaintiff’s claim for statutory damages also fails. RESPA permits statutory damages only 
upon a showing of a “pattern or practice of noncompliance”. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(B). Plaintiff 
alleges no facts supporting any pattern or practice of noncompliance, so statutory damages are 
unavailable, and the claim must be dismissed. 
 
C. Negligence 
 
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence claim because it is barred by the 
economic loss doctrine. (D.E. 13 at 3–4.) Plaintiff reasserted the same claim in the Amended 
Complaint without curing the defect, so the negligence claim is dismissed again. (AC ¶¶ 63–67.) 
 
D. Leave to Amend 
 
Although courts are instructed to “freely give leave” to amend pleadings, they may deny a 
motion to amend when amendment would be futile, or if the amended complaint would not survive 
a motion to dismiss. Winer Fam. Tr. v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 330 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 
Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 153 (3d Cir. 2004) ); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 
(3d Cir. 2000). Here, any further attempt to amend Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint would be futile 
because Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support any of the three claims. (See generally 
AC.) Accordingly, this case is dismissed with prejudice. PageID:
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant ’s Motion is GRANTED, and the Amended 
Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This case shall remain closed. An appropriate 
order follows. 
 
___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton___ 
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J. 
 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Stacey D. Adams, U.S.M.J. 
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