govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_26-cv-05810-0

1 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
 
ALISA LOVE, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
SUPERIOR COURT OF ESSEX 
COUNTY, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 26-5810 (SDW) (AME) 
 
 
WHEREAS OPINION & ORDER 
 
 
June 10, 2026 
 
WIGENTON, District Judge. 
THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Plaintiff Alisa Love’s (“Plaintiff”) 
filing of a Complaint (D.E. 1) and an application to proceed in forma pauperis , (D.E. 1-2 (“IFP 
application”)), and this Court having sua sponte reviewed the Complaint for sufficiency pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a); and 
WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without 
paying the filing fee —that is, in forma pauperis —so long as the plaintiff submits an affidavit 
demonstrating she is “unable to pay such fees,” but must dismiss a case that is frivolous, “fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1), (e)(2)(B); and 
WHEREAS here, Plaintiff’s IFP application shows that her income far exceeds her total 
monthly expenses, rendering her ineligible for IFP status. (Compare D.E. 1-2 at 1–2 (total monthly 
income exceeding $16,000), with D.E. 1-2 at 4–5 (monthly expenses totaling $1,357)); and PageID:
<pageID>
2 
 
WHEREAS pursuant to Rule 8(a), “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief 
sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The complaint must apprise the defendant with “fair notice of what 
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” containing “more than labels and conclusions.” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957)). P ro se complaints, although “[held] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), must still “state a plausible 
claim for relief,” Yoder v. Wells Fargo Bank , 566 F. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013)); and 
WHEREAS “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that 
power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts “are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on 
their own initiative.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017) (citing 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011)). “Although courts hold 
pleadings drafted by pro se litigants to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, pro 
se litigants still bear ‘the burden of showing that the case is properly before the court at all stages 
of the litigation.’” Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, No. 14-6388, 2015 WL 758680, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Phillip v. Atl. City Med. Ctr. , 861 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (D.N.J. 2012)); 
and 
WHEREAS under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction 
over suits that are essentially appeals from state -court judgments.” Great W. Mining & Min. Co. 
v. Fox Rothschild LLP , 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). For the Rooker -Feldman doctrine to PageID:
<pageID>
3 
 
apply, the following four requirements must be met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; 
(2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state -court judgments’; (3) those 
judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the 
district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Id. at 166 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); and 
WHEREAS Plaintiff complains of conduct related t o or involving August 2012 
foreclosure proceedings before the New Jersey Superior Court of Essex County involving her 
home. This Court has previously encountered— and dismissed—the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s 
Complaint. (See Docket No. 15- cv-2961, D.E. 3 (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 
state a claim where her time to appeal “any decision that issued in 2012” had expired, among other 
grounds); see also Docket No. 16-cv-3360, D.E. 6 (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint because they 
had been resolved in state court in or around 2012 and alternatively, for lack of jurisdiction and 
because the statute of limitations had run)); and 
WHEREAS in this instance, Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the state court’s May 
11, 2026 decision denying Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the state court matter . (D.E. 1- 4 at 1.) 
Plaintiff goes as far as characterizing this matter as an appeal of the state court’s May 11, 2026 
decision. (Id.) This Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as seeking recourse from the state court 
proceeding; this, however, is not the appropriate forum to raise these claims. See Nest v. Nationstar 
Mortg., No. 16- 4282, 2016 WL 4541871, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2016) (“The Third Circuit has 
specifically held that the Rooker -Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from providing relief that 
would invalidate a state court foreclosure decision.”). Finding that the elements of the Rooker -
Feldman doctrine apply, this Court concludes it lacks subject -matter jurisdiction over the instant 
matter; therefore PageID:
<pageID>
4 
 
IT IS, on this 10th day of June 2026, 
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED; 
and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 ___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____ 
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J. 
 
 
 
 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Parties 
 Andre M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J. PageID:
<pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight