govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00107-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
RONNIE GULLY, JR., #B88170, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
 vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-00107-SMY 
 ) 
LATOYA HUGHES, LT. DALLAS, ) 
LT. BRANDT, MAJOR DESMOND, ) 
JACOB SCHULTZ, ) 
PAIGE S. (Behavioral Health Tech.), ) 
CHELSEA RAPENSBURG, ) 
NICOLSON (Mental Health Professional), ) 
JANE DOE 1 (Mental Health Director), and ) 
ANTHONY WILLS, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
YANDLE, Chief Judge: 
 Plaintiff Ronnie Gully, Jr., an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) 
currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center , filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. He claims he was confined in 
unsanitary conditions and denied mental health treatment (Doc. 1). He seeks monetary damages 
and injunctive relief. Id. 
 This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious 
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, 
fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be 
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Also pending is Plaintiff’s motion for an emergency temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction (Doc. 2). Page ID
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The Complaint 
 Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Between May 2025 
and October 2025, Plaintiff was held in Cell 817 in Menard’s North Two Segregation. The cell 
was contaminated with black mold, peeling paint , and rusted metal (Doc. 1, p. 4) . Inmates 
regularly threw feces and flooded the gallery with toilet water. In August 2025, Plaintiff broke 
out in rashes and hives that went untreated for a long period (Doc. 1, p. 6). Other inmates’ yelling 
and banging aggravated his mental health conditions, as did the lack of access to religious services. 
Plaintiff was not given enough showers or razors from January to November 2025 (Doc. 1, pp. 6-
7). Defendant Brandt denied Plaintiff’s request to go to the barber while he was in restrictive 
housing, and he was unable to obtain hair care products or trimmers (Doc. 1, p. 7). Yard time was 
frequently cancelled. The prison smelled like spoiled milk and sewage, and summer temperatures 
reached 120 degrees in the cells. Plaintiff complained about the segregation conditions in many 
letters to Defendant Hughes, which she forwarded to Defendant Dallas (Internal Affairs), but 
nothing was done (Doc. 1, p. 7). 
Defendant Wills failed to provide a clean, healthy living environment at Menard, despite 
having federal funding to provide heat in winter, hot running water, address the infestation of 
roaches, mice, and spiders, provide properly cooked and nutritious food, and provide adequate 
medical care (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 7-8). The insufficient protein in prison meals caused Plaintiff’s weight 
to fall from 300 to 239 pounds (Doc. 1, p. 4). 
 For ten months,
1 mental health provider Defendants Ms. Paige S. and Rapensburg denied 
Plaintiff group and individual therapy for his PTSD, ASPD, bipolar disorder, depression, and 
anxiety. Plaintiff informed Defendant Nicolson, a mental health professional, of his needs via 
 
1 Plaintiff does not give the dates of this ten -month period when he could not access mental health services, but at 
least some of this time was during his confinement in segregation (Doc. 1, p. 5). Page ID
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crisis calls and several intakes. Nicolson made a treatment plan without evaluating or interviewing 
Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p. 5). Defendant Desmond was part of the treatment team and failed to “run 
group” and provide security, thus Plaintiff was unable to be involved in a mental health 
program/group. Id. 
 While Plaintiff was in the East Cell House, he was denied ADA -equipped showers (Doc. 
1, pp. 5-6). Menard does not offer any college, trade education, or rehabilitation programs (Doc. 
1, p. 6). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and a transfer out of Menard (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 2). 
 Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in this 
pro se action: 
Count 1: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against 
Wills, Hughes, Dallas, Schultz, and Brandt, for confining Plaintiff 
in unsanitary and unhealthy conditions in Menard’s North Two 
Segregation Cell 817 from May 2025 through October 2025. 
 
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious mental health 
needs claim against Paige S., Rapensburg, Nicolson and Desmond 
for denying Plaintiff mental health services for ten months. 
 
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be 
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading 
standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is 
plausible on its face.”). 
Preliminary Dismissals 
 Plaintiff includes the Jane Doe 1 Menard Mental Health Director (misidentified as “John” 
Doe 1 on the docket sheet. Doc. 1, pp. 1, 3) as a defendant but fails to mention this individual in 
his statement of claim and does not describe what she allegedly did to violate his constitutional 
rights. Merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against Page ID
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that individual. See Collins v. Kibort , 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) . Instead, a plaintiff is 
required to associate specific defendants with specific facts and claims so defendants are put on 
notice of the claims brought against them and can properly answer the complaint. See Hoskins v. 
Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003). Because Plaintiff has not stated a viable claim against 
Jane Doe 1, she will be dismissed from the case without prejudice. 
Discussion 
Count 1 
Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food, medical care, 
sanitation, or physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 346- 47 (1981) . To state an Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement, Plaintiff must plead facts suggesting he was denied “the minimal civilized measure 
of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to his health or safety . Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). He must also sufficientl y plead that the defendant exhibited deliberate 
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, despite the defendant’s knowledge 
of the conditions. Farmer , 511 U.S. at 837, 842. For a defendant to be personally liable under 
§ 1983, the individual “must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper 
v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). 
Plaintiff describes an objectively serious deprivation in the Complaint; an approximate six-
month period in a cell contaminated with black mold, vermin, and human waste, with no hot water. 
He allegedly developed skin and respiratory conditions and his mental health suffered. He claims 
the cell was not adequately heated or cooled and that he did not receive adequate nutrition. The 
combination of these conditions may amount to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s physical and mental 
health. See Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013). Page ID
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Plaintiff alleges Wills is responsible for the unconstitutional cell conditions because he is 
in charge of managing the prison. However, Wills cannot be held liable in a § 1983 civil rights 
case based on his supervisory position as warden. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 
(7th Cir. 2001). 
Plaintiff alleges Hughes, Wills, and Lt. Dallas “spoke to [him] formally and informally” 
about his many claims of cruel and unusual punishment (Doc. 1, p. 8). If Plaintiff’s conversations 
with these defendants informed them of the conditions in Cell 817 during May 2025 through 
October 2025 and they took no steps to mitigate the risks to Plaintiff’s health, they may be found 
liable under Eighth Amendment standards. 
Defendants Brandt and Schultz , however, will be dismissed from this claim. Plaintiff 
alleges only that Brandt refused him permission to visit the barber, which does not amount to a 
constitutional violation. Plaintiff does not include any factual allegations regarding Schultz. His 
only mention of Schultz is that he subjected Plaintiff to “a vast array of cruel, evil, and malicious 
conditions.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). 
Count 1 will proceed only against Hughes, Wills, and Dallas. 
Count 2 
 Prison officials and medical/mental health staff violate the Eight h Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a 
prisoner’s serious medical or mental health needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 
2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must plead facts suggesting that (1) he suffered from an 
objectively serious medical or mental health condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate 
indifference to his medical/mental health needs. Id. 
 Plaintiff alleges he personally informed defendant mental health providers Ms. Paige S., Page ID
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Chelsea Rapensburg, and Ms. Nicolson that he needed mental health treatment for PTSD, ASPD, 
bipolar disorder, depression, and extreme anxiety conditions and that they failed to provide him 
with any individual or group mental health therapy sessions for a ten -month period. These 
allegations are sufficient to state a claim in Count 2 for deliberate indifference against these three 
mental health providers. Plaintiff also adequately states a claim against Major Desmond, who 
allegedly interfered with his access to mental health groups/programs. 
Count 2 will proceed against Desmond, Paige S., Rapensburg, and Nicolson. 
Injunctive Relief 
 Because t he Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief , the current Warden of 
Menard Correctional Center, in his/her official capacity, will be added to the docket regarding the 
request for injunctive relief . See Gonzales v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible for 
ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out). 
Plaintiff requests a TRO and Preliminary Injunction, ordering defendants to transfer him 
away from Menard to escape the unconstitutional conditions (Doc. 2). He asserts he is currently 
housed in the North Two Restricted Housing unit in Cell 154 (Doc. 2, p. 2). While this is a different 
cell from the cell involved in Count 1, it is in the same housing unit and Plaintiff describes similar 
conditions. P laintiff claims: t he cell is freezing in the winter, too hot in summer, and not 
adequately ventilated ; there is no hot water for bathing; Plaintiff has respiratory and sinus 
congestion; he does not have enough clothing or blankets to stay warm and the heaters are turned 
off; the cell is infested with roaches, mice, and spiders (Doc. 2, p. 3); and his sick call requests are 
not answered (Doc. 2, p. 5). 
A TRO is an order issued without notice to the party to be enjoined that may last no more Page ID
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than 14 days. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2). A TRO may issue without notice only if (A) specific facts 
in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the 
movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should 
not be required. F
ED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1). Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated the likelihood 
of immediate and irreparable harm before Defendants can be heard , his request for a TRO is 
DENIED. 
A preliminary injunction may issue only after the adverse party is given notice and an 
opportunity to respond. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 
must establish that he has some likelihood of succeeding on the merits, that no adequate remedy 
at law exists, and that he will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted. Mays v. 
Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen , 968 F.3d 628, 637 
(7th Cir. 2020)). If these elements are established, the Court must then balance the potential harm 
to the movant if the preliminary injunction were denied a gainst the potential harm to the non-
movant if the injunction were granted, and must consider whether granting the preliminary 
injunction is in the public interest. Mays, 974 F.3d at 810; Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 
F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2018). 
Defendants must be given an opportunity to file a response before the Court can resolve 
Plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly, the Menard Warden, in his official capacity, may respond to the 
motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 2) within 14 days of returning an executed waiver of service of 
process. 
Disposition 
 The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 1 against Latoya Hughes, Lt. Dallas, and Page ID
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Anthony Wills ; and in Count 2 against Paige S. , Chelsea Rapensburg , Nicolson, and Major 
Desmond. Lt. Brandt, Jacob Schultz, and John/Jane Doe 1 (Menard Mental Health Director) are 
DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ADD the Warden of 
Menard Correctional Center, in his or her official capacity, to the docket for purposes of Plaintiff’s 
claim for injunctive relief. 
 The Clerk shall prepare for Latoya Hughes, Lt. Dallas, Major Desmond, Paige S., Chelsea 
Rapensburg, Nicolson, Anthony Wills, and the Warden of Menard Correctional Center (official 
capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), 
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, 
a copy of the Complaint, a copy of the Motion at Doc. 2, and this Memorandum and Order to each 
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return 
the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms 
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the 
Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer 
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the 
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as 
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be 
retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. 
 Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the 
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to 
Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues Page ID
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stated in this Merit Review Order. 
 Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes 
the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the 
costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(f)(2)(A). 
 Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of 
Court and the opposing part ies informed of any change in his address; the Court will not 
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days 
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a 
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of 
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, t he Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to 
ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED: June 9, 2026 
 
 
________________________ 
 Staci M. Yandle 
Chief U.S. District Judge 
 
Notice to Plaintiff 
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve 
them with a copy of your Complaint . After service has been achieved, Defendant s will enter an 
appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date 
of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days Page ID
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or more. When Defendant s have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order 
containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to 
wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant s before filing any motions, to give the Defendant s 
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant s’ counsel 
has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any 
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so. Page ID
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