govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-6_25-cv-01109-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
VERNON P. TURNER, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No. 25-1109-JWB 
 
 
TRAVIS SOWERS and CITY OF KINGMAN, 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the court on Defendant s’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 17) and Plaintiff’s 
motion to file a surreply (Doc. 23). The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision. 
(Docs. 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25.) The motions are GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
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I. Facts 
 The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 1.) The court has also taken judicial 
notice of the proceedings in Plaintiff’s related criminal case that are attached to Defendants’ 
briefing as well as documents in the state court record. See Stan Lee Media, In c. v. Walt Disney 
Co., 774 F.3d 1292, 1298 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting th at a court may “take judicial notice of 
documents and docket materials file d in other courts”) (citation omitted). The court may review 
state court filings and ta ke judicial notice of th e same in assessing the motion to dismiss, even 
though they were not submitted in connection with the briefing b ecause they are documents of 
public record. Eckert v. Dougherty, 658 F. App'x 401, 404, 411 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 In April 2018, Defendant Trav is Sowers, an officer with the Kingman Police Department, 
was conducting a criminal investigation involv ing Plaintiff. On April 27, 2018, Sowers 
 
1 The court has considered Plaintiff’s surreply in its ruling. 

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interviewed A.K.,2 a potential victim of the crimes, in connection with the investigation. On May 
11, 2018, Sowers submitted an affida vit in support of an arrest warrant which was largely based 
on his interview with A.K. (Doc. 1 at 4.) According to Plaintiff, the affidavit omitted material 
facts and contained deliberately false information. The factual discrepancies involved the dates of 
alleged sexual assaults by Plaintiff. According to Sowers, A.K. could not recall the exact dates of 
these five incidents but believe d that they had occurred between the summer of his eighth and 
ninth grade school years, which was the summer of 2014. ( Id. at 10.) According to Plaintiff, 
however, Sowers knew the location of the alleged as saults and Plaintiff di d not reside at that 
residence until September of 2014. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that A.K. told Sowers that 
these events occurred a few months after his camping trip, which was in early June 2015. Plaintiff 
alleges that Sowers had this information but inten tionally failed to disclose it to the magistrate 
judge. Plaintiff alleges that Sowers intentionall y presented a false timeline in order to obtain the 
arrest warrant. (Id.) The timeframe was notable because A.K. was under the age of sixteen during 
the summer of 2014, which would subject Plaintiff to higher penalties under Kansas law for his 
alleged conduct. (Id. at 24.) 
 Plaintiff further alleges that Sowers misrepres ented his contacts with A.K. and presented a 
narrative to reflect that he was isolating and grooming A.K. ( Id. at 20–21.) With respect to the 
camping trip, Plaintiff a lleges that Sowers failed to preserve an email regarding A.K.’s camping 
trip. According to Plaintiff, A.K. showed So wers the email on his phone , which referenced the 
dates of the trip, but Sowers failed to preserve this evidence. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff also asserts that 
Sowers failed to conduct an adequate investiga tion from late April to May 11, 2018. Plaintiff 
contends that Sowers should have investigated the camping trip, the effects of a drug alleged to be 
 
2 The court uses initials to discuss the alleged victim as he was a minor during the alleged crimes. 

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used by Plaintiff and given to A.K., failed to inte rview more witnesses, and failed to investigate 
Plaintiff’s residences. (Id. at 43–45.) 
 On May 11, 2018, the magistrate judge issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. On 
that same date, the Kingman County Attorney filed criminal charges against Plaintiff in State v. 
Turner, Case No. 2018-CR-076. The charges included five counts of aggravated criminal sodomy 
in violation of K.S.A. § 21-5504(b )(3)(A), one count of furnishing alcohol to a minor for illicit 
purposes in violation of K.S.A. § 21-5607(b), and one count of felony criminal threat in violation 
of K.S.A. § 21-5415(a). (Doc. 19-1.) All crimes were alleged to have occurred between May and 
August 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff was arrested on May 14, 2018. (Doc. 19-2 at 2.) Plaintiff could not 
post bond and remained in custody for several years. 
 On July 24, 2020, a preliminary hearing was he ld. The court found probable cause on three 
of the five counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, the charge of furnishing alcohol to a minor, and 
the charge of criminal threat. (Doc. 19-3.) The court dismi ssed the remaining two counts of 
aggravated criminal sodomy. (Id.) The county attorney filed an amended complaint to reflect the 
remaining charges. (Doc. 19-4.) On January 26, 2021, an arraignment was held and Plaintiff 
entered pleas of not guilty to the charges in the amended complaint. (Doc. 19-5.) In 2022, Plaintiff 
filed motions to suppress and for a Franks hearing on the basis of the false and misleading 
statements and omissions from the affidavit in support of the arrest warr ant. (Doc. 19-6.) The 
arguments raised in the motions were essentially the same allega tions made in this action. The 
court held that the alleged omissions were not material because the exact date of the commission 
of the crime is unnecessary and that a conviction may be obtained as long as the crime occurred 
within the statute of limitations. ( Id. at 21.) Further, there were no arguments that the alleged 
crimes occurred outside of the statute of limita tions and the sodomy charges do not require that 

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the victim is a certain age, i.e. 14 or 15. (Id. at 22–23.) The court further held that even if all of 
the omitted information Plaintiff complained of had been included in the affidavit, the court would 
have issued the arrest warrant. (Id. at 23.) 
 On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff entered a no cont est plea to the charge of furnishing alcohol 
to a minor for illicit purposes in Case No. 2018-CR-076. (Docs. 19-7, 19-8.) The record reflects 
that the plea agreement included a no contest plea in two other cases charging similar crimes with 
different victims. (Doc. 19-7.) The county attorney sought a consecutive sentence for the crimes 
in the three cases. ( Id.) At the time Plaintiff entered his plea, the court dismissed the remaining 
charges in Case No. 2018-CR-076 pursu ant to the plea agreement. See Case No. 2018-CR-076, 
Journal Entry of February 6, 2023 (electronically filed on Aug. 11, 2023). The state court docket 
sheet reflects the disposition of those counts as dismissed on February 6, 2023. See id. Plaintiff 
was released on bond prior to sentencing. Although the state court records show that he was 
released on April 26 (Doc. 19-9), according to Pl aintiff, he was released on May 2, 2023. (Doc. 
20 at 2.) 
 Plaintiff’s sentencing was held on May 17, 2023. (Doc. 19-10.) Plaintiff’s underlying 
sentence in Case No. 2018-CR-076 was for thirt een months with probation imposed to run 
consecutive with his sentences in the other two cases; however, th e journal entry reflects that 
Plaintiff had served his time while awaiting se ntencing and that no probation would be imposed. 
(Id. at 3, 5–6.) The journal entry of judgment was entered on July 19, 2023. 
 On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant Sowers and the City of 
Kingman (the “City”). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges 
essentially three claims against Defendant Sowe rs: violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights for omissions and false and misleading statements in the affidavit in support of 

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the arrest warrant; violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment for failing 
to preserve exculpatory evidence ; and a violation of his due pro cess rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment for failing to conduct an adequate investigation.3 Plaintiff also brings Monell claims 
against the City, including claims of failure to train, failure to supervise and discipline, ratification, 
and an unlawful custom. These claims are all ba sed on Sowers’ alleged vi olation of Plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights. 
 Defendants move to dismiss Pl aintiff’s complaint on the basis that his claims are barred by 
the statute of limitations; alterna tively, they argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to 
state a claim. 
II. Standard 
In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a 
complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face. Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from 
those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 
1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations , however, have no bearing upon the court’s 
consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the c ourt is to liberally construe his filings. United 
States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). Howeve r, liberally construing filings does 
 
3 Plaintiff’s claims are somewhat difficult to follow. He has three separate claims for relief against Defendant Sowers. 
Under his first claim of relief, he identifies five separate counts. All of the counts pertain to information contained in 
or missing from the affidavit. Essentially, he is identif ying the various allegations of false statements, misleading 
statements, and omissions. However, they can all be collapsed into his claim regarding the statements and omissions 
as to the affidavit. 

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not mean supplying additional factual allegations or constructing a legal theory on Plaintiff’s 
behalf. Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997). 
III. Analysis 
“The statute of limitations period for a § 1983 claim is dictated by the personal injury 
statute of limitations in the state in which the claim arose.” McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 
1289 (10th Cir. 2011). In Kansas, such claims are governed by the two-year period in K.S.A. § 
60-513(a). Brown v. Unif. Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Schs. , 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 
2006). Federal law alone determines the date on which a claim accrues – that is, the date on which 
the limitations period is triggered. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Mondragon v. 
Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). 
An accrual analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right alleged to have 
been violated and is guided by common law principles governing analogous torts. McDonough v. 
Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115–16 (2019). Section 1983 claims presumably accrue when a plaintiff has 
“a complete and present cause of action,” although if a particular claim may not re alistically be 
brought while a violation is ongoing, the claim may accrue at a later date. Id. at 115 (quoting 
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388). 
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court cited the tort of malicious prosecution in holding 
that a claim challenging the va lidity of a conviction or sent ence under § 1983 “does not accrue 
until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994). With respect to 
an action which resulted in a dismissal of charges, the Tenth Circuit has held that the claim accrues 
upon dismissal. See Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1192, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the plaintiff “properly stated a Fourth Amendment claim fo r malicious prosecution, which 
accrued” on the date when the district attorney dropped all charges against him). By holding that 

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such claims do not accrue until the underlying criminal conviction has been invalidated or charges 
have been dismissed, the rule avoids conflicting civil and criminal judgments and the use of § 1983 
actions to collaterally attack criminal judgments. McDonough, 588 U.S. at 118. 
By contrast, where a § 1983 claim alleged that a plaintiff was arrest ed without probable 
cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the claim did not ac crue when the criminal charge 
was ultimately dismissed, but when legal process wa s first initiated against the plaintiff – that is, 
when the plaintiff appeared before a ma gistrate and was bound over for trial. Wallace, 549 U.S. 
at 391. Wallace noted the tort of false im prisonment consists of detention without legal process, 
which necessarily ends when the victim becomes held pursuant to legal process. Any unlawful 
detention thereafter “forms part of the damages for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious 
prosecution,” which remedies the wrongful institution of legal process ra ther than a wrongful 
detention without legal process. Id. at 390. 
The court now turns to identifying the nature of Plaintiff’s clai ms. Although Plaintiff 
alleges claims under both the Fourth and Fourteen th Amendment, he is adamant in his response 
that he is not bringing a claim for false arrest, which implicates the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 20 
at 4–5.) Plaintiff does not address whether his claim is one for false imprisonment, also under the 
Fourth Amendment. As set forth above, such a claim under § 1983 accrues at the time legal process 
is initiated. See Mondragon , 519 F.3d at 1083. Because Plaintiff was held over after the 
preliminary hearing on July 24, 2020, the statute of limitations began on that date for any claim of 
false arrest or unlawful detention. As Plaintiff brought this action almost five years later, any such 
claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
In Mondragon, the court of appeals held that if a plaintiff “has been imprisoned pursuant 
to legal but wrongful process, he has a claim under the procedural component of the Fourteenth 

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Amendment's Due Process Clause analogous to a tort claim for malicious prosecution.” 519 F.3d 
at 1082. These “claims concern the period between the institution of legal process and its favorable 
termination through, for example, ac quittal or the dismissal of char ges, and they accrue ‘at the 
earliest when favorable termination occurs.’” Heter v. City of Hutchinson, Kan. , 851 F. App'x 
874, 875–76 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mondragon, 519 F.3d at 1083). Because Plaintiff’s claims 
concern his allegations that he was detained pur suant to a wrongful process that included false 
information in the affidavit and material omissions, the court will analyze his claims as analogous 
to a claim of malicious prosecution which accrues when the proceeding terminates in his favor. 
The court notes that Plaintiff’s re sponse is not entirely clear as to what framework he believes 
applies. Plaintiff appears to assert that his Franks claim regarding the affidavit transforms his 
claim into something other that a claim involving a malicious prosecution but he fails to point to 
any authority in support of his ar gument. (Doc. 20 at 8.) Defe ndants argue that no such “hybrid 
claim” exists. (Doc. 21 at 3.) In any event, Plaintiff fails to identify any authority to suggest that 
the statute of limitations begins to run later than the date of favorable termination for such a claim. 
To the extent Plaintiff’ s claim is construed as a fabrica tion or suppression of evidence claim 
resulting in a denial of his due process rights, the statute of limitations on such a claim also begins 
to run when the prosecution terminates in his favor. See McDonough, 588 U.S. at 119–20; see 
also McIntyre v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty. & Kansas City, Kansas, No. CV 18-2545-KHV, 
2020 WL 1028303, at *27 (D. Kan. Mar. 3, 2020) (to th e extent a § 1983 claim would imply that 
a conviction is invalid, the statute of limitations begins to run when the conviction is overturned). 
Under this framework, the court now turns to the record to determine when the statute of 
limitations began to accrue. Defe ndants argue that Plaintiff’s claims accrued upon the dismissal 
of all counts on February 6, 2023. Plaintiff argues that his cause of action did not accrue until the 

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judgment was entered on July 19, 2023. Throughout his response, Plaintiff argues that this must 
be so because he was barred from bringing an action under Heck prior to that time. Plaintiff, 
however, completely ignor es the sequence of events in hi s underlying criminal prosecution. 
Notably, the sodomy and criminal threat charges were dismissed at the plea hearing on February 
6, 2023, which is more than two year s before this cause of action was filed. Plaintiff fails to 
address the significance of this dismissal in order to argue that the final journal entry controls. As 
discussed, a review of the state court record shows that those charges were dismissed on February 
6, 2023, when he pleaded guilty to the charge of furnishing alcohol to a minor for illicit purposes 
in Case No. 2018-CR-076. (Docs. 19-7, 19-8.) At th e time Plaintiff entere d his plea, the court 
dismissed the remaining charge s in Case No. 2018-CR-076 pursuan t to the plea agreement. See 
Case No. 2018-CR-076, Journal Entry of February 6, 2023 (electronically filed on Aug. 11, 2023). 
At this point, the statute of limitations began to run. See Myers, 738 F.3d at 1195; see also 
McCarty, 646 F.3d at 1290 (discussing that the question is when the “conviction” or, here, charges 
are no longer outstanding and citing to Heck). 
The court notes that the journal entry refl ecting what occurred on February 6, 2023, was 
not filed until August 2023, after judgment was entered in the criminal case. That order reflects 
the approval of a journal entry submitted by th e parties on February 6, 2023. Significantly, the 
journal entry reflects that as of February 6, 2023, the court di smissed the charges, ordered a 
presentence investigation, and set a status conference later in February 2023. See Case No. 2018-
CR-076, Journal Entry of February 6, 2023 (electronically filed on Aug. 11, 2023). It is clearly a 
journal entry to reflect the events that transp ired in court on February 6, which Plaintiff was 
personally aware of and present for.4 See Foster v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 950, 951–52 (10th Cir. 1937); 
 
4 “Under [Kansas] Supreme Court Rule 170, a district court may direct a party to prepare a journal entry reflecting 
the court's orders. See Rule 170(a). The party preparing the journal entry must submit it to the opposing party within 

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see also Kansas v. Moses , 227 Kan. 400, 402–03, 607 P.2d 477, 480 ( 1980) (discussing that in 
Kansas, journals and records are just formal evidence of the judgment and sentence and noting that 
the “defendant is personally pr esent, and thus knows th at at that moment he or she has been 
sentenced, fined, or placed on probation, or that the imposition of sentence has been suspended.”) 
There is no argument or indication from the state court record that those charges were still pending 
as of the date of judgment or even as of the date of sentencing. (See Doc. 19-10.) 
Therefore, the fact that it was entered after the events occurred and the judgment was 
entered in the state criminal case is not significant especially in light of the state court docket that 
clearly reflects that the date of disposition of Plaintiff’s dismi ssed charges occurred on February 
6, 2023.5 Further, the court notes that the issue here is when Plaintiff had a complete and present 
cause of action. As of February 6, 2023, Plaintiff knew that these charges were dismissed pursuant 
to the plea agreement. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run at that time. 
 Plaintiff’s argument that the entry of final judgment was the event that started the clock 
for statute of limitations purpos es is not persuasive because that document only references 
Plaintiff’s conviction on the count pertaining to providing a minor with illegal substances. There 
is no mention whatsoever of the counts that had been previously dismissed in February 2023. 
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims do not concern his conviction and sentence in 2018-CR-076 on the charge 
of providing alcohol to a minor for illicit purposes.6 If they did, they would be subject to dismissal 
 
14 days, and the opposing party has 14 days after service of the proposed journal entry to object. See Rule 170(b), 
(c).” Kirk v. VIM Props., LLC, 461 P.3d 865 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020). 
5 The court recognizes that there is a distinction between journal entries in civil cases and criminal cases in Kansas. 
See Kansas v. Moses, 227 Kan. 400, 403, 607 P.2d 477, 480 (1980). 
6 Because the court determines Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, it declines to address whether 
Plaintiff can proceed on a malicious prosecution claim in light of a guilty plea as to one but not all of the charges. See 
Al-Anesi v. City of New York , No. 18-CV-08439, 2022 WL 1948879, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022) (considering 
Thompson and holding that a guilty plea to a lesser charge negates the favorable termination element); see also 
Grainger v. Buckhannon, No. 22-CV-00354, 2022 WL 2168079, at *3 (D.S.C. June 15, 2022) (“ Thompson did not 
directly address proceedings involving multiple charges wher e some resulted in the plaintiff's conviction and others 
were dismissed. The court is not persuaded that the application of Thompson to such cases permits a § 1983 claim for 

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as there is no allegation that the conviction was reversed on appeal or vacated pursuant to a habeas 
claim. Moreover, Plaintiff was sentenced on May 17, 2023, which was more than two years before 
he filed this action. In Kansas, a court’s judgment and sentence is effective when announced not 
when the journal entry is entered. See Moses, 607 P.2d at 478; K.S.A. § 22-3424. Plaintiff further 
argues that he was barred from bringing a claim under Heck until final disposition of all charges 
in the prosecution. The court disagrees. See Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 
2007) (finding that Heck did not bar a plaintiff from asserting a § 1983 claim on dismissed charges 
even though he pleaded guilty to unrelated charges). 
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Sowers are subject to dismissal as they are barred by 
the statute of limitations. The court finds that by February 6, 2023, or at the latest, May 17, 2023, 
Plaintiff had “a complete and present cause of action” such that his claims accrued. Wallace, 549 
U.S. at 388. Plaintiff’s claims against the City for failure to train, supervise, having an unlawful 
custom, and ratification of Sowe r’s conduct are also barred by the statute of limitations. These 
claims are allegations of an unlawful policy based on Sowe r’s conduct and would accrue, at the 
latest, at the time the charges were dismissed. See id. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Defendants’ motion to dismi ss (Doc. 17) is GRANTED. Pl aintiff’s motion to file a 
surreply (Doc. 23) is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 8th day of June, 2026. 
s/ John W. Broomes 
JOHN W. BROOMES 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
 
 
malicious prosecution where the charges are related and arise from the same course of conduct conceded by the 
plaintiff's guilty plea.”). 

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