govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_22-cv-00504-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 
KAREN CAMPBELL MCGAGH, 
 
 v. 
 
BALTIMORE COUNTY, et al. 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. CCB-22-504 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM 
Pro se plaintiff Karen McGagh claims that her constitutional rights were violated by 
Baltimore County, the Baltimore County State’s Attorney ’s Office (“BCSA”), the Baltimore 
County Police Department (“BCPD”), Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Adam Lippe, Detective 
Brian Wolf, Officer Scott Shellenberger, and ten “Doe” defendants when they allegedly conspired 
to ignore her sexual assault police report and instead falsely charge d her with making a false 
statement to a police officer and perjury. Now pending before the court is a motion to dismiss 
submitted by defendants Baltimore County and BCPD. Ms. McGagh opposed the motion, and the 
moving defendants did not reply. No oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the 
following reasons, the defendants’ motion will be granted. 
BACKGROUND 
Ms. McGagh alleges that, since 2017, the defendants have “engaged in a conspiracy to 
frame [her] for perjury and false statement to a police officer after she reported sexual assault, 
depriving her of her constitutional rights, and causing severe harm.” Compl. ¶ 10, ECF 1. Ms. 
McGagh was allegedly assaulted by an employee at a Verizon Wireless store, and she claims that 
much of the incident was recorded on camera. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. She filed criminal charges against the 
employee, but those charges were eventually dropped and Ms. McGagh was instead charged with 
making a false statement to a police officer and perjury by affidavit. Id. ¶ 13. 

2 
 
Defendants ASA Lippe and Detective Wolf investigated the charges against Ms. McGagh. 
Id. ¶ 14. Ms. McGagh alleges that Lippe and Wolf worked together outside of their governmental 
duties; Wolf ran his own private security firm and Lippe worked for Wolf’s firm as an instructor. 
Id. ¶¶ 16 -19. According to Ms. McGagh, this business relationshi p was “undisclosed” and 
“creat[ed] a conflict of interest with their investigation and prosecution work as paid employees of 
Baltimore County.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 18-19. Ms. McGagh claims that Lippe and Wolf “conspired to falsify 
evidence against [her],” including testimony from an allegedly fictional “Dr. Kohn.” Id. ¶¶ 20-22.1 
She also claims that “all Defendants deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence, as well as 
fabricated false rep orts and other evidence, thereby misleading and misdirecting the criminal 
prosecution of Ms. McGagh.” Id. ¶ 54. 
Ms. McGagh was sentenced to eight-and-a-half years in prison for making a false statement 
to a police officer and perjury by affidavit. Id. ¶ 29. But her conviction was overturned by the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals in March 2020.2 Id. ¶ 30. The State then appealed to the Court 
of Appeals,3 which reversed the Court of Special Appeals and reinstated her conviction. Id. ¶ 32. 
Ms. McGagh claims that the Court of Appeals’s decision was based on false evidence submitted 
by BCSA. Id. ¶¶ 31 -32. She also alleges that ASA Lippe made false statements during her 
resentencing hearing, including that she had contacted him on a weekly basis. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. 
Before her conviction was overturned, Ms. McGagh had been granted parole by the 
Maryland Parole Board, and upon returning to prison she expected to finish serving the sentence 
she would have had under that grant of parole. Id. ¶ 39. Instead, however, she was informed that 
 
1 Ms. McGagh admits that she was seen by doctors named Lois Conn and Janet Cohn, but claims 
that both of them deny making the statements attributed to “Doctor Kohn.” Compl. ¶ 23. 
2 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals is now known as the Appellate Court of Maryland. 
3 The Maryland Court of Appeals is now known as the Supreme Court of Maryland. 

3 
 
“her parole had been ‘invalidated.’” Id. ¶ 40. She claims that David Blumberg, Chairman of the 
Maryland Parole Board, told her attorney that he had been pressured by ASA Lippe and BCSA to 
invalidate her parole. Id. ¶ 41. A new p arole hearing was held, at which ASA Lippe allegedly 
convinced an unnamed “victim” (presumably the Verizon employee) to testify against Ms. 
McGagh. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. Ms. McGagh was eventually paroled seven weeks thereafter. Id. ¶ 47. 
Ms. McGagh alleges that the conspiracy against her was part of BCPD’s and BCSA’s 
“policy of not investigating allegations of assault by women,” which she claims is “well 
documented.” Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 107; see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 58, 62, 65, 72, 78. As evidence of this policy, Ms. 
McGagh states that “[a]n independent team of investigators found that [BCPD] and [BCSA] were 
deficient in twenty-areas [sic] of investigating and prosecuting assaults against women,” and that 
there were “numerous complaints” on the subject. Id. ¶¶ 105, 107. The policy allegedly manifested 
in Detective Wolf, “with his supervisor’s knowledge, refus[ing] to investigate some crimes, and 
fram[ing] other defendants”; “ASA Lippe was a willing participant in this conspiracy.” Id. ¶ 108. 
Ms. McGagh brings fifteen counts, alleging violations of the federal constitution (Counts 
I-V, VIII, IX, & XV ), conspiracy (Counts VI & VII), and state law torts (Counts X-XIV).
4 The 
allegations do not specifically differentiate which claims are asserted against which defendants. 
Baltimore County and BCPD moved to dismiss, contending that Ms. McGagh’s complaint fails to 
state any viable claims against them. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual allegations that “raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint 
 
4 Ms. McGagh styles Count XV as “state law claim freedom of speech,” but cites federal law in 
that Count, so the court construes the Count as a First Amendment claim. 

4 
 
are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence 
sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts 
to establish those elements.” Wal ters v. McMahen , 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted). “Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint that the right to 
relief is ‘probable,’ the complaint must advance the plaintiff ’s claim ‘across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Additionally, although courts 
“must view the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” they “will not accept ‘legal 
conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments’” 
in deciding whether a case should survive a motion to dismiss. U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda 
Pharm. North Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wag More Dogs, LLC v. 
Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012)). When a plaintiff is pro se, the court must hold their 
pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers .” Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
ANALYSIS 
Baltimore County and BCPD argue that they should be dismissed as defendants because 
BCPD is not an entity that can be sued, and because Ms. McGagh’s allegations do not include any 
specific facts that would establish either defendant’s liability. See Mot., ECF 25-1. Ms. McGagh 
responds that the defendants’ motion is untimely and that she has stated claims against the 
defendants. The court will consider the timeliness of the defendants’ motion before determining 
whether BCPD can be sued, and will then review the complaint to decide whether any claims have 
been stated against the moving defendants. 

5 
 
I. Timeliness 
A Rule 12(b) motion must be filed before a responsive pleading is due. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b). And a defendant generally must serve an answer “within 21 days after being served with 
the summons and complaint.” Id. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). When Ms. McGagh filed her federal complaint, 
her state criminal proceedings were still pending, so the court directed her to show cause why the 
civil case should not be dismissed without prejudice or stayed until the criminal proceedings were 
resolved. Show Cause Order, ECF 5. During the time Ms. McGagh was given to respond to the 
court’s order, Baltimore County and BCPD moved for an extension of time to answer the 
complaint. Mot. for Extension, ECF 7. Ms. McGagh responded, and the court stayed the case until 
her Writ of Innocence hearing and granted the defendants’ motion for an extension until eight days 
after the hearing. Stay Order, ECF 12. The defendants timely filed their initial motion to dismiss. 
See First Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 14. But Ms. McGagh’s mailing address was incorrect, and she was 
not served with the motion. Mail Return, ECF 17. So the court denied the motion without prejudice 
and ordered Ms. McGagh to update her address , after which the defendants were given twenty -
eight days to renew their motion to dismiss . Address Order, ECF 19. Ms. McGagh updated her 
address on August 21, 2023, Notice of Change of Address, ECF 21, and the defendants re -filed 
their motion to dismiss on September 11, 2023, Mot. The defendants therefore filed their motion 
within the time allowed by court-approved extensions, and the motion is timely. 
II. BCPD’s Status 
BCPD argues that it cannot be sued because it “does not exist as a legal entity” under 
Maryland law. Mot. at 3. State law determines an entity’s capacity to be sued, and, under Maryland 
law, “absent a statutory or constitutional provision creating a government agency, an ‘office’ or 
‘department’ bears no unique legal identity, and thus, it cannot be sued.” Owens v. Balt. City 

6 
 
State’s Attys. Off., 767 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) and Boyer v. 
State, 323 Md. 558, 572 n.9 (1991)). Courts in this district have consistently held that BCPD is not 
sui juries (i.e., has no independent legal existence) and is not amenable to suit. McCann-McCalpine 
v. Detective Fisher of BC PD, No. 23-cv-2039-BAH, 2024 WL 3427211, at *6 (D. Md. July 12, 
2024); Borkowski v. Balt. Cnty., 414 F. Supp. 3d 788, 804 (D. Md. 2019). Ms. McGagh offers no 
argument to justify departing from this well -accepted holding, and the court will therefore grant 
the motion as to BCPD.5 Although BCSA has not filed a motion seeking dismissal on this ground, 
the law is equally clear that it is similarly not sui juris, Owens, 767 F.3d at 393-95, and the court 
will also dismiss it as a defendant. 
III. Failure to State a Claim 
A. Federal Constitutional Claims 
“Section 1983 provides that ‘ [e]very person,’ who, under color of state law causes the 
violation of another’s federal rights shall be liable to the party injured by his conduct.” Owens, 767 
F.3d at 402 (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In Monell v. New York City 
Department of Social Services , the Supreme Court ruled that municipalities are suable under 
Section 1983, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), but expressly cabined their liability by holding that a 
county or municipality “is liable only for its own illegal acts,” Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (citing 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Accordingly, local governments “are not vicariously liable under 
[Section] 1983 for their employees’ actions.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing 
 
5 Courts often permit amendment to substitute the proper defendant, Baltimore County, for BCPD, 
particularly where a plaintiff is pro se. McCann-McCalpine, 2024 WL 3427211, at *6; see Truant 
v. Persuhn, No. 23- cv-579-RDB, 2023 WL 8600552, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2023). Ms. 
McGagh does not distinguish between defendants when alleging the counts in her complaint, so 
the court will simply construe counts as alleged against Baltimore County where appropriate, and 
impute allegations about BCPD to Baltimore County. 

7 
 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). So to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Baltimore County, Ms. 
McGagh must adequately allege that it “follows a custom, policy, or practice by which local 
officials violate a plaintiff’s constitutiona l rights.” Owens , 767 F.3d at 402 (citing Monell , 436 
U.S. at 694). 
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four 
ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) 
through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an 
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate 
indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent 
and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.” 
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris , 164 F.3d 215, 217 
(4th Cir. 1999)). 
Ms. McGagh’s policy allegations are sparse. She claims that “BCPD . . . had a policy of 
not investigating allegations of assault by women,” Compl. ¶ 26, which is “well documented,” id. 
¶ 27, but her only non- conclusory allegations about the “policy” are that “[a]n independent team 
of investigators found that [BCPD] and [BCSA] were deficient in twenty- areas [sic] of 
investigating and prosecuting assaults against women,” and that there wer e “numerous 
complaints” on the subject. Id. ¶¶ 105, 107; see Opp’n to Mot. at 11-12, ECF 37 (describing the 
same allegations) (“Opp’n”). In her opposition, Ms. McGagh also identifies one instance of the 
County settling claims brought by a woman who claimed that the County sent police offers to her 
home to discourage her from filing charges against her assaulters. Opp’n at 22. Construing these 
claims as liberally as possible, BCPD’s poor handling of assaults against women could implicate 
a failure to train o fficers, or a widespread and persistent practice. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 473-74. But 
Ms. McGagh offers no specifics to show that the alleged defects were due to a failure to train, nor 
that citizens ’ constitutional rights were frequently being violated by BCPD . See id. at 473 
(“‘[I]solated incidents’ of unconstitutional conduct by subordinate employees are not sufficient to 

8 
 
establish a custom or practice for § 1983 purposes. Rather, there must be ‘ numerous particular 
instances’ of unconstitutional conduct in order to establish a custom or practice.” (quoting Carter, 
164 F.3d at 220 and Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1991))). Even if her allegations 
were adequately detailed, however, Ms. McGagh’s complaint suffers from a more fundamental 
flaw. 
A municipality will only be liable under Section 1983 when its “official policy or custom” 
“causes the deprivation.” Id. at 471 (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 218). Here, Ms. McGagh alleges 
that she was “deprived . . . of her constitutional right to a fair t rial,” Compl. ¶ 53, “falsely 
imprisoned in violation of her constitutional rights,” id. ¶ 59, coerced to falsely confess, id. ¶ 69, 
“denied . . . reasonable bail,” id. ¶ 75, “abus[ed]” by being placed in prison, id. ¶¶ 80-84, and 
“denied . . . the right to access to courts,” id. ¶ 101. The gravamen of all these allegations is that 
Ms. McGagh was wrongfully charged with perjury and making false statements, improperly 
prosecuted for those charges, and eventually imprisoned based on illegit imate evidence. Thos e 
events, although reprehensible if true, bear no causal relation to BCPD’s alleged policy of 
deficiently investigating and prosecuting assaults against women. Ms. McGagh offers no 
allegations to support the theory that any Baltimore County entity had a policy of malicious or 
vengeful prosecutions, and in fact admits that she “is the only woman to be sent to prison for 
reporting assault.” Id. ¶ 27; see Lytle, 326 F.3d at 473; Palma v. Montgomery Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 
3d 288, 297-98 (D. Md. 2022). Furthermore, on Ms. McGagh’s own allegations, she was singled 
out for retribution by the individual defendants ; many of her injuries allegedly stemmed from 
Lippe and Wolf conspiring “to exact revenge on Ms. McGagh, [because she] discovered the 
corruption in the State’ s Attorney’s office and the undisclosed business relationship between 

9 
 
Defendants Lippe and Wolf.” Id. ¶ 42; see Opp’n at 8 (arguing that the relationship between ASA 
Lippe and Detective Wolf “is at the heart and soul of this case”). 
Because Ms. McGagh has not adequately alleged that she was injured by a custom, policy, 
or practice of Baltimore County, her constitutional claims against it will be dismissed (Counts I -
V, VIII, IX, & XV). 
B. Federal Conspiracy Claims 
Ms. McGagh brings conspiracy claims under Section 1983 and Section 1985. To 
adequately plead a conspiracy claim under either provision, the plaintiff must at least allege that 
the defendants “acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the 
conspiracy which resulted in [the plaintiff’s] deprivation of a constitutional right.” Hinkle v. City 
of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Hafner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 577 (4th 
Cir. 1992)) (Section 1983 conspiracy); White v. City of Annapolis , 439 F. Supp. 3d 522, 541 (D. 
Md. 2020) (quoting Facey v. Dae Sung Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (D. Md. 2014) ) (stating 
similar elements for Section 1985 conspiracy). Conspiracy claims must be pled with “concrete 
supporting facts,” and will be rejected “whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely 
conclusory manner.” A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Ci r. 2011) 
(quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
With regard to Baltimore County, Ms. McGagh’s conspiracy claims are entirely 
conclusory. She offers no explanation as to how BCPD or the County, as opposed to the individual 
defendants who were their employees, joined in the alleged conspiracy or took any actions to 
further it. She alleges that the conspiracy “was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of 
the Baltimore County Police Department,” Compl. ¶¶ 91, 99, but, as explaine d, she has not 
adequately alleged the exist ence of any relevant policy that deprived her of her constitutional 

10 
 
rights. And she claims that the conspiracy “was tacitly ratified by policy -makers for the City of 
Baltimore County [sic] with final policymaking authority,” id. ¶ 99, but she never explains who 
these policymakers were or how they ratified the alleged actions of the individual defendants. Ms. 
McGagh cannot extend her conspiracy allegations to Baltimore County through its employees, and 
her conclusory allegations that the County was part of the alleged conspiracy are insufficient. 
Counts VI & VII will be dismissed as to Baltimore County. 
C. State Law Claims 
Ms. McGagh brings several claims under state tort law and, because she does not specify 
to which defendants each count applies, the court will assume that she alleges all counts against 
all defendants. 
The Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) requires a plaintiff seeking 
to bring tort claims against a local government to provide notice of those claims within one year 
of her injury. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(b)(1); Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 452 
F. Supp. 3d 283, 315 (D. Md. 2020). A plaintiff must affirmatively plead compliance with the 
notice requirement or face dismissal. Hansen v. City of Laurel , 420 Md. 670, 694 (2011). Ms. 
McGagh does not allege that she complied with the notice requirements of the LGTCA, and her 
state law claims against the County must therefore be dismissed. Furthermore, the LGTCA merely 
requires a local government to pay for a judgment against its employee under specific 
circumstances; it does not waive a local government’s immunity from direct liability. Doe v. 
Comm’y Coll. of Balt. Cnty., 595 F. Supp. 3d 392, 411-12 (D. Md. 2022); Coit v. Nappi, 248 Md. 
App. 44, 64 (2020). Ms. McGagh’s state law claims fail for this reason too. 

11 
IV. Remaining Defendants
It is unclear from the record whether the individual defendants have been properly served
with Ms. McGagh’s complaint. Ms. McGagh will be ordered to submit proof of service as to the 
individual defendants in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1), or to request the court’s assistance 
with effectuating service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), within twenty-eight days. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above -stated reasons, BCPD and Baltimore County’s motion to dismiss will be 
granted. BCSA will also be dismissed as a defendant. Ms. McGagh must provide proof of service 
as to the individual defendants within twenty-eight days. 
____________ _________________________
 
Date Catherine C. Blake 
United States District Judge 
8/12/2024 /s/

Passage view · GavelSight