govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_22-cr-00085-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
United States of America, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No.  1:22cr085-1 
 
Jamal Binford, Judge Michael R. Barrett 
 
Defendant. 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
 This matter came on for consideration of Defendant Jamal Binford's Motion for 
New Trial (Doc. 203); the Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial (Doc. 205); Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for New Trial (Doc. 206) 
and Supplemental Memorandum to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial (Doc. 207); and the 
Government’s Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Defendant’s Motion for New Trial 
(Doc. 208).  In addition, on March 30, 2026, the Court held oral argument on Defendant’s 
Motion.  (Doc. 209). 
I. BACKGROUND 
 On February 3, 2025, a jury convicted Defendant on five counts: (1) Narcotics 
Conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) Accessory After the Fact in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 3; (3) Murder in Connection with a Drug Trafficking Conspiracy Violating 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), in violation of 21 U. S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A); (4) Use of a Firearm During 
and in Relation to a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (5) Use of a 
Firearm to Commit Murder During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(G)(1).  (Doc. 161). 
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 Defendant explains that at trial the Government presented evidence from his 
phones which looked like he was engaged an illegal narcotics operation, but these photos 
and videos were actually a part of a “sizzle reel” for a movie he was creating.  Defendant 
explains that the movie would be called “American Cartel” and was intended to be a social 
commentary based on a comparison of the  pharmaceutical industry to the illegal drug 
trade.  Defendant admits that he sold  marijuana and the marijuana shown in the 
Government’s exhibits at trial was real,1 but explains that the narcotics were fake.  (Doc. 
179, PAGEID 1115).  Defendant explains that the sizzle reel would be used to shop the 
movie idea to directors and producers.  (Doc. 179, PAGEID 1114).  Defendant maintains 
that there was evidence that drug activity was being simulated for the sizzle reel, but this 
evidence was never presented at trial by his attorney.  Now proceeding with new counsel, 
Defendant filed his Motion for a New Trial on January 7, 2026. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s 
motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice 
so requires.”2  Although the Rule does not define “interest of justice,” it is “widely agreed 
that Rule 33’s interest of justice standard allows the grant of a new trial where substantial 
 
1Defendant testified at trial that he sold marijuana illegally but was planning to open a 
licensed marijuana growing business. (Doc. 179, PAGEID 1105) (“Not only did I just sell 
marijuana, but I was actively pursuing -- I wanted to get into growing it now that it's legal. That 
what's I wanted to do.”); (Doc. 179, PAGEID 1115) (“[J]ust to be extremely clear, I’ll take 
accountability for my actions. I sell weed. I’m into marijuana. I look forward to opening my own 
growing operation. That’s what I want to do.”). 
 
2The Government maintains that Defendant’s motion is untimely because it was filed 
outside the Rule’s 14-day deadline.  However, a motion for new trial grounded on newly 
discovered evidence must be filed within three years of the finding of guilty.  Fed. Crim. P. 
33(b)(1). 
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legal error has occurred.”  United States v. Munoz , 605 F.3d 359, 373 (6th Cir. 2010). 
This includes “reversible error or violation of the defendant's substantial rights.”   Id . at 
374.  “[L]ess clear is whether a district court may grant Rule 33 relief where the verdict is 
not against the substantial weight of the evidence, and where no reversible error or 
violation of the defendant's substantial rights has occurred, but where the distric t court 
nonetheless believes that ‘the interest of justice’ requires a new trial.”  Id. 
 Defendant sets forth four bases for a new trial : (1) Defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel; (2) the Court improperly denied trial counsel’s motion to withdraw; 
(3) the Court improperly denied Defendant a continuance to retain an expert; and (4) there 
was prosecutorial misconduct.  In addition, in a supplemental filing, D efendant explains 
he and his new counsel have discovered an instance of  potential evidence tampering.   
(Doc. 207-2). 
A. Evidence tampering 
At trial, the Government introduced Exhibit C20, which is a report of the forensic 
extraction of data from one of Defendant’s iPhones (Item 60).  Defendant maintains that 
Government Exhibit C20 was altered to delete exculpatory information.  Defendant 
explains that in reviewing materials for the Motion for New Trial, counsel discovered note 
number 121, which is an iPhone note from Defendant’s phone.  (Doc. 207-2).  Defendant 
concludes that the Government removed this version of the iPhone note from Exhibit C20. 
The Government responds that when the forensic extraction of Item 60 is viewed 
in the Cellebrite software program, note number 121 appears.  However, when counsel 
used the Cellebrite software to generate a report of the iPhone notes found on Item 60, 
the PDF report generated by Cellebrite generates a report which omits note 121 (and also 
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note 221).  (Doc. 208, PAGEID 3525).  Current counsel for Defendant reported the same 
issue when attempting to generate a report  from the forensic extraction.  (Doc. 208, 
PAGEID 3526). 
 This issue was discussed during the oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for New 
Trial.  While the Cellebrite’s omission of notes 121 and 221 when generating a report is 
troubling, it is undisputed that Defendant and his trial counsel had access to the full  
forensic extraction of Item 60.   Moreover, because Defendant believed certain videos 
were missing from the extraction, the Court delayed the start of trial and gave Defendant 
an opportunity to review all the evidence from the iPhones  with counsel.  (Doc.  150, 
PAGEID 647, 665).  During this period of review, Defendant himself was given access to 
the actual phones to review the information contained on the phones.  (Doc. 150, PAGEID 
661-665).3  Therefore, the Court concludes that there is insufficient support for any claim 
of evidence tampering ; and any technical difficulties with printing the report from the 
forensic extraction of Item 60 did not prevent Defendant and his counsel from having 
access to the full extraction. 
 B. Ineffective assistance of counsel 
 “It is well settled that in order to prevail on a motion for new trial based upon 
 
3The Court explained: 
 
I do have a concern that Jamal says he's not been able to see all of this material, 
so I'd like to accomplish that.  And then I'm thinking, just to be on the safe side – 
 
Not to rush you guys, but I think we start a trial Wednesday to give an opportunity 
for them to review, do what we have talked about, and then pick a jury on 
Wednesday. Then that gives counsel and Jamal time to discuss what they've seen 
or not seen. 
 
(Doc. 150, PAGEID 665).
 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that: (1) counsel's 
performance was deficient; and (2) it prejudiced the defense in a manner which deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial.”  United States v. Garcia, 19 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).   However, “[w]hen deciding 
ineffective-assistance claims, courts need not address both” the deficient performance 
and prejudice “components of the inquiry ‘if the defendant makes an insufficient showing 
on one.’”  Campbell v. United States , 364 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 
 An attorney's performance is deficient if “counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.  The 
defendant must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 
687.  The Court must apply “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable assistance.”  Id. at 689. “[T]he defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 To show prejudice, the defendant must establish “a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 694. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding,” but “the defendant need not show 
that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Id. 
at 693.  Instead, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694. 
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 Defendant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present 
or discuss evidence which would corroborate his moviemaking endeavor .  Defendant 
identifies the following evidence: (1) notes in his iCloud account detailing the themes and 
plot of “American Cartel;” (2) a recording of his meeting with Hollywood executives who 
were interested in the movie; and (3) a recording of a rap song Defendant helped create 
for the sizzle reel for the movie. 
 As to the notes in his iCloud account, Defendant’s current counsel has found four 
notes discussing or otherwise indicating Defendant’s  plan to produce a movie called  
“American Cartel.”  While three of the notes were admitted into evidence at trial through 
Government Exhibit C20, Defendant argues that  his trial attorney  did not present or 
meaningfully discuss that evidence at trial.  The fourth note is contained in Defendant’s 
iCloud extraction report, but it was never introduced into evidence. Defendant argues that 
this note  (the “movie scenes re-do” note”) is the most important.   The note reads  as 
follows: 
Body: Movie scenes redo. First side of the ( American 
cartel complete in head ) now it is time to start the 
corporate side of things. Get corporate position with 
pharmaceutical company to get real insight  
 
Create chart that shows thousands of kilos and pounds 
at a time this time, not in the drugs that are most 
associated with the American consumer in the street 
level. It’ll be kilos of OxyCodon, volume and other 
pharmaceutical medication that we can use in t he 
movie showing how America got hundreds of billions of 
kilos of their drug of choice and sold/ sell them legally 
It is a must that I use real life people who are familiar 
with drugs on the pharmaceutical end to get real life 
corporate snow on the bluff l ike material. This is why 
corporate position at a pharmaceutical or logistics 
company is important  
 
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This will be a small list of the corporate/legal drug 
dealers and how they purchase kilos of medication by 
the Ton that is a lot deadlier than street drugs of ( 
cocaine/ marijuana ) and use them to make billions of 
dollars on behalf of their pharmaceutical companies 
and even file taxes on these drugs ! Film will also depict 
how pharmaceutical companies influence drug related 
laws to eliminate minority dealers while simultaneously 
allowing the big ones to clown. Vaccinations will be 
shown to be created after viruses are made in a lab. 
The pharmaceutical companies make the viruses in 
labs to put out in public so that in turn the companies 
conspire with a politician to create thr bs virus / disease 
just so they can make vaccinations and charge the govt 
/ people billions of dollars . Govt selling things to itself 
 
Movie will show main character, starting as a street 
hustler making hundreds of thousand and eventually 
millions at the street level. Once main character 
escapes the streets, a lot of his guys he grew up with 
will continue to sell drugs . They all get caught and get 
sentenced to multiple life sentences by judge with no 
remorse. The main character, moves on gets a degree 
in business, gets a position as a top executive at a 
pharmaceutical company. He’s in charge of budgeting 
and approving dollar amount for th e legitimate drug 
purchasing. He attends a dinner with the big wigs of the 
pharmaceutical and government officials and realizes 
that they all conspire to legitimize the sell of legal drugs 
that tend to be a lot more deadly and addictive while 
joking about putting the “ niggas and other minorities “ 
in prison for the rest of their lives because they don’t 
value their lives. This causes the main character to 
start not only recording conversations from top 
politicians and govt officials, but he begins the idea of 
taking His information to the nato/ United Nations to 
make a human rights complaint just to realize that they 
were in on it. 
 
(Doc. 203-1, PAGEID 3436).   
The Court notes that according to this “movie scenes re -do” note, “American 
Cartel” revolves around the pharmaceutical industry's proliferation of Oxycodone through 
various means. However, none of the trial exhibits reference or show Oxycodone, which 
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would be in keeping with this plot line.  Rather, the evidence submitted by the Government 
deals with Defendant's involvement in the marijuana trade – which he admits – along with 
cocaine and fentanyl trafficking. In addition, Defendant's reliance on the sizzle reel is 
misplaced.  As with his boxing promoter/trainer activity, two things can be true at the same 
time.  Defendant did manage boxers, but he also used this opportunity to recruit young 
men into his drug trafficking enterprise.  The sizzle reel and his real criminal activity could 
easily contemporaneously exist .  Therefore, even if the jury had known that Defendant 
was developing a movie called “American Cartel,” Defendant has not shown a reasonable 
probability the jury would have concluded that Defendant was not involved in a narcotics 
conspiracy and the outcome of his trial would have been different. 
As to the recording of Defendant’s meeting with Hollywood executives (Defendant 
Exhibit 5), the Government points out that this recording contains metadata which shows 
that the meeting occurred on May 5, 2022.  This date is after Defendant was interviewed 
by agents and his phones were seized in late 2021.  Defendant testified that it was at this 
meeting that the Hollywood executives advised him t o create a sizzle reel for “American 
Cartel.”  (Doc. 181, P AGEID 1400).  Therefore, the  metadata calls into question 
Defendant’s timeline and would have discredited his testimony that he began filming the 
sizzle reel in 2020.  (See Doc. 179, PAGEID 1188).  Even if the Court were to find that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not presenting this evidence at trial , Defendant did not suffer 
any prejudice as a result.  Defendant was able to testify about this meeting at trial.  (Doc. 
179, PAGEID 1309).  Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the jury would 
have concluded based on the recording of the meeting that Defendant was not a part of a 
narcotics conspiracy.  The jury also considered the other evidence from Defendant’s 
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phones: text messages with co- conspirators; photographs of fentanyl, cocaine, and 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia;  videos related to the trafficking of these drugs ; and 
drug ledgers in Defendant’s iPhone notes. 
As to the recording of the rap song Defendant helped create for the “American 
Cartel” sizzle reel  (Defendant Exhibit 6) , Defendant argues that trial counsel  was 
ineffective for  failing to explain that the song was an affirmative step Defendant took 
towards creating the movie.   Defendant argue s that the song recording was exculpatory 
evidence and should have been presented at trial. 
As Defendant is correct to point out : “An attorney's failure to present available 
exculpatory evidence is ordinarily deficient, unless some cogent tactical or other 
consideration justified it.” Caldwell v. Lewis , 2011 WL 915764 at *6 (6th Cir. March 16, 
2011) (quoting Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotes omitted).  
However, the Court is not convinced that the song recording  was exculpatory because it 
does not directly show that Defendant was not participating in a narcotics conspiracy.  See 
United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “explicitly 
exculpatory” evidence is evidence that “tend[s] to negate directly the guilt of the 
defendant”).  In addition, even if counsel ’s failure to introduce the recording of the song 
amounted to deficient performance, t he Court fails to see how the trial's outcome would 
have been different had the jury known about the song recording .  The metadata for the 
recording shows a date of February 1, 2022, which was after Defendant was questioned 
by agents in December of 2021.  The jury could have viewed the song recording as a post 
hoc explanation for the other evidence of cocaine and fentanyl trafficking, or as explained 
above, even if the song recording corroborated Defendant’s “sizzle reel” theory, it does 
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not eliminate the possibility  that Defendant was also involved in trafficking cocaine and 
fentanyl.  In light of this evidence, Defendant has not shown prejudice.   See Hodge v. 
Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 375 n. 17 (6th Cir.  2005) (“[T]he prejudice determination is 
necessarily affected by the quantity and quality of other evidence against the defendant.”).  
The Court concludes that Defendant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel 
based on trial counsel’s failure to present or discuss the evidence identified by Defendant.   
 Defendant also claims ineffective assistance of counsel  based on trial counsel’s 
failure to prepare him to testify.  Defendant explains that trial counsel attempt ed to rest 
without him taking the stand , but he  insisted upon testifying after his counsel failed to 
introduce key pieces of evidence.   
The trial transcript shows that after the Government rested its case, trial counsel 
explained that on behalf of Defendant, he was “ not going to put any  evidence on, and I 
want to go on the record that my client  does not wish to take the stand after conferring 
with me time  and time again. So I want the record to reflect that he was  given the 
opportunity to testify but he's chosen not to.   I'm saying that in open court and my client 
is present.”  (Doc. 195, PAGEID 3337).  The Court then advised Defendant of his absolute 
right not to testify.   (Doc. 195, PAGEID 3337).  Defendant confirmed on the record that 
he had conferred with counsel and decided that he was not going to testify.  (Doc. 195 , 
PAGEID 3338).  However, later that same day, Defendant changed his mind.  (Doc. 195, 
PAGEID 3350).   At that time, t he Court advised Defendant that “[b] y taking the stand, 
you're exposing yourself to cross -examination by the government. I just want to make 
sure that you know you have an absolute right not to testify, but it's your call at the end of 
the day.”  (Doc. 195, PAGEID 3350).  Defendant confirmed that he wished to testify.  (Doc. 
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195, PAGEID 3350) (“I'm absolutely positive that's what I want to do.”).  The next day, the 
Court once again advised Defendant that if he waive d his right to not testify, then the 
Government would be able to ask him questions under cross -examination.  ( Doc. 179, 
PAGEID 1094).  Defendant again confirmed that he wanted to testify.  (Doc. 179, PAGEID 
1095).  The jury was brought in and Defendant’s trial counsel requested to have the case 
reopened.  (Doc. 179, PAGEID 1095) (“On behalf of Mr. Binford, notwithstanding the fact 
that I rested before the jury, I  respectfully request the Court to allow me to reopen the 
case so that Mr. Binford can address the jury.”).  The Court granted the motion and 
Defendant began to testify.  (Doc. 179, PAGEID 1096). 
Defendant has not specified what further preparation would have resulted in a 
different outcome at trial. 4  Defendant was fully advised of his right to not testify.   If 
Defendant did not feel adequately prepared to give testimony, he was informed that it was 
his absolute right to decide whether to testify and he did not have to proceed. Accord 
United States v. Noel, No. 7:18-CR-2-KKC-CJS, 2024 WL 5294361, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 
29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR 7:18-2-KKC, 2024 WL 5055832 
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2024).  Therefore, Defendant has not shown ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on trial counsel’s preparation for him to testify at trial. 
Finally, Defendant argues that his trial counsel argued against his interests.  
 
4For instance, Defendant explains that trial counsel was unprepared because he did not 
show the jury the recording of Defendant’s meeting with the Hollywood executives after 
Defendant himself told the jury that they would see the video.  (Doc. 181, PAGEID 1399-1400) 
(“we’ll play the video for the jury”); (Doc. 179, PAGEID 1309) (“you’ll see the video”).  However, 
as explained above, the metadata from the recording would have contradicted Defendant’s 
timeline of events and discredited his own testimony that he began filming the sizzle reel in 
2020.  Defendant also states that he was unprepared to be cross-examined on statements from 
his affidavit; but the affidavit was introduced in the Government’s case-in-chief (Government 
Exhibit 66) and contained Defendant’s own statements, so questions about the statements 
should have come as no surprise to Defendant. 
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Defendant points to two comments made by his trial counsel: (1) trial counsel told th e 
Court that the motion to dismiss had no merit and Defendant’s request to review the 
evidence from his iPhones on the morning of trial was a “delay tactic;” and (2) trial counsel 
effectively told this Court that Defendant was guilty and the evidence against him was  
“overwhelming.”  Defendant maintains that this conduct must be evaluated under United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
 Defendant’s reliance on Cronic is misplaced.   In  Cronic, the Supreme Court 
identified three circumstances “so likely to prejudice the accused” that a “presumption of 
prejudice” may be appropriate. 466 U.S. at 658- 60. Those circumstances include (1) 
where a defendant “is denied counsel at a critical stage” of the proceeding; (2) where 
“counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing;” 
and (3) where counsel is made to represent a client where no lawyer could provide 
effective assistance.  Id. at 659-60.  None of these circumstances exist here.  Defendant 
has not presented any evidence that his trial counsel was “physically absent throughout 
an entire phase of the litigati on or that a state actor prevented [trial] counsel from 
adequately representing him.”  Moss v. Miniard, 62 F.4th 1002, 1012-13 (6th Cir. 2023).  
In addition, the record shows that  before and during the thirteen -day trial, Defendant’s 
trial counsel meaningfully prepared for and participated in the trial, and subjected the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.  Trial counsel consult ed with 
Defendant, objected to exhibits and cross-examined the Government's witnesses.  While 
Defendant has identified two isolated comments made by trial counsel, t he Sixth Circuit 
has explained that, under Chronic, “[u]ltimately, an ‘attorney's failure must be complete’ 
rather than failing to act ‘at specific points[.]’ ” Id. at 1012-13.  Therefore, the Court will 
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employ the traditional two-part test for ineffective assistance found in Strickland. 
At the outset, the Court notes that trial counsel’s comments were made outside the 
presence of the jury.  As to the substance of the comments themselves, the Court finds 
that the comments were “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.  As another district court has explained, 
counsel is not required to raise meritless arguments: 
The Sixth Circuit has made clear that “there can be no constitutional 
deficiency” in failing to raise meritless arguments.  Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 
408, 413 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Ludwig v. United States , 162 F.3d 456, 
459 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that counsel “[is] not required to make meritless 
arguments to avoid a charge of ineffective assistance of counsel”); see also 
Horn v. Lafler , 10 -680, 2014 WL 4983659, at *34 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 
2014) (“Substantial deference is given to counsel's decisions not to raise an 
argument.”). 
 
United States v. Bartleson, No. 5:17 -CR-124, 2025 WL 4706383, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted , 2026 WL 636676 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 
2026).  Given the timing and nature of the comments, trial counsel’s performance did not 
fall below “an objective standard of reasonableness” in light of “prevailing professional 
norms.”  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.  Moreover, Defendant has not 
explained how he was prejudiced by the comments.  Accord Breedlove v. United States, 
816 F. Supp. 3d 800, 807 (M.D. Tenn. 2026)  (even assuming that counsel rendered 
deficient performance during the plea-bargaining process when she told the court that the 
defendant was guilty, the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails on the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland test). 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is not granted a new trial based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
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 C. Motion to withdraw 
 Defendant maintains that the Court i mproperly denied trial counsel’s Motion to 
Withdraw.  Defendant explains that the Court did not focus on trial counsel’s knowledge 
of the evidence and preparation for trial. 
 The Sixth Circuit has explained that “where a district court is on notice of a criminal 
defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel, the court has an affirmative duty to inquire as to 
the source and nature of that dissatisfaction—regardless of whether the attorney is court -
appointed or privately retained.”  Rodriguez Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625, 634 
(6th Cir.2008).  To satisfy this duty, district courts “simply must allow a defendant the 
opportunity to explain the attorney -client conflict as he perceives it.” United States v. 
Marrero, 651 F.3d 453, 465 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Vasquez , 560 F.3d 
461, 467 (6th Cir. 2009)).   In deciding a motion to withdraw, the following factors are to 
be considered: 
(1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into 
the matter, (3) the extent of the conflict between the attorney and client and 
whether it was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication 
preventing an adequate defense, and (4) the balancing of these factors with 
the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. 
 
United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 Here, Defendant raised his dissatisfaction with counsel on the eve of trial.  (Doc. 
150, PAGEID 644).  The granting of Defendant’s request would have necessitated a last-
minute continuance.  The Court inquired as to the nature of the conflict in open court and 
in ex parte discussions.  Despite the request to withdraw, Defendant and his trial counsel 
were still communicating with one another.
5  The disagreement between trial counsel and 
 
5For example, Defendant’s trial attorney explained: “I've discussed at length the 
government's position on resolving this matter by plea negotiation probably for like the last week 
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Defendant was centered on Defendant’s belief that there were certain videos missing 
from the evidence produced by the Government .  Defendant believed that  trial counsel 
needed to subpoena phone records directly from Apple and the phone carriers,  but trial 
counsel believed it was unnecessary.  There was an extensive discussion of the issue by 
both Defendant and trial counsel  before the Court .  ( Doc. 150, PAGEID 648-669).  A 
solution was reached whereby the start of trial was delayed, Defendant was given access 
to the phones and had an opportunity to review the information on the phones along with 
his attorney.  (Doc. 150, PAGEID 666).  Defendant did not raise any further objections to 
trial counsel’s representation; and therefore, the Court perceived that the conflict between 
Defendant and his trial counsel had been cured. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is not granted a new trial based upon this 
Court’s denial of his Motion to Withdraw. 
 D. Request for a continuance 
Defendant maintains  that the Court improperly denied his request for a 
continuance to retain a private expert to review his phone.   Defendant explains that a 
continuance would have made it possible for a phone extraction expert to testify. 
As explained above, on the eve of trial, Defendant raised concerns about evidence 
it believed the Government had withheld and wanted to fire his attorney because he did 
not subpoena phone records from Apple and the phone carriers. (Doc. 150, PAGEID 647-
651).  The Government explained that it had produced and made available the forensic  
extractions of the phones .  (Doc. 150, P AGEID 652-53).  After an extensive discussion 
 
or so, Judge. I've been communicating with him regarding plea negotiations in person at the 
Campbell County Jail. I have explained to him each and every offer that the government has 
made, including the offers articulated by the government this morning.”  (Doc. 150, PAGEID 
646). 
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between the Court, Defendant and his trial counsel and the Government, Defendant and 
his attorney were given access to the physical phones for inspection.  (Doc. 150, PAGEID 
656-57).  Defendant discovered that on one iPhone (Item 60), there was a note with a 
save date of February 18, 2023, which was f ive days after his phones were seized, and 
two days after it was placed into ATF’s locked evidence vault.  Defendant’s trial counsel 
maintained that someone had deleted a video and note from Item 60.  (Doc. 191, PAGEID 
2640-43).  Defendant moved to dismiss the Indictment.  The Court denied the motion, but 
explained that the issue “was fertile ground for cross -examination when agents testify.”  
(Doc. 191, PAGEID 2660).  Defendant then requested a continuance to allow an expert 
to examine Item 60.  The Court denied this request.  (Doc. 191, PAGEID 2661). 
When presented with a motion for a continuance: 
[the Sixth Circuit] has granted district courts wide discretion when 
determining whether a district court's denial of a criminal defendant's 
request for a trial continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Lewis, 605 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2010).  A district court's denial 
of a continuance is typically considered an abuse of discretion only when it 
has made its ruling based on “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.”  Vasquez, 560 
F.3d at 466 (quoting Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 11– 12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 
75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)).   Further, in order for the district court's ruling to 
warrant reversal, a defendant must show that the denial of the continuance 
caused him actual prejudice in the defense of his case.  To show actual 
prejudice, the defendant must establish that the continuance “would have 
made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense.”  
United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 
United States v. Johnson, 612 F. App'x  345, 353 (6th Cir. 2015) .  Defendant has not 
established that a continuance would have added something to the defense.  Defendant 
was free on cross-examination to inquire about the discrepancy in the “save dates.”  He 
was also permitted to testify about the actual events which took place in the videos which 
he claimed had been deleted from his phone. 
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is not granted a new trial based upon this 
Court’s denial of his request for a continuance. 
 E. Prosecutorial misconduct 
Defendant argues prosecutorial misconduct based on (1) the failure to correct 
untrue or misleading testimony and (2) misleading statements made in rebuttal closing 
argument. 
With regard to the failure to correct untrue or misleading testimony, this Court has 
explained that the prosecution's reliance on false testimony could serve as grounds for a 
new trial under Rule 33: 
“The knowing use of perjured testimony, including the failure to correct false 
testimony, constitutes a denial of due process if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury.”  Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 391- 92 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Napue 
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959)). “In 
order to prevail on his claim that his conviction was obtained with the use of 
evidence that the prosecution knew or should have known was false, ‘the 
moving party must show (1) the statements were actually false; (2) the 
statements were material, ...; and (3) [the] prosecution knew they were 
false.’ ” United States v. O'Dell , 805 F.2d 637, 641- 42 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(quoting United States v. Chagra, 735 U.S. F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 
United States v. Thompson, No. 2:21 -CR-173(1), 2024 WL 4473930, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 
Oct. 11, 2024).  Here, Defendant has not shown that the statements he has identified are 
actually false.   
First, Defendant points to the testimony of Agent Ruchti who stated that there was 
no evidence that Defendant made “American Cartel. ”  The Court notes that w hile 
Defendant testified that he had plans to make a movie called “American Cartel,” there 
was no evidence that the movie was ever made. 
Next, Defendant argues Agent Ruchti falsely testified there was no evidence that 
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18 
 
Defendant owned a marijuana- related business entity.   However, the question Agent 
Ruchti was asked was whether he found evidence that Defendant “obtained a license to 
run or sell growing operations of marijuana.”  (Doc. 189, PAGEID 2452).  Agent Ruchti 
replied: 
I have not. I have searched the phone for emails related to that, messages 
related to that from an entity that would issue that, as well as attempted to 
search the Oklahoma and Texas websites for businesses related to that 
with Jamal Binford.  We found nothing. 
 
(Doc. 189, PAGEID 2452). 
 Finally, Defendant explains that Agent Ruchti testified that no search was 
conducted of the Lexington Avenue property , but Defendant has submitted a photo with 
his motion showing what he claims are federal agents  on the sidewalk outside the 
Lexington address.  (Doc. 203- 3, PAGEID 3466).  However, the Court notes that it was 
Ruchti’s testimony that as a part of his investigation, a search warrant was never obtained 
for the property.  (Doc. 189, PAGEID 2464).  
With regard to any misleading statements made in rebuttal closing argument, this 
Court has explained: “When considering whether conduct by the Government rises to the 
level of prosecutorial misconduct that requires a new trial, the Court first determines 
whether the conduct was improper.”  United States v. Flynn, No. 2:19-CR-208, 2023 WL 
2552741, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2023)  (citing United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 
613 (6th Cir. 2004)).  “Next, the Court considers whether the conduct was ‘flagrant.’”  Id.  
The following factors are relevant in determining whether the conduct was flagrant:  “1) 
whether the statements tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; 2) whether 
the statements were isolated or among a series of improper statements; 3) whether the 
statements were deliberately or accidentally before the jury; and 4) the total  strength of 
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19 
 
the evidence against the accused.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 
549–50 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
Defendant points to remarks by the prosecutor in rebuttal closing argument  that 
there was “no shred of any movie,” and an invitation to the jury to “look through the 
evidence. It’s not there.”  (Doc. 203, PAGEID 3430).  These statements do not amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct.   As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “[t]he  prosecutor is 
ordinarily entitled to wide latitude in rebuttal argument and may fairly respond to 
arguments made by defense counsel.”  United States v. Montgomery, 358 F. App'x 622, 
631 (6th Cir. 2009)  (quoting United States v. Wall , 130 F.3d 739, 745 (6th Cir.1997) ).  
Here, there was no evidence that the “American Cartel” movie was ever made  and the 
prosecutor could fairly respond to the argument that any evidence showing fentanyl and 
cocaine distribution were actually for a movie Defendant was creating. 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is not granted a new trial based upon 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Jamal Binford's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 203) 
is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
            /s/ Michael R. Barrett       
Michael R. Barrett 
United States District Judge 
 
 
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