govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00764-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
CLARENCE DACE, N22471, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-764-DWD 
 ) 
ASST. WARDEN HVARRE, ) 
DR. LARSON, ) 
T A T E , ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
DUGAN, District Judge: 
Plaintiff Clarence Dace, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections 
(IDOC) currently detained at Big Muddy River Correctional Center (Big Muddy), brings 
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his 
constitutional rights. (Doc. 1) . Plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated his 
rights by failing to pr ovide treatment for multiple conditions. Plaintiff has also filed a 
related Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 2). 
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A . Under Section 1915A, the Co urt is required to screen 
prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b) . 
Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law 
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) . At this juncture, Page ID
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the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. 
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). 
The Complaint 
Plaintiff alleges that on March 23, 2023, wh ile detained at Stateville Correctional 
Center, he was informed that he had prosta te cancer. (Doc. 1 at 6). By way of 
background, he explains that in 2013 he was successfully treated for kidney cancer. (Id.). 
In August of 2023 and June of 2024 while at Stateville, Plaintiff was treated for his prostate 
cancer at the University of Illinois Chicago medical center. However, in September of 
2024 he was transferred to Dixon Correctional Center where he alleges he received no 
treatment. (Id. at 6-7). In April of 2025, Plaintiff was transferred to Big Muddy, where he 
has continued efforts to seek care. (Id. at 7). 
Plaintiff alleges that he has written to the go vernor, to no avail. (Doc. 1 at 7). He 
also alleges that on May 16, 2025, he saw Defendant Dr. Larson and discussed his prostate 
and former kidney cancer, and his desire for ongoing prostate care. He alleges Dr. Larson 
promised x-rays, but nothing has happened, despite Plaintiff raising the lack of progress 
at an August 21, 2025, follow-up with Dr. Larson. (Doc. 1 at 9). 
In addition to the prostate cancer issue, Plaintiff alleges he a l s o i n f o r m e d D r . 
Larson of problems with his right knee that were being treated at Stateville, and he 
showed Dr. Larson a lump that had formed on his abdomen recently. At the August 2025 
follow-up, he informed Dr. Larson that th e lump had grown, and that his knee was 
causing constant pain. Plaintiff claims that at Stateville he had been told he needed knee 
replacement surgery, and he alleges he was taken outside the prison for care multiple Page ID
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times for his knee. He alleges that Dr. Larson has not acted to provide any care. Plaintiff 
faults Defendants Hvarre and Tate for having multiple face-to-face conversations with 
him about his three discrete medical issues, for promising to follow-up, and for failing to 
ensure that he has received any care. 
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following 
claim: 
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment delib erate indifference claim against 
Defendants Dr. Larson, Hvarre, and Tate for denying or 
delaying care for Plaintiff’s prostate cancer, chronic right 
knee pain, and lump on Plaintiff’s abdomen. 
 
The parties and the Court will use these design ations in all future pleadings and orders 
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned 
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without 
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does 
not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”). 
Analysis 
 An Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of medical care consists of 
an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir. 
2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious medical condition (i.e., an 
objective standard) and also show that each defendant responded with deliberate 
indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). Id. To satisfy the subjective component, a 
prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Page ID
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inmate health. Greeno v. Daley , 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) . Neither medical 
malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judg ment will amount to 
deliberate indifference. Id. Additionally, an inmate is no t entitled to demand specific 
care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of acceptable courses of care. 
Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 Plaintiff’s allegations against Dr. Larson may proceed at this juncture because he 
alleges three discrete conditions that the Court will assume are serious for the purpose of 
initial screening, and he alleges that Dr. Larson has failed to implement any sort of care 
to diagnose, monitor, or treat his serious conditions, despite knowing that he was in pain 
and that he previously had ongoing trea tment managed by outside providers at 
Stateville. Plaintiff may also proceed against Defendants Hvarre and Tate on the theory 
that they have turned a blind eye or refused to assist in securing care for his three medical 
conditions. 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 
 In the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff primarily reiterates facts from 
his complaint. He alleges Dr. Larson promised to begin care, but has not done so, and 
Defendants Hvarre and Tate have not followed through on his requests for assistance in 
securing care. As relief, Plaintiff specifical ly asks that the Court contact IDOC Director 
Latoya Hughes to recommend his transfer to another facility where he may receive care. 
(Doc. 2 at 6). He also asks that the Court issue a protective order to stop recent false 
disciplinary reports. (Id.). Page ID
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To seek a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: a likelihood of success 
on the merits of his claim; no adequate remedy at law; and irreparable harm without the 
injunctive relief. See Mays v. Dart , 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) . As for the first 
requirement, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any likelihood of success—
in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM General Corp. v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). “A movant’s likelihood of success 
on the merits must be strong.” Tully v. Okeson , 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) . While 
Plaintiff is not required to “show that [he] definitely will win the case…a mere possibility 
of success is not enough,” and he must make “[a] strong showing th at [he] is likely to 
succeed on the merits.” Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker , 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020) . 
A strong showing typically entails a demonstration of how the applicant intends to prove 
key elements of his case. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker , 973 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir. 
2020); Doe v. University of Southern Indiana , 43 F.4th 784, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2022) (the court 
is not required to make inferences in the movant’s favor when considering preliminary 
injunctive relief). 
The Court must also decide whether an a d e q u a t e r e m e d y a t l a w e x i s t s a n d 
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Irreparable 
harm is harm which cannot be repaired. Graham v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 296 
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down 
a ga i n , a ton e d f o r. T h e i n j u ry m u s t b e of a particular nature, so that compensation in 
money cannot atone for it.”). The Court must then weigh “t he balance of harm to the 
parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction Page ID
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on the public interest.” Id.; Korte v. Sebelius , 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013) . “This 
equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-sc ale analysis; the greater the likelihood of 
success of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s 
favor.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 665. 
An injunction that seeks an affirmativ e act by the respondent is a mandatory 
preliminary injunction and should be sparingly issued. Mays, 974 F.3d at 818 . If 
injunctive relief is warranted, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that the 
injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the 
harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626(a)(2). Injunctive relief must be related to issues in the underlying lawsuit. See e.g., 
Tatum v. Hunter, Case No. 22-2411 (S.D. Ill. 2023) (Doc. 16) (denying injunctive relief, 
including a request for a transfer, where the injunctive relief sought was not narrowly 
tailored and did not align with the claims in the case) aff’d in Tatum v. Hunter , Case No. 
23-2253 (7th Cir. May 16, 2024); Daniels v. Dumsdorff, et al. , Case No. 19-cv-394 (S.D. Ill. 
2019). 
 Plaintiff’s mention of relief related to a pr otective order or false discipline will not 
be addressed further because these allegations are legally distinct from the Eighth 
Amendment claim proceeding in this case, and Plaintiff has not linked this allegation to 
the named defendants. The Court also does no t find it appropriate to direct a prison 
transfer because that is an extraordinary measure and implicates prison security. 
However, the Court will direct the defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s assertion that he Page ID
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has been waiting since May of 2025 for care related to alleged prostate cancer, chronic 
right knee issues, and a lump on his abdomen. 
Disposition 
Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives against Defendants Dr. Larson, Hvarre, 
and Tate. Hvarre shall be served in individual and official capacity, and shall respond 
to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) in official capacity within 21 
days of returning an executed waiver of service. 
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Dr. Larson, Tate, and 
Hvarre (individual and official capacity): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to 
Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk 
is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), the Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place 
of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the 
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the 
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on 
Defendant, and the Court will require Defendan t to pay the full costs of formal service, 
to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If a Defendant cannot be found at the wo r k a d d r e s s p r o v i d e d b y P l a i n t i f f , t h e 
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not 
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for 
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation Page ID
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of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be 
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. 
 Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to 
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g) . 
Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need on ly respond to the issues stated in this 
Merits Review Order. 
 If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment 
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, 
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A). 
 Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk 
of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not 
independently investigate his wh ereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later 
than 14 days after a change of address occurs . Failure to comply with this order will 
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this 
action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case 
because it will involve the exchange of medical records. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 8, 2026 
 ________________________ 
 D A V I D W . D U G A N 
 U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t J u d g e 
 
Judge 
Dugan
Digitally signed 
by Judge Dugan 
Date: 2026.06.08 
22:43:52 -05'00' Page ID
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 NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF 
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,
the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will 
likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,
but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants
have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, disco very, and procedures. Plainti ff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court. 
 
The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles
that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but
it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clea r. As noted above, surviving initial screening
only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some
relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged 
actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is
the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear. Page ID
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