govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_26-cv-01937-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

PSG OF SARASOTA, LLC, *
also known as IV SOLUTIONS RX
*
Plaintiff,
* Civil Action No. RDB-26-1937
v.
*
VALERIE CAMPBELL,
*
Defendant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter arises from a dispute between Plaintiff PSG of Sarasota, LLC also known as
IV Solutions RX (“Plaintiff” or “IV Solutions”) and its former employee Defendant Valerie
Campbell (“Defendant” or “Ms. Campbell”) regarding IV Solutions’ confidential patient
information. Between January 2024 and her resignation on May 15, 2026, Ms. Campbell
worked as a registered nurse at IV Solutions, a specialty pharmacy that offers patients in-home
infusion treatments. On May 15, 2026, IV Solutions initiated this action by filing in this Court
a five -Count Complaint alleging that Ms. Campbell misappropriated confidential patient
information while attempting to obtain employment with its direct competitor, TidalHealth
Infusion Center. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19 –52, 109.) IV Solutions alleges against Ms. Campbell:
(1) breach of duty of loyalty (Count I); (2) violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act
(“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836 et seq. (Count II); (3) violation of the Maryland Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (“MUTSA”), MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-201 et seq. (Count III); (4) unfair
competition (Count IV); and (5) temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction (Count V).
See generally (ECF No. 1).

Presently pending before this Court is IV Solutions’ Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) (“Plaintiff’s Motion” ).1 Ms. Campbell has
responded in Opposition (ECF No. 10), and, on June 8, 2026, this Court heard oral arguments
from the parties, see (ECF No. 13) . For the reasons set forth on the record and elaborated
below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
IV Solutions is an independent specialty pharmacy that employs registered nurses to
provide in-home medical care, including infusion treatments, to patients. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1 –
2; ECF No. 2-2 ¶¶ 5–6.) IV Solutions’ Chief Operating Officer and Clinical Specialist, Victoria
Starr (“Ms. Starr”), asserts that such nurses help IV Solutions develop customer goodwill by
fostering relationships with patients during in-home treatments. (ECF No. 2-2 ¶¶ 10–12.) IV
Solutions receives patients via referral from physicians, and it then assigns one of its registered
nurses to each patient.
I. Ms. Campbell’s employment with IV Solutions
Between January 2024 and May 15, 2026, Ms. Campbell worked as a registered nurse
at IV Solutions. At the hearing of June 8, 2026, Ms. Starr testified that Ms. Campbell became
employed with IV Solutions after she responded to an online job posting. Immediately prior
to working for IV Solutions, Ms. Campbell worked at a n infusion suite with Dr. Ivonne
Herrera (“Dr. Herrera”), a dermatologist who refers patients for infusion treatments. During
the same period that Ms. Campbell responded to IV Solutions’ online job posting, Ms. Starr

1 As confirmed with counsel on the record, this Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 2) as a Motion
for Preliminary Injunction because Ms. Campbell had notice of the requested relief and filed an Opposition
(ECF No. 10), and this Court held an adversary hearing on the matter.

separately coordinated with Dr. Herrera to take on her patients for infusion treatments.
Specifically, Ms. Starr learned that Dr. Herrera intended to close one of her infusion suites and
wished to refer patients treated at that suite to IV Solutions for in-home treatments.
Although Ms. Campbell worked at IV Solutions continuously between January 2024
and May 15, 2026, her status varied throughout her employment. IV Solutions employs both
per diem nurses and full-time nurses. Per diem nurses work on a day -by-day basis, do not
receive benefits, and do not have guaranteed caseloads. Importantly, IV Solutions permits per
diem nurses to maintain dual employment, including employment with competitors. Unlike
per diem nurses, full -time nurses receive benefits , have guaranteed caseloads , and are not
permitted to maintain employment with its competitors. Between March 2024 and December
2024, Ms. Campbell worked as a per diem nurse. Between December 2024 and April 2025,
she became a full-time nurse. Finally, from April 2025 until December 2025, she returned to
per diem employment before again switching to full-time work in December 2025 through
her resignation on May 15, 2026. At various times between January 2024 and May 2026, Ms.
Campbell was dually employed with both Dr. Herrera and IV Solutions.
IV Solutions assigns patients to nurses based on the nurse’s clinical skillset and caseload
and the patient’s age, gender, and medical needs . Its nurses are not permitted to select their
own patients and should only refuse patients if their schedule is full. Some of Ms. Campbell’s
assigned patients had been referred by Dr. Herrera and already knew Ms. Campbell from her
prior employment with Dr. Herrera. Many of these patients continued to receive medical care
from Dr. Herrera throughout the period in which they received in -home infusion treatments
from IV Solutions. Although Ms. Campbell also served patients who were referred to IV

Solutions by at least one other doctor, Dr. Michael Crouch , approximately 80 of her patients
were referred by Dr. Herrera.
Ms. Campbell’s duties included visiting patients in their homes, assessing their medical
conditions, determining if medication could be safely dispensed, and provid ing prescribed
medications via infusion. (ECF No. 2-1 at 4.) To facilitate such duties, IV Solutions provides
registered nurses like Ms. Campbell with patient -specific binders containing confidential
information pertinent to patient care, including: patient demographic and contact information,
allergy and medical information, physician orders , treatment and infusion rate flow sheets,
scheduling information, and other patient-care records. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20–21.) It limits access
to such information to personnel who need it to perform their duties, and it maintains policies
and procedures to prevent unauthorized use of the information. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Although IV
Solutions does not require its full-time nurses to sign restrictive covenant agreements, it
supplies customer privacy, confidential information, and employee loyalty expectations in
several policies: (1) a Confidentiality and Financial Incentive Attestation Policy, 2 (id. Ex. F);
(2) Conflict of Interest Guidelines, 3 (id. Ex. B); (3) a Business Code of Conduct, ( id. Ex. G);

2 In pertinent part, the Confidentiality and Financial Incentive Attestation Policy advises that employees shall
(a) “Adopt a high ethical standard of conduct in performance of duties;” (b) “Observe laws and regulations
governing business transactions;” (c) “Compete fairly with others;” . . . and (e) “Preserve the confidentiality of
individually identifiable health information.” (ECF No. 1 -7 at 2.) It identifies “areas of concern,” including:
“Using information to which an employee has access by reason of his or her position by disclosing such
information to competitors (e.g., financial information, technical information, or trade secrets) or using suc h
information for his or her own benefit.” (Id. at 3.)
3 These Guidelines provide that “no employee is permitted to participate in any activity that is in direct
competition to the pharmacy or accept financial gain through that activity.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 5.)

(4) a Pledge of Confidentiality; 4 and (5) a Regulatory Compliance Policy, 5 (id. Ex. E). Ms.
Campbell signed many of these policies in January 2024.
II. Ms. Campbell’s resignation from IV Solutions
In April 2026, Ms. Campbell accepted employment with TidalHealth Infusion Center
(“TidalHealth”), a direct competitor of IV Solutions. (ECF No. 10-2 ¶ 7; ECF No. 2-2 ¶¶ 39–
40.) During the same period , Dr. Herrera intended to open an infusion suite at TidalHealth
and informed Ms. Campbell that she would stop referring her patients to IV Solutions and
begin referring them for infusion treatments at TidalHealth’s infusion suite.
On April 26, 2026, Ms. Campbell sent a notice of resignation via email to Ms. Starr.
(ECF No. 2-2 ¶ 28.) She set her resignation date as May 15, 2026, and provided three separate
lists of patients: (1) “a list of patients that will need a new nurse to take over care ,” which
largely included patients referred to IV Solutions by Dr. Crouch; (2) “a list of patients that
will need to be discharged from IV Solutions as they are going to receive their treatment at
the infusion suite of Dr. Herrera,” which largely included patients referred to IV Solutions by
Dr. Herrera; and (3) “a list of [medication name] patients that need to be discharged.” (Id. ¶¶
28–35.) According to Ms. Campbell, the patients in the third list were patients of Dr. Herrera
who were scheduled for upcoming office visits. Dr. Herrera informed Ms. Campbell that she

4 The Pledge of Confidentiality states:
Information regarding a patient of the pharmacy shall not be released to any sources outside
the pharmacy without the signed permission of the patient. Furthermore, information will
only be released internally on a need -to-know basis. All employees will not discuss patient
cases outside the pharmacy or with anyone not employed by the pharmacy unless they are
directly involved in the patient’s case.
(ECF No. 2-2 ¶¶ 52–55.)
5 The Regulatory Compliance Policy requires that patients’ “medical information and their names, addresses,
phone numbers, dates of birth, and social security numbers must be kept confidential.” (ECF No. 2-2 ¶ 59.)

intended to speak to those patients about transitioning their infusion services from IV
Solutions to TidalHealth at their upcoming appointments. The list of patients who needed a
new nurse included 14 patients, but the lists of patients to be discharged included
approximately 80 patients. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35.)
After IV Solutions requested clarification about the patients to be discharged, Ms.
Campbell allegedly admitted that she was attempting to divert patients to TidalHealth. (Id. ¶¶
39–40.) Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Campbell stated that she did not yet have a job offer from
TidalHealth, but she hoped that her ability to divert patients would help her obtain a position
there. ( Id.) Both Dr. Herrera and Ms. Campbell currently wor k at TidalHealth , but Ms.
Campbell testified that she had no formal job offer when she sent IV Solutions her notice of
resignation. (ECF No. 10-2 ¶¶ 5, 7.)
Ms. Starr testified at the hearing of June 8, 2026, that she called each of Ms. Campbell’s
patients to determine whether they wished to continue treatments with IV Solutions. She
understood after those calls that Ms. Campbell sought to divert patients to TidalHealth, but
she acknowledged that she has no personal knowledge of such solicitation. On April 27, 2026,
another nurse at IV Solution reported that Ms. Campbell had contacted her to state that she
had resigned and to suggest that she could send patients to TidalHealth. (ECF No. 2-3 ¶¶ 5–
6.) On April 29, 2026, IV Solutions’ counsel sent Ms. Campbell a letter alleging that her
conduct breached her duty of loyalty and demanded that she cease all patient solicitations.
(ECF No. 1 Ex. H.) IV Solutions also sent a Notice of Violation of Duty of Loyalty and Cease
and Desist letter to Dr. Herrera, (id. Ex. I). Dr. Herrera responded that “Valerie Campbell is
not [her] employee and [she is] not a beneficiary of the pursuit described . . . .” (Id. Ex. K.)

Ms. Campbell and IV Solutions thereafter agreed that she would remain employed at
IV Solutions through May 15, 2026, but she would no t attempt to solicit its patients, and
patients would continue to receive services through IV Solutions. (ECF No. 2 -2 ¶¶ 67–70.)
On May 8, 2026, a patient who received services from Ms. Campbell informed IV Solutions
that they were transferring to the infusion suite at TidalHealth. (Id. ¶ 72.) As of June 8, 2026,
nine patients have informed IV Solutions that they are trans ferring to the infusion suite at
TidalHealth. IV Solutions also alleges that patients have reported that Ms. Campbell removed
medical items necessary for treatment from their homes. Ms. Starr testified that IV Solutions
had to replace medical equipment that had been removed from the homes of some pat ients.
Ms. Starr further testified that patients have reported confusion about whether they are able
to continue in-home treatment with IV Solutions.
At the hearing of June 8, 2026, Ms. Campbell testified that she never solicited patients
to TidalHealth. She stated that Dr. Herrera informed her of her intent to stop referring
patients to IV Solutions and begin referring them to TidalHealth, but she did not participate
in any effort to encourage patients to switch to TidalHealth. She testified that in the week
before she sent her resignation notice, she informed patients—many of whom she had known
before she began working for IV Solutions in January 202 4—that she was resigning. Some
patients asked about her next steps, and she informed them that she was switching her
employment to TidalHealth. She also testified that she never removed medical items from
patients’ homes, she has not visited any patient’s home since her resignation, and she has not
had contact with any of her former patients since her resignation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remed [y] involving the exercise of very
far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough
Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 816 (4th Cir. 1991)). In determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, th is Court follow s the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), which requires a showing that:
(1) the movant is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief;
(3) the balance of equities favors the movant; and
(4) an injunction is in the public interest.
Id. at 20. The Court cannot issue a preliminary injunction unless the plaintiff makes a “clear
showing” that all four requirements are satisfied. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t,
979 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021).
ANALYSIS
For the reasons set forth on the record and expounded below, IV Solutions has not
met its burden to make a “clear showing” that it is likely to succeed on the merits of at least
one of its claims in this case. See Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle , 979 F.3d at 226 . IV Solutions
contends that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of duty of loyalty claim in Count
I; its misappropriation of trade secrets claims under federal and state law in Counts II and III,
respectively; and its unfair compet ition claim in Count IV. Nevertheless, as explained at the
hearing and below, it has not established at this preliminary stage that Ms. Campbell engaged
in solicitation as required to establish breach of duty of loyalty or unfair competition. Nor has

it shown, at this stage, that she likely misappropriated any trade secrets. The Court addresses
each claim in turn, grouping some claims together where appropriate.
A. IV Solutions has not established a likelihood of success on the merits as to its
misappropriation of trade secrets claims in Counts II and III
In Counts II and III, IV Solutions alleges that Ms. Campbell misappropriated trade
secrets in violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836, et
seq., and the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”), MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§§ 11-201 et seq., respectively. The standards for misappropriation of trade secrets under
both statutes are nearly identical: a plaintiff must show (1) that the documents are trade secrets
and (2) that the defendant misappropriated them. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836(b)(1), 1839(3),
1839(5); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-1201(c). As explained on the record, at this
preliminary stage, IV Solutions has not established the existence of a trade secret.
The DTSA and the MUTSA define a trade secret similarly. See Md. Physician’s Edge,
LLC v. Behram, No. DKC-17-2756, 2019 WL 4573417, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2019). Both
statutes require that (1) the information derives economic value from being not readily
ascertainable and (2) the owner of the purported trade secret employs reasonable measures to
keep the information secret. Id.; see MD. CODE COM. LAW § 11-1201(e); Brightview Grp., LP v.
Teeters, 441 F. Supp. 3d 115, 129 (D. Md. 2020). Courts may consider factors such as: (1) “the
amount or effort or money expended by [the plaintiff] in developing the information” and (2)
“the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others.” AirFacts, Inc. v. de Amezaga, 909 F.3d 84, 95 (4th Cir. 2018). As relevant to this case,
this Court has recognized that “sensitive patient information” may be a trade secret. Samirah
v. District Smiles, PLLC, Civ. No. MJM-21-829, 2025 WL 1018886, at *12 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2025)

(citing Behram, 2019 WL 4573417, at *5 –6). Patient information may not be a trade secret ,
however, where (1) it “‘was developed as an incident of the practice’ and was not the result of
‘an extraordinary amount of effort or money’ expended by the Plaintiff” and (2) “there were
no rules, regulations, or known procedures which restricted the availability of the patient
information only to select persons.” Ultimate Outdoor Movies, LLC v. FunFlicks, LLC, Civ. No.
SAG-18-2315, 2019 WL 2233535, at *17 (D. Md. May 23, 2019) (quoting Allan M. Dworkin,
D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal, 551 A.2d 947, 950 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)).
IV Solutions argues that the patient binders provided to Ms. Campbell are trade secrets
because they compile sensitive patient information and proprietary treatment plans developed
by its pharmacists. As explained on the record, however, they have not shown at this
preliminary stage that the content of the binders differs from the medical information available
to any medical provider. Where information “was developed as an incident of the practice”
without evidence of “an extraordinary amount of effort or money expended,” it generally is
not a trade secret. Id. at *17 (quoting Allan M. Dworkin, D.D.S., 551 A.2d at 950); see AirFacts,
909 F.3d at 95 (explaining ease of discoverability of information is relevant to status as trade
secret under Maryland law ). Thus, IV Solutions has not met its burden at this preliminary
stage to demonstrate that it can likely establish the existence of trade secrets as required to
succeed on the merits of its claims in Counts II and III.
B. IV Solutions has not established a likelihood of success on the merits as to its
breach of duty of loyalty and unfair competition claims in Counts I and IV
Nor has IV Solutions shown a likelihood of success on the merits as to its breach of
duty of loyalty claim in Count I or its unfair competition claim in Count IV. As to Count I,
Maryland recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty where a

plaintiff can “show (i) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (ii) breach of the duty owed by
the fiduciary to the beneficiary; and (iii) harm to the beneficiary.” Philips N. Am., LLC v. Hayes,
Civ. No. ELH -20-1409, 2020 WL 5407796, at *13 (D. Md. Sep. 9, 2020) (quoting Plank v.
Cherneski, 231 A.3d 436, 466 (Md. 2020)). “Under Maryland law, every employment contract
contains an ‘implied duty [of loyalty] that an employee act solely for the benefit of his employer
in all matters within the scope of em ployment.’” Id. (quoting Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner , 382
A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978)); Weichert Co. of Md., Inc. v. Faust, 19 A.3d 393, 318 (Md. 2011). An
employee may be liable for breach of a fiduciary duty where she engages in “a fraudulent,
unfair, or otherwise wrongful act such as misappropriation of trade secrets . . . or interference
with an employer’s business opportunities.” EndoSurg Med., Inc. v. EndoMaster, Inc., 71 F. Supp.
3d 525, 556 (D. Md. 2014).
Nevertheless, employees are permitted to “prepare or make arrangements to compete
with their employers prior to leaving,” and, after leaving, a former employee “may solicit his
former employer’s employees and customers without breaching the duty of loyalty unless he
does so through ‘misuse of his former employer’s trade secrets or confidential information.’”
Id. (quoting Metzner, 382 A.2d at 568); see also Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Anderson, Civ.
No. JKB-13-1708, 2014 WL 5797125, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2014). Importantly, Maryland’s
highest court has held that “solicitation of employer’s customers prior to cessation of
employment” may breach the duty of loyalty. Metzner, 382 A.2d at 569 (citing Ritterpusch v.
Lithographic Plate, 119 A.2d 392, 39 7 (Md. 1956)); BEP, Inc. v. Atkinson , 174 F. Supp. 2d 400,
406 (D. Md. 2001). To establish a likelihood of success on the merits of the breach of duty
of loyalty claim in this case, therefore, Plaintiff must show that Ms. Campbell either solicited

customers prior to cessation of employment , misappropriated trade secrets, or engaged in
some other misconduct. As explained above and on the record, IV Solutions has not shown
at this stage that it is likely to establish that Ms. Campbell misappropriated trade secrets.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown at this very early stage that Ms. Campbell breached
her duty of loyalty by soliciting patients to a competitor while still employed with IV Solutions.
Although Plaintiff presented the testimony of its Chief Operating Officer, Ms. Starr, regarding
her impression from patients that Ms. Campbell sought to divert them to TidalHealth , Ms.
Starr acknowledged that she has no personal knowledge of Ms. Campbell’s conversations with
any patients. Ms. Campbell then testified that she never solicited patients or coordinated with
Dr. Herrera to solicit patients. The record does not contain any statements from patients that
Ms. Campbell solicited them to TidalHealth. IV Solutions represents that nine patients have
ceased treatment with IV Solutions and commenced treatment with TidalHealth, but many—
if not all—of those patients have consistently been treated by Dr. Herrera. Thus, the limited
record before the Court at this early stage suggests that patients may have chosen to follow
Dr. Herrera to a new infusion suite without solicitation by Ms. Campbell. Finally, the limited
available record contains no evidence that Ms. Campbell used confidential patient information
to solicit or contact patients after she terminated her employment with IV Solutions on May
15, 2026. At this preliminary stage , IV Solutions has not established that it is likely to show
that Ms. Campbell breached her duty of loyalty as alleged in Count I.
For similar reasons, Plaintiff also has not established a likelihood of success on the
merits as to its unfair competition claim in Count IV. Under Maryland law, unfair competition
lacks specific elements but generally precludes “damaging or jeopardizing another’s business

by fraud, deceit, trickery or unfair methods of any sort.” ClearOne Advantage, LLC v. Kersen ,
756 F. Supp. 3d 30, 43 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Balt. Bedding Corp. v. Moses , 34 A.2d 338, 342
(Md. 1943)). As Judge Bredar of this Court has explained, “[w]hile the standard for unfair
competition is broad, it is not boundless; to recover, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
conduct damaged or jeopardized its business.” Id. (citing Berlyn, Inc. v. The Gazette Newspapers,
Inc., 73 F. App’x 576, 585 (4th Cir. 2003)). Use of confidential customer information to benefit
a competitor in breach of a contractual obligation constitutes unfair competition. Id. at 44.
For the reasons set forth on the record and above, the limited record before the Court does
not reflect that Ms. Campbell engaged in improper solicitation, deceit, or unfair methods. At
this preliminary stage, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of Count
IV.6

6 Failure to satisfy any one Winter factor precludes injunctive relief, but, for completeness, this Court briefly
analyzes the remaining three factors. The irreparable harm factor is neutral or slightly favors Plaintiff. As noted
on the record, Plaintiff may have shown irreparable harm because it has lost nine customers. See, e.g., Salomon
& Ludwin, LLC v. Winters, 150 F.4th 268, 278 n.7 (4th Cir. 2025) (noting irreparable harm may exist based on
permanent loss of customers). Any harm to Ms. Campbell is negligible because she testified that she has not
solicited any customers and her counsel represented that she will not solicit Plaintiff’s customers in the future.
Yet, Plaintiff has not established at this stage that any improper solicitation occurred. For similar reasons, the
balance of the equities favors Plaintiff. Where a preliminary injunction only prevents a defendant from
misappropriating “trade secret and proprietary information,” there is no real harm to the defendant. Brightview
Grp., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 142. “Finally, the public interest favors the protection of trade secrets, and the
prevention of unfair business practices.” Id. As Judge Bredar of this Court has aptly noted, however, “[t]here
are countervailing public interests in fostering robust competition and in securing to each person the ‘right to
labor or use one’s skills, talents, or experience for one’s own benefit.’” ClearOne Advantage, Inc. v. Kersen, 710 F.
Supp. 3d 425, 438 (D. Md. 2024) (citing Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co ., 225 A.2d 288, 293 (Md. 1967)).
Absent a showing of unfair conduct or misappropriation, the public interest s remain evenly balanced in this
case.

14
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as
to at least one of its claims. Absent such a showing , this Court cannot exercise the
“extraordinary” and “very far-reaching power” to issue a preliminary injunction. MicroStrategy
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). For the reasons stated at the hearing of
June 8, 2026, and expounded above, it is this 9th day of June 2026, hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is DENIED; and,
2. The Clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of this Memorandum Order to counsel
of record in this matter.
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge
/s/

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