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govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-02354-0

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · 2026-06-09

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 Chambers of 101 West Lombard Street 
 GEORGE L. RUSSELL, III Baltimore, Maryland 21201 
Chief United States District Judge 410-962-4055 
 
June 9, 2026 
 
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL RE: Key Investment Group LLC, et al. v. 
Ferguson, et al. 
Civil Action No. GLR-25-2354 
Dear Counsel: 
 
Pending before the Court is Defendants Federal Trade Commission, Andrew N. Ferguson, 
Melissa Ann Holyoak, Mark R. Meador, and Rebecca K. Slaughter’s (collectively “the FTC” or 
“Defendants”) Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 28). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and 
no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the 
Court will grant the Motion. 
 
The Court previously recounted the background of this case: 
 
This action arises from Defendants’ enforcement of the Better 
Online Sales Ticket Act, 15 U.S.C § 45c, (the “BOTS Act”) against 
Plaintiffs Yair D. Rozmaryn, Totally Tix LLC, Elan N. Rozmaryn, 
TotalTickets.com LLC, Taylor Kurth, Front Rose Tix LLC, Key 
Investment Group LLC, WLK Investments LLC. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–22, 
ECF No. 1 ). Plaintiffs are involved in the secondary -ticket market 
but assert that they do not use “bots” to circumvent any security 
measures and as such, the BOTS Act is not applicable to them. (See 
id. ¶¶ 1–2, 20–22). Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n attempting to 
misuse the BOTS Act to destroy Plaintiffs’ legitimate business and, 
by extension, the entirety of the secondary -ticket market, 
Defendants’ actions run counter to both the BOTS Act and the 
FTC’s very purpose.” ( Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiffs seek d eclaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and a finding that Defendants’ reading of the 
BOTS Act is unconstitutionally vague as to Plaintiffs and other 
similarly situated businesses in the secondary-ticket market who do 
not use bots. (Id. ¶ 22). 
 
(Apr. 28, 2026 Order at 1, ECF No. 27). On June 21, 2025, Plaintiffs Yair D. Rozmaryn, Totally 
Tix LLC, Elan N. Rozmaryn, TotalTickets.com LLC, Taylor Kurth, Front Rose Tix LLC, Key 
Investment Group LLC, and WLK Investments LLC filed a Complaint against the Federal Trade 
Commission, Andrew N. Ferguson, Melissa Ann Holyoak, Mark R. Meador, and Rebecca K. 
Slaughter. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs style their Complaint as including five causes of action : 
Declaratory Judgment that Plaintiffs Do Not Violate the Bots Act (Count I); Injunctive Relief so 
that Defendants Cannot Enforce the Bots Act Against Plaintiffs (Count II); Declaratory Judgment 

 
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that Plaintiffs Had No Requisite Knowledge to Assess Civil Penalties (Count III); Injunctive Relief 
so that Defendants Cannot Assess Civil Penalties [ on] Plaintiffs (Count IV); and the Bots Act is 
Void For Vagueness as applied to Plaintiffs under the Fifth And Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution (Count V). (Compl. ¶¶ 133–65, ECF No. 1). The FTC filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
November 24, 2026 (ECF No. 24), which this Court denied on April 28, 2026 (ECF No. 27). The 
FTC filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration on May 8, 2026 (ECF No. 28) , which Plaintiffs 
opposed on May 21, 2026 (ECF No. 32). The FTC filed a Reply on June 4, 2026. (ECF No. 36). 
 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) , a district court may revise any decision 
before an entry of final judgment. Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders —meaning 
non-final orders issued during the course of litigation —“are not subject to the strict standards 
applicable to motions f or reconsideration of a final judgment.” Am. Canoe Ass ’n v. Murphy 
Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003). “In considering whether to revise interlocutory 
decisions, district courts in this Circuit have looked to whether movants presented new arguments 
or evidence, or whether the court has obviously misapprehended a party ’s position or the facts or 
applicable law.” Cohens v. Md. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 933 F.Supp.2d 735, 742–43 (D.Md. 2013). 
 
Here, the Court will grant the Motion for Reconsideration . Although there is no binding 
precedent directly on point with the unusual circumstances present here, the Court finds that 
judicial review of the constitutionality of the BOTS Act, along with any order of declaratory or 
injunctive relief, is inefficient and unnecessary, particularly because Plaintiffs can challenge—and 
indeed are challenging—the BOTS Act in the FTC’s enforcement action currently pending before 
this Court. See generally Compl., FTC v. Key Inv. Grp. LLC, No. GLR-25-2716 (D.Md. Aug. 18, 
2025) (ECF No. 1). Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court put it when explaining the limited 
nature of judicial review of agency action: 
 
In contrast to the complaint ’s lack of legal or practical effect upon 
[the plaintiff] , the effect of the judicial review sought by [the 
plaintiff] is likely to be interference with the proper functioning of 
the agency and a burden for the courts. Judicial intervention into the 
agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own 
mistakes and to apply its expertise. Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 
749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). Intervention 
also leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and 
upon completion of the agency process might prove to have been 
unnecessary. McGee v. United States , 402 U.S. 479, 484, 91 S.Ct. 
1565, 1568, 29 L.Ed.2d 47 (1971); McKart v. United States , 395 
U.S. 185, 195, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). 
Furthermore, unlike the review in Abbott Laboratories [v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)], judicial review to determine 
whether the Commission decided that it had the requisite reason to 
believe would delay resolution of the ultimate question whether the 
Act was violated. Finally, every respondent to a Commission 
complaint could make the claim that [the p laintiff] had made. 
Judicial review of the averments in the Commission ’s complaints 

 
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should not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before 
adjudication concludes. 
 
F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co. of Ca ., 449 U.S. 232, 242 –43 (1980); see also Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 
U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (noting that district courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets 
with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases) ). Further, both parties 
acknowledge the inherent efficiencies in streamlining this case, made evident by their own Joint 
Correspondance requesting that this Court consolidate the initial discovery teleconferences 
scheduled in both cases into a single teleconference. ( See May 22, 2026 Order, ECF No. 33 
(granting parties’ consent request to consolidate hearings)). As a result, the Court will grant 
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the FTC’s Motion for 
Reconsideration (ECF No. 28) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED 
without prejudice. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case. Despite the informal nature of this 
memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of the Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it 
accordingly. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 /s/ 
George L. Russell, III 
Chief United States District Judge 

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