govinfo:USCOURTS-wiwd-3_26-cv-00265-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN 
  
 
VANESSA RICE, on behalf of  
minor child K.J.B.,            
          
    Petitioner,    OPINION AND ORDER 
 v. 
                 26-cv-265-wmc 
FABIAN BASINA and 
JUDGE BEEKSMA, 
 
    Respondents. 
 
 
Petitioner Vanessa Rice, who is representing herself, has filed a federal petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of her minor child, K.J.B ., in connection with a custody 
dispute with the child’s biological father now pending before a tribal court .  (Dkt. #1.)  
Petitioner has filed a declaration in support, a supplement, a notice of recent developments 
in the ongoing custody proceedings, and a request for expedited review.  (Dkts. ##2, 5, 
6.)  Because petitioner is proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee, the court must 
screen the petition and dismiss any claim that is frivolous , malicious, or fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.  28 U.S.C. §  1915(e)(2)(B).  The court also has 
“an independent obligation to satisfy itself that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists 
before proceeding to the merits in any case.”  Smith v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 337 
F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2003).  In screening complaints and petitions drafted by a non -
lawyer, the court applies a less stringent standard.  Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 
(7th Cir. 2011).  Even under this lenient standard, however, the petition must be dismissed 
for the reasons explained below, including a fundamental lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
in this court. 
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ALLEGATIONS OF FACT1 
 Petitioner Vanessa Rice is a resident of Rib Lake, Wisconsin, whose father was “of 
full-blooded Cherokee descent.”  Rice and respondent Fabian Basina are presently 
embroiled in a child custody dispute that is pending before the Red Cliff Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Tribal Court (the “Red Cliff Tribal Court”).2  According to Rice, Basina 
obtained a judgment of paternity establishing that he is the father of Rice’s minor child, 
K.J.B.  However, Rice disputes  this and has requested genetic testing.   Although Basina 
was granted custody of K.J.B. under the terms of a temporary restraining order in 2024, it 
appears that Rice and Basina now have joint custody of the child under an order entered 
by the Red Cliff Tribal Court in Case No. 24 -DV-07/8518PA07 on December 25, 2025.  
(Dkt. #3-2.)   
Rice alleges that Basina violated th e Red Cliff Tribal Court’s custody order by 
holding the child at his “off -reservation residence”  in Washburn, Wisconsin,  and by 
refusing to return her to Rice’s custody on March 21, 2026.   Specifically, Rice seeks to 
dispute Basina’s paternity and is challenging several orders that were entered by the Red 
Cliff Tribal Court regarding K.J.B.’s placement.  More generally, invoking the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, Rice asks this court to intervene in the underlying child 
 
1 For purposes of this opinion, the court accepts all of plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, 
construing them liberally and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.  Arnett, 658 F.3d 
at 751.  
2 Rice does not expressly indicate whether she or Basina are affiliated with the Red Cliff Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa and offers  no explanation for the Red Cliff Tribal Court’s jurisdiction.   
Exhibits provided by Rice appear to reflect that Basina is a tribe member and has sought tribal 
enrollment for his daughter.  (Dkt. #5-1, at 2.) 
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custody dispute by issuing a writ of habeas corpus for K.J.B.’s “release” from Basina’s 
“custody.” 
OPINION 
A number of procedural and jurisdictional hurdles prevent this case from proceeding 
past the initial screening stage.  To begin, in courts of the United States “parties may plead 
and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1654, but they cannot 
represent others while also representing themselves.  This means that parents cannot 
litigate the claims of their children unless they obtain counsel.  Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 
722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013); Tuttle v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 7 F.3d 238, 
at *1 (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished order); see also Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 704 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“Normally, representative parties such as next friends may not conduct 
litigation pro se ; pleadings may be brought before the court only by parties or their 
attorney.”).  This appears true in Tribal Court as well, where K.J.B. is being represented by 
a guardian ad litem.     
Even more importantly, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen 
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co ., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  “ They possess only that power 
authorized by Constitution and statute, . . . which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” 
Id. The party invoking jurisdiction always bears the “burden of showing its existence.”  Page 
v. Democratic Nat’l Comm ., 2 F.4th 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2021).  Generally, federal district 
courts have the authority to hear two types of cases: (1) cases in which the plaintiff alleges 
a violation of his or her constitutional rights or rights established under federal law, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) cases in which a citizen of one state alleges a state law claim against 
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a citizen of another state that amounts to more than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Because 
petitioner does not attempt to establish that diversity of citizenship exists, nor does that 
appear at all likely, this court only has subject matter jurisdiction if petitioner’s claims arise 
under the United States Constitution or other federal law. 
Here, petitioner invokes the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 , which 
provides that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, 
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by an order of an Indian 
tribe.”  (emphasis added).  However, this statute does not assist petitioner.  To establish 
ICRA jurisdiction, a petitioner must demonstrate that she has been “detained” as that term 
is used in § 1303.  Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9 th Cir. 2010).  Petitioner not 
only fails to allege this, but  federal habeas corpus review is otherwise “not available to 
challenge parental rights or child custody.”  Azure-Lone Fight v. Cain, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 
1150 (D.N.D. 2004) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 
508-12 (1982); and Wells v. Philbrick, 486 F. Supp. 807, 809 (D.S.D. 1980)).  Accordingly, 
ICRA does not afford a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.  See Walton v. Tesuque 
Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2006) ( a person must be “detained” for federal 
courts to have jurisdiction under § 1303).   
Further, it is evident from the pleadings and exhibits that petitioner is continuing 
to litigate her child custody dispute with Basine before the Red Cliff Tribal Court and that 
she is further pursuing an appeal from unspecified orders with that court system .  (Dkt. 
#3-6, at 5.)  To the extent that petitioner asks this court to intervene in ongoing litigation, 
abstention is typically required under Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) .  See 
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n , 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (“The 
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policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when 
important state interests are involved.”); S.P. ex rel. Parks v. Native Village of Minto , 443 F. 
App’x 264, 265 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s decision to abstain under 
Younger from hearing a dispute about whether a tribal court lacked jurisdiction to make a 
child custody determination); Mesteth v. Odegard, No. 4:23CV4135, 2024 WL 2371886, 
at *7 n.2 (D.S.D. May 23, 2024) (dismissing claims for injunctive relief as moot, but noting 
that “Younger abstention principles likewise would militate for this Court to abstain in favor 
of allowing a tribal court to adjudicate custody and visitation issues within its 
jurisdiction”).  Relatedly, since litigation in the tribal court is ongoing, petitioner’s claims 
are also barred by the “tribal exhaustion doctrine,” which requires her to exhaust all tribal 
remedies, including exhausting opp ortunities for appellate review in tribal courts , before 
coming to federal court.  Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987).   
Finally, and most importantly,  as petitioner appears to acknowledge, even if  
jurisdiction in the tribal court is not appropriate, then child custody matters generally fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, over which only the United States Supreme 
Court would have discretionary review.  See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) 
(recognizing a “domestic relations exception” to federal jurisdiction, which means that  
lower federal courts may not hear divorce, alimony, or child custody cases).  
Since there is neither  a valid basis for federal  subject matter jurisdiction, nor any 
exception to the doctrines of abstention and tribal exhaustion , this action must be 
dismissed.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action .”).  Moreover, while t he 
Seventh Circuit has cautioned against dismissing a pro se litigant’s case without offering a 
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chance to amend the pleadings, Felton v. City of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2016), 
since it is obvious that no amendment can save this court’s lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, no such offer will be afforded.  Instead, this action will be dismissed without 
prejudice given that a federal writ of habeas corpus is not available to challenge parental 
rights or child custody matters.  See Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“[T]he court should grant leave to amend after dismissal of the first complaint 
unless it is certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or 
otherwise unwarranted.”) (emphasis in original, citation and quotation marks omitted).   
Petitioner may, however, seek relief from the dismissal by filing a n appropriate motion 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
1) The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by petitioner Vanessa Rice on 
behalf of minor child K.J.B. (dkt. #1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE as set forth above.   
2) The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 
case. 
Entered this 9th day of June, 2026. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
      /s/ 
      __________________________________ 
      WILLIAM M. CONLEY 
      District Judge 
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