govinfo:USCOURTS-txed-4_25-cv-01123-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
SHERMAN DIVISION 
 
ANTONE THOMPSON 
 
v. 
 
LOCKHEED MARTIN 
CORPORATION 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
CIVIL NO. 4:25-CV-1123-SDJ 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Before the Court is Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation ’s Motion to 
Transfer Venue. (Dkt. #28). Lockheed asks that the Court transfer this case to the 
Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division. (Dkt. #28 at 5); see also (Dkt. #36). 
Plaintiff Antone Thompson opposes the motion . (Dkt. #34). Because Lockheed has 
demonstrated that the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas is a 
clearly more convenient venue for this action, the Court will grant the motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This is a n employment discrimination and retaliation case. Plaintiff Antone 
Thompson worked for Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation at its Fort Worth 
aeronautics facility from October 2012 to April 2024. (Dkt. #16 ¶¶ 4, 181); (Dkt. #28 
at 6). Thompson alleges that, during his employment with Lockheed in Fort Worth, 
he was discriminated against on the basis of his race, sex, age, disability, and military 
service. See (Dkt. #16). Thompson further alleges that he was retaliated against, and 
ultimately fired, for reporting this discrimination. See (Dkt. #16 ¶ 314). Lockheed 
denies the allegations. According to Lockheed, it fired Thompson for twice bringing a PageID #: 
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gun onto the premises of its Fort Worth facility , in violation of company rules. See 
(Dkt. #27 at 5). 
Thompson sued Lockheed in October 2025, see (Dkt. #1), and amended his 
complaint a few months later, see (Dkt. #16). He brings claims under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(“USERRA”), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Shortly after 
Thompson filed his First Amended Complaint, (Dkt. #16), Lockheed moved to dismiss 
his claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See (Dkt. #27). That motion 
remains pending before the Court. Lockheed now moves to transfer this case to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See (Dkt. #28 at 5). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Section 1404(a) permits the transfer of civil actions for the convenience of the 
parties and witnesses , and in the interest of justice , to other districts or divisions 
where the plaintiff could have properly brought the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to transfer a case under 
Section 1404(a), In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. ( Volkswagen II), 545 F.3d 304, 311 
(5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and Section 1404(a) motions are adjudicated on an 
“individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness ,” Stewart PageID #: 
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Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) 
(cleaned up). 
The party seeking a transfer under Section 1404(a) must show good cause. 
Volkswagen II , 545 F.3d at 315. In this context, showing good cause requires the 
moving party to “clearly demonstrate that a transfer is for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice.” Id. (cleaned up). When the movant fails 
to demonstrate that the proposed transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than 
the plaintiff’s chosen venue, “the plaintiff ’s choice should be respected.” Id. 
Conversely, when the movant demonstrates that the proposed transferee venue is 
clearly more convenient, the movant has shown good cause, and the court should 
transfer the case. Id. The “clearly more convenient” standard is not equal to a clear-
and-convincing-evidence standard, but it is nevertheless “materially more than a 
mere preponderance of convenience.” Quest NetTech Corp. v. Apple, Inc. , No. 2:19 -
CV-118-JRG, 2019 WL 6344267, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2019). 
To determine whether a Section 1404(a) movant has demonstrated that the 
proposed transferee venue is “clearly more convenient,” the Fifth Circuit employs the 
four private-interest and four public-interest factors first enunciated in Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). Volkswagen II , 545 F.3d 
at 315. The private -interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of 
proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; 
(3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems 
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id . (citation omitted). PageID #: 
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The public-interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court 
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the 
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance 
of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
Although these factors “are appropriate for most transfer cases, they are not 
necessarily exhaustive or exclusive,” and no single factor is dispositive. Id. Moreover, 
courts are not to merely tally the factors on each side. In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 
285, 290 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013). Instead, courts “must make factual determinations to 
ascertain the degree of actual convenience, if any, and whether such rises to the level 
of clearly more convenient.” Quest NetTech, 2019 WL 6344267, at *7 (cleaned up); see 
also In re Radmax, 720 F.3d at 290 (holding that courts abuse their discretion when 
they deny transfer solely because the plaintiff’s choice of forum weighs against 
transfer). 
III. DISCUSSION 
This case has no meaningful connection to the Eastern District of Texas. All of 
the events relevant to Thompson’s claims occurred at Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility 
in Tarrant County, located within the Northern District of Texas . Unsurprisingly, 
then, most of the expected witnesses are also located in the Northern District. For 
these reasons, and as explained further below, the Court will transfer this case to the 
Northern District of Texas. PageID #: 
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A. Threshold Venue Inquiry 
The threshold inquiry on a Section 1404(a) motion to transfer is “whether the 
judicial district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the 
claim could have been filed.” In re Volkswagen AG (Volkswagen I), 371 F.3d 201, 203 
(5th Cir. 2004). All eighteen of Thompson’s claims, brought under six federal statutes, 
could have been brought in the Northern District of Texas. The Court addresses each 
statute’s venue provision in turn. 
 Title VII and ADA claims may be brought (1) “ in any judicial district in the 
State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed”; 
(2) “in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice 
are maintained and administered”; (3) “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved 
person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice”; or , if 
the respondent is not found within any of these districts , (4) “ within the judicial 
district in which the respondent has his principal office .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -5(f)(3); 
see also Beavers v. Express Jet Holdings, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 994, 996 (E.D. Tex. 2005) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117) (explaining that Title VII’s special venue provision applies 
to ADA claims). Here, Thompson could have brought his Title VII and ADA claims in 
the Northern District of Texas because (1) the alleged discrimination occurred there, 
(2) Thompson’s employment records are maintained there, see (Dkt. #28-1 ¶ 2), and 
(3) Thompson would have continued to work there but for his allegedly unlawful 
firing. PageID #: 
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 USERRA claims may be brought in “any district in which the private employer 
of the person maintains a place of business. ” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(c)(2). Lockheed 
maintains a place of business in the Northern District of Texas —the Fort Worth 
facility at which Thompson worked—so Thompson could have brought his USERRA 
claims in that district. 
 Claims brought under the ADEA, FMLA, and Section 1981 are governed by 
the general venue statute , 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 1 Such claims may be brought in “(1) a 
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the 
State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part 
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no 
district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any 
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction 
with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, venue would have been proper 
in the Northern District of Texas under either the first or second category above: The 
Northern District has specific personal jurisdiction over Lockheed for purposes of this 
civil action, so Lockheed “resides” there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (explaining that a 
defendant entity resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject 
to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”). And 
 
1 Martin v. Impact Health, No. CV 23-2497, 2023 WL 7498175, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 
2023) (explaining that the general venue statute governs Section 1981 claims ); Myers v. 
Gibson, No. 3-07-CV-864-B, 2007 WL 1953443, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2007) (same, for 
the ADEA); Fowler v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. CV 15 -2695, 2017 WL 1293983, at *2 
(W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2017) (same, for the FMLA). PageID #: 
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all of the alleged discrimination giving rise to Thompson’s claims occurred at 
Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility located in the Northern District. 
B. The Public- and Private-Interest Factors 
Having found that this case could have been brought in the Northern District 
of Texas , the Court will now analyze the private - and public- interest factors to 
determine whether Lockheed has demonstrated that the Northern District is a 
“clearly more convenient” forum for this case than the Eastern District of Texas. 
Lockheed argues (and Thompson does not seriously dispute) that five of the 
eight factors are either inapplicable to this case or neutral. Those factors are the 
relative ease of access to sources of proof (private-interest factor one); the availability 
of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses (private-interest factor 
two); the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion (public-interest 
factor one); the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case (public-
interest factor three); and the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws 
or in the application of foreign law (public-interest factor four). See (Dkt. #28 at 11–12 
n.14); (Dkt. # 34 at 5 –7). The Court agrees and therefore treats these factors as 
neutral. 
That leaves three factors in dispute: the cost of attendance for willing 
witnesses (private-interest factor three); all other practical problems that make trial 
of a case easy, expeditious , and inexpensive (private-interest factor four); and the PageID #: 
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local interest in having localized interests decided at home (public-interest factor 
two).2 The Court addresses each in turn. 
i. Cost for Willing Witnesses 
Private-interest factor three, which focuses on the “cost of attendance for 
willing witnesses,” Volkswagen II , 545 F.3d at 315, “is probably the single most 
important factor in transfer analysis,” In re Genentech , Inc. , 566 F.3d 1338, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Neil Bros. Ltd. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 325, 
329 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)). It is obviously more convenient for witnesses to testify closer to 
home, and additional distance means additional travel, meal, and lodging costs, as 
well as additional time away from the witnesses’ regular employment. Volkswagen II, 
545 F.3d at 317. 
“When the distance between an existing venue for trial of a matter and a 
proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience 
to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” 
Id. (citation omitted). That is not to say, however, “that a transfer within 100 miles 
does not impose costs on witnesses or that such costs should not be factored into the 
 
2 Both Lokcheed and Thompson suggest that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is a “factor” 
in the venue -transfer analysis, to be weighed against and alongside the eight private - and 
public-interest factors. See (Dkt. #28 at 13) (describing plaintiff’s choice of venue as “the only 
factor that affirmatively weighs against” transfer); (Dkt. #34 at 7) (arguing that the private- 
and public -interest factors do not “outweigh the final factor of Plaintiff’s choice”) . That 
characterization is understandable but technically incorrect . While the plaintiff’s choice of 
venue is certainly relevant to the venue-transfer analysis, it is not a “factor” in the traditional 
sense. See IP Co., LLC v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., LLC, No. 2:09-CV-37, 2009 WL 10677429, 
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2009). As explained above, there are eight venue-transfer factors, and 
the plaintiff’s choice of venue is not one of them. “Instead, the plaintiff's choice of venue 
contributes to the defendant’s burden to prove that the transferee venue is ‘clearly more 
convenient’ than the plaintiff’s chosen venue.” Id. (cleaned up). PageID #: 
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venue-transfer analysis.” In re Radmax , 720 F.3d at 289. It is only to say that the 
witness-cost factor “has greater significance when the distance is greater than 100 
miles.” Id. 
Here, Lockheed identifies fourteen likely witnesses , including “the alleged 
harassers,” “the alleged recipients of Thompson’s alleged protected complaints,” “the 
Security Captain who discovered Thompson’s gun on site,” “the persons who voted to 
terminate Thompson’s employment,” and “the human resources employee who was 
on the dismissal call.” (Dkt. #28 at 12). According to Lockheed’s records, eleven of the 
fourteen likely witnesses live in the Northern District of Texas, and many of those 
eleven are current employees of Lockheed who also work in the Northern District at 
Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility. See (Dkt. #28-1 ¶¶ 12–13, 15–16, 18–23). Two of the 
fourteen live out of state. (Dkt. #28-1 ¶¶ 14, 24). Just one lives in the Eastern District 
of Texas, but even that witness works in the Northern District. See (Dkt. #28-1 ¶ 17). 
In sum, the vast majority of expected witnesses either live or work in the 
Northern District—primarily in and around Fort Worth —and just one lives in the 
Eastern District. It follows that the Northern District’s Fort Worth division is the 
more convenient venue for most witnesses. To be sure, the distance between the Plano 
and Fort Worth federal courthouses is less than 100 miles — 45.5 miles by car, to be 
exact. But as anyone who has driven across the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex can tell 
you, that is no small distance , especially during rush hour . You’re often looking at 
about a two-hour round trip, several dollars in tolls, and certain frustration. See Toll PageID #: 
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Calculator, North Texas Tollway Authority, https://www.ntta.org/toll-calculator (last 
visited June 5, 2026). Thus, the witness-cost factor weighs in favor of transfer. 
ii. All Other Practical Problems that Make Trial Easy, Expeditious, 
and Inexpensive 
The fourth private -interest factor is “all other practical problems that make 
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. As 
explained above, trial in the Northern District would be easier and less expensive for 
the vast majority of expected witnesses .3 And there is no reason to think that a 
transfer would frustrate judicial economy. This case is still at a relatively early stage, 
see (Dkt. # 26), and the Court has not yet gained substantial familiarity with the 
merits of the case. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. 
iii. Local Interests 
The second public-interest factor, which focuses on the local interest in having 
localized interests decided at home, “most notably regards not merely the parties’ 
significant connections to each forum writ large, but rather the significant 
connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a suit.” Def. 
Distributed v. Bruck , 30 F.4th 414, 435 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Important 
considerations include the location of the injury, witnesses, and the plaintiff’s 
residence. Id. As the Fifth Circuit has made clear, “the place of the alleged wrong is 
one of the most important factors in venue determinations.” Id. (cleaned up). 
 
3 In fact, it appears that trial in the Northern District would be slightly easier and 
less expensive for Thompson too. Thompson says he is domiciled in Argyle, Texas, which by 
car is several miles closer to the Fort Worth federal courthouse than it is to the Plano 
courthouse. See (Dkt. #36 at 3). PageID #: 
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All of the events that gave rise to this suit occurred in the Northern District of 
Texas; none occurred in the Eastern District of Texas. Although both parties have 
some connection to the Eastern District—Thompson lives in Argyle, and Lockheed 
has an operations facility in Lufkin—those connections have nothing to do with this 
case. See (Dkt. #36 at 3). This case is about discrimination that allegedly occurred at 
Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility in the Northern District of Texas. It is the Northern 
District, then, that has the greater interest in deciding the merits of this case. Thus, 
this factor weighs in favor of transfer. 
* * * 
In sum, three of the eight private- and public-interest factors weigh in favor of 
transfer, and none of the factors weighs against transfer. A motion to transfer venue 
should be granted if the moving party shows that one venue is “clearly more 
convenient” than the other. In re Genentech , 566 F.3d at 1342. The Court, having 
considered the facts and law, concludes that the Northern District of Texas , Fort 
Worth Division, is clearly the more convenient venue to resolve this action than the 
Eastern District of Texas. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation’s Motion to 
Transfer Venue, (Dkt. #28), is GRANTED. 
It is therefore ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED to the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division. PageID #: 
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