govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00091-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
MARTIN LYONS, ) 
M19540, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) 
 ) 
ANGELA CRAIN, ) 
PHILLIPA DEVENNEY, ) 
CONNIE DOLCE, ) Case No. 26-91-DWD 
TARA CHADDERTON, ) 
TARA MCCOY, ) 
ANTHONY WILLS, ) 
JANE DOES 1-4, ) 
JANE DOE 6 (LPN), ) 
MICHAEL MOLDENHAUER, ) 
ANGELA KENNER, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
DUGAN, District Judge: 
Plaintiff Martin Lyons, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) 
currently detained at Menard Correctional Center (Menard), brings this civil rights action 
for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 17, 
2026, the Court designated claims sufficient to proceed beyond initial review (Doc. 13) 
and it initiated service of process. While service is ongoing, Plaintiff has now moved for 
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction alleging that he has been without 
his medication since May 20, 2026. (Doc. 41). Page ID
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Background 
The operative claims from the Amended Complaint are: 
Claim 1: Claim against Defendants Wills, Crain, and Devenney, for 
maintaining a policy, custom or practice, of allowing 
medical prescriptions to lapse for 3 weeks or longer at a time 
without medical evaluation; 
 
Claim 2: Claim against Defendants Wills, Crain, and Devenney for 
maintaining a policy, custom, or practice requiring inmates 
to submit kites to seek medical care, but routinely not 
responding to kites; 
 
Claim 3: Claim against Defendants Wills, Crain, and Devenney for 
denying Plaintiff gabapentin/Neurontin due to the 
“emergency meds only” policy, custom, or practice, on 
numerous dates in May, June, July, August, September, and 
October of 2023; 
 
Claim 4: Eighth amendment deliberate indifference by Defendant 
Chadderton for failing to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances 
about the emergency meds only issues; 
 
Claim 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference clam against 
Defendant McCoy for turning a blind eye to Plaintiff’s 
complaints about his medication being provided in an 
“open and float” method; 
 
Claim 6: Eighth Amendment delib erate indifference claim against 
Defendants Crain, Devenney, Dolce, Chadderton, McCoy, 
Kenner, Jane Does 1-4, and Jane Doe 6 (LPN) for their roles 
in allowing Plaintiff’s gabapentin/Neurontin to lapse 
between January 25-February 11, 2024; and January 9-
February 25, 2026; 
 
Claim 7: Eighth Amendment deliber ate indifference claim against 
Defendant Moldenhauer for decreasing Plaintiff’s 
gabapentin/Neurontin prescription from 1800mg to 600mg 
in February of 2026. Page ID
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(Doc. 13 at 6-7). Of signif icance for the present motion , Claims 1, 2, and 6 concern 
Plaintiff’s timely receipt of his gabapentin/Neurontin prescription, and his attempts to 
use kites to seek needed medical attention. 
 In the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 
41), Plaintiff alleges that after his filing of this lawsuit, Defendants Kenner, Dolce, 
Moldenhauer, Crain, and Devenney have st opped his medication for no reason and 
without a medical examination. He further alleges he has attempted to alert Jane Doe 2 
to the upcoming lapse in his medication, and he has attempted to transmit kites but Jane 
Doe 2, Kenner, and non-party staff, have turned a blind eye and have destroyed his kites. 
He also alleges personal conversations with Kenner and a recent visit with Moldenhauer. 
He argues that there is no justification for the lapse in medication and implies that the 
current lapse may be retaliation associated with this lawsuit. 
 To seek a preliminary injunction, a plaint iff must establish: a likelihood of success 
on the merits of his claim; no adequate remedy at law; and irreparable harm without the 
injunctive relief. See Mays v. Dart , 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) . As for the first 
requirement, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any likelihood of success—
in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM General Corp. v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). “A movant’s likelihood of success 
on the merits must be strong.” Tully v. Okeson , 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) . While 
Plaintiff is not required to “show that [he] definitely will win the case…a mere possibility 
of success is not enough,” and he must make “[a] strong showing th at [he] is likely to 
succeed on the merits.” Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker , 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020) . Page ID
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A strong showing typically entails a demonstration of how the applicant intends to prove 
key elements of his case. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker , 973 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir. 
2020); Doe v. University of Southern Indiana , 43 F.4th 784, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2022) (the court 
is not required to make inferences in the movant’s favor when considering preliminary 
injunctive relief). 
The Court must also decide whether an a d e q u a t e r e m e d y a t l a w e x i s t s a n d 
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Irreparable 
harm is harm which cannot be repaired. Graham v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 296 
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down 
a ga i n , a ton e d f o r. T h e i n j u ry m u s t b e of a particular nature, so that compensation in 
money cannot atone for it.”). The Court must then weigh “t he balance of harm to the 
parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction 
on the public interest.” Id.; Korte v. Sebelius , 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013) . “This 
equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-sc ale analysis; the greater the likelihood of 
success of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s 
favor.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 665. 
An injunction that seeks an affirmativ e act by the respondent is a mandatory 
preliminary injunction and should be sparingly issued. Mays, 974 F.3d at 818 . If 
injunctive relief is warranted, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that the 
injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the 
harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626(a)(2). Injunctive relief must be related to issues in the underlying lawsuit. See e.g., Page ID
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Tatum v. Hunter, Case No. 22-2411 (S.D. Ill. 2023) (Doc. 16) (denying injunctive relief, 
including a request for a transfer, where the injunctive relief sought was not narrowly 
tailored and did not align with the claims in the case) aff’d in Tatum v. Hunter , Case No. 
23-2253 (7th Cir. May 16, 2024); Daniels v. Dumsdorff, et al. , Case No. 19-cv-394 (S.D. Ill. 
2019). 
 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations in his motion align with Claims 1, 2, and 6 in this case 
and involve some of the same defendants named in those claims. However, Plaintiff’s 
demand for relief is broader than just Claims 1, 2, or 6. Specifically he seeks that the Court 
hold a hearing and direct the defendants to: renew his medication, show cause about why 
his medication has lapsed, disclose medical records and MARS from January-June 2026, 
provide all communications between defendants and/or their attorneys about this 
matter, temporarily lift his medical hold and transfer him to a facility better suited for his 
medical needs, provide diagnostic testing to assess his nerve pain, and provide any 
reports or recommendations about the treatment of his neuropathy and carpal tunnel for 
the last six months. (Doc. 41 at 7). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief broader than 
the claims in this case, his requests are not a ppropriate. At this juncture, the only relief 
that the Court views as approp riately correlated with the claims is the demand that 
Plaintiff’s medication be restored. 
 Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining or der, which generally only lasts 14 days. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) . To qualify, he must set forth “specific facts in an affidavit or a 
verified complaint clearly show[ing] that immediate or irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Page ID
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FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A) . Here, Plaintiff included his own affidavit and one from a 
fellow inmate attesting he recently has not had access to his medications and has vomited 
once or twice. Though even a brief lapse in medications can sometimes sustain an Eighth 
Amendment claim, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s allegation that he vomited once or 
twice in the last two weeks to be sufficient to warrant the sort of urgent relief afforded by 
Rule 65(b). Furthermore, relief granted by a temporary restraining order would only last 
14 days, and the Court presumes Plaintiff wants longer-term relief to ensure steady access 
to his medication. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a temporary 
restraining order. 
This leaves Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction directing a timely refill 
of his Neurontin/gabapentin prescription, that he alleges lapsed on May 20, 2026, and 
has not yet been refilled. The Court finds it appropriate to direct a response from 
defendants on this very narrow issue. The Warden of Menard has already been served 
in this matter in his/her official capacity to assist with John Doe identification, so the 
Warden shall now have 21 days to respond to Plaintiff’s allegations in his motion about 
a current lapse in his gabapentin/Neurontin medication. 
DISPOSITION 
 Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restra ining Order or Preliminary Injunction 
(Doc. 41) is DENIED in part, and a ruling is DEFERRED in part. Specifically, Plaintiff’s 
request for a temporary restraining order is DENIED, and his request for all injunctive 
relief beyond the scope of Claims 1, 2, and 6 in this case is DENIED. The Defendants 
shall have 21 days to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion solely as it pertains to preliminary Page ID
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injunctive relief concerning an alleged lapse in his gabapentin/Neurontin medication 
from May 20, 2026-present . The Defendants shall respond via the Warden of Menard, 
who has already been served in this case for purposes of John Doe identification. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 8, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 __________________________ 
 D A V I D W . D U G A N 
 U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t J u d g e 
 
 
 
Judge 
Dugan
Digitally signed 
by Judge 
Dugan 
Date: 
2026.06.08 
22:57:51 -05'00' Page ID
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