govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_21-cv-02662-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
BOWEN UHLENKAMP AND SADAF 
LAKHANI, parents of the minor child A.U., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 1:21-cv-2662 (TNM) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 This case is another iteration in a years-long dispute between D.C. Public Schools 
(“DCPS” or “the District”) and the parents of one of its former students. The parents seek relief 
for DCPS’s alleged failure to provide their child an adequate education as required by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parents’ challenge began half a 
decade ago, when they took their claims to an administrative hearing officer, who denied them in 
full. That denial prompted the parents to turn here hoping to undo the administrative decision. 
After the Court remanded the case to the hearing officer for another look, he again denied their 
claim and the dispute has thus returned. 
The parents move for summary judgment and once more ask this Court to reverse the 
hearing officer’s decision. Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh has issued a thorough Report and 
Recommendation (“Report”) proposing that the Court grant in part and deny in part the parents’ 
motion and the District’s cross-motion. The Report and Plaintiffs’ objections to it are now 
before the Court. Because the hearing officer adequately substantiated his conclusions on his 
second go at the case for some claims but not others, the Court will adopt the Report in full and 
thus grant in part and deny in part both motions. 

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I. 
The Court’s first opinion in this case details its factual background at length. See 
Uhlenkamp v. District of Columbia, 691 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229 (D.D.C. 2023). Because there is 
no need to rehash those facts, the Court provides an abbreviated version here. 
Five years ago, Plaintiffs Bowen Uhlenkamp and Sadaf Lakhani sought relief for DCPS’s 
alleged failure to provide their child—“A.U.” —a free and appropriate public education 
(“FAPE”) in violation of the IDEA. Id. at 234. They claimed that DCPS failed to develop an 
individualized education plan (“IEP”) that adequately addressed A.U.’s learning disabilities. Id. 
at 231. In line with IDEA’s requirement that Plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies before 
suing in federal court, see Massey v. District of Columbia, 400 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 2005), 
Plaintiffs started their challenge by filing an administrative complaint. Uhlenkamp, 691 F. Supp. 
3d at 234. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved A.U. to a private school, so their requested relief 
included tuition for his new school and several other education-related reimbursements. Id. at 
233–34. Hearing Officer Terry Michael Banks heard their case and denied relief in full. Id. at 
234–35. Plaintiffs then turned to this Court, suing DCPS under the IDEA to try to undo that 
decision. Id. at 235. 
Following cross motions for summary judgment, this Court remanded the case to the 
hearing officer to decide whether three individualized education programs (“IEPs”)—from April, 
May, and December 2019—violated A.U.’s right to a FAPE and whether Plaintiffs were entitled 
to tuition reimbursement. Id. at 229. On a second pass, the hearing officer again rejected 
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the three IEPs and thus declined to impose tuition reimbursement. See 
Remand Administrative Record (“RAR”) at 57–58, ECF No. 66-1. Plaintiffs once more seek to 
reverse the hearing officer’s decision. See generally Supplemental Compl., ECF No. 63. After 

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the Court referred the case to a magistrate judge for full case management, both parties again 
moved for summary judgment. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 67-1; Defs.’ Cross Motion for 
Summ. J., ECF No. 70. 
In his Report considering these cross motions, Magistrate Judge Matthew J. Sharbaugh 
recommended granting and denying both motions in part. Report, ECF No 74. While he found 
two of three IEPs insufficient to meet DCPS obligations under the IDEA, Magistrate Judge 
Sharbaugh agreed with DCPS that the third IEP (from December 2019) appropriately addressed 
A.U.’s needs. Id. at 15, 17, 22. Because Plaintiffs’ tuition reimbursement claims were tethered 
only to the December IEP, the magistrate judge also recommended denying that request. Id. at 
23–24. 
 Now before the Court are the parties’ summary judgment motions, the Report, and 
Plaintiffs’ seven objections to it. Pls.’ Objections, ECF No. 77. They challenge Magistrate 
Judge Sharbaugh’s conclusions about only the December IEP (and thus also tuition). Id. Neither 
party objects to the other two-thirds of the Report. 
Upon consideration of the Report, Plaintiffs’ objections, the District’s response, the 
summary judgment briefing, and the entire record, the Court will adopt the findings and 
conclusions of the Report in full. It will thus grant in part and deny in part both parties’ 
summary judgment motions. The Court provides supplemental analysis only in response to 
Plaintiffs’ objections about the December IEP and otherwise incorporates by reference 
Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s Report. 
II. 
 A few sets of rules govern this Court’s review. First are those guiding summary 
judgment in the IDEA setting. Although styled as motions for summary judgment, the Court 

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treats the cross-motions before it as seeking review of Hearing Officer Banks’ administrative 
determination. See S.B. v. District of Columbia, 783 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2011). That is 
because, when neither party puts forth additional evidence, a summary judgment motion in this 
setting operates as the “the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis 
of the administrative record.” M.G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(cleaned up). 
The Court “must give due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford some 
deference to the expertise of the hearing officer and school officials responsible for the child’s 
education.” Gill v. District of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up); 
Roark ex rel. Roark v. District of Columbia, 460 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2006). Indeed, “a 
hearing officer’s findings based on credibility determinations of live witness testimony are given 
particular deference where there is no supplementation of the record.” McAllister v. District of 
Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 72, 76 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up). That said, a hearing decision that 
lacks “reasoned and specific findings deserves little deference.” Kerkam v. Superintendent of 
D.C. Pub. Schs., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (cleaned up). 
Next are rules for reviewing objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation. Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), once a magistrate judge has entered his recommended 
disposition, a party may file specific written objections. The district court “must determine de 
novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to,” and “may 
accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Proper 

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objections “shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations 
to which objection is made and the basis for objection.” Local R. Civ. P. 72.3(b).1 
Last are rules about party presentation. Because the Court’s ultimate task is reviewing 
the parties’ summary judgment motions, arguments Plaintiffs made in their original summary 
judgment briefing guide the inquiry, not “new initiatives that were not put before the magistrate 
judge.” Edward M.R. v. District of Columbia, 660 F. Supp. 3d 82, 97 (D.D.C. 2023) (cleaned 
up), aff’d, 128 F.4th 290 (D.C. Cir. 2025). These guideposts call for caution in taking on 
Plaintiffs’ objections given their volume. What started as about seven pages of summary 
judgment briefing tethered to the December IEP, see Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 36–44, has now 
ballooned into over sixty pages of objections on the same subject. See generally Pls.’ 
Objections; Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 80. New arguments among this heap will not carry the day. 
III. 
The remaining core of this dispute is whether A.U.’s December IEP satisfies the IDEA. 
IDEA’s mandate “requires an educational program,”—here the December IEP — “ reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. 
Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 403 (2017). Considering the parties’ briefing and the 
hearing officer’s determination, the Court concludes that the hearing officer correctly determined 
that the December IEP was reasonably calculated to enable A.U. to make progress based on his 
individual circumstances and thus met IDEA’s demands. 
 
1 The Court assumes de novo review applies. Although some courts have held that objections 
that merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the magistrate judge are not 
“properly objected to” and are therefore entitled only to clear error review, see Shurtleff v. EPA, 
991 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013), Plaintiffs’ claims fail de novo review, so the Court need not 
determine whether clear error applies now. 

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Because the Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s analysis, it focuses here on the 
seven objections Plaintiffs levy at the Report. An initial problem is Plaintiffs’ blunderbuss 
approach to briefing. This is not a new problem. The first magistrate judge to handle this case 
three years ago described Plaintiffs’ arguments as “scattered and difficult to follow.” 
Uhlenkamp, 691 F. Supp. at 244. Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh likewise characterized the current 
round of summary judgment briefing as “meandering and often difficult to follow.” Report at 
18. Even Plaintiffs acknowledge that their summary judgment arguments were “perhaps 
clumsily made.” Pls.’ Objections at 3; see id. at 18 (referring to their own “clumsy” briefing). 
Scattershot briefing does not serve them or this Court well. Cf. Jones v. Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74, 
83 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs . . . .” 
(cleaned up)). With that in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ objections and sifts through their 
arguments best it can. 
Objection 1. Plaintiffs’ first objection questions whether the Report properly 
characterizes their “claims and their legal import.” Pls.’ Objections at 3; Pls.’ Reply at 2. 
Consider Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s view of their claims. He summed up many claims as 
complaints that the hearing officer “improperly weighed the evidence and should have reached 
different conclusions based on the record presented.” Report at 18. Because courts must give 
“due weight” to a hearing officer’s weighing of evidence, Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh rejected 
those claims. See A.I. ex rel. Iapalucci v. District of Columbia, 402 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 
(D.D.C. 2005) (cleaned up); id. at 170 (explaining that hearing officers are responsible for 
determining “how much weight to give the evidence”); Block v. District of Columbia, 748 F. 
Supp. 891, 896 (D.D.C. 1990) (“In evaluating the witnesses’ responses and weighing their 

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testimony . . . the Hearing Officer was utilizing his knowledge and experience such that judicial 
deference to his expertise is especially appropriate.”). 
The Report correctly characterized Plaintiffs’ claims and thus justified their rejection. As 
Plaintiffs put it in their opening summary judgment brief, “[h]ad the [hearing officer] weighed 
the evidence properly, he should have found DCPS failed to prove the December 2019 IEP 
appropriate.” Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 44; see also id. at 40 (arguing that Hearing Officer 
Banks’ evidentiary conclusions were “inconsistent with the evidence already cited herein”); id. at 
41 (arguing that certain conclusions were “not what the evidence showed”). Based on these 
excerpts, Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh did not mischaracterize Plaintiffs’ claims. He nearly 
parroted them. And then he properly rejected them as insufficient to undermine the hearing 
officer’s conclusions. Accord Garris v. District of Columbia, 210 F. Supp. 3d 187, 190 (D.D.C. 
2016) (rejecting arguments “about how the Hearing Officer weighed evidence” because even if 
one could “draw a different conclusion from that evidence,” that “does not make the Hearing 
Officer’s alternative conclusion improper.”). 
Plaintiffs see their objection differently. Plaintiffs contend they did not argue that the 
hearing officer improperly weighed evidence, but that he failed to “reconsider” altogether 
“conflicting evidence that weighed against the IEP[]” despite its remand “instructions” to do so. 
Pls.’ Objections at 3. This new gloss makes no difference. First, it is dubious that Plaintiffs 
squarely presented this (supposedly separate) argument in the few pages dedicated to the 
December IEP in summary judgment briefing. And recall that summary judgment briefing 
governs the scope of Plaintiffs’ arguments now, not new claims in their objections to the 
magistrate judge’s Report. The closest they come is in citations to swaths of highly specific 
evidence that the hearing officer opted not to mention. See. e.g., Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 43 

8 
 
(cherry-picking several tests that did not feature in Hearing Officer Banks’ final report to assert 
that he “ignored” evidence). But this case’s administrative record spans over two thousand 
pages. See ECF Nos. 10–38. Hearing Officer Banks could not expressly mention every test or 
individual score in Plaintiffs’ favor if he tried. See Goodman v. Colvin, 233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 109 
(D.D.C. 2017) (explaining that an administrative law judge need not “refer to every piece of 
evidence in his decision” (cleaned up)). Claiming that the hearing officer should have will not 
breathe life into a claim that neither Defendants nor the magistrate judge discerned in responding 
to Plaintiffs’ claims. 
Even if this argument were clearly presented, Plaintiffs’ allegations that the hearing 
officer ignored relevant evidence do not add up. For instance, they now claim that the hearing 
officer overlooked favorable evidence about grades and executive functioning. Pl.’s Objections 
at 4–5. But Hearing Officer Banks considered conflicting views on those very points. He 
contemplated the possibility that grades may not provide reliable evidence but concluded that 
here, there was “no evidence that [A.U.’s] grades are invalid or inflated.” RAR at 55.
2 He also 
spent several pages detailing differing evidence related to executive functioning before drawing 
conclusions about A.U.’s needs on that score. See id. at 52–54. Courts give evidentiary findings 
like these “due weight.” Schoenbach v. District of Columbia, 309 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 
2004). Courts do not ignore them as Plaintiffs do. The Court overrules this objection. 
 
2 Plaintiffs’ argument about grades independently fails because this Court already accepted 
Hearing Officer Banks’ reliance on grades before remanding the case. See Uhlenkamp, 691 F. 
Supp. 3d at 245 (noting with approval Banks’ reliance on “cases to support his reliance on 
A.U.’s grades”). He thus did not need to say anything more about them on remand. This 
oversight is but one example of the shortcomings of Plaintiffs’ everything-but-the-kitchen sink 
approach.
 

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Objection 2. Next, Plaintiffs object that neither the hearing officer’s analysis of the 
December IEP nor the magistrate judge’s Report followed the issues originally certified for the 
remand hearing. Pls.’ Objections at 5; Pls.’ Reply at 2. This objection fares no better. 
Consider the issues certified for the administrative hearing related to the December IEP. 
Hearing Officer Banks was to assess whether the December IEP: “(a) provided insufficient 
specialized education hours, (b) provided inappropriate IEP goals and baselines based on the 
nature and extent of the disability at that time and the present levels of performance as described 
in the IEP, (c) failed to provide occupational therapy (‘OT’) services, (d) failed to provide an 
appropriate placement, and (e) failed to provide appropriate modifications, accommodations, and 
interventions including an appropriate reading program.” RAR at 48; Pls.’ Objections at 5 
(same). 
Hearing Officer Banks addressed each of these points. Going in order of this list, he: (a) 
discussed the “eight hours per week of specialized instruction” the December IEP promised, 
RAR at 49; (b) discussed the very testimony asserting that the December IEP provided 
“inappropriate” goals before deciding that issue, id. at 50; (c) detailed why the record did “not 
support” a need for occupational theory services, id. at 55; (d) concluded DCPS did not owe 
A.U. placement in a different school only after finding the IEP appropriate, id. at 57; and (e) 
discussed the IEP’s approach to A.U.’s reading issues at length, with a specific eye toward this 
Court’s remand instructions, id. at 48–49. This coverage belies Plaintiffs’ claim that the hearing 
officer ignored the issues certified for his determination. 
Plaintiffs contest this conclusion with more of the same. They mount another set of 
arguments against the hearing officer’s handling of the evidence. See Pls.’ Objections at 9–10 

10 
 
(arguing that he should have weighed favorable testimony more heavily). Repackaging these 
now-familiar points under a different objection will not earn a different result. 
Plaintiffs separately fault Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh for not saying more about their 
claims. See id. at 7 (asserting that the Report “spent just 7 pages addressing a narrow set of the 
issues in the case” while leaving out others). As already explained, the Court, assessing the 
hearing officer’s determination de novo, agrees with Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s conclusion 
on this score. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (explaining that courts “must determine de novo any 
part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to”). So even if the 
Report inadequately “consider[ed] the breadth” of Plaintiffs’ “allegations,” Pls.’ Objections at 7, 
this argument fails. The Court rejects the notion that he said too little, in any case.3 
Objection 3. Plaintiffs next contend that because Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh found the 
April and May IEPs inadequate, he must have wrongly found the December IEP adequate. Pls.’ 
Objections at 11. Plaintiffs claim that because he rejected Hearing Officer Banks’ handling of 
evidence about the April and May IEPs, that he should have come to the same conclusion for the 
December IEP. Pls.’ Objections at 11–17. But each IEP involved different testimony, different 
educational concerns, and different instructions on remand. The hearing officer’s approach to 
testimony about the April IEP thus says little about his approach to separate testimony about the 
December IEP. See, e.g., Pls.’ Objections at 12 (claiming that because Magistrate Judge 
Sharbaugh saw error in Hearing Officer Banks’ rejection of testimony from a school 
psychologist (Margaret Mallory) about the April IEP, that Banks must have also erred in 
 
3 Plaintiffs’ criticisms about the Report’s depth are unwarranted. Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s 
Report more than sufficiently addressed Plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ summary 
judgment briefing on the December IEP spans about the same number of pages as the Report on 
the same subject. See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 36–44. Their own treatment of this IEP 
confirms that Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s coverage on the matter sufficed. 

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construing a reading teacher’s (Kendra Wells) and different school psychologist’s (Arielle Edge) 
testimony supporting his December IEP findings); see also RAR at 60 (listing witnesses). 
If anything, this objection is a new spin on Plaintiffs’ now-familiar gripe that Hearing 
Officer Banks should have weighed the December IEP evidence differently or discussed specific 
evidence more. See, e.g., Pls.’ Objections at 14 (once more faulting the hearing officer for 
relying on grades and certain testimony more than other evidence); id. at 15 (once more claiming 
the hearing officer should have expressly addressed various handpicked pieces of evidence). 
Because nothing suggests the April and May IEPs tie the Court’s hands when it comes to 
December, the Court overrules this objection. 
Objection 4. Plaintiffs continue that Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh should have faulted the 
hearing officer’s remand determination for relying on points this Court had rejected on the first 
round of summary judgment briefing. Pls.’ Reply at 4. Most of the ink Plaintiffs spill on this 
objection recites at length what this Court said in its first opinion remanding the case for a 
second look. See Pls.’ Objections at 19–21 (quoting various lengthy portions of this Court’s 
opinion in Uhlenkamp). They then claim, without offering citations or clear examples, that the 
hearing officer “did not” address these deficiencies and on his second go at the case. Id. at 21. 
They likewise fault Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh for relying on arguments this Court allegedly 
rejected. Id. 
None of this works. First, Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion tees up this Court’s 
review of the hearing officer’s decision, not the Report. See L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. District of 
Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 74 (D.D.C. 2012). And the hearing officer’s decision addressed 
the deficiencies this Court’s remand instructions highlighted. As Plaintiffs themselves note, 
Hearing Officer Banks added over “5 pages of analysis . . . new to remand” on the December 

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IEP alone. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 38. Much of that analysis directly spoke to the remand 
instructions. See RAR at 48 (discussing specific remand instructions). Plaintiffs’ insistence that 
Hearing Officer Banks rinsed and repeated conclusions this Court previously rejected ignores its 
own summary of the determination. This Court will not do the same. The fourth objection fails. 
Objection 5. Plaintiffs claim in their fifth objection that the Report contained errors and 
failed to comprehensively address Plaintiffs’ claims and relevant evidence. Pls.’ Objections at 
22; Pls.’ Reply at 6. An initial problem is that the substance of this objection far exceeds the 
scope of the arguments Plaintiffs preserved in their summary judgment briefing. Compare Pls.’ 
Objections at 22–29 (detailing the alleged failure to address the “STARI” reading program, 
A.U.’s self-esteem, stress, and stutter) with Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 36–43 (not mentioning 
these alleged issues in challenging the December IEP). Given that objections to a magistrate 
judge’s report do not serve as second bite at the summary-judgment apple, the objection falters 
on that ground alone. See Sciacca v. FBI, 23 F. Supp. 3d 17, 27 (D.D.C. 2014). 
A glance at Plaintiffs’ cited errors, though, confirms the argument’s weakness. Consider 
Plaintiffs’ claim that Hearing Officer Banks wrongly found that [A.U.] lacked an “orthographic 
processing issue requiring a reading intervention.” Pls.’ Objections at 23. That is wrong. The 
hearing officer stated that a reading program called “STARI” in A.U.’s December IEP “would 
address fluency, comprehension, and decoding.” RAR at 53. Those goals, he went on, would in 
turn address “concern[s] that a weakness in orthographic processing” affects A.U.’s 
comprehension. Id. He, in other words, acknowledged the very concern Plaintiffs claim he 
dismissed. 
Or take Plaintiffs’ claim that the hearing officer “failed to adequately consider the 
evidence in the record about the impact of A.U.’s stutter.” Pls.’ Objections at 27. The record 

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tells a different story. As the hearing officer explained in a new paragraph directly addressing 
this Court’s remand instructions, A.U.’s stutter “was not mentioned” in the prehearing order that 
outlines the issues for him to consider. RAR at 56. And no witness provided “persuasive 
testimony” that A.U.’s stutter impaired his learning ability anyway. Id. The Court adopts 
Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s thorough summary of the other relevant testimony and findings on 
the stutter confirming that Hearing Officer Banks made a reasonable conclusion. See Report at 
20–21. Extensive discussion on this point undermines Plaintiffs’ claim that either Hearing 
Officer Banks or Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh gave it too little attention. Like the rest of 
Plaintiffs’ objections, citing a hodge podge of allegedly related, favorable evidence will not 
establish error. 
Objection 6. Plaintiffs insist that the December IEP was inadequate because it did not 
include math and English supports that A.U. required, and they fault Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh 
for relying on Edward M.R. v. District of Columbia, 128 F.4th 290 (D.C. Cir. 2025), to conclude 
otherwise. Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh correctly reasoned that, under Edward M.R., the 
December IEP was adequate because A.U. received math and English support services even if 
his IEP did not address them. Report at 22. In Edward M.R., the plaintiff faulted the relevant 
IEP for failing to include “research-based instruction.” 128 F.4th at 294. But because that 
plaintiff received “research-based instruction,” his IEPs’ “silen[ce] on the matter” did not render 
it inadequate. Id. That case maps directly onto this one. Plaintiffs claim that A.U. “received” 
extra hours in English and math but complain that those extra hours were “not on his IEPs.” 
Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. Under Edward M.R., then, because A.U. “did receive” services—
“even if his IEPs were silent” about them—“his claim fails.” 128 F. 4th at 294. 

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Citing unpublished or out-of-circuit district court cases predating Edward M.R., as 
Plaintiffs do, will not get them around on-point, binding precedent. See, e.g., Pls.’ Objections at 
31 (citing Jones v. District of Columbia, No. 17-1437, 2018 WL 7286022, at *13 (D.D.C. Sept. 
5, 2018)); id. at 32 (citing Q.K. v. Smith, No. 21-0283, 2022 WL 912720, at *13 (D. Md. Mar. 
29, 2022)). Neither will citing rule statements from non-binding circuit court decisions in 
different contexts. See, e.g., id. at 33 (citing A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 
F.3d 672, 682 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an IEP needed to identify in its “terms” the school 
that could meet a student’s needs where that student had not yet been placed in an appropriate 
school)). And the only D.C. Circuit authority Plaintiffs cite likewise says nothing about this 
issue. See Z.B. v. District of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (focusing on parents’ 
burden in IEP challenges and explaining that they need not “rule out” the possibility that any 
school in an “entire school system” could adequately serve their child to prevail). 
Objection 7. Last, Plaintiffs object that the magistrate judge should have considered 
A.U.’s performance at the private school Siena, in which he enrolled months after the December 
IEP’s creation, in considering the older IEPs. Pls.’ Objections at 35. Again, what ultimately 
matters to the Court’s review is what evidence the hearing officer considered. See L.R.L. ex rel. 
Lomax, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 74. And as Plaintiffs themselves assert, Hearing Officer Banks 
considered testing results from the start of A.U.’s time at Siena. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 35; 
RAR at 57 (explaining that a test A.U. took “upon enrollment” at Siena confirmed his reading 
ability). That Plaintiffs wish he instead relied on different testing data from later that school year 
once again amounts to an argument about how to weigh evidence. See Garris, 210 F. Supp. 3d 
at 190 (rejecting a challenge to a hearing officer’s conclusion that merely “draw different 
conclusions from [the] evidence” before him); A.W. v. District of Columbia, No. 12-411, 2014 

15 
 
WL 12884524, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2014) (explaining that courts should not reverse hearing 
officers’ decisions just “because some evidence in the record, if given substantial weight, could 
support a finding in [Plaintiffs’] favor”). So even if Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh more directly 
considered later evidence, the claim would still have failed. The Court thus overrules this 
objection. 
* * * 
 To sum up, the Court overrules Plaintif fs’ objections, and otherwise agrees with 
Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh that Hearing Officer Banks appropriately reevaluated the December 
IEP on remand. This takes care of Plaintiffs’ reimbursement request too. Plaintiffs’ tuition 
reimbursement claim (for enrolling A.U. at Siena) hinges on finding the December IEP 
inadequate. See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 44 (recognizing that their reimbursement claim 
hinges on a ruling that “DCPS did not prove the December 2019 IEP appropriate”); Pls.’ 
Objections at 37. Because DCPS provided A.U. with an adequate December IEP, the claim fails. 
IV. 
For these reasons, the Court adopts in full and incorporates by reference the Report and 
Recommendation. It will accordingly grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the District’s Cross-Motion. A separate Order will issue. 
 
 
 
Dated: June 9, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J. 

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