govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_21-cr-00019-5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No.: 3:21-CR-19-TAV-DCP-2 
 ) 
JAMES J. JOY, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s pro se motion for a compassionate 
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 242]. The Federal Defender Services of 
Eastern Tennessee filed a notice of no intent to supplement the pro se motion [Doc. 244]. 
The government responded in opposition [Doc. 247], and defendant replied [Doc. 251]. 
For the reasons set forth more fully below, defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction 
under § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 242] is DENIED. 
I. Background 
On December 15, 2021, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 100 grams 
or more of heroin, 40 grams or more of fentanyl, and a quantity of carfentanil, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 1), conspiracy to 
distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base and a quantity of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 2), and possession of a 
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) 
(Count 3) [Docs. 86, 91 ]. The Court sentenced defendant to a total of 120 months’ 

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imprisonment, consisting of 60 months as to Counts 1 and 2, to run concurrently, and 60 
months as to Count 3, to run consecutively [Doc. 141]. According to the Bureau of Prisons’ 
website, defendant is presently scheduled for release on October 15, 2028. Inmate Locator, 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (accessed June 4, 
2026). 
II. Legal Standard 
A court generally lacks “the authority to change or modify [a sentence, once 
imposed,] unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. 
Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 
326 (6th Cir. 2010)). “One exception —commonly referred to as ‘compassionate 
release’—permits the court to reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds, among other 
things, that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” Rutherford 
v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, slip op. at 1 (2026) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). 
The First Step Act of 2018’s amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A) revised this exception. First 
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115 -391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); Rutherford, slip op. 
at 4. Prior to the First Step Act, a district court could grant relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
only on motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Now a court may modify a 
defendant’s sentence upon a motion by a defendant if the defendant has exhauste d all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 
defendant’s behalf or after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the 
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

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If the defendant surmounts this preliminary hurdle, the Court may grant a sentence 
reduction “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable” if it finds: 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or 
 
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in 
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense 
or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a 
determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that 
the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community, as provided under section 3142(g); 
 
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . . 
 
Id. Defendant seeks relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) [Doc. 242]. 
If the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, courts must then follow the statute ’s 
three-step test: 
At step one, a court must “find[ ]” whether “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. At step two, a court must “find[ ]” 
whether “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Commission’s policy statement 
on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Thus, if § 1B1.13 is 
still “applicable,” courts must “follow the Commission’s instructions in 
[§ 1B1.13] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification 
and the extent of the reduction authorized.” At step three, “§ 3582(c)[(1)(A)] 
instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine 
whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” 
 
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
In considering a compassionate release motion, “district courts may deny compassionate 
release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and 

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do not need to address the others” but must “address all three steps” if granting such a 
motion. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). 
III. Analysis 
A. Exhaustion 
The Court first examines whether defendant has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 
exhaustion requirement, which is a mandatory prerequisite to consideration of a 
compassionate release request on the merits. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 
(6th Cir. 2020). “When ‘properly invoked,’ mandatory claim -processing rules ‘must be 
enforced.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi. , 138 S. Ct. 
13, 17 (2017)). The only exceptions to such a mandatory claim-processing rule are waiver 
and forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 
In this case , the government concedes that the exhaustion requirement has been 
satisfied [Doc. 247, p. 2]. Accordingly , the Court will proceed to evaluate defendant’s 
compassionate release request according to the three-step test explained above. 
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
 
Turning to whether defendant has set forth extraordinary and compelling grounds 
for relief, the Court first notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
previously held that “[i]n cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate 
release, federal judges may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full 
discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ without consulting the policy statement 
of § 1B1.13.” United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020). This was so 

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because the applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13, as 
written at the time, did not contemplate inmate -filed motions for compassionate release, 
but instead, was limited to circumstances where the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion on an 
inmate’s behalf. Id. at 1109–10; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
However, the Sentencing Commission amended the policy statement in § 1B1.13, 
effective November 1, 2023, to encompass inmate-filed motions for compassionate release. 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023). It thus appears 
that the Sixth Circuit’s prior ruling that § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement to 
inmate-filed motions for compassionate release is no longer consistent with the Guidelines. 
See United States v. Nash, No. 23-3635, 2024 WL 1979067, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) 
(noting the amendment to § 1B1.13 and stating that “prior to [the date of amendment], no 
guideline policy statement applied to compassionate -release motions brought by 
defendants, and a distric t court could deny a defendant -filed motion without reference to 
any policy statement”); see also United States v. Ringgold , No. ELH -17-232, 2023 WL 
7410895, at *5–6 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2023) (“[I]t appears that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion 
in McCoy, 981 F. 3d at 281, to the effect that ‘§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable’ policy 
statement,’ is no longer consistent with the Guidelines. This is because the Policy 
Statement is now expressly applicable to defendant -filed motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).”). However, “[t]he new policy statement largely preserves the discretion 

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district courts held to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release.” 
United States v. Davis, No. 3:20-cr-16, 2023 WL 7356579, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2023). 
As amended, § 1B1.13(b) states that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist 
under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof,” and discusses when 
the medical circumstances of the defendant, the age of the defendant, the family 
circumstances of the defendant, the defendant’s victimization in custody, and other reasons 
may constitute extraordinary circumstances. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). 
Recently, the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the meaning of the term 
“extraordinary and compelling.” “The term ‘extraordinary’ means ‘most unusual,’ ‘far 
from common,’ or ‘having little or no precedent.’” Rutherford, slip op. at 8. 
“‘Compelling,’ meanwhile, means ‘tending to convince or convert by or as if by 
forcefulness of evidence.’” Id. “Putting these definitions together ‘extraordinary and 
compelling’ reasons for compassionate release are those that are especially unusual and 
convincing.” Id. at 8–9. Thus “[w]hile the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ leave 
room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration.” Id. at 11. 
Rather, “[t]heir meaning depends on context: A reason is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ 
only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to ‘warrant’ compassionate release.” Id. 
 
 
 

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1. Validity of Conviction 
Defendant’s first ground for seeking compassionate release is his contention that his 
conviction under § 924(c) is “constitutionally and factually unsupported” [Doc. 242, pp. 
2–3]. But the Supreme Court recently confirmed that “[a] prisoner who collaterally attacks 
the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U.S.C. §2255, not 18 U.S.C. §3582.” 
Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ____, slip op. at 5 (2026). The Supreme Court noted 
that “[c]hallenging the validity of a conviction through a compassionate release motion 
circumvents the exacting requirements of §2255.” Id., slip op. at 7 –8. Moreover, “[t]hat 
Congress has chosen to make §2255 a high bar is not a compelling reason to reduce the 
sentences of prisoners who fall short.” Id., slip op. at 10. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandez, it is clear that the Court is 
not to consider any challenge to the validity of defendant’s conviction as an extraordinary 
and compelling ground for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
 2. Change in Law 
Next, in his reply brief, defendant suggests that he is eligible for relief under 
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) of the Guidelines [Doc. 251, p. 2]. That section of the amended policy 
statement provides that non-retroactive changes in law can constitute an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for release under certain conditions. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1B1.13(b)(6). However, in April 2025, the Sixth Circuit invalidated section 
1B1.13(b)(6). United States v. Bricker , No. 24-3286, 2025 WL 1166016, at *1 (6th Cir. 
Apr. 22, 2025) . Based in part on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Loper 

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Bright Enter prises v. Raimondo , 603 U.S. 369 (2024) , which reduced the interpretive 
deference afforded to agencies, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Commission 
“overstepped its authority and issued a policy statement that is plainly unreasonable under 
the statute and in conflict with the separation of powers .” Bricker, 2025 WL 1166016, at 
*1; see also Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2024) (clarifying 
when courts should independently interpret statutes). 
In reaching its conclusion, the Bricker majority clarified that the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. McCall , 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc) , which 
predates the amended policy statement, remains the law of this Circuit. In contrast to the 
policy statement contained in § 1B1.13(b)(6) of the Guidelines, the McCall court held that 
the fact “that a defendant might receive a different sentence today than he received years 
ago represents the routine business of our legal system ” and “ cannot supply an 
extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a lawful sentence whose term Congress 
enacted, and the President signed, into law.” Id. at 1065. In other words, because Loper 
Bright reduced courts’ deference to Commission policy statements, and the Bricker 
majority held that section 1B1.13(b)(6) is “plainly unreasonable,” “ we [are] bound by 
McCall’s views on the plain meaning of ‘extraordinary and compelling .’” Bricker, 2025 
WL 1166016, at *1–*9 (citing United States v. Ferguson , 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 
2017)). 
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue and held that “Congress’s 
nonretroactive change to §924(c) —considered by itself or in combination with other 

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factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.” Rutherford, slip op. 
at 16. The Court stated that, to the extent the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statement 
counsels otherwise, “the Commission’s policy statement is invalid.” Id. The Court 
specifically concluded that the disparity created by the amendment of § 924(c) does not 
satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s “extraordinary and compelling” requirement. Id. at 9. The Court 
reasoned that “[f]ar from ‘extraordinary,’ nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties 
are the norm.” Id. Further, the Court stated that “[i]t is hard to see how Congress’s 
deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could 
be a convincing reason that ‘warrants’ a reduction .” Id. (emphasis in original) (alteration 
omitted). Further, the Court found that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c)’s sentencing 
scheme also “fall[s] well outside the heartland of compassionate release, which has long 
been defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances.” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the disparity that results from Congress’s decision to leave a sentence 
untouched cannot serve as an extraordinary and compelling ground for relief under 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. at 17. 
In light of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bricker and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rutherford, it is clear that the Court is not to consider any non-retroactive change-of-law 
as an extraordinary and compelling ground for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
 3. Combination of Factors 
Finally, defendant cites his rehabilitative efforts [Doc. 242, p. 4]. But rehabilitation 
“is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of this policy 

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statement.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(d). Because the Court has 
rejected defendant’s remaining grounds in light of binding Supreme Court precedent, it 
therefore cannot properly consider defendant’s rehabilitation in isolation. See U.S. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(d). 
Given that the Court has rejected defendant’s extraordinary and compelling 
arguments, his request for compassionate release [Doc. 242] is hereby DENIED. Because 
“3582(c)[(1)(A)] instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors” only where 
“the reduction [is] authorized by [steps one and two],” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108, the Court 
need not address the section 3553(a) factors at this stage. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth more fully above, defendant’s motion [ Doc. 242 ] is 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Thomas A. Varlan 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 

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