govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-3_26-cv-00920-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
HARSHDEEP SINGH, ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
 ) Civil No. 26-920 
v. ) 
 ) 
LEONARD ODDO, et. al., ) 
 Respondents. ) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 Pending now before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1) filed by Harshdeep Singh (“Singh”). Leonard Oddo, et.al. 
(collectively, “Respondents”) filed a response in opposition on May 27, 2026 (ECF No. 5). The 
petition is ripe for decision. 
Singh, a citizen of India, asserts that his continued detention violates due process. He 
asserts that he has been detained since January 1, 2025 -- over sixteen months – without a bond 
hearing and his removal is not imminent because his appeal of the removal order remains 
pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner asserts he has not been found to be 
a flight risk or danger to the community, and is entitled to an individualized bond hearing or 
immediate release. 
Singh acknowledges that he was ordered removed from the United States on June 12, 
2025, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal on February 24, 2026 (ECF 
No. 1 at 4, 8). This case, therefore, does not implicate detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 or 
1226(a), as in many recent habeas cases. Singh recognizes that a 90-day post-final-order 
removal period pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B) was in effect until May 25, 2026. Singh 
argues that his detention after May 25, 2026 is lawful, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 

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Discussion 
Singh argues his detention is unconstitutionally prolonged under the German Santos 
framework and independently exceeds the presumptive reasonable period set forth in Zadvydas 
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
The government argues that the petition should be dismissed. The government maintains 
Singh’s detention is within the presumptive reasonable period set forth in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
U.S. 678 (2001). The government argues, in the alternative, that Singh failed to meet his burden 
to demonstrate a good reason to believe his removal was not imminent and submitted an order 
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dated May 1, 2026, which denied Singh’s motion to stay 
his removal pending review of his appeal (ECF No. 5-5). 
With respect to Singh’s detention, the government asserts: (1) detention was mandated by 
statute until May 25, 2026 (90 days after the administratively final removal order), pursuant to § 
1231(a)(2); and (2) detention is presumptively proper pursuant to § 1231(a)(6), which provides: 
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, 
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or 
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or 
unlikely to comply with the order of r emoval, may be detained beyond the 
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in 
paragraph (3). 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
 In Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573 (2022), the Supreme Court concluded 
“there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the Government to 
provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention. . . .” Id. at 581. 
The Court commented: “On its face, the statute says nothing about bond hearings before 
immigration judges or burdens of proof, nor does it provide any other indication that such 

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procedures are required.” Id. The court concludes that petitioner is properly detained pursuant 
to § 1231(a)(6). 
The court is not persuaded by Singh’s argument based on Zadvydas. The Supreme Court 
established, for the sake of uniform administration, that a 6-month period of detention after a 
final removal order was presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. It is only “[a]fter 
this 6–month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant 
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with 
evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. Here, as the government points out, the six-
month post-final-removal order period does not expire until August 24, 2026. Singh’s detention 
prior to the order of removal does not affect this six-month period. 
The Supreme Court further explained: 
This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed 
must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in 
confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 
 
Id. 
The dismissal on this ground is without prejudice in the event that Singh is able to show 
good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 
future. As the detention lengthens, the “reasonably foreseeable future” time of removal shrinks. 
Davis, 533 U.S. at 701. As of the date of this opinion, Singh has not been detained post-final-
removal order for more than 6 months. His detention is presumptively reasonable. 
In German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 
2020), the court identified four factors to consider whether continued detention without a bond 
hearing is unreasonable: (1) duration of the detention; (2) whether the detention is likely to 
continue; (3) the reasons for the delay, but not holding an alien's good-faith challenge to his 

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removal against him; and (4) whether the alien's conditions of confinement are meaningfully 
different from criminal punishment. Id. at 211. 1 The government argues that Singh is not 
entitled to a bond hearing under this framework because he is subject to a removal order. See 
Singh v. Lowe, No. 3:26CV998, 2026 WL 1399924, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2026) (“Petitioner, 
however, has pointed to no authority authorizing application of the German Santos factors to 
detainees held under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6).”). Because the court determined that Singh’s 
detention is not unconstitutional under Zadvydas, the court does not reach this issue. The court 
also does not decide the parties’ dispute about whether Singh was required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), will 
be denied without prejudice to petitioner’s ability to demonstrate that there is not a significant 
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 
An appropriate Order will be entered. 
Dated: June 9, 2026 BY THE COURT: 
 
 /s/ Joy Flowers Conti 
Joy Flowers Conti 
 Senior United States District Court Judge 
 
1 In German Santos, the court explained: 
 
When an alien is first detained, we can presume that detention is needed to prevent flight or danger 
to the community. Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 474. The benefit of detaining these aliens as a class 
outweighs their “short-term deprivation of liberty.” Id. Eventually, though, that burden “outweighs 
a mere presumption that the alien will flee” or pose a danger. Id. at 474–75. “At this tipping point,” 
we said, due process requires the Government to justify continued detention at a bond hearing. Id. 
at 475, 478. 
 
Id. at 209. 
 

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