govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-5_25-cv-04874-2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 
CHERYL CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CUSTOM WOODWORKING CABINETRY AND 
DESIGN, LLC; J. HERBERT FISHER, JR.; 
CWCD HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
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No. 5:25-cv-4874 
 
 
O P I N I O N 
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18 – Granted in part, Denied in part 
 
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. June 9, 2026 
United States District Judge 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Cheryl Cummings filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Defendants, 
Custom Woodworking Cabinetry and Design, LLC, CWCD Holdings, LLC, and J. Herbert 
Fisher, Jr., discriminated against, disparately treated, and retaliated against her on the basis of her 
gender, leading to her constructive discharge. Now pending is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
the gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims in Counts One, Two, 
and Three of the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, 
the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Count Two and the retaliation 
allegations in Count Three of the Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. 
 

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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Allegations 
Cummings was a salesperson for Defendants Custom Woodworking Cabinetry and 
Design, LLC, CWCD Holdings, LLC, and J. Herbert Fisher, Jr., from January 2016 to October 
11, 2023. See Am. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 17. Levi Stoltzfus hired Cummings. See id. ¶ 13. 
Cummings was the only female salesperson and was supervised by all male employees. See id. ¶ 
14. Levi Stoltzfus sold his ownership of Defendants Custom Woodworking and CWCD 
Holdings “to, among others, Defendant [Fisher], on April 23, 2019.” Id. ¶ 15. “[Cummings’] 
office, peers, and operations remained mostly the same after the sale; however, [Cummings] 
began to experience discrimination, disparate treatment, and other mistreatments as set forth 
below that/which continued and lasted up through [her] constructive discharge on October 11, 
2023.” Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Fisher was Cummings’ supervisor after the sale. See id. ¶ 17. 
After the sale, “Defendants[’] employees made sexist[,] discriminatory comments to 
[Cummings] with regard to her work habits, lifestyle, and general conduct; which were 
unwelcome, discriminatory, and further color Defendants’ other conduct.” Id. ¶ 18. For example, 
a manager, Brad Yoder, said “women should not be doing construction” and Yoder and 
Defendant Fisher both called Cummings “too sensitive” and “stupid.” Id. ¶ 19. Additionally, 
David Fisher, a painter working for Defendants, told Cummings “you are a girl and should just 
stay at home where you belong” and referred to another female employee, in front of Cummings, 
as “a fat queer woman.” Id. ¶ 20. 
Defendants paid Cummings on a commission basis, which was ten percent (10%) of all 
sales, and, absent commissions, Cummings “could make draws that would be paid back to 
Defendants out of future commission payments.” Id. ¶ 41. Beginning in 2021, Cummings 

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received an additional eight percent (8%) commission rate on gross sales of the Century Cabinet 
product line. See id. ¶ 42. Cummings was entitled to reimbursement for “mileage, tolls, parking, 
and cell[]phone bills.” Id. ¶ 43. “Salespersons were expected to be paid in the next biweekly pay 
period after submitting requests for payment[.]” Id. ¶ 44. 
After the sale, Cummings’ “commission payments were consistently delayed in relation 
to male salespersons, for months up to over half a year.” Id. ¶ 22. She “learned through 
conversation with male salespersons, including Levi Stoltzfus and Brad Yoder (who was also a 
Manager), that her payments were being delayed as those individuals stated they were paid the 
very next pay period (biweekly).” Id.; see also ECF No. 17-1. Cummings’ “commission 
payments were also unilaterally and discriminatorily reduced in amount, against [Cummings] 
specifically, under the guise of ‘claw back’ of money when errors were made or other customer 
friendly actions taken, for which [Cummings] had little or no input, and for which other male 
salespersons never had commission payments reduced for similar reasons.” Am. Compl. ¶ 23. 
Additionally, Defendants “denied and refused” to pay Cummings her expense reimbursements, 
while not doing so “to similarly situated male salespersons.” Id. ¶ 24. Defendants also “offered 
health insurance and/or health insurance reimbursement to male salespersons and employees, but 
not [Cummings.]” Id. ¶ 25. Defendants also allegedly offered vacation and sick time to male 
employees, including Yoder, but not to Cummings. See id. ¶ 26. Cummings requested vacation 
and sick time, but Defendants denied her request and told her that others did not receive such 
time. See id. 
Additionally, Cummings alleges that Defendants’ employees mistreated her “customers, 
clientele, assistants, contractors, and affiliates in an effort to undermine [her] and cause [her] to 
quit[.]” Id. ¶ 27. “For example, after having made mistakes and errors on customer and client 

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Michael D. Fried’s order, Defendants made comments to Mr. Fried about [Cummings] to 
undermine his confidence in her, specifically Brad Yoder’s statement [that] ‘women should not 
be doing construction.’” Id. ¶ 28. Also, Defendants made other comments to Fried, including that 
Cummings was “too sick” and “cannot handle the job.” Id. 
Cummings complained, both verbally and in writing, to her superiors about the alleged 
treatment. See id. ¶ 29. Specifically, on October 4, 2023, she emailed Brad Yoder, Defendant 
Fisher, “and others that Defendants were bullying and discriminating against her, and that labor 
laws exist to protect her from the discrimination and harassment.” Id. ¶ 30. “[T]here were no 
investigation[s] or actions taken in response to” Cummings’ complaint. Id. ¶ 31. A week later, on 
October 11, 2023, Cummings emailed Brad Yoder, Defendant Fisher, and others
1 to stop the 
“constant harassment and discrimination over what I have earned and should be paid. . . .” Id. ¶ 
32. Cummings referred to herself as “the woman who brought in 80[%] – 90% of the sales, 
worked the most hours, without overtime,” and “loved her job.” Id. Cummings then announced 
her intention to resign from Defendants’ employ. See id. ¶ 33. Defendants did not investigate 
Cummings’ complaints. See id. ¶ 34. 
Yoder responded to Cummings on October 11, 2023, saying that he sought to maintain 
“honesty and integrity and was never [his] intention to discriminate or bully by doing an accurate 
report.” Id. ¶ 35. Yoder added that it was “not his responsibility to approve reports, the owners 
[including Defendant Fisher] do,” and “defended the late payments by claiming [Cummings] was 
delayed in submitting reports.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. Cummings alleges that “the constant disparate and 
discriminatory mistreatment, late and non-payment of wages, denial of expenses and benefits, 
 
1 It is unclear who the others in question are. 

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refusal to investigate complaints, comments, conduct, and mistreatment of clients made there no 
other reasonable alternative[]” but for her to resign. Id. ¶ 39. 
Cummings calculates her total unpaid expenses as $101,447.87.2 See id. ¶ 46; see also 
ECF No. 17-3. She calculates her total unpaid commissions as $44,762.13. See Am. Compl. ¶ 
47; see also ECF No. 17-2. 
Cummings negotiated with Defendants about the unpaid commissions and expenses 
through and after October 2023. See Am. Compl. ¶ 48. On November 2, 2023, Cummings filed a 
Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and received a Notice of Right to Sue on 
June 6, 2025. See id. ¶ 11. 
 Cummings brings five counts in her Amended Complaint: Count One is for Hostile Work 
Environment, Discrimination, and Disparate Treatment under Title VII against Defendants 
Custom and CWCD Holdings. See id. ¶¶ 51–60. Count Two is for Retaliation under Title VII 
against Defendants Custom and CWCD Holdings. See ¶¶ 61–68. Count Three is for Harassment, 
Discrimination, and Retaliation under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 P.S. 
§§ 951-63, against all Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 69–76. Count Four is for the Non-payment of 
wages under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment & Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260.1, against all 
 
2 The Court notes that the “Exhibit B” reflects unpaid expenses, see ECF No. 17-2, and 
“Exhibit C” reflects unpaid commissions from April through December of 2023, see ECF No. 
17-3. Although the Amended Complaint refers to “Exhibit B” as unpaid commissions totaling 
$101,447.87, and “Exhibit C” as unpaid expenses totaling $44,762.13, the Court interprets the 
exhibits before it to reflect $44,762.13 in unpaid commissions and $101,447.87 in unpaid 
expenses. The diagram in both exhibits reflects the same. See ECF Nos. 17-2, 17-3. To the extent 
Cummings alleges the reduction of her commissions included a “claw back,” Am. Compl. ¶ 23, 
the amount ($65,943.56) is included in the “expenses” exhibit. See ECF No. 17-2. 

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Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 77–88. Count Five is for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment 
against all Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 89–97. 
B. Procedural History 
Cummings filed her Complaint on August 26, 2025. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On October 
14, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three. See ECF No. 8. 
The Court granted the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice on March 30, 2026. See ECF Nos. 
15, 16. 
Cummings filed an Amended Complaint on April 20, 2026. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 
17. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Three (and requesting that the 
Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts Four and Five) on May 4, 2026. 
See Mot., ECF No. 18. Defendants maintain that Cummings’ allegations of late commission 
payments in her gender discrimination claim are time-barred. See id. at 9–10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e)(1)). Cummings filed a Response in Opposition on May 18, 2026. See Resp., ECF No. 
19. Defendants filed a Reply on May 26, 2026. See Reply, ECF No. 20. 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim – Review of Applicable Law 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if “the ‘[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level’” has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. (explaining that determining “whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”). 
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits 
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents 
if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 
230 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 
(2007) (holding that “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources 
courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, 
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take 
judicial notice”); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that “a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be 
considered” (internal quotations omitted)). Courts may also consider “an undisputedly authentic 
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims 
are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 

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B. Discrimination under Title VII – Review of Applicable Law 
Federal law prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, and disability. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448–49 (3d 
Cir. 2015). Disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII are analyzed using the three-step 
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Rabinowitz v. 
AmeriGas Partners, L.P., 252 F. App’x 524, 527 (3d Cir. 2007). “Under the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm, an employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, after which the 
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse 
employment decision.” Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals has “defined ‘an adverse employment action’ under Title VII as an action by an 
employer that is ‘serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.’” Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)). “If the employer 
articulates one or more such reasons, the aggrieved employee must then proffer evidence that is 
sufficient to allow a reasonable finder of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employer’s proffered reasons are false or pretextual.” Fasold, 409 F.3d at 184. “It is important to 
note that although the ‘burden of production’ may shift during the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, 
the ‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the [employer] intentionally discriminated 
against the [employee] remains at all times with the [employee].’” Id. (citing Williams v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 759 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (explaining that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the law creates a “presumption” of unlawful discrimination, which is rebutted if the 
employer articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for the employer’s action, but 

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the “presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the 
Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion”). 
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: 
(1) he is a member of a protected class; 
(2) he was qualified for the position in question; 
(3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 
(4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; see also Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 
797 (3d Cir. 2003). “The central focus in a discrimination case is “whether the employer is 
treating ‘some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.’” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (quoting Int’l Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15. (1977)). 
C. Hostile Work Environment under Title VII – Review of Applicable Law 
To establish a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show: 
 
(1) he suffered intentional discrimination because of his national origin, race, or 
age; 
(2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; 
(3) it detrimentally affected him; 
(4) it would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same protected 
class in his position; and 
(5) there is a basis for vicarious liability. 
Massey, 269 F.3d at 260; Tate v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., No. 03-6081, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1814, at *60-61 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2005). In deciding whether an environment is “hostile,” the 
court may consider “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 
(1993). Title VII “does not reach the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, for example, 

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sporadic use of abusive language or generally boorish conduct.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 
U.S. 421, 452 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). “‘[O]ffhanded comments and isolated 
incidents (unless extremely serious)’ are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment 
claim.” Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2005). The “standards for judging 
hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility 
code.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). A constructive discharge 
occurs when the employer made working conditions “so unpleasant or intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would resign.” Rosh v. Gold Standard Café at Penn, 
Inc., No. 16-1676, 2016 WL 7375014, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2016) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). The plaintiff does not need to show that the employer intended for him to 
resign, only that it “knowingly permitted the unpleasant or intolerable discrimination.” Id. 
D. Retaliation under Title VII – Review of Applicable Law 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the ADA, and/or the PHRA, 
“a plaintiff must show: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either 
after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection 
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.” Krouse v. Am. 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997); Boykins v. SEPTA, No. 17-1980, 2018 WL 
460652, at *2, *6 (3d Cir. 2018) (analyzing claims under Title VII and the PHRA the same). 
Pursuant to the first element, a report to a superior may constitute protected activity 
where discrimination is specifically alleged in the verbal or written report. See LeBlanc v. Hill 
Sch., No. 14-1675, 2015 WL 144135, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2015) (citing Barber v. CSX 
Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 

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341 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that the employee must have a good faith, reasonable belief that the 
activity complained of is unlawful (citing Clark Cnty v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001))). 
As to the second element, a plaintiff must show that “a reasonable employee would have 
found the alleged retaliatory actions ‘materially adverse’ in that they ‘well might have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Moore, 461 F.3d at 
341 (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). “Under 
the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of 
unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes. . . . 
The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person 
in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?” Suders, 542 U.S. at 141. 
 Under the third element, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the protected 
activity and the retaliatory act. See Moore, 461 F.3d at 341–42. In determining causation, courts 
often look to the “temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged 
discrimination” and “the existence of a pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.” Jensen 
v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 450 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 
260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other 
grounds by Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. 53. Since there is no single, definite way of showing 
causation, the court must look at the evidence “as a whole” to determine if retaliation has been 
sufficiently pled. See Jensen, 435 F3d at 450 (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 
271, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2000)). However, “for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need 
not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Connelly v. Lane 
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a prima facie case is an 
evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement, and hence is not a proper measure of whether a 

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complaint fails to state a claim” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). “Instead of requiring 
a prima facie case, the post-Twombly pleading standard simply calls for enough facts to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].” 
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
E. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act – Review of Applicable Law 
Title VII and the PHRA both “make it illegal for an employer to discriminate against an 
individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the 
basis of sex.” Summy-Long v. Pa. State Univ., 226 F. Supp. 3d 371, 411 (M.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 
715 F. App’x 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) “The two acts are substantially similar, and 
Pennsylvania courts generally interpret the PHRA consistent with Title VII.” Id. “The proper 
analysis under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is identical, as Pennsylvania 
courts have construed the protections of the two acts interchangeably.” Summy-Long, 226 F. 
Supp. 3d at 411 (citing Weston v. Commw. of Pa, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment under Title VII and the PHRA 
The Court finds Cummings’ allegations sufficient to state gender discrimination and 
hostile work environment claims under both Title VII and the PHRA. To the extent that 
Defendants argue that Cummings’ commission allegations are time-barred, see Mot. 9–10, she 
alleges that Defendants owed her commissions incurred during the 300-day EEOC window. See 
ECF No. 17-3. 
B. Retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA 
Cummings fails to plausibly plead retaliation. Although Cummings engaged in a 
protected activity by emailing her supervisors and management about her alleged discrimination, 

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see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32, she fails to allege any conduct that occurred after her October 4, 2023 
email. All she alleges is that Defendants failed to either respond to her email or investigate her 
complaints until after she sent a second email on October 11, 2023, after which she resigned 
from Defendants’ employ. See id. ¶¶ 31–34. Cummings thus does not state a retaliation claim. 
See LeBlanc, 2015 WL 144135, at *17 (finding that “an employer’s failure to investigate a 
complaint of discrimination cannot be considered an adverse employment action taken in 
retaliation for the filing of the same discrimination complaint”); see also Lustgarten v. 
Hunterdon Med. Ctr., No. 20-12695, 2020 WL 6707959, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2020) 
(dismissing a retaliation claim when “the Amended Complaint does not appear to allege any 
facts that Defendants took adverse employment actions after Plaintiff engaged in protected 
activity”). 
Since the Court gave Cummings an opportunity to amend her Complaint, granting further 
leave to amend her retaliation claims would be futile. See In re Avandia Marketing, Sales 
Practices, and Prods. Liability Litig., 564 F. App’x 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Denial of leave to 
amend a complaint is especially appropriate where a party has already been given the 
opportunity to amend the complaint.”) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Upon review of the Amended Complaint and the Motion to Dismiss, this Court finds that 
Cummings states a claim for gender discrimination and hostile work environment but fails to 
state a claim for retaliation. The Court denies the Motion to Dismiss Count One and the gender 
discrimination allegations in Count Three but grants the Motion as to Count Two and the 
retaliation allegations in Count Three. Count Two and the retaliation allegations in Count Three 
are dismissed with prejudice. 

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A separate Order follows. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 /s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
 JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR. 
 United States District Judge 
 

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