govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-4_23-cv-01007-6

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
RONALD CUPP, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., 
Defendants. 
 

 
 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
Re: ECF No. 110 
 
 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court dismisses this case for failure to prosecute under 
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 11, 2026, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this case. ECF 
No. 107. Any response from Plaintiff Ronald Cupp was due on March 25, 2026. Id. On May 1, 
2026, the Court issued an order to show cause why no opposition had been filed, noting that “[i]f 
Plaintiff does not file a timely response to this order . . . , the Court may . . . dismiss this case for 
failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” ECF No. 110 at 1–2. 
Plaintiff’s attorney, Eric Young, timely filed a response in the form of a declaration 
describing serious health and staffing challenges he has recently faced. ECF No. 111. He asked 
the Court “to give [him] the weekend to prepare additional filings on Mr. Cupp’s behalf,” 
including “a motion requesting the Court set a new scheduling order that will allow leave to 
amend the Complaint to allege new factual information uncovered by the ACLU’s lawsuit against 
the County” and “to allege any additional drone flyovers that occurred since June 2022.” ECF No. 
111 at 8. His request would “also include a request to reopen fact discovery for both sides.” Id. 
He would “provide a thorough proposed schedule with [his] filing, which [he would] complete by 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Monday, May 18, 2026.” Id. He also stated that, “at great personal sacrifice to [his] own 
privacy,” he would “submit documentation supporting each fact contained herein about [his] 
health or other pertinent matters.” Id. 
The Court issued a brief order in response asking that no further information concerning 
Mr. Young’s health be filed, and withholding any opinion on his forthcoming requests “unless and 
until they are before the Court.” ECF No. 112. May 18, 2026 came and went without the Court 
receiving further filings from Plaintiff or his attorney. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The district court has the discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(b). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally 
been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily 
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). “Despite this 
authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and, therefore, it should only be imposed in extreme 
circumstances.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the 
merits.”). 
Courts “must weigh five factors” in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to 
prosecute: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 
disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” Ferdik, 
963 F.2d at 1260–61. Considering each factor in turn, the Court concludes that they weigh in 
favor of dismissal. 
First, “the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” 
Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). That is true here. This lawsuit 
has been pending for more than three years. ECF No. 1. Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment has received no response even though it was filed almost three months ago, and even 
though a response was due more than ten weeks ago. And although attorney Young indicated his 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
intent to file further motions on May 18, none have been filed. Accordingly, this factor weighs in 
favor of dismissal. 
Second, “[i]t is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to 
routine noncompliance of litigants.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261). Here, Cupp failed to oppose the motion for summary judgment 
or file a statement of nonopposition, as Civil Local Rule 7-3(b) required him to do. Nor did he 
seek an extension. He responded to the Court’s order to show cause, but never filed the further 
motions his response promised. Under these circumstances, the Court is not obligated to issue yet 
another order to show cause before dismissing his case. “The trial judge is in the best position to 
determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public 
interest.” Id. The present delay has “consumed some of the court’s time that could have been 
devoted to other cases on the docket.” Id. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 
Third, in order to prove prejudice, “a defendant must establish that plaintiff’s actions 
impaired defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision 
of the case.” Id. (citing Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)). Here, 
Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion for summary judgment or to file another motion seeking leave 
to amend his complaint and has not otherwise advanced the litigation. To state the obvious, the 
Court cannot “proceed to trial” if one party refuses to participate in the litigation. “Whether 
prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in part judged with reference to the 
strength of the plaintiff’s excuse for the default.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 131 (citation omitted). 
Here, although Young provided some explanation for his failure to oppose the motion for 
summary judgment, he also stated that he is “stronger and healthier now than [he has] been in the 
past six months” and that he “seek[s] an opportunity to move forward.” There is no apparent 
justification for his failure to move forward under those circumstances. Accordingly, this factor 
also weighs in favor of dismissal. 
Fourth, “less drastic sanctions” are unlikely to be effective in advancing this case. The 
Court already issued an order to show cause providing Plaintiff with two weeks to respond. ECF 
No. 110. Young filed his responsive declaration on the last timely day, promising further motions 

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United States District Court 
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the following Monday, but those motions were never filed. The Court’s order to show cause 
warned that dismissal may result from further noncompliance. Id. at 1–2. Although a motion for 
summary judgment and an order to show cause remain pending, both of which could terminate 
Plaintiff’s case, Plaintiff and his attorney have not attempted to explain their failure to provide 
further filings. Accordingly, lesser sanctions are unlikely to effectively advance this case. 
Finally, “[p]ublic policy favors disposition of cases on the merits,” such that “this factor 
weighs against dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. Nonetheless, because four of the five 
factors weigh in favor of dismissal, the Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff’s case for failure to 
prosecute is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the case for failure to prosecute under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dismissal is without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and
close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 9, 2026 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 

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