govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-02921-1

I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
BENJAMIN HENDREN, 
 Plaintiff, 
 v. CIVIL ACTION FILE 
 NO. 1:24-CV-2921-TWT 
 JOHN PATTON, et al., 
 Defendants. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
T his is a civil rights case. It is before the Court on the GSU Defendants’1 
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 6 4]. As set forth below, the GSU 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 64] is GRANTED. 
I. Background2
This case involves an alleged unlawful arrest of a photojournalist while 
he was documenting a protest in and around a construction site at the GSU 
Convocation Center. Defendant John Patton is a sergeant with the Georgia 
State University Police Department (“GSUPD”), and Defendants Jamar Reed, 
Anthony Ewing, Deronald Davis, and Jeremiah Blaxstone are officers with the 
1 The Court uses the term “GSU Defendants” in this Order to refer only 
to the Movant-Defendants, who are John Patton, Jamar Reed, Anthony Ewing, 
DeRonald Davis, and Jeremiah Blaxstone. 
2 The operative facts on the Motion for Summary Judgment are taken 
from the parties’ Statements of Undisputed Material Facts and the responses 
thereto. The Court will deem the parties’ factual assertions, where supported 
by evidentiary citations, admitted unless the respondent makes a proper 
objection under Local Rule 56.1(B). 

2 
 
GSUPD. ( 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8 -12 [Doc. 59]). At all relevant times, Plaintiff 
Benjamin Hendren was a credentialed, freelance photojournalist working for 
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (the “AJC”). (Id. ¶¶ 7, 25). 
On July 29, 2022, approximately 30 to 40 individuals wearing masks, 
dark clothing, and camouflage entered Georgia State University’s convocation 
center to protest the construction of the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, 
as part of a project otherwise known as “Cop City.” (GSU Defs.’ Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 [Doc. 64-1]). Defendant Brasfield & Gorrie was 
involved in the construction of the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center. (Id. 
¶¶ 2-3 ). During the protest, t he protesters made statements like “Stop Cop 
City” and “Stop Brasfield Gorrie. ” (Id. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Response to GSU Defs.’ 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4 [Doc. 71-1]). 
During the protest, Defendants Jackson Bussey and Moses Paige, two 
construction workers for Defendant Brasfield & Gorrie, were on site. (See GSU 
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4). Defendants Bussey and 
Paige witnessed one of the protestors inside the center holding a camera and 
either filming or taking pictures of the protest. (
Id. ¶ 6). Defendant Bussey 
instructed the protestors to leave the construction site, and they ultimately 
complied with the request. (Id. ¶ 8-9). During the protestors’ compliance with 
the instructions by Defendant Bussey, Defendant Ewing witnessed the 
protestors “jostling with the construction workers” at the convocation center 
and “called it out over the radio.” ( Id. ¶ 10). Defendant Ewing then inserted 

3 
 
himself between the protestors and construction workers to separate them. (Id. 
¶ 11). The protestors fled the scene afterwards. (Id. ¶ 12). The GSU Defendants 
soon detained several protestors who fled the scene away from the construction 
site. (See id. ¶¶ 13-22). Several protestors wore dark or black clothing. (See id. 
¶¶ 1, 13, 18). 
At the time of these events, the Plaintiff was on assignment for the AJC 
and was covering “the breaking news morning shift. ” (Id. ¶ 24). While the 
Plaintiff has testified that he was not at the convocation center, this fact is 
disputed by the parties. (Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 
[Doc. 71-2]; GSU Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts ¶ 1 [Doc. 79-2]). The Plaintiff wore a white shirt, black pants, and a black 
hoodie or raincoat. (GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 32-
33; Pl.’s Response to GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 32). 
The Plaintiff arrived at the scene after hearing Defendant Ewing’s 
communications over his police scanner. (
Id. ¶¶ 23, 25). After parking next to 
a convenience store, the Plaintiff got out of his vehicle, walked across the street 
from the convenience store, and began taking photos of the detainees. ( Id. ¶ 
26). Defendant Patton noticed the Plaintiff shortly after his arrival and told 
Defendant Reed that he was “pretty sure” the Plaintiff “was there too” and that 
“we might as well stop him and ID him too.” (
Id. ¶ 27). 
Defendant Reed walked over to the Plaintiff to talk to him. ( Id. ¶ 28). 
Before Defendant Reed had a chance to ask any questions, the Plaintiff 

4 
 
informed him that he was not at the protest and that he was freelance with the 
AJC. (Id. ¶ 29). Defendant Reed asked the Plaintiff for his credentials, but he 
did not have any on him, and the interaction ended. (Id. ¶ 30). Later, Defendant 
Patton repeated his belief that the Plaintiff was at the protest to another 
officer. ( Id. ¶ 31). But during his deposition, Defendant Patton did not 
remember seeing the Plaintiff at any time previously. ( Pl.’s Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 8; GSU Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 8). 
Shortly after Defendant Reed spoke to the Plaintiff, Defendants Reed 
and Davis drove back to the construction site and picked up Defendants Bussey 
and Paige for a “showup.” (GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
¶ 34). Defendant Reed explained to the two that the “showup” would require 
them to “sit in the back seat [of the patrol vehicle] . . . ride by and [look at the 
suspects] and . . . say if that was them or not.” (
Id. ¶ 35). On the ride over, 
Defendant Reed told Defendants Bussey and Paige “We got them. We just want 
to bring y’all over here . . . so y’all can id them for us because they said they 
were not in . . . the building.” (
Id. ¶ 37). Defendant Paige responded that “they 
did . . . they fucking lying.” (Id. ¶ 38). Defendant Bussey chimed in that “one of 
them shoved my ass. I know which one it is too.” ( Id.). Defendant Reed 
continued: “Because they’re saying that, we want to positively get some 
witnesses to say . . . y’all verify y’all saw them in the building. These are the 
ones we have.” (
Id. ¶ 39). 

5 
 
When they arrived, Defendants Bussey and Paige both positively 
identified the protestors sitting on the curb. ( Id. ¶ 40). Defendant Davis then 
pointed at the Plaintiff, who was standing on the opposite side of the street 
from the protestors, and asked Defendant Reed: “Did [Defendants Bussey and 
Paige] say he’s a part of them?” (Id. ¶ 42). Defendant Reed responded that the 
Plaintiff “has on a press badge. I’m not sure. He could possibly be.” (Id. ¶ 43). 
Either Defendant Bussey or Paige then informed the officers that “that’s the . 
. . video guy.” (Id. ¶ 44). In response, either Defendant Bussey or Paige agreed, 
saying “yeah, that’s the video guy . . . get his ass, that’s the video guy, he was 
videoing inside [the convocation center.” (Id. ¶ 45). As a result of the positive 
identification, Defendants Reed and Davis detained the Plaintiff, explaining 
that he was identified as the guy who was shooting video inside the convocation 
center. (
Id. ¶ 46). Both Defendants Bussey and Paige positively identified the 
Plaintiff at least two more times. (Id. ¶ 48). After detaining the Plaintiff, they 
walked him across the street, handcuffed him behind his back, and sat him 
down on the curb. (
Id. ¶ 47). 
Some time after the arrest, Defendant Patton was going to issue 
criminal trespass warnings to everyone because he did not want to take them 
to jail just for being on the property. ( Id. ¶ 49). But an unnamed officer 
informed Defendant Patton that there may have been property damage and an 
assault at the convocation center, so the officers tried to figure out if any of the 
detainees were responsible. (
Id. ¶ 50; Pl.’s Response to GSU Defs.’ Statement 

6 
 
of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 50). This resulted in Defendant Patton holding 
off from issuing the warnings or uncuffing the detainees . ( GSU Defs.’ 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 51). 
During the Plaintiff’s detention, he spoke to several officers to protest 
his innocence and explained that he was working freelance for the AJC. ( Id. 
¶ 52). The Plaintiff offered to show that there were no images of the 
convocation center on his camera to prove his innocence. (Pl.’s Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 14). During one such conversation, Officer Brooks 
looked at the Plaintiff’s press badge and told Defendant Blaxstone that “we 
have his ID right here.” ( Id. ¶ 4; GSU Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4). Officer Brooks asked the Plaintiff if anyone 
could corroborate his claim that he was parked nearby, but no one could 
because he was there alone. ( GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts ¶¶ 53- 54). Officer Brooks later asked the Plaintiff how he got to the 
location where the protestors were detained. (Id. ¶ 55). The Plaintiff explained 
that he got there by car but refused to tell Officer Brooks where his car was 
when Officer Brooks inquired further. (
Id. ¶ 56). Even when Officer Brooks 
explained that divulging the location of his car might help his story make 
sense, the Plaintiff still refused. (
Id. ¶ 57). 
Ultimately, the Plaintiff and the other detainees were transported to the 
Georgia State Police headquarters, where two officers with the Atlanta Police 
Homeland Security Division questioned him and looked at the photos on his 

7 
 
camera and work cell phone. ( Id. ¶¶ 58-59). Ultimately, the officers released 
the Plaintiff without issuing any warnings or charges. (Id. ¶ 60). 
Based on these events, the Plaintiff filed suit against all Defendants 
under Section 1983 and state law. (See generally Compl. [Doc. 1]; Am. Compl. 
[Doc. 9]). After the parties completed discovery, the GSU Defendants filed this 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (See generally GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 
[Doc. 64]). 
II. Legal Standard 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, 
depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue 
of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). A court should view the evidence and draw any 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158- 59 (1970). On cross-motions for summary judgment, 
a court views the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party on 
each motion.” Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State, State of Ala., 
992 F.3d 1299, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021). The party seeking summary judgment 
must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323- 24 (1986). The burden then 
shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present 
affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 

8 
 
III. Discussion 
In his Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff pleads two substantive 
Section 1983 counts against the Defendants: one for a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment right against unlawful seizure, and another for a violation of his 
First Amendment rights because of retaliatory actions taken against him. (2d 
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104- 15 [Doc. 59]). The Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees 
and punitive damages under these claims. ( Id. ¶¶ 128 -29). The GSU 
Defendants request summary judgment on all counts. ( See generally Br. in 
Supp. of GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. 64-2]). Before the Court evaluates 
the substantive issues on this Motion for Summary Judgment , the Court will 
first address an evidentiary issue raised by the Defendants related to a 
YouTube video introduced by the Plaintiff, as well as severe deficiencies within 
the Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Response to the 
GSU Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. 
A. Evidentiary Issues 
1. YouTube Video 
The Plaintiff relies heavily on an exhibit named “Unicorn Riot YouTube 
Video” throughout his Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and his 
Response to the GSU Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts . 
(See generally Unicorn Riot YouTube Video [Doc. 65]). The GSU Defendants 
make several objections to the Plaintiff’s use of this exhibit, arguing that the 
video is inadmissible. Specifically, the GSU Defendants take issue with the fact 

9 
 
that the video is edited and there is a lack of authenticity and foundation under 
Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. 
On a motion for summary judgment, a court may only consider evidence 
“which can be reduced to an admissible form. ” Rowell v. Bellsouth Corp., 433 
F.3d 794, 800 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, “courts may consider 
unauthenticated documents on a motion for summary judgment if it is 
apparent that they will be admissible at trial.” Edwards v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citation modified ). 
“The ‘admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.’” 
United States v. Broomfield , 591 F. App’x 847, 851 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 766 (11th Cir. 1985)). “Before an 
item of evidence may be admitted, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires it 
to be authenticated with evidence ‘sufficient to support a finding that the item 
is what the proponent claims it is.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)). “Proper 
authentication requires only that the proponent of the evidence make out a 
prima facie case that the proffered evidenc e is what it purports to be.” Id. 
(citing United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 819 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
“Evidence may be authenticated by its ‘appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics . . . taken together with 
all the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)). “Authentication 
may be established ‘solely through the use of circumstantial evidence.’” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Once 

10 
 
such a showing has been made, the court may admit the evidence, and the 
ultimate question of its reliability is reserved for the fact finder.” Id. (citing 
Belfast, 611 F.3d at 819). 
YouTube videos have been the subject of several evidentiary disputes 
across the nation on the issue of authentication. The less popular approach 
finds that YouTube videos can be self -authenticating under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 902(11) when a party proffers the certificate of a YouTube custodian 
verifying the videos’ authenticity and the records meet the requirements of 
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6)(A)-(C).
3 But in this Circuit, courts generally 
require the proffering party to provide witnesses capable of authenticating the 
content of the videos by showing (1) when the video was originally recorded, 
(2) what device made the recording, 
or (3) any witness testimony to the 
accuracy of the event or whether the video has been altered. See, e.g., Marvel 
Tech. (China), Co. Ltd. , 2025 WL 2644734 at *13; McHale v. Crown Equip. 
 
3 See, e.g., Ratner v. Kohler, 2018 WL 1055528, at *11 (D. Haw. Feb. 26, 
2018) (citing United States v. Hassan , 742 F.3d 104, 132- 34 (4th Cir. 2014)); 
Saraceni v. MerchSource, LLC, 2022 WL 283104, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2022); 
but see Marvel Tech. (China), Co. Ltd. v. Individuals, P’ships and 
Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule “A”, 2025 WL 2644734, at *13 
(S.D. Fla. Sep. 15, 2025) (“even if Defendants eventually obtained a 
certification from a custodian of record and otherwise satisfied the remaining 
Rule 902(11) requirements, all a certification would establish under the 
circumstances is that the videos were indeed uploaded to YouTube on a 
particular date”); 
United States v. Hunt , 534 F. Supp. 3d 233, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 
2021) (“a certification by a custodian in itself cannot be sufficient for purposes 
of authentication because . . . such a certification serves a limited role: it simply 
shows that a record was made at or near a certain time, that the record was 
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and that the 
making of the record was a regular practice of that activity”). 

11 
 
Corp., 2022 WL 4350702, at *4 (11th Cir. Sep. 20, 2022); Broomfield, 591 F. 
App’x at 852 (affirming authentication decision of trial court when substantial 
evidence established (1) where and when the video was made and (2) who and 
what appeared in the video); see also Carey v. Kirk , 2022 WL 4597806 (S.D. 
Fla. Sep. 7, 2022) (excluding certain videos, in part, because the videos were 
edited compilations). The Court need not decide which applies here because 
the Plaintiff does not argue that the YouTube video is self-authenticating, that 
he can offer a certific ate from a YouTube custodian, or that he will be able to 
do so. Thus, the Court looks to the evidence before it to determine whether the 
YouTube video can be authenticated. 
Here, there is some evidence that the Unicorn Riot YouTube Video can 
be authenticate d. Witness testimony suggests that the YouTube video 
accurately reflects the events of the protest. First, Defendant Bussey 
acknowledged that the length of the Unicorn Riot YouTube Video was similar 
to the length of time the protestors were on the construction site. (Bussey Dep. 
at 33:15- 33:24 [Doc. 64- 3]). Second, when Defendant Bussey was asked 
whether he could recall anything content-wise that was cut out from the video, 
Defendant Bussey stated that he could not. (
Id. at 34:7-34:12). Implicitly, this 
also demonstrates the date the video was taken. Third , witness testimony 
acknowledged the accuracy of specific moments captured within the YouTube 
video. Defendant Bussey acknowledged that the protestors d id not enter the 
construction site by forced entry, instead just walking through an unlocked 

12 
 
door. ( Id. at 21:5- 21:11). Additionally, Defendants Bussey and Paige 
acknowledged their own accurate presence within the video as the protestors 
moved through the construction site. ( Id. at 30:13-31:17; Paige Dep. at 12:25-
13:7 [Doc. 64 -5]). Next, Defendant Paige noted that the YouTube video 
accurately represent ed “direct physical contact between a protestor and [ ] 
Bussey.” (See Paige Dep. at 26:17-27:4). 
But there is also ample evidence that cuts against authentication. 
Addressing the elephant in the room first, the video is clearly edited. Text is 
overlaid throughout the video, the video is cut several times, and faces of 
certain individuals are blurred. Second, witness testimony contradicts claims 
as to the accuracy of the YouTube video. For example, Defendant Paige 
discusses shoving between the protestors and Defendant Bussey going on for 
five to eight minutes, which exceeds the length of the YouTube video. ( See 
Paige Dep. at 27:5-27:15). Defendant Paige also discusses property damage to 
the construction site when the YouTube video does not show any such damage. 
(See id. at 30:3- 35:7; but see Bussey Dep. at 34:7 -34:12 (stating that the 
YouTube video did not omit anything content -wise)). Finally, the Plaintiff 
offers little evidence as to the identity of who recorded or edited the YouTube 
video. While Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant Bussey posits that the “video 
guy” that Defendant Bussey saw at the construction site could be behind the 
YouTube video, nothing shows that Plaintiff’s counsel can produce this 
individual at trial. (
See id. at 14:22-15:2). 

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After reviewing all the evidence, the Court will not consider the Unicorn 
Riot YouTube Video as evidence in evaluating this Motion for Summary 
Judgment. While the Plaintiff can offer when and where the video was made 
with relative certainty, the Plaintiff has not presented enough evidence 
showing who and what was in the YouTube video to authenticate the evidence, 
especially where the video was edited. See Broomfield, 91 F. App’x at 852. The 
Plaintiff does not even know the individuals who recorded and edited the video. 
Under the circumstances , the Court is unconvinced that the Plaintiff will be 
able to authenticate the Unicorn Riot YouTube Video at trial. Thus, the Court 
excludes the video from consideration on this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See Rowell, 433 F.3d at 800; Edwards, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 1329. 
2. Local Rules Violations 
The Court now addresses the Plaintiff’s Local Rules violations. The 
Local Rules for the Northern District of Georgia require that a non -movant’s 
statement of additional material facts conform with the requirements for a 
movant’s statement of material facts. LR 56.1(B)(3), NDGa. The rule governing 
a movant’s statement of material facts states: 
A movant for summary judgment shall include with the motion 
and brief a separate, concise, numbered statement of the material 
facts to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue to 
be tried. Each material fact must be numbered separately and 
supported by a citation to evidence proving such fact. 
The Court 
will not consider any fact : (a) not supported by a citation to 
evidence (including page or paragraph number); (b) supported by 
a citation to a pleading rather than to evidence; (c) stated as an 
issue or legal conclusion; or (d) set out only in the brief and not in 
the movant’s statement of undisputed facts. 

14 
 
 
LR 56.1(B)(1), NDGa. Further, the Local Rules also contains the following 
requirements with regard to a non -movant’s response to the movant’s 
statement of undisputed facts: 
(1) [The response] shall contain individually numbered, 
concise, nonargumentative responses corresponding to each of the 
movant’s numbered undisputed material facts. 
 
(2) This Court will deem each of the movant’s facts as admitted 
unless the respondent: (i) directly refutes the movant’s fact with 
concise responses supported by specific citations to evidence . . .; 
(ii) states a valid objection to the admissibility of the movant’s 
fact; or (iii) points out that the movant’s citation does not support 
the movant’s fact or that the movant’s fact is not material or 
otherwise has failed to comply with [Local Rule 56.1(B)(1)]. 
 
LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(1)-(2), NDGa (emphasis added). 
 Both the Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts and the 
Plaintiff’s Response contain several deficiencies with regard to these Local 
Rules. Apart from the citations to inadmissible evidence (the Unicorn Riot 
YouTube Video), the majority of the Plaintiff’s additional facts and responses 
are argumentative, non -concise, contain legal conclusions when such 
conclusions are not required, and are either not material or do not directly 
address the GSU Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (
See, 
e.g., Pl.’s Response to GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 
2, 4 -7, 8, 9 -12, 26- 27, 29- 33, 35- 46, 48 -51, 52, 56- 57, 60). Indeed, one such 
response takes up nearly a page with more citations to case law than actual 
citations to the evidence. (See id. ¶ 56). Such responses are strictly prohibited 

15 
 
under the language of the Local Rules as to both filings. As the Court engages 
in an analysis of the substantive counts within the GSU Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Court will address these violations as they arise 
and the proper remedy in each instance. 
B. Unlawful Seizure 
The Court now turns to the substantive counts against the GSU 
Defendants. The Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim against the Defendants 
for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment in Count I. ( See 2d Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 104-07). “Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and an arrest is a seizure 
of the person.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation 
modified). “A seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes, however, only 
when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, a person’s freedom of 
movement is restrained.” United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 778 (11th Cir. 
2006) (citation modified). 
“There are three broad categories of police -citizen encounters for 
purposes of [the Court’s] Fourth Amendment analysis: (1) police -citizen 
exchanges involving no coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory 
detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.” 
Id. (citation omitted). The first category 
does not implicate any Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. (citation omitted). The 
second category “‘involves reasonably brief encounters in which a reasonable 
person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.’” Id. (citation 

16 
 
omitted). The third category involves situations where “‘the totality of 
circumstances indicate that an encounter has become too intrusive to be 
classified as a brief seizure.’” Id. (citation omitted). To justify a Fourth 
Amendment seizure under the second category, there must exist “a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime.” 
Id. (citation omitted). But to justify a Fourth Amendment seizure under 
the third category, “the ‘reasonableness’ . . . turns on the presence or absence 
of probable cause.” 
Case, 555 F.3d at 1326 (citation omitted); Perez, 443 F.3d 
at 778 (citation omitted). “The existence of probable cause at the time of arrest 
constitutes an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.” Case, 555 
F.3d at 1326 -27 (citation modified). Although the GSU Defendants dispute 
whether the seizure-at-issue falls under the second or third category, the GSU 
Defendants focus their whole qualified immunity argument on the third 
category. (Br. in Supp. of GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 12). Thus, the Court 
need not decide this issue and will conduct its qualified immunity analysis as 
if the GSU Defendants arrested the Plaintiff. 
“Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have 
facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.” 
Case, 555 F.3d at 1327 (citation modified). It requires there to be a “probability 
or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such 
activity.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 245 n. 13 (1983)). 

17 
 
“Probable cause does not require overwhelmingly convincing evidence, but only 
‘reasonably trustworthy information.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
“If a constitutional violation occurred because the officer lacked probable 
cause, [a court then] ... consider[s] whether arguable probable cause existed.” 
Id. “The officer may still be shielded from liability because his ‘actions did not 
violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known .’’” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730, 739 (2002)). “Absent probable cause, an officer is still entitled to qualified 
immunity if arguable probable cause existed.” Id. (citation omitted). “Arguable 
probable cause exists where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and 
possessing the same knowledge as [a defendant] could have believed that 
probable cause existed to arrest.” 
Id. (citation modified). “‘Indeed, it is 
inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but 
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and in such cases those 
officials should not be held personally liable.’” 
Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala. , 
618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “Whether an officer 
possesses arguable probable cause depends on the elements of the alleged 
crime and the operative fact pattern.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 The parties acknowledge that the Plaintiff was arrested for criminal 
trespass under Georgia law. (See Br. in Supp. of GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., 
at 14; Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 10-11 [Doc. 71]; see 
also 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 99-100). Under Georgia’s statute for criminal trespass, 

18 
 
“[a] person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he . . . knowingly 
and without authority . . . [e]nters upon the land or premises of another person 
. . . for an unlawful purpose.” O.C.G.A. § 16 -7-21(b)(1). The GSU Defendants 
argue that under this provision and the operative facts, they had actual or 
arguable probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff. (
See Br. in Supp. of GSU Defs.’ 
Mot. for Summ. J., at 14-15). The Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that (1) there is 
a jury question over whether the GSU Defendants had arguable probable cause 
to arrest the Plaintiff for criminal trespass and (2) the GSU Defendants 
manufactured the show-up that led to the arguable probable cause. ( See Pl.’s 
Br. in Opp’n to GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 10-24). 
 The C ourt looks to the underlying operative facts leading up to the 
arrest of the Plaintiff. Soon after the protestors fled the construction site, 
several Defendants, including Defendant Patton, responded to a radio call from 
Defendant Ewing to detain the fleeing protestors. ( See GSU Defs.’ Statement 
of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 10- 22). When the Plaintiff arrived at the 
location of where other protestors were detained, Defendant Patton mentioned 
that he was “pretty sure” that the Plaintiff was with the group of protestors he 
was tracking down who had fled from the convention center. ( Id. ¶ 27). The 
protestors who Defendant Patton saw flee the convention center were wearing 
dark clothing and those arrested at the scene were, in part, wearing dark or 
black clothing. (
See id. ¶¶ 13, 18). During the Plaintiff’s interaction with the 
GSU Defendants, the Plaintiff was wearing black pants, a white shirt, and a 

19 
 
black raincoat or hoodie that he put on at times during the relevant time 
period. (See id. ¶¶ 32-33; Pl.’s Response to GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed 
Facts ¶¶ 32-33). Thus, Defendant Patton’s belief that the Plaintiff could have 
been at the protest was not wholly unfounded. 
 The GSU Defendants had further reason to suspect the Plaintiff when 
Defendant Reed approached him . (See GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts ¶ 28). When Defendant Reed approached, the Plaintiff 
identified himself as a freelance reporter for the AJC. (
Id. ¶ 29; Pl.’s Response 
to GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 29). But the Plaintiff failed to 
provide any credentials to Defendant Reed confirming his employment during 
that interaction. (Id. ¶ 30). In the GSU Defendants’ point of view, the Plaintiff 
(1) was near the scene where other protestors were caught and arrested, 
(2) wore a similar color scheme to the arrested protestors, (3) was potentially 
identified as a protestor fleeing from the convocation center by Defendant 
Patton, and (4) failed to produce identification confirming his purported 
employment at the time De fendant Reed asked him to show identification. 
Still, the Defendants did not arrest the Plaintiff at that time and did not 
require the Plaintiff to stay at the location. (
See GSU Defs.’ Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 34; see also Pl.’s Statement of Additional 
Material Facts ¶ 10 [Doc. 71 -2]). The GSU Defendants only arrested the 
Plaintiff soon after Defendants Bussey and Paige, who were present at the time 
of the protest, positively identified the Plaintiff as an individual who was 

20 
 
present at the construction site, making him liable for criminal trespass. (See 
GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 42-48). In the Court’s 
view, the facts available to the GSU Defendants support a finding that at least 
arguable probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. 
 Still, the Plaintiff makes several arguments against the finding of 
arguable probable cause. First, the Plaintiff argues that, even if the positive 
identification by Defendants Bussey and Paige was reliable, it does not amount 
to probable cause because his presence at the construction site alone does not 
establish criminal trespass. ( See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to GSU Defs.’ Mot. for 
Summ. J., at 11). But the Eleventh Circuit is clear that “[s]howing arguable 
probable cause does not . . . require proving every element of a crime.” 
Brown 
v. City of Huntsville, Ala. , 608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010). The GSU 
Defendants either saw or were informed that the protestors were “jostling with 
the construction workers” after they were told to leave the premises by 
Defendant Bussey. (See GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
¶¶ 8-10). Thus, the GSU Defendants were informed that some of the protestors 
were engaging in conduct violative of the criminal trespass statute. And 
contrary to the Plaintiff’s position, the identification by Defendants Bussey and 
Paige creates the particularized suspicion necessary to arrest the Plaintiff. 
 Second, the Plaintiff points to the fact that both Defendants Reed and 
Patton testified in their depositions that they did not believe probable cause 
existed to arrest the Plaintiff when he was put into handcuffs. (Pl.’s Br. in 

21 
 
Opp’n to GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 11 -12 (citing Reed Dep. at 48:16 -
48:19, 48:24-49:2, 50:3-50:12 [Doc. 64-10], then citing Patton Dep. at 47:14-48:2 
[Doc. 64 -7])). But the Plaintiff’s selected portions of their deposition 
testimonies omit relevant context. Defendant Patton’s testimony discusses the 
protestors who were detained prior to the arrival of the Plaintiff , not the 
Plaintiff himself. (See Patton Dep. at 47:1-48:25). But even if this testimony is 
applied to the Plaintiff, Defendant Patton still planned to issue criminal 
trespass warnings to the detained protestors for their presence on property 
that was not open to the public. (See id. at 48:2-48:9). Contrary to the Plaintiff’s 
attempt to speak for Defendant Patton, Defendant Patton’s intent to issue 
criminal warnings shows that he believed that probable cause existed for 
criminal trespass. In Defendant Reed’s deposition testimony, Defendant Reed 
actually testified that he believed that there was probable cause to arrest the 
Plaintiff after Defendants Bussey and Paige positively identified him . (Reed 
Dep. at 45:5- 45:25). The record of the deposition testimony then makes cl ear 
that, in order to get acceptable testimony for his side, Plaintiff ’s counsel 
thoroughly confused Defendant Reed over pages of testimony to get him to say 
that he had no probable cause to believe that a crime was committed. (
Id. at 
48:14-48:19). When the Plaintiff attempt ed to get Defendant Reed to explain 
why, it is clear Defendant Reed only said so because he believed an 
investigation must occur before a crime is committed, which is far divorced 
from the probable cause analysis. (
See id. at 49:5- 49:12). Ultimately, the 

22 
 
excluded context is key to finding that neither piece of deposition testimony is 
particularly persuasive to the Plaintiff’s position. 
 Third, the Plaintiff asserts that arguable probable cause does not exist 
because he offered exculpatory information to the Defendants after his arrest. 
(Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 12-13). Specifically, the 
Plaintiff was on the phone with his editor while detained and also offered to 
show the Defendants the lack of pictures involving the construction site on his 
camera. (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Mate rial Facts ¶ 14, 16; GSU Defs.’ 
Response to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts ¶ 16 [Doc. 79-2]). This 
argument is unpersuasive , primarily because the existence of exculpatory 
information does not automatically defeat a finding of arguable probable cause. 
Davis v. City of Apopka , 78 F.4th 1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 2023). Indeed, 
“arresting officers . . . are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or 
resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present 
a sufficient basis for believing that an offense has been committed.” Paez v. 
Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). But an officer 
cannot turn a blind eye toward such evidence when considering probable cause. 
Davis, 78 F.4th at 1343. Here, the majority of the evidence offered by the 
Plaintiff can be characterized as showing that he worked for the AJC. But the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a reporter’s job title does not 
immunize him from state criminal prosecution on First Amendment grounds. 
See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668-69 (1991). Even if the 

23 
 
Plaintiff provided this information after his arrest, the fact that he works for 
the AJC does not remove him from criminal liability for trespassing within the 
convocation center. Further, other evidence arose after his arrest providing the 
GSU Defendants further reason to suspect the Plaintiff. When Officer Brooks 
asked the Plaintiff if anyone could corroborate his claim that he was away from 
the construction site, he admitted that no one could. (GSU Defs.’ Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 53- 54). Still, Officer Brooks gave the Plaintiff 
another opportunity to verify his story when he asked him where he parked 
his car, but the Plaintiff refused to disclose the car’s location, even when told 
that such information could help clear his involvement. (
See id. ¶¶ 55 -57). 
Thus, even if the information provided by the Plaintiff could be considered 
exculpatory, it does not defeat the finding of arguable probable cause here. 
 Finally, the Court arrives at the Plaintiff’s argument that, because the 
show-up by Defendants Bussey and Paige was determined to be 
unconstitutional by Fulton County Superior Court Judge Farmer, the 
identification cannot support a finding of arguable probable cause to arrest the 
Plaintiff. (See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 20-24; see 
also Judge Farmer Op. & Or. [Doc. 64-12]). But this ruling has little to do with 
the Plaintiff. The state court case involves improper comments made by 
Defendants Reed and Davis as to the protestors and positive identifications 
made by Defendants Bussey and Paige 
before they identified the Plaintiff, who 
was seated separately and away from the rest of the protestors. (See generally 

24 
 
Judge Farmer Op. & Or.). As to the Plaintiff, Defendant Reed concluded the 
positive identification was when Defendant Davis reminded him about the 
Plaintiff. (GSU Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 41-42). The 
only comments Defendants Reed and Davis made were to each other, not to 
Defendants Bussey and Paige. ( See id. ¶¶ 42-43). While Defendants Bussey 
and Paige may have been in earshot, Defendants Reed and Davis made no 
substantive comments explicitly insinuating that the Plaintiff was also a t the 
protest. (
See id.). Defendants Bussey and Paige identified the Plaintiff soon 
after. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45). Thus, there is little reason for the GSU Defendants to 
doubt this identification separate from the remaining protestors. This is 
especially true when both Defendants Bussey and Paige refer to the Plaintiff 
as “the video guy”, showing that the identification was based off personal 
knowledge and not suggestive techniques. (
Id.). Although the Plaintiff also 
argues that a violation of police department policy renders the show -up 
unreliable, this argument alone cannot defeat a finding of arguable probable 
cause, especially when considering the Plaintiff’s own conduct. 
 In sum, the GSU Defendants had at least arguable probable cause to 
arrest the Plaintiff based on the totality of the circumstances. Because the 
existence of arguable probable bars a section 1983 action for unlawful seizure, 
Case, 555 F.3d at 1327, the Court grants summary judgment as to the 
Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claim. 

25 
 
C. First Amendment Retaliation 
The Plaintiff also brings a Section 1983 claim against the Defendants 
for retaliation in violation of the Fourth Amendment in Count II. (See 2d Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 108-15). But the existence of arguable probable cause for an arrest 
also defeats a First Amendment retaliation claim. Prospero v. Sullivan , 153 
F.4th 1171, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2025). Thus, because the Court has concluded 
that the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is barred by the existence of 
arguable probable cause , the Plaintiff’s First Amendment cla im against the 
GSU Defendants fails as well. 
D. Punitive Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
The Plaintiff’s remaining counts plead for punitive damages and 
attorney’s fees. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 128-29). Since none of the substantive 
claims against the Defendants have survived, the Plaintiff’s derivative claims 
for litigation expenses and punitive damages also fail. See, e.g., Lacy v. Clayton 
Cnty., 2018 WL 4899431, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 9, 2018) (“Because the Plaintiff’s 
underlying § 1983 claim is dismissed, the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages 
should also be dismissed.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (allowing courts to award 
attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party”) . Thus, the Court grants the GSU 
Defendants summary judgment on the derivative counts. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the GSU Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment [Doc. 64] is GRANTED. 

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SO ORDERED, this day of May, 2026. 
____ _____ _______ __ ___ ___ 
THOM
AS W. THRASH, JR. 
United States District Judge 
15th

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