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T:\ORDERS\24\Hendren\mtdtwt2.docx
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

BENJAMIN HENDREN,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:24-CV-2921-TWT
JOHN PATTON, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights case. It is before the Court on the Brasfield
Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 67]. As set forth below, the Brasfield
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 67] is GRANTED.
I. Background2
This case involves an alleged unlawful arrest of a photojournalist while
he was documenting a protest in and around a construction site at the GSU
Convocation Center. John Patton is a sergeant with the Georgia State
University Police Department (“GSUPD”), and Jamar Reed, Anthony Ewing,
Deronald Davis, and Jeremiah Blaxstone are officers with the GSUPD. (2d Am.

1 The “Brasfield Defendants” include Defendants Brasfield & Gorrie,
LLC, Brasfield & Gorrie, LP, Jackson Bussey, and Moses Paige.
2 The Court accepts the facts as alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint as true for purposes of the present Motion to Dismiss. Wilding v.
DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 2019).

Compl. ¶¶ 8-12 [Doc. 59]).3 Defendants Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC and Brasfield
& Gorrie, LP are companies work ing a construction site housing the GSU
Convocation Center. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 19). Jackson Bussey and Moses Paige are
Brasfield & Gorrie employees and were for all relevant times acting within the
scope of their employment. ( Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 45). At all relevant times, Plaintiff
Benjamin Hendren was a credentialed, freelance photojournalist working for
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. (
Id. ¶¶ 7, 25).
On July 29, 2022, protestors entered into a Brasfield & Gorrie
construction site at the GSU Convocation Center seeking to frustrate the
construction of the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, known colloquially
as “Cop City.” (
Id. ¶¶ 19-20). Brasfield & Gorrie is involved in the construction
of the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center. ( Id. ¶ 21). According to police
reports, the protesters yelled statements like “Stop Cop City” and “Stop
Brasfield Gorrie” and caused property damage to walls and signage at the
construction site. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23).
The Plaintiff was not a part of the protest, never entered the
construction site, and did not observe the protesters at the construction site.
(Id. ¶¶ 27-29). He was instead parked downtown and heard over police radio

3 Officers Patton, Reed, Ewing, Davis, and Blaxstone were Defendants
in this action, formerly known as the “GSU Defendants.” Before the Brasfield
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, the GSU Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment. (
See generally GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc.
64]). The Court granted this motion, rendering the GSU Defendants non -
parties to this action. ( See generally GSU Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Op. & Or.
[Doc. 85]).

that there was law enforcement activity related to a protest. ( Id. ¶¶ 26, 30).
The Plaintiff was hired by the Atlanta Journal -Constitution to document
activity including opposition to the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center and
law enforcement response. (Id. ¶ 32). Accordingly, the Plaintiff drove towards
the location of the protest to photograph it. (Id. ¶ 30).
The Plaintiff first saw alleged protestors when he was at a traffic stop
approximately half a mile away from the construction site. ( Id. ¶ 33 ). He
parked his car and began to photograph the traffic stop and the subsequent
arrests. (
Id. ¶ 34). He did not interfere with traffic, commit any crime, or do
anything that may be mistaken as a crime. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37). Moreover, while the
protestors were in one vehicle wearing similar clothing (including wearing
black and camouflage clothing as well as masks), the Plai ntiff arrived in a
separate vehicle and was wearing khaki pants, a light color button up shirt, no
mask, and a lanyard around his neck with a photo identification of himself as
a photojournalist. (
Id. ¶¶ 63-65).
One or more of the GSUPD officers approached the Plaintiff while he
was taking photographs. (Id. ¶ 66). They put him in handcuffs and told him to
sit on the curb. ( Id.). Afterwards, he told the GSUPD officers that he was not
involved in the protests and was only photographing the arrests. (Id. ¶ 69). He
also told them to look at his press credentials and talk to his editor at the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, but they refused to do so, even though his editor
was on the phone. ( Id. ¶ 70). Instead, the GSUPD officers forcibly took

photographs of the Plaintiff while he was handcuffed and sat on the curb. ( Id.
¶ 72). When the Plaintiff tilted his head to avoid being photographed, Officers
Reed and/or Blaxstone “grabbed his hair and yanked his head up so he could
be photographed against his will.” (Id. ¶ 73).
The Defendants conspired to manufacture a justification to continue to
prolong the Plaintiff’s ordeal. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 76). A Major with the Atlanta Police
Department encouraged the GSUPD officers to arrest the protestors,
acknowledging that arresting them would be a reach. (Id. ¶ 75). Officers Reed
and Davis asked Defendants Bussey and Paige to come with them in their
vehicle and ride over to the Summerhill neighborhood for a show-up. (Id. ¶ 44).
Bussey and Paige were selected from a large number of constructi on workers
due to their enthusiasm. ( Id.). Before Defendants Bussey and Paige saw the
detained individuals, Officer Reed suggested to the employees that they caught
the protestors, saying, “yeah, we got ‘em.” (Id. ¶ 47).
In response—without having seen the people the GSUPD officers were
talking about —they replied, “[t]hey did went [sic] into the building. They
fucking lying.” (Id. ¶ 50). Officers Reed and Davis continued to encourage this
form of identification by Defendants Bussey and Paige. ( Id. ¶¶ 51- 52). When
they arrived to the area where the detainees were seated, Officer Reed told
Defendants Bussey and Paige that they did not have to get out of the vehicle
for identification (despite not being able to clearly see the detainees from their
vantage point), but Defendants Bussey and Paige joked that they wanted to

get out so they could do something to the handcuffed detainees. (Id. ¶ 53). They
ultimately identified the detainees despite not being able to see them. ( Id.
¶ 55).
At this point, Officers Reed and Davis knew that Defendants Bussey and
Paige only needed the slightest invitation to positively identify an individual.
(Id. ¶ 56). Officer Reed said that the Plaintiff “could possibly be ” part of it to
Defendants Bussey and Paige. ( Id. ¶ 57). When they reached the spot where
the Plaintiff was photographing, they ultimately said after feeding off each
other and the officers, “[t]hat’s him right there. Get his ass. He’s the video guy.
He’s a liar.” (Id.). But Defendants Bussey and Paige were the individuals who
lied, leading to t he Plaintiff being handcuffed. ( Id. ¶¶ 58, 78 ). Each of the
GSUPD officers knew that these inculpatory statements were false and made
at the GSUPD officers’ prompting. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62). Nevertheless, Officer Reed
wrote a report stating that the Plaintiff was handcuffed because Defendants
Bussey and Paige identified him as a protester. (Id. ¶ 79).
After the Plaintiff was detained, the GSUPD officers continued to search
for justifications to hold the Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 80). During this time, the Plaintiff
continued to offer proof of his innocence. ( Id. ¶ 82). The Plaintiff also asked
whether he was being arrested or detained, and the supervisor for the Atlanta
Police Department stated that he was only detained but deferred to the other
officers. (
Id. ¶ 83). But during the detention, the Plaintiff was handcuffed and
not free to leave. ( Id. ¶ 84). He was eventually transferred to a police station

and continued to be detained. ( Id. ¶ 86). After being held for approximately
seven hours, the Plaintiff was released without being charged with any offense.
(Id. ¶¶ 87-88).
Based on these events, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants
under Section 1983 and state law. (See generally Compl. [Doc. 1]; Am. Compl.
[Doc. 9]). The Brasfield Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim against them. (
See generally Brasfield Defs.’
Previous Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. 16]) . The Court granted this motion. ( See
generally Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Op. & Or. [Doc. 34-1]). After seeking
leave from the Court to correct the deficiencies noted by th e Court’s Opinion
and Order granting dismissal , the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended
Complaint. (See generally Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Compl. [Doc. 27]; Pl.’s Mot. to
Amend Compl. Op. & Or. [Doc. 57]; 2d Am. Compl. [Doc. 59]). The Brasfield
Defendants now seek to dismiss all claims against them within the Second
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. (
See generally Brasfield Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. 67]).
II. Legal Standard
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it
appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; however, even if it is
“improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the

possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court
must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A.
v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A. , 711 F.2d 989, 994- 95 (11th Cir.
1983); see also Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. , 40 F.3d
247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff
“receives the benefit of imagination”). Generally, notice pleading is all that is
required for a valid complaint.
See Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc. , 753
F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only
give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon
which it rests.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
III. Discussion
Under the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff brings federal
claims against the Brasfield Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and First Amendment retaliation. (
See
2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104- 15). The Plaintiff also brings state law claims against
the Brasfield Defendants for unlawful seizure, false imprisonment, and
negligence. ( See id. ¶¶ 116 -27). Finally, the Plaintiff requests punitive
damages and attorney’s fees from the Brasfield Defendants. ( See id.
¶¶ 128-30). While the Plaintiff has modified the factual background within his

Second Amended Complaint, the claims brought against the Brasfield
Defendants are the same as within the Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 76-100).
In this Court’s previous Opinion and Order addressing the Brasfield
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to the Amended Complaint, the Court noted
several inconsistencies within the pleading that proved fatal to all claims
against the Brasfield Defendants. Specifically, the Court found that factual
inconsistencies within the Amended Complaint as to when the Brasfield
Defendants were involved in the arrest of the Plaintiff required the Court to
dismiss the federal law claims against the Brasfield Defendants and the state
law false imprisonment claim entirely . (
See Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
Op. & Or der, at 8 -12). Additionally, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s
negligence claim because the claim was not distinct from the Plaintiff’s false
imprisonment claim. (
See id. at 13- 14). Finally, the Court dismissed the
Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees and punitive damages because no
substantive claims remained against the Brasfield Defendants. (See id. at 14).
After the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint purporting to
correct these deficiencies, the Brasfield Defendants once more move to dismiss
the claims against them within the Second Amended Complaint for several
reasons. First, they argue that the Plaintiff’s federal claims cannot stand
against the Brasfield Defendants because they were not state actors or
operating under the color of state law. (
See Br. in Supp. of Brasfield Defs.’ Mot.

to Dismiss, at 7 -17 [Doc. 67] ). Second, they argue that the Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim should be dismissed because they were not
aware of the protected speech that the Plaintiff claims retaliation for. ( See id.
at 17-18). Third, they argue that the state false imprisonment claim should be
dismissed against the Brasfield Defendants because the Plaintiff was
identified and slated for detention by the GSUPD officers before the Brasfield
Defendants were involved. ( See id. at 18 -21). Fourth, t hey argue that the
Plaintiff’s state law negligence claim should be dismissed against the Brasfield
Defendants because they fail to plead the requisite causation. (
See id. at 21-22).
Finally, they argue for the dismissal of claims related to attorney’s fees and
punitive damages for the failure to plead any substantive claims. (
See id. at
23). The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Brasfield Defendants as State Actors
“A successful section 1983 action requires a showing that the conduct
complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law
and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d
1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “Only in rare circumstances can
a private party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983 purposes.” Id. One
of three conditions must be met to do so:
(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the
action alleged to violate the Constitution (“State compulsion
test”);

(2) the private parties performed a public function that was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State (“public
function test”); or

(3) “the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint
participant in the enterprise[]” (“nexus/joint action test”).

Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue , 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).
The Plaintiff argues that the Brasfield Defendants are state actors
under the state compulsion test and the nexus/joint action test. ( See Pl.’s Br.
in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 5-13 [Doc. 70]). First, the Court
addresses whether the Plaintiff remedied the factual defects present within
the Court’s previous Opinion and Order.
As this Court has previously stated, both the state compulsion test and
the nexus/joint action test (which the Plaintiff asserts through his
conspiracy-based theory) require a private entity to have coordinated with the
State when the constitutional violation was committed . See Nat’l Broad. Co.,
Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL -CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.
1988) (“The state compulsion test . . . limits state action to instances in which
the government has coerced or at least significantly encoura ged the action
alleged to violate the Constitution .” (citation modified ) (emphasis added));
Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2015) (in discussing
the requirements for asserting a conspiracy under Section 1983, stating that
“plaintiff alleged all defendants ‘acted in concert’
when the constitutional

violation was committed. ” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). Despite the
Court’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s position that this showing at the motion to
dismiss stage is unnecessary , the Plaintiff returns with an almost identical
brief attempting to succeed on his argument that such a showing is not
required under his conspiracy theory.
Addressing the Plaintiff’s arguments head-on demonstrates the flaw in
the Plaintiff’s position. The Plaintiff strongly relies on Burrell v. Bd. Of Trs. of
Ga. Mil. Coll., 696 F. Supp. 1522 (M.D. Ga. 1988), to establish that evidence of
a conspiracy between a private entity and a state officer is sufficient to satisfy
the state actor requirement for a Section 1983 claim at the motion to dismiss
stage. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 5-6). In
Burrell,
the plaintiff alleged that a private party defendant, First Federal, conspired
with a state actor, the GMC Board of Trustees, t o terminate the plaintiff’s
employment in violation of her constitutional rights. 696 F. Supp. at 1524. The
plaintiff alleged that the conspiracy happened prior to First Federal’s decision
to terminate the plaintiff’s employment.
Id. at 1523. Because the plaintiff “has
alleged that the GMC Board of Trustees conspired with the officers and Board
Members of First Federal to have her terminated,” the court concluded that
the Section 1983 claim survive d the motion to dismiss.
Id. at 1524. Thus, the
court’s conclusion was predicated on the fact that the conspiracy occurred
before the private party violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
See id. at

1523. In fact, every case cited by the Plaintiff in support of his conspiracy
theory is similarly predicated on this order of events.4
But despite arguing against the Court’s previous holding, the Court
finds that the Plaintiff has remedied the identified defects of the Amended
Complaint within his Second Amended Complaint as to the timeline issue. The
Second Amended Complaint now states that the actual detention and arrest of
the Plaintiff happened after the identification provided by Defendants Bussey
and Pa ige. According to the allegations, the GSUPD officers sought to
manufacture a reason to detain the Plaintiff and asked him for identification,
which the Plaintiff provided. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 41). At that time, the
Plaintiff was not detained. ( See id. ¶ 41). Officers Reed and Davis then
returned to the construction site and brought Defendants Bussey and Paige to

4 See Am. Fed’n of Lab. and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, FL,
637 F.3d 1178, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2011) (on a motion for summary judgment,
considering certain evidence of a conspiracy prior to the violation of the
plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional rights); Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala. , 618
F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for
conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed
that
resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.” (citation
omitted) (emphasis added)); Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1379
(S.D. Ga. 2015) (in reviewing the standard for pleading conspiracy for a Section
1983 claim, acknowledging that the defendants have to agree and act together
to deprive a plaintiff of their constitutional rights before the actu al violation
occurs);
Zivojinovich v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC , 445 F. Supp. 2d 1337,
1340-41, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff’s conspiracy-based
Section 1983 claim survives a motion to dismiss when the defendants alleged
conspiracy occurred prior to the unconstitutional act) ; Charles v. Johnson, 18
F.4th 686, 696- 97 (11th Cir. 2021) (discussing communications between a
private party and a state officer to determine whether a conspiracy existed to
render the private party a state actor).

identify other protestors and the Plaintiff as the individuals who were present
at the construction site. ( Id. ¶ 44). After suggestive commentary from Officer
Reed, Defendants Bussey and Paige falsely stated that the Plaintiff was
trespassing. (
See id ¶¶ 47- 57). Only then was the Plaintiff detained and
handcuffed. ( See id. ¶¶ 58, 66- 67). Thus, assuming that the Plaintiff has
adequately pled that the Brasfield Defendants are state actors under Section
1983, the timeline deficiency has been sufficiently remed ied. The Court now
turns to whether the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to support a finding
that the state compulsion test or the nexus/joint action test applies.
1. State Compulsion Test
“‘The state compulsion test . . . limits state action to instances in which
the government has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action
alleged to violate the Constitution.’” Hill v. Raulston, 2026 WL 280675, at *2
(11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2026) (quoting Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast
Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003)). The Plaintiff argues that
the Brasfield Defendants are state actors under the state compulsion test
because the GSUPD officers encouraged Defendants Bussey and Paige to
falsely identify the Plaintiff as present at the protest in order to detain and
arrest him. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 11).
This argument fails on its face. The underlying offending action for the
Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and First Amendment retaliation claims
is the GSUPD officers’ detention and arrest of the Plaintiff. (
See 2d Am. Compl.

¶¶ 104, 110). While the Plaintiffs also allege that the GSUPD officers
encouraged the Brasfield Gorrie Defendants to falsely identify the Plaintiff as
a precursor to his arrest and detention, the Brasfield Gorrie Defendants
themselves were not encouraged to detain and arrest the Plaintiff by the
GSUPD officers, as required by the state compulsion test. It is irrelevant that
Defendants Bussey and Paige were upset that the protestors were interfering
with their work and thus falsely identified the Plaintiff because the retaliatory
action was the detention and arrest itself, which was not carried out by the
Brasfield Gorrie Defendants. (
See id. ¶¶ 110-11).
In any case, the Plaintiff presents no legal authority to support his
position that the state compulsion test applies. This is important whether a
private party is a state actor is determined on a case -by-case basis, Focus on
the Family , 344 F.3d at 1277, and the Plaintiff cannot present even an
analogous instance where a court has concluded that a private party is a state
actor. The Court will not extend the state compulsion test to conduct that is
squarely constitutional.
Thus, the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the
Brasfield Defendants are state actors under the state compulsion test.
2. Nexus/Joint Action Test
“‘The nexus/joint action test applies where the state has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party]
that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” Hill, 2026 WL 280675 at *2
(quoting Focus on the Family , 344 F.3d at 1277). “To charge a private party

with state action under this standard, the governmental body and private
party must be intertwined in a symbiotic relationship. The Supreme Court has
indicated that the symbiotic relationship must involve the specific conduct of
which the plaintiff complains.” Focus on the Family , 344 F.3d at 1278. In
Charles, the Eleventh Circuit explained the following tests to determine
whether the nexus/joint action test is satisfied:
Under the joint action test, the Supreme Court has held that a
‘willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents’ is
a state actor.
See United States v. Price , 383 U.S. 787, 794 [ ]
(1966). At least three threads of cases have arisen under this
doctrine. First, a private citizen can be held liable when he or she
conspires with a state actor to deprive the plaintiff of his
constitutional rights.
See id.; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398
U.S. 144, 152 [ ] (1970). Second, the state can make an active
choice to partner with a private entity in a way that can impart
liability.
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 [
] (1974); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery , 417 U.S. 556, 574 [ ]
(1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 [
] (1961). Last, a private citizen can take up the mantle of
sovereignty through the ex parte use of civil or criminal processes.
See Lugar [v. Edmondson Oil Co. ], 457 U.S. [922, 924 (1982)];
Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469 (11th Cir. 1990).

Charles, 18 F.4th at 696.
Whether a private entity is a state actor under the nexus/joint action
test is an intensive fact -specific inquiry. Id. (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 722).
But a district court may properly dismiss a Section 1983 claim under the
nexus/joint action test if a plaintiff fails to plead adequate facts within his
complaint that supports such a finding.
See Emmanuelli v. Priebus , 500 F.
App’x 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s dismissal of a
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim because the plaintiff fai led to adequately plead

sufficient facts within his complaint); Leitgeb v. Sark Wire Corp. – GA, 2023
WL 5607882, at *2-3 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2023) (same).
The Plaintiff argues that the Brasfield Defendants are state actors
under the first of the three tests enumerated by Charles because the Brasfield
Defendants conspired with the GSUPD officers to deny the Plaintiff his
constitutional rights. (See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss,
at 5, 10- 11). “To establish a prima facie case of [S]ection 1983 conspiracy, a
plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendants reached an
understanding to violate his rights.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d
1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation modified). “‘The linchpin for conspiracy is
agreement, which presupposes communication.’”
Pittman v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. , 662 F. App’x 873, 880 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bailey v. Bd. Of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992)).
The Plaintiff argues that the factual requirement to allege a conspiracy
under Section 1983 is low. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss,
at 5-7). This is incorrect. Even at the Motion to Dismiss stage, “[a] showing of
conspiracy requires more than conclusory allegations and a ‘mere scintilla of
evidence.’”
Pittman, 662 F. App’x at 880 (citing Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283-84); see
Sheets v. Woelk , 817 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2026) . “A plaintiff
bringing a conspiracy claim must inform the defendants of the nature o f the
conspiracy alleged . . . [i] t is not enough to aver in the complaint that a
conspiracy existed.” Pittman, 662 F. App’x at 880 (citing Fullman v. Graddick,

739 F.2d 553, 556- 57 (11th Cir. 1984)). Such conspiracy allegations must be
particularized, not vague and conclusory. Id. (quoting GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998), then citing Fullman, 739 F.2d
at 556-57). “The claims must include enough factual allegations to ‘raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554).
Finally, and separate from these enumerated pleading requirements, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that “a civilian’s rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance
to a law enforcement officer is not state action, absent proof of a conspiracy to
violate the constitutional rights of another.” Charles, 18 F.4th at 697.
The Court turns to the Second Amended Complaint and reviews the
allegations under the guidance provided by the Eleventh Circuit. According to
the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, it is clear that the GSUPD
officers and Defendants Bussey and Paige wanted to detain and arrest the
Plaintiff. (
See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40- 41, 44, 46, 47, 49- 52, 54, 57, 66, 71,
72-73, 75, 86- 88, 90, 111). What is important is the specific communications
between the GSUPD officers and Defendants Bussey and Pa ige as alleged by
the Second Amended Complaint . After Officers Reed and Davis picked up
Defendants Bussey and Paige to identify the protestors for them, Officer Reed
told them, “yeah, we got ‘em.” (Id. ¶ 47). After arriving at the location of the
detained individuals, Officer Reed asked Defendants Bussey and Paige if the
individuals were the ones who were present at the construction site, to which
Defendants Bussey and Paige agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50). Officer Reed then thanked

Defendants Bussey and Paige for their identification. ( Id. ¶ 52). After Officer
Reed, Officer Davis, and Defendants Busse y and Paige reached where the
Plaintiff sat, Officer Reed said that the Plaintiff “could possibly be” part of the
protest. (Id. ¶ 57). As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, Officers Reed
and Davis knew that Defendants Bussey and Paige were likely to give a
positive identification with the slightest invitation. ( Id. ¶ 56). Defendants
Bussey and Paige then confirmed that the Plaintiff was present by saying
“That’s the video guy?” and “That’s him right there. Get his ass. He’s the video
guy. He’s a liar.” (Id. ¶ 57).
The Court concludes that these communications do not adequately
allege that the Brasfield Defendants were state actors, even when construing
all facts in the Second Amended Complaint in favor of the Plaintiff. See Quality
Foods de Centro Am., S.A. , 711 F.2d at 994-95. This is because “[m]erely
making a report of perceived misconduct and furnishing information to the
police” does not transform a private party into a state actor.” Kelly v. Broward
Sheriff’s Office Dept. of Detention’s, 560 F. App’x 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2014). As
another court put it, “[i]t is not enough to show that a private citizen and the
police communicated. The court must be able to infer a shared, unlawful goal
to violate the Constitution.”
Sheets, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (citing Rowe, 279
F.3d at 128 3). Where allegations suggest that state officials used a private
party as an unsuspecting pawn in their investigation of the plaintiff, they do
not establish an agreement. Id.; Pittman, 662 F. App’x at 881.

That allegations within the Second Amended Complaint fall into several
categories that the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly excluded from the evidence
necessary to form a Section 1983 conspiracy. First, as people present at the
construction site, Defendants Bussey and Paige only supplied information to
the GSUPD officers for the purpose of identifying the people present at the
protest for the benefit of the police officers. This information, in turn, gave the
GSUPD officers justification to arrest the protestors and the Plaintiff. The fact
that Defendants Bussey and Paige wished for these individuals to be arrested
parallels the facts in
Kelly, where the court held that an individual reporting
a possible Peeping Tom was not a state actor working in concert with the police
officers.
Kelly, 560 F. App’x at 819, 821.
Second, and similar to the rule discussed above, the facts alleged within
the Second Amended Complaint amount to brief, ad hoc assistance by
Defendants Bussey and Paige to a law enforcement officer. See Charles, 18
F.4th at 697. Defendants Bussey and Paige had no prior relationship to
Officers Reed and Davis. Under the allegations of the Second Amended
Complaint, t he first time that the parties appear to interact is whe n
Defendants Reed and Davis sought to find construction workers who could
positively identify the protestors and the Plaintiff. ( See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 44).
The communications between the parties show no agreement and concern the
assistance the GSUPD officers needed from Defendants Bussey and Paige. In
fact, the only communication between the Brasfield Defendants and the

GSUPD officers concerning the Plaintiff relates purely to identification
matters, and shows no agreement at all. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 57).
To this point, the Plaintiff disagrees and argues that a reasonable jury
could find an agreement between the Brasfield Defendants and the GSUPD
officers to deny Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 12 -13). After a review of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Charles, the Court disagrees. In that case, an officer was struggling
to arrest the plaintiff for an outstanding warrant during a traffic stop. Charles,
18 F.4th at 691. During the struggle, a bystander, the private party defendant,
is heard asking, “Sir, can you get a cuff on him?” Id. at 691-92. The bystander
then proceeds to assist the police officer in restraining the plaintiff by putting
him in a “chokehold” or “full nelson.”
Id. at 692. Due to these events, the
plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action against the bystander for excessive force
in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 693.
In reviewing whether the bystander’s actions satisfied the nexus/joint
action test to convert his actions into state action, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that, even under a conspiracy theory, the pleadings should demonstrate that a
“symbiotic relationship” existed between the private party and the police
officer. See id. at 696. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that “brief, ad hoc
assistance to a law enforcement officer is not state action” and concluded that
the bystander’s actions did not amount to anything more than that.
Id. at 697.

The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Charles imposes a standard of what
must be demonstrated for a plaintiff to assert that a private party was a state
actor under the nexus/joint action test. But the Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
surmount the evidence before the court in Charles. Even considering the
extrinsic evidence before the Court,5 the communications between the GSUPD
officers and Defendants Bussey and Paige show no agreement between the
GSUPD officers and the Brasfield Defendants and instead relate to the
assistance Defendants Bussey and Paige are providing to the police officers. In
fact, the extrinsic evidence shows even more definitively that there was no
agreement “that the Brasfield Defendants [would] provide the justification of
the arrest of anyone” the GSUPD officers say, as the Plaintiff argues. (Pl.’s Br.
in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 11-12).

5 Generally, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may not
consider any evidence beyond the face of the complaint and any additional
documents attached thereto. See Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc. ,
500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007). But this rule is not absolute. An exception
exists when either the defendant or the plaintiff attaches exhibits to his motion
to dismiss or responsive briefing, respectively, and the exhibits are (1) central
to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) their authenticity is not disputed. Crawford’s
Auto Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 945 F.3d 1150, 1162 (11th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The Plaintiff refers to certain exhibits submitted
within the GSUPD officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment to argue that there
was ample communication between the GSUPD officers and Defendants
Bussey and Paige for a reasonable jury to conclude that a conspiracy existed.
(
See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 11-12). The Court
will consider these exhibits because the communications between the parties
are central to determining whether the Brasfield Defendants are state actors
and the Brasfield Defendants do not dispute the authenticity of the exhibits.

Another key difference between the facts underlying Charles and the
ones present here is that the bystander in Charles actually participated in the
unconstitutional conduct complained of. In Charles, the Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim related directly to the bystander’s “chokehold” or “full nelson” on
the plaintiff while rendering assistance to the police officer. See id. at 692-93.
Here, the Plaintiff’s Fourth and First Amendment claims were predicated on
the detention and arrest by the GSUPD officers . (
See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104,
110). Nowhere in the pleadings does it state that the Brasfield Defendants
participated in the actual detention or arrest of the Plaintiff. With no requisite
communication or any direct action that relates directly to the constitutional
violation, the Court concludes that the Brasfield Defendants’ assistance
amounts to “brief, ad hoc assistance” by a private party that does not amount
to state action. See Charles, 18 F.4th at 693.
Third, the facts alleged under the Second Amended Complaint strongly
suggest that Defendants Bussey and Paige were used as unsuspecting pawns
in the GSUPD officers’ plot to detain and arrest the Plaintiff. See Sheets, 817
F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (citing Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283); Pittman, 662 F. App’x at
881. As discussed earlier, the GSUPD officers had a strong desire to arrest the
Plaintiff and were under orders to arrest as many possible protestors as
possible. (
See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40- 41, 44, 46, 47, 49- 52, 54, 57, 66, 71,
72-73, 75, 86-88, 90, 111). The GSUPD officers selected Defendants Bussey and
Paige for assistance exactly because they were enthusiastic about identifying

the protestors. ( See id. ¶ 44). The Plaintiff then details several suggestive
comments the GSUPD officers made in order to prompt their “pawns” —
Defendants Bussey and Paige —to positively identify the protestors and the
Plaintiff despite knowing that such comments were improperly suggestive.
(See id. ¶¶ 47, 49- 57, 61). Indeed, the Second Amended Complaint explicitly
states that, “following [ Officers] Reed and Davis’ prompting, [Defendants]
Bussey and Paige falsely identified Hendren as a person who committed
criminal offenses at the construction site, despite knowing that Hendren had
not been at the construction site” and that Defendants “Bussey and Paige’s
false identification was significantly encouraged by the GSUPD officers ’
improper comments and suggestions.” ( Id. ¶¶ 59 -60). Contrary to any
communications showing any form of agreement, the Plaintiff’s allegations
demonstrate a situation where the GSUPD officers used Defendants Bussey
and Paige to provide some justification for arresting the Plaintiff, knowing that
Defendants Bussey and Paige already harbored animosity for anyone they
perceived to be at the protest. (
See id. ¶ 53 (“Bussey and Paige joked that they
wanted to get out so they could do something to the handcuffed detainees”)).
Thus, the Plaintiff’s allegations fall into three categories that the
Eleventh Circuit has explicitly excluded from the evidence necessary to form a
Section 1983 conspiracy. The fact that the Second Amended Complaint states
that Defendants “Bussey and Paige’s false identification was part of a joint
enterprise with the GSUPD officers to falsely inculpate persons potentially

involved with the Stop Cop City protests” does not save the claims against the
Brasfield Defendants. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 76). “While courts must liberally
construe and accept as true allegations of fact in the complaint and inferences
reasonably deductive there from, they need not accept factual claims that are
internally inconsistent.”
Willis v. Arp , 165 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1359 (N.D. Ga.
2016) (citation omitted); see also McMahon v. City of Riviera Beach, 2008 WL
4108051, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2008) (“[W]hen reviewing a motion to
dismiss, a court is not required to accept factual claims that are internally
inconsistent.” (citation modified));
Thomas v. Kamtek , Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d
1179, 1188-89 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“Contrary to alternative or inconsistent claims
or defenses, factual assertions in pleadings are judicial admissions conclusively
binding o n the party that made them.” ( citation modified )). Additionally, a
“district court is not required to accept as true [the plaintiff’s] conclusions of
law when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
.” Solis-Ramirez v. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1985).
Alleging that the Defendants were part of a joint enterprise speaks
directly to whether a Section 1983 conspiracy exists and is a legal
determination that a court must make in order to find that a private party is
a state actor. See Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283 (requiring a finding that the private
party and state officers came to an understanding to violate the rights of the
plaintiff). Thus, the Court owes no deference to the allegation. But even if the
Court did, such an allegation would be internally inconsis tent with the facts

alleged through the rest of the Second Amended Complaint. As discussed, the
allegations and extrinsic evidence more clearly demonstrate that there was no
agreement between the GSUPD officers and the Brasfield Defendants to
violate the Plaintiff’s rights. Assuming that the Plaintiff’s conclusion is a
finding of fact, stating that the Defendants formed a joint enterprise runs
counter to the rest of the alleged facts. Accordingly, the Court owes no
deference to the specific paragraph in coming to its conclusion.

In sum, b ecause state action is required to bring a Section 1983 claim
against a defendant, Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130, and the Plaintiff has failed to
plead such , the Court dismisses the Section 1983 claims (Counts I and II)
against the Brasfield Defendants.
B. False Imprisonment
The Plaintiff brings a state-law false imprisonment claim against the
Brasfield Defendants under Count III of the Second Amended Complaint. (See
2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116-123). “False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of
the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived
of his personal liberty.” O.C.G.A. § 51 -7-20. It is an intentional tort.
Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Steed , 340 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2016).
“Generally, one who causes or directs the arrest of another by an offi cer
without a warrant may be held liable for false imprisonment, in the absence of
justification.”
Ferrell v. Mikula , 295 Ga. App. 326, 330 (2008) (citation
modified). A private informant may be liable for false imprisonment. Id. “The

party need not expressly request an arrest[ ] but may be liable if his conduct
and acts ‘procured and directed the arrest.’” Id. (citation omitted). A private
informant is not liable for false imprisonment “because he ‘merely relates facts
to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest.’” Id. (citation
omitted). The question of whether an officer made an independent decision to
arrest the plaintiff is generally a factual question for the jury. Id. But a court
may resolve the question of causation on a motion to dismiss where there is no
need to further develop the factual record for a false imprisonment claim.
See,
e.g., Orr. v. Rogers, 2021 WL 456632, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2021); cf. Lyle v.
Heath, 376 Ga. App. 322, 329-30 (2025) (vacating judgment of trial court where
issue of qualified immunity as to the false imprisonment claim required factual
discovery which had not begun and could not be resolved at the
motion-to-dismiss stage).
The Court previously dismissed the state-law false imprisonment claim
because of internal inconsistencies as to when the Brasfield Defendants were
involved in the process of arresting the Plaintiff. (
See Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss Op. & Or., at 12 -13). Specifically, because the Amended Complaint
inconsistently alleged that the GSUPD officers had already detained the
Plaintiff when the Brasfield Defendants identified him, the Court concluded
that the GSUPD officers made an independent decision to detain and arrest
the Plaintiff without the Brasfield Defendants. ’ involvement ( See id. ). Th is
timing issue has been remedied in the Second Amended Complaint.

The Brasfield Defendants now argue for the dismissal of the false
imprisonment claim on the ground that the allegations still show that the
GSUPD officers exercised independent judgment in deciding to arrest the
Plaintiff without the Brasfield Defendants’ involvement. (Br. in Supp. of
Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 21). The Court agrees.
The allegations show that the GSUPD officers already decided that they
planned to detain the Plaintiff before the Brasfield Defendants were ever
involved. This began when the Plaintiff began to photograph the detention of
the alleged protestors while the GSUPD officers were detaining them. (2d Am.
Compl. ¶ 34). The Plaintiff’s lawful actions led to the GSUPD officers
attempting to figure out how to detain the Plaintiff. (
Id. ¶ 38). Indeed,
according to the allegations, Officer Patton began fabricating reasons to arrest
the Plaintiff by claiming that he thought the Plaintiff was present at the
construction site despite knowing that he was not there. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40). Officer
Reed then approached the Plaintiff, who identified himself as a photographer.
(Id. ¶ 41). Officer Davis also sought to falsely place the Plaintiff at the scene of
the construction site to detain him. ( Id. ¶ 42). Because the GSUPD officers
could not detain the Plaintiff on these suppositions, the GSUPD officers then
sought the involvement of the Brasfield Defendants in order to manufacture
some cause to arrest him. (
Id. ¶¶ 43-44). This is clarified later in the Second
Amended Complaint, as the Plaintiff states that the GSUPD officers “ had
already conspired to retaliate against Hendren before the false identification.”

(Id. ¶ 79 (emphasis added)). Additionally, the Plaintiff includes a paragraph
from a state court proceeding where the court concluded that the police officers
used impermissibly suggestive tactics to ensure a positive identification. ( Id.
¶ 89). From there, the GSUPD officers manipulated Defendants Bussey and
Paige into identifying every protestor, including the Plaintiff , by making
suggestive comments. ( Id. ¶¶ 47, 49- 57, 61). Additionally, once Defendants
Bussey and Paige allowed the GSUPD officers to arre st the Plaintiff, the
GSUPD officers made sure to humiliate the Plaintiff and prolong the injurious
conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 66-75).
In the face of these allegations, the Plaintiff makes two arguments that
the Brasfield Defendants caused his false imprisonment. First, he argues that
extrinsic evidence and the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint show
that Defendants Bussey and Paige pushed the GSUPD officers to arrest the
Plaintiff, making the issue a jury question. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss, at 16) . Second, he argues that, because the allegations show
that Defendants Bussey and Paige made false identifications, a jury could find
the Brasfield Defendants liable for false imprisonment.
The Plaintiff’s arguments contain two glaring errors. First, the Plaintiff
puts the cart before the horse because he ignore s the predicate causation
required. The fact that Defendants Bussey and Paige made statements
directing the GSUPD officers to arrest the Plaintiff does not create a jury
question as to whether the Plaintiff exerted control because the Second

Amended Complaint plainly states that the GSUPD officers intended to arrest
the Plaintiff even before the identification. The statements made by
Defendants Bussey and Paige did not move the needle at all . See Steed, 340
Ga. App. at 56 (finding that an informant was not liable for false imprisonment
when the officer made an independent judgment to arrest the plaintiff separate
from the information provided). This same reasoning defeats the Plaintiff’s
second argument because, as cited by the Plaintiff, supplying false information
to a police officer only makes an informant liable for false imprisonment when
the false information unduly influenced the authorities. (
See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n
to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 17).
Second, the Plaintiff fails to provide adequate authority supporting his
claim that the knowing provision of false information to an officer creates a
claim for false imprisonment. The Plaintiff cites Wolf Camera, Inc. v. Royter ,
253 Ga. App. 254, 258 (2002), to make his second argument, asserting that “‘[a]
person may be liable where he gave information to the investigating officer
which he knew to be false’ because doing ‘so unduly influenced the
authorities.’” (See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 17).
The Court will not conclude such a quote is misleading, but it does acknowledge
that this argument comes close. Nowhere within the Plaintiff’s case is false
imprisonment discussed at all. The quoted port ion of the case only discusses
the state law tort of malicious prosecution,
not false imprisonment. See Wolf
Camera, Inc., 253 Ga. App. at 258. Because the Plaintiff provides no other legal

authority, this argument is wholly unpersuasive. Therefore, because the
Plaintiff failed to adequately allege a claim against the Brasfield Defendants
as to his false imprisonment count, the Court dismisses Count III in its
entirety.
C. Negligence
The Plaintiff’s remaining substantive claim against the Brasfield
Defendants arises out of negligence. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 124-127). To state
a cause of action for negligence, “a plaintiff must establish the following
essential elements: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of this duty; (3) an injury; and
(4) a causal connection between the breach and the injury.” Martin v.
Ledbetter, 342 Ga. App. 208, 211 (2017) (citation omitted). The Brasfield
Defendants once again argue that the Plaintiff cannot establish causation. (See
Br. in Supp. of Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 21 -22). In response, the
Plaintiff briefly reviews every element of his negligence claim. (See Pl.’s Br. in
Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 18-19). Had the Plaintiff not done
so, the Court may have been inclined to preserve the claim.
First, the Plaintiff asserts that the Brasfield Defendants owe a duty to
the Plaintiff to “make a reasonable investigation” before reporting a crime to
law enforcement. (
Id.). In making this assertion, the Plaintiff cites three cases
in different contexts. (Id. (citing Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 824
(1981), then citing Douglas v. State, 327 Ga. App. 792, 795 (2014), then citing
Colonial Oil Indus. Inc. v. Underwriters Subscribing to Policy Nos.

TO31504670 and TO31504671, 268 Ga. 561, 562 (1997)). But Melton does not
even concern a duty and Douglas and Colonial Oil Indus. Inc. involve duties
imposed in specialized circumstances. Indeed, applying these cases to the
negligence context would be comparing apples to oranges and such arguments
border on frivolous.
In Melton, the question of whether an individual made a reasonable
investigation before reporting a crime was in relation to establishing the
fundamental elements of a malicious prosecution claim. Melton, 258 Ga. App.
at 824. Specifically, th at question is relevant to determining whether a
defendant would have a reasonable belief that there was probable cause for
prosecution.
Id. at 823-24. In any case, this is not an issue of duty. In Douglas,
the court was concerned with a lawyer’s “duty to make reasonabl e
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.” Douglas, 327 Ga. App. at 795 (citation omitted).
Not only is this a duty imposed on a lawyer, but it is one that is relevant to the
court’s inquiry in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 794- 95.
Finally, in Colonial Oil Indus., the court discusses an insurer’s duty to conduct
a reasonable investigation into a complaint filed against an insured. Colonial
Oil Indus Inc. , 268 Ga. at 562. In other words, the duty arises out of some
contractual indemnification obligation between two parties and is not one that
exists even in tort. Thus, the Plaintiff has not presented to the Court any legal
authority that allows him to brin g a negligence claim against the Brasfield

Defendants under some duty to make a reasonable investigation before
reporting a crime to law enforcement.
Without a predicate duty, there is no breach. See Martin, 342 Ga. App.
at 211. Regardless, the Plaintiff asserts that “[n]egligent falsehoods leading to
arrest are cognizable under Georgia law.” (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Brasfield Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss, at 19). Unsurprisingly, the Plaintiff cites inapplicable law for
this proposition. (Id. (citing Rent to Own, Inc. v. Bragg, 248 Ga. App. 130, 131
(2001))). Neither the Brasfield Defendants nor the Court sees how Rent to Own
applies to the case before the Court . Rent to Own addresses a motion for
frivolous appeal damages and addresses Georgia agency law. Rent to Own,
Inc., 248 Ga. App. at 130-31. It fails to discuss the issue of negligent falsehoods
leading to arrest at all. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to allege breach.
Finally, even if the Plaintiff had properly addressed the issues of duty
and breach (even though the Plaintiff did not need to), the Plaintiff provides
no argument for why the causation analysis between false imprisonment and
negligence should differ. The Plaintiff simply parrots his previous arguments
related to false imprisonment. Indeed, Georgia courts have recognized that the
causation analysis between false imprisonment and negligence is similar, if
not the same.
See, e.g., Corp. Prop. Invs. v. Milon, 249 Ga. App. 699, 705 (2001)
(holding the traditional elements of negligence overlap with false
imprisonment when both are brought for the same action). Because the Court
concluded that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged causation as to his false

imprisonment claim, the same applies to his negligence claim. Accordingly, the
Court dismisses Count IV.
D. Attorney’s Fees and Punitive Damages
The Plaintiff brings claims for punitive damages and attorney ’s fees
within the Second Amended Complaint as Counts V and VI against all
Defendants. (
See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 128- 29). Since none of the substantive
claims against the Brasfield Defendants have survived, the Plaintiff’s
derivative claims for litigation expenses and punitive damages will also be
dismissed.
See, e.g., J. Andrew Lunsford Props., LLC v. Davis , 257 Ga. App.
720, 722 (2002) (“[T]he claims seeking attorney fees and punitive damages
were properly dismissed as derivative of the other dismissed claims.”). Thus,
Counts V and VI are dismissed as to the Brasfield Defendants.
E. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
A dismissal with prejudice bars the Plaintiff from amending his
pleadings and from later pursuing the same action against the same
Defendants. See McNair v. Johnson , 143 F.4th 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.
2025) (explaining the consequences of a dismissal with prejudice). “Dismissal
with prejudice is proper when a more carefully drafted complaint would not
state a claim for relief.” Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank , NA, 569 F. App'x
669, 686 (11th Cir. 2014). Generally, district courts have discretion in
determining whether to allow a plaintiff to amend his pleadings. See Pinnacle
Advert. and Mktg, Grp., Inc. v. Pinnacle Advert. and Mktg. Grp., LLC, 7 F.4th

989, 999-1000 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating that the standard of review for a district
court's decision to grant leave to amend is abuse of discretion); but see Eiber
Radiology, Inc. v. Toshiba America Medical Sys., Inc. , 673 F. App'x 925, 929
(11th Cir. 2016) (noting that a district court's discretion to dismiss a complaint
without leave to amend is “severely restricted” by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2), which requires leave to amend be freely given when justice
so requires).
The Eleventh Circuit generally encourages district courts to exercise
their discretion in favor of allowing plaintiffs to amend their pleadings. Id. at
1000. However, this does not mean that every dismissal should be without
prejudice. In Arthur, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal
with prejudice when the appellants amended their complaint on three
occasions and represented to the district court that they would be adding
“significant additional facts” that were directly relevant to th eir claims in a
subsequent amendment.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit found implausible that
further pleading would remedy the defects in the complaint due to the repeated
amendments and the purported additions.
Id. Additionally, when a plaintiff is
represented by counsel, the Eleventh Circuit has never “required district
courts to grant counseled plaintiffs more than one opportunity to amend a
deficient complaint” and has affirmed a district court ’s decision to deny a
plaintiff a second opportunity to amend, especially when the plaintiff failed to
properly request it.
Eiber Radiology, 673 F. App'x at 930. Here, the Court has

35
already dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims against the Brasfield Defendants once.
Accordingly, this second dismissal of the Brasfield Defendants is due to be with
prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Brasfield Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. 67] is GRANTED . Counts I, II, V , and VI of the Second Amended
Complaint are dismissed with prejudice as to the Brasfield Defendants . The
Clerk is directed to enter judgment and to close the case.
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of June, 2026.
___________ __________________
THOM
AS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge

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