govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_17-cv-00242-0

1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
JOE BALTAS, : 
JASON GOODE, : 
KENYON L. JOSEPH PELLOT- : 
 CASTELLANO, : 
RICHARD RICE, : 
YARDLEY DAVIS, : 
PHILIP RIVERA, : 
NOAH GLADDING, : 
PETER TARASCO, : 
THOMAS DELEO and : 
JOSE ORTIZ, : 
 : 
 Plaintiffs, : 
 : 
v. : Case No. 3:17-cv-242(RNC) 
 : 
CAROL CHAPDELAINE, : 
GIULIANNA MUDANO and : 
ANGEL QUIROS, : 
 : 
 Defendants. : 
 
RULING AND ORDER 
 
 In 2017, inmates in the custody of the Connecticut 
Department of Correction (“DOC”) at MacDougall-Walker 
Correctional Institution (“MWCI”) brought this action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOC officials in their individual 
and official capacities seeking damages and injunctive 
relief based on alleged violations of their rights under 
federal and state law arising from their confinement in Q-
Pod, a housing unit at MWCI. Named as defendants were the 
officials responsible for the operation of Q-Pod at the 

2 
time: Carol Chapdelaine, who served as Warden of MWCI; 
Guilianna Mudano, who served as Deputy Warden; and Angel 
Quiros, who served as DOC’s District Administrator. 
 Plaintiffs alleged that Q-Pod, although nominally a 
general population housing unit, actually functioned as an 
administrative detention unit. Plaintiffs alleged that 
while in Q-Pod, they were denied privileges in 
contravention of DOC Administrative Directives (“DOC 
A.D.”), specifically, DOC A.D. 9.4, which authorizes 
various types of restrictive housing units, and DOC A.D. 
9.5, which governs the disciplinary process. They further 
alleged that they were housed in Q-Pod for up to a year or 
more at the “whim” of prison officials without the benefit 
of procedural safeguards. Plaintiffs claimed that as a 
result of their confinement in Q-Pod, each of them had been 
deprived of certain constitutional rights, with the 
knowledge and approval of the defendants, specifically: (1) 
the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process of law; (3) the First Amendment right to access 
the courts; and (4) the First Amendment right to the free 

3 
exercise of religion.1 In addition, the complaint alleged 
violations of the Connecticut Constitution and state 
statutes. 
 The defendants denied the allegations of the amended 
complaint and pleaded defenses of qualified immunity and 
mootness. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed 
and argued and the case has been effectively stayed pending 
a ruling on the motions. 
 The defendants seek summary judgment on all the 
federal causes of action in the amended complaint. They 
argue that the admissible evidence in the record would not 
permit a jury to find in favor of any of the plaintiffs on 
any of those causes of action. They further argue that, at 
a minimum, they are protected by qualified immunity under § 
1983. Finally, they argue that the claims for injunctive 
relief are moot. I conclude that to the extent any of the 
plaintiffs may have a viable claim under § 1983, qualified 
immunity applies. I also conclude that the claims for 
injunctive relief are moot. Accordingly, the defendants’ 
 
1 Plaintiffs also invoke the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In 
substance, the Fourth Amendment claim is duplicative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, so it is not 
discussed separately in the text. The Fifth Amendment claim is 
not discussed because it does not apply to the matters at issue. 

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motion is granted with regard to the federal claims, 
plaintiffs’ motion is denied, and the state law claims are 
dismissed without prejudice. 
I. Background 
 Based on the summary judgment record, the following 
matters appear to be undisputed. MWCI is a high security, 
level 4/5 facility. It provides a highly structured 
environment for long-term sentenced offenders, protective 
custody offenders, and high bond unsentenced offenders. At 
the pertinent time, it had a population of approximately 
1900 inmates. 
 Q-Pod is a housing unit located in the MacDougall wing 
of MWCI. Established in 2003, it has been used to house 
inmates who are transitioning from more restrictive 
conditions of confinement, such as punitive segregation, 
back to general population. Q-Pod has been the subject of 
prior cases brought by inmates under § 1983. See, e.g.
, 
Galarza v. Erfe, No. 3:18-cv-663(JAM), 2019 WL 8756874 (D. 
Conn. April 30, 2019)(denying Q-Pod inmate’s motion to 
reopen action under § 1983 for failure to show plausible 
grounds for relief for any constitutional claim); 
Harnage 
v. Brighthaupt, No. 3:12-cv-1521, Ruling On Motion to 

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Dismiss In Part, ECF 42 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2014)(dismissing 
Q-Pod inmate’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement 
claim and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process 
claim); Shakur v. Sieminski, 3:07-cv-1239(CFD), 2009 WL 
2151174 (D. Conn. July 15, 2009)(dismissing Q-Pod inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim).2 
 There are 60 cells in Q-Pod, each one designed for two 
people. The cells are divided for administrative purposes 
into 4 groups of 15 cells each. This arrangement enables 
prison officials to separate inmates for safety and 
security reasons by placing them in different groups. Each 
cell throughout the unit has a toilet with a timer that 
limits the number of consecutive flushes.
3 The unit has a 
medical assessment room. The outdoor recreation yard 
attached to the unit includes a full-length basketball 
court. There is no television. 
 
2 Shakur provides a detailed description of Q-Pod, which at the 
time was called “Q-Unit.” 
3 While the exact intervals on the timer are in dispute, the 
official notice sent to inmates when the timers were installed 
reads as follows: “Be advised you can flush the toilet two times 
in five minutes. You must wait five minutes before flushing 
again. If you try to flush a third time before the ten minute 
period the toilet will lockout for 30 minutes. After 30 minutes 
the cycle will reset to normal operation.” ECF 61-1 at 12. 

6 
 Inmates in Q-Pod are generally housed with a cellmate 
and permitted daily visitation. Meals are provided to 
inmates in their cells.4 Inmates recreate in the outdoor 
recreation yard 15 cells at a time (i.e. 30 inmates per 
session). When the plaintiffs were housed in Q-Pod, they 
were not given access to group religious services with the 
general population, although that has since changed. 
 Q-Pod inmates have fewer privileges than general 
population inmates. Authority for this disparity in 
privileges is unclear, but may be found in DOC A.D. 9.4.6, 
which provides that “[a]n inmate on restrictive housing 
status shall not be entitled to access to programs or 
privileges afforded an inmate in general population.” In 
any event, the stated purpose of the disparity in 
privileges is to motivate inmates to work their way out of 
Q-Pod by complying with prison rules and regulations. 
“Correctional experience has demonstrated that it is an 
effective correctional tool to disincentivize inmates from 
 
4 The parties disagree as to why inmates in Q-Pod are fed in 
their cells. Defendants argue that this policy arises from the 
need to separate inmates due to safety and security concerns. 
Plaintiffs claim that there were no separation issues while they 
were housed in Q-Pod and that defendants conflate security 
issues in the MacDougall and Walker wings of MCWI. 

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getting tickets or disciplinary reports.” See Plfs’ Local 
Rule 56(a)(2) Statement, ECF 69, at 2 ¶9, admitting Defs’ 
Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement, ECF 56-2, at 2 ¶9.5 
 The following matters are disputed. Plaintiffs allege 
that when they were in Q-Pod, medical and mental health 
services were provided only within the unit itself (if at 
all), rather than in the main building, where general 
population inmates receive services. Defendants state that 
like general population inmates, Q-Pod inmates go to the 
main building for medical and mental health services; the 
medical assessment room in Q-Pod is available for use in 
emergencies. Plaintiffs further allege that when they were 
in Q-Pod, inmates were allowed to go to the library in the 
main building just once a month, in contrast to general 
population inmates, who could go once a week. Defendants 
state that Q-Pod inmates were able to access the library 
every other week if they signed up in advance. 
 Toilet-related issues are also disputed. Defendants 
 
5 In 2004, soon after Q-Pod opened, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, National Institute of Corrections, issued a report 
commending DOC’s “Close Custody Phase Program” at MWCI. See 
Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners, A 
National Assessment of Current Practices, at 51, available at 
http://www.nicic.org. 

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say that toilets all over MWCI have timers due to an 
agreement with the Town of Suffield related to water usage; 
plaintiffs say that toilets in other parts of the facility 
did not have timers when they were in Q-Pod. Plaintiffs 
also allege that Q-Pod was the only unit where DOC staff 
could shut off inmates’ water and that some (unidentified) 
correctional Officers sometimes shut off inmates’ water for 
hours. 
 Finally, the parties dispute what determined the amount 
of time plaintiffs stayed in Q-Pod. Defendants state that 
the duration of a plaintiff’s stay depended on the 
disciplinary ticket he received: a ticket for a Class A 
violation resulted in a stay of 90 days; a Class B ticket 
resulted in a stay of 60 days. Plaintiffs say the duration 
was always longer than 90 days. Defendants counter that 
new violations of prison rules reset the clock for a 
plaintiff’s stay in Q-Pod, as prison officials noted in 
response to one of plaintiff Baltas’s grievances. See Pl. 
Ex., ECF 47-3 at 17, 40. 
II. Legal Standard 
 
 “Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, 

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‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A genuine issue of 
material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.’” 
Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 
875 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Summary judgment 
may be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
The non-moving party may defeat summary judgment by 
pointing to a genuine dispute of material fact but may not 
do so through conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated 
speculation, or inadmissible evidence. See F.D.I.C. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010). “The 
mere verification by affidavit of one’s own conclusory 
allegations is not sufficient to oppose a motion for 
summary judgment.” Zigmund v. Foster, 106 F. Supp. 2d 352, 

10 
356 (D. Conn. 2000) (brackets omitted) (quoting Greene v. 
Ga. Pardons & Parole Bd., 807 F. Supp. 748, 750 n.5 (N.D. 
Ga. 1992)); see also Saji v. Nassau Univ. Med. Ctr., 724 F. 
App’x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (holding that a 
plaintiff “must offer some hard evidence showing that 
[their] version of the events is not wholly fanciful” 
(quoting D’Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d 
Cir. 1998)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of 
evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be 
insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
III. Discussion 
A. Eighth Amendment 
Plaintiffs claim that their rights under the Eighth 
Amendment were violated as a result of their placement in 
Q-Pod in that they were: (1) denied group meals, group 
exercise and other group activities providing opportunities 
to socialize; (2) denied vocational training, job 
assignments, and education; (3) deprived of adequate 
medical care; (4) deprived of court-ordered drug and 
alcohol counseling; and (5) deprived of access to toilets 
without timers. 
The Eighth Amendment is concerned with “[a prisoner’s] 

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basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical 
care, and reasonable safety.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). “[A] 
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when” he 
or she causes a deprivation that is “sufficiently serious.” 
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). 
“Only ‘deprivations “denying the minimal civilized measure 
of life’s necessities” are sufficiently grave to form the 
basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’” 
Id. (quoting 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 
In accordance with these principles, plaintiffs’ Eighth 
Amendment claim requires that they prove (1) an 
“objectively, sufficiently serious . . . denial of the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and (2) a 
“sufficiently culpable state of mind” on the part of the 
responsible official. Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 
66 (2d Cir. 2015). The deprivations at issue here do not 
meet the first prong. See Galarza v. Erfe, 2019 WL 
8756874, *3 (Q-Pod inmate’s allegations of no communal 
meals, 45-minute limit on recreation time, non-availability 
of programs outside of cell, and correctional officers’ 

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loud walkie-talkies disrupting sleep failed to meet first 
prong); Shakur, 2009 WL 2151174, *6 (rejecting claim that 
restrictive conditions in Q-Pod constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel explained that 
plaintiffs’ lack of access to group meals, group exercise 
and other group activities while in Q-Pod resulted in a 
form of debilitating isolation. “Confinement . . . in an 
isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny 
under Eighth Amendment standards.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678, 685 (1978). But plaintiffs do not allege that 
any of them was held in isolation. Rather, each plaintiff 
had a cellmate, was permitted daily visits and could 
recreate up to two hours a day with many others. Given 
this level of social contact, plaintiffs’ lack of access to 
group meals, group exercise and other group activities did 
not impose a level of isolation sufficient to support a 
constitutional claim. Cf. Tavares v. Amato, 954 F. Supp. 
2d 79, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that administrative 
segregation conditions are generally insufficient to 
establish Eighth Amendment violations). 
Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a 

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prisoner’s serious medical or mental health needs 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See Slavone v. 
New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d 
Cir. 2013). However, “not every lapse in medical care is a 
constitutional wrong.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279. To 
prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must demonstrate (1) 
that his need for medical care was objectively, 
sufficiently serious, and (2) that the defendant failed to 
provide necessary care despite being aware of a substantial 
risk that the inmate would suffer serious harm as a result. 
Plaintiffs do not specifically allege (or offer evidence to 
prove) any instance in which any of them was denied access 
to needed medical or mental health care. Rather, they 
state that “many times the offender would be denied medical 
treatment” and that with regard to mental health treatment, 
“[t]here was not any confidentiality.” ECF 69 ¶ 36. These 
allegations are insufficient to support a claim of 
deliberate indifference. 
The absence of specific allegations of harm (and lack 
of supporting evidence), also undercuts the Eighth 
Amendment claim insofar as it is based on denial of access 

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to drug and alcohol counseling. Plaintiff Rivera claimed 
in an inmate request form that he needed to be in a drug 
treatment program to become eligible for parole but was 
being denied entry into the program because he was in Q-
Pod. Pl. Ex., ECF 47-4, at 20. DOC’s response to Rivera’s 
grievance indicates that he was barred from the program 
because of his disciplinary report rather than by his 
housing status per se. Id. Delayed eligibility for parole 
is not a deprivation of basic human needs and does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment. 
Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding toilet timers does not 
support an Eighth Amendment claim. Temporary deprivations 
of toilet use that do not result in serious physical harm 
or contamination do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. Harvin v. Chapdelaine
, No. 3:16-
CV-1616(VAB), 2017 WL 3725611, at *11 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 
2017) (collecting cases). 
Finally, plaintiffs’ lack of access to jobs, 
educational programs and vocational training while in Q-Pod 
does not support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Galarza v. 
Erfe, 2019 WL 8756874, *3 (non-availability of programs in 
Q-Pod did not provide plausible ground for Eighth Amendment 

15 
claim). 
 Defendants argue that even assuming an Eighth 
Amendment violation could be found on the basis of the 
record here, they are entitled to qualified immunity. I 
agree. 
 Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
claims for damages under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.” Farid v. Ellen
, 593 F.3d 233, 244 (2d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To overcome a 
defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that 
(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) 
the right at issue was clearly established at the time of 
the defendant’s conduct. 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 232 (2009). “A clearly established right is one that 
is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would 
have understood that what he is doing violates that 
right.’” 
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting 
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). To 
determine whether a right was clearly established, courts 

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in this circuit consider “Supreme Court decisions, [Second 
Circuit] decisions, and decisions from other circuit 
courts.” Simon v. City of New York, 893 F.3d 83, 92 (2d 
Cir. 2018). “A right must be defined with reasonable 
specificity and is clearly established only if the relevant 
case authority is directly on point or clearly foreshadows 
a ruling recognizing the right.” 
Galarza v. Erfe, No. 
3:18-cv-663 (JAM), 2020 WL 5501239, *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 
2020), citing Sloley v. VanBramer, 845 F.3d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
 Plaintiffs have not identified relevant case authority 
showing that the restrictive conditions they experienced in 
Q-Pod violated the Eighth Amendment. They cite no decision 
of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit or other circuit 
courts suggesting that the conditions were objectively, 
sufficiently serious to rise to the level of cruel and 
unusual punishment. Moreover, the decision in Shakur
 
rejecting the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim gave the 
defendants reason to believe that the conditions of 
confinement in Q-Pod did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
See also Galarza v. Erfe, No. 3:18-CV-00663 (JAM), 2019 WL 
8756874, *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2019) (inmate’s allegations 

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concerning conditions of confinement in Q-Pod failed to 
provide plausible ground for Eighth Amendment claim). 
B. Fourteenth Amendment 
 
i. Procedural Due Process 
 
 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects inmates against deprivation of certain liberty 
interests without procedural safeguards. A prisoner has a 
right to procedural protection when (1) the state has 
created a liberty interest in a statute or regulation and 
(2) deprivation of that interest results in “atypical and 
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents 
of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner
, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995).6 Accordingly, to prevail here, plaintiffs must 
establish both that their confinement in Q-Pod imposed an 
atypical and significant hardship under Sandin, and that 
the state granted them, by regulation or statute, a 
protected liberty interest in remaining free from 
 
6 Sandin involved an inmate, Demont Connor, who was confined in 
disciplinary segregation for 30 days. During his 30 days in 
disciplinary segregation, Connor was confined to his cell except 
for 50 minutes each day when he was permitted to exercise and 
shower while isolated from other inmates and constrained by leg 
irons and waist chains. The Court concluded that Conner’s 
confinement in disciplinary segregation for 30 days did not 
impose “atypical and significant hardship.” 

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confinement in Q-Pod. See Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 
313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 The record is insufficient to permit a reasoned 
determination of whether plaintiffs can prove a state-
created liberty interest. They point to DOC A.D 9.5, which 
sets out the available penalties for disciplinary 
violations. See ECF 60. They contend that this regulation 
gives prisoners a liberty interest in being free from 
penalties that are not expressly authorized. Defendants 
have not addressed this contention directly. See ECF 56-1 
at 21-22. But they do deny that the conditions in Q-Pod 
imposed a penalty. Though the record is insufficient to 
permit a reasoned finding, I will assume for present 
purposes that plaintiffs can prove they had a state-created 
liberty interest in avoiding assignment to Q-Pod. 
 Whether plaintiffs can prove that the conditions in Q-
Pod imposed atypical and significant hardship is also 
unclear. The inquiry hinges on two factors: the duration 
of the plaintiff’s confinement in Q-Pod and the extent to 
which the conditions in Q-Pod differed from the conditions 
in general population. See Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 
60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004); Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 

19 
(2d Cir. 2000). Some of the plaintiffs were confined in Q-
Pod for lengthy periods of time, so the duration factor 
weighs in their favor. However, the conditions in Q-Pod 
were not dramatically different from the conditions in 
general population. 
 In assessing the conditions in Q-Pod for purposes of 
the Sandin claim, guidance can be drawn from other cases 
brought in this court by Q-Pod inmates seeking relief under 
Sandin. In the first case, filed in 2012, Judge Thompson 
summarized the plaintiff’s allegations with regard to the 
conditions in Q-Pod as follows: 
The plaintiff alleges that he is denied communal 
meals, must shower in the evening rather than 
being allowed to choose to shower in the morning 
or evening, and can access the prison library only 
one day per week. The plaintiff is afforded two 
hours out-of-cell time per day, one hour of 
recreation in the morning and one hour for showers 
and telephone use in the evening. He is not 
allowed the additional hour of exercise in a large 
outdoor yard or, during inclement weather, in the 
gymnasium that other general population inmates 
are afforded. The housing unit does not have a 
television in the day room or a typewriter for the 
unit. 
 
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss in Part, 
Harnage v. 
Brighthaupt, No. 3:12-cv-1521 (AWT) (D. Conn. Feb 12, 
2014), ECF 42 at 14. Judge Thompson observed that while 
these conditions may have been harsher than the conditions 

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in other housing units, “the plaintiff had alleged no facts 
describing any condition that an inmate should not expect 
to undergo by virtue of his incarceration.” Id. at 18. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff could not meet the significant 
and atypical standard of Sandin. 
 In the second case, filed in 2015, the same plaintiff 
alleged that while he was in Q-Pod, “prison officials 
subjected [him] to limited access to library resources, 
shorter recreation periods, restrictions on photocopying 
services and no access to intramural sports and communal 
dining. In addition, religious and medical services were 
performed within the unit instead of outside of the unit.” 
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, Harnage v. Chapdelaine
, 3:15-
cv-1034 (AWT) (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2017), ECF 25 at 2-3 
(“Harnage II”). Judge Thompson again concluded that the 
conditions alleged by the plaintiff did not meet the Sandin 
standard and he was therefore “not entitled to procedural 
due process prior to his placement in Q-Pod.” Id. at 10. 
 Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning lack of access to 
jobs, vocational training and classroom instruction go 
beyond the allegations in the Harnage cases. But the 
record does not support a finding that this lack of access 

21 
was a marked departure from the ordinary incidents of 
prison life. With regard to jobs, plaintiffs admit that 
MWCI had a wait list for general population inmates who 
wanted jobs.7 They also do not dispute that, with the 
possible exception of “tiermen” in Q-Pod, inmates with 
disciplinary records did not have jobs. Id. ¶ 30. With 
regard to other programming, the record indicates that 
eligibility depended on an inmate’s disciplinary record, 
rather than his housing assignment. See Pl. Ex., ECF 47-4 
at 20 (grievance from plaintiff Rivera claiming that he had 
been denied program participation because of his placement 
in Q-Pod; response stating that program participation 
required a clean disciplinary record for 120 days after a 
Class A violation). 
 The allegations in the present case also go beyond the 
allegations in the Harnage cases with regard to medical and 
religious services. Plaintiffs allege that services were 
provided only within Q-Pod, the same allegation made in 
Harnage II. But plaintiffs also assert that some Q-Pod 
inmates were denied access to medical care and religious 
 
7 At the pertinent time, there were approximately 1900 inmates at 
MWCI and only about 500 jobs. ECF 69 ¶ 31-32. 

22 
services even within the unit, in other words, they were 
wholly denied access to medical and religious services. 
These allegations were not made in the Harnage cases. 
 Viewed most favorably to plaintiffs, the record does 
not permit a finding that any of them was ever denied 
access to needed medical care while in Q-Pod. The 
assertion that “many times” unidentified “offenders” were 
denied needed medical care is conclusory in nature. There 
is no allegation or evidence that any of the plaintiffs had 
a need for medical treatment while in Q-Pod, sought 
treatment and was denied treatment. 
 Plaintiffs’ claim with regard to the alleged denial of 
access to religious services is better supported. 
Plaintiff Baltas’s affidavit states that he could not 
smudge in his cell. His statement is contradicted by 
contemporaneous documentary evidence. See
 Pl. Ex., ECF 47-
3 at 21 (grievance by plaintiff Baltas claiming that he was 
restricted from practicing his Native American religion by 
smudging with the rest of the general population; response 
by officials stating that inmates in Q-Pod may dry smudge 
in their cells and that the “Native American Chaplin [sic] 
does a service with the inmates in Q unit.”). But 

23 
plaintiff Tarasco’s affidavit makes a similar claim 
regarding Native American religious services. He alleges 
that he “was not allowed to attend [his] religious 
practices or purifications at all” and that as a result of 
his persistent complaints about this restriction, he “was 
eventually removed from Q-Pod.” ECF 47-5 at 6. Tarasco’s 
claim is buttressed by the affidavit of plaintiff 
Castellano, which recounts a conversation between Tarasco, 
a Native American Services Alder, and a Q-Pod counselor, 
which Castellano overheard. According to Castellano’s 
account, Tarasco asked the alder about accessing services, 
including a sweat lodge and smudging. The counselor said 
the Warden and Deputy Warden had been informed of Tarasco’s 
request and were looking into whether services could be 
provided. Both the counselor and the alder said they were 
uncertain whether any services could be provided to Tarasco 
in Q-Pod due to staffing issues. ECF 47-5 at 7-8. 
 Viewing the record most favorably to plaintiffs, the 
affidavits of Baltas, Tarasco and Castellano, in 
combination, raise a triable issue whether Baltas and 
Castellano were unable to smudge or attend sweat lodge 

24 
services in Q-Pod. But the duration of the deprivation 
remains unclear. 
 As to the amount of time plaintiffs spent in Q-Pod, the 
record, viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, shows the 
following: 
 Baltas was in Q-Pod from April 9, 2015 to May 12, 
2015; then from May 29, 2015 to October 21, 2015; then from 
November 13, 2015 to February 24, 2016; then from April 8, 
2017 to July 3, 2016; 
 Rivera was in Q-Pod for 9 months; 
 Tarasco was in Q-Pod for 3 months and a few days; 
 Rice was in Q-Pod from March 28, 2016 to July 6, 2016; 
And 
 Gladding was in Q-Pod for longer than 6 months 
consecutively and ultimately spent a total of more than one 
year in Q-Pod.
8 
 Based on this record, I cannot exclude the possibility 
that Baltas, Rivera and Gladding may be able to prove that 
they were confined in Q-Pod without procedural protections 
for a longer period than permitted by the Fourteenth 
 
8 The record does not disclose the duration of the other 
plaintiffs’ confinement in Q-Pod. 

25 
Amendment. A decision by Chief Judge Underhill shows that 
the claims of these plaintiffs have arguable merit. In 
Garcia v. Semple, No. 3:18-cv-1226, 2019 WL 5597771 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 30, 2019), the plaintiff was placed on high 
security status and moved to a cell in Q-Pod, where he 
remained for 89 days. The plaintiff’s affidavit described 
conditions similar to the ones at issue here. 
See No. 
3:18-cv-1226, ECF 1 at ¶ 167. Judge Underhill concluded 
that the plaintiff had a plausible procedural due process 
claim. See 2019 WL 5597771, *13.9 
 However, I agree with the defendants that they are 
entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs cite no 
relevant case authority clearly establishing that confining 
them in Q-Pod without procedural safeguards for the periods 
at issue violated the Fourteenth Amendment. At the 
pertinent time, relevant case authority indicated that 
confinement in more severe conditions for months at a time 
would not constitute atypical and substantial hardship 
under Sandin. See Frazier
, 81 F.3d at 317-18 (120 days in 
segregation followed by 30 days loss of recreation and 
 
9 The case was later dismissed for failure to prosecute. See ECF 
35. 

26 
other privileges did not impose atypical and significant 
hardship). Moreover, in the Harnage cases, the plaintiff 
alleged that he had been in Q-Pod for four or five months 
at a time. See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, Harnage v. 
Chapdelaine, 3:15-cv-1034 (AWT) (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2017), 
ECF 25 at 3. Accordingly, the dismissal of the procedural 
due process claims in those cases signaled that the 
conditions in Q-Pod were not so different from the ordinary 
incidents of prison life as to support a claim under 
Sandin. 
 I also agree with defendants’ argument that 
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief under Sandin are 
moot. ECF 56-1 at 28-30. At the time this motion was 
briefed, none of the plaintiffs remained in Q-Pod, and only 
two of them remained at MWCI. See id. at 29-30. Now, it 
appears, four plaintiffs are incarcerated at MWCI, but it 
is unclear whether any of them are housed in Q-Pod. When 
an inmate is moved from the facility that is the site of 
his claim for injunctive relief, the request is generally 
moot. Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 
1989); see also Candelaria v. Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 
378 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 979 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Because 

27 
plaintiff has now been transferred to another facility, we 
dismiss his claim for injunctive relief as moot."). 
ii. Grievance Process 
 Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated their due 
process rights by failing to properly administer the 
grievance process. More specifically, plaintiffs claim 
that their grievances were not addressed at all or were not 
addressed in a timely manner. Am. Compl., ECF 14 ¶ 47. They 
also object to the practice of resolving grievances by 
“compromising” them, which did not allow for the usual 
appeals process. See, e.g., Pl. Ex., ECF 47-4 at 14. The 
record does not support a viable due process claim. 
“Although state laws may in certain circumstances create a 
constitutionally protected entitlement to substantive 
liberty interests, state statutes do not create federally 
protected due process entitlements to specific state-
mandated procedures.” 
Holcomb v. Lykens, 337 F.3d 217, 224 
(2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see Kalican v. 
Dzurenda, 583 F. App’x 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary 
order) (“Grievance procedures, which are creatures of state 
law, are not interests independently protected by the 
Constitution . . . .”); 
see also Green v. Martin, 224 F. 

28 
Supp. 3d 154, 178 (D. Conn. 2016) (“Prisoners have no 
constitutionally protected right to have prison officials 
comply with grievance procedures or even to respond to 
grievances.”). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment on this claim. 
C. First Amendment 
i. Access to the Courts 
Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their right 
to access the courts by interfering with their use of the 
library and the typewriter.10 The record, viewed most 
favorably to plaintiffs, does not raise a triable issue 
with regard to this claim. “[T]here is . . . no 
constitutional right to a typewriter as an incident to the 
right of access to the courts.” Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 
F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting 
Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 1978), 
 
10 Plaintiffs also assert that they were stymied in bringing 
grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. There is no 
right to a grievance procedure under the First Amendment. 
Boddie v. Alexander, 356 F. App’x 438, 440 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(summary order). “[T]he First Amendment functions only to 
prohibit the government from obstructing the right to petition.” 
Id. “Because [plaintiffs] allege[], in essence, that the 
[defendants] failed to assist [their] ability to raise a 
grievance — not that the [defendants] obstructed [their] ability 
to raise a grievance — [plaintiffs have] failed to state a 
cognizable First Amendment claim.” Id. at 441. 

29 
rev’d on other grounds, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
(1979)). 
As for library access, the parties dispute how often Q-
Pod inmates could visit the library. Again viewing the 
record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, I 
will assume that the plaintiffs had access to the library 
only once per month, unlike general population inmates on 
other units who accessed the library once per week. While 
Bounds v. Smith requires adequate access to a law library 
as a part of the right to access the courts, 430 U.S. 817, 
829 (1977), plaintiffs still must demonstrate inadequate 
access resulting in “actual injury.” Benjamin v. Fraser, 
264 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Because law libraries 
and legal assistance programs do not represent 
constitutional rights in and of themselves, but only the 
means to ensure ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to 
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional 
rights to the courts,’ prisoners must demonstrate ‘actual 
injury’ in order to have standing.” (quoting 
Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (internal quotations 
omitted)). In other words, plaintiffs must show that their 
lack of access to the law library was in fact inadequate 

30 
and impeded their access to the courts. 
The record does not support a finding of actual injury 
as a result of any limited access to the library or 
typewriters. In particular, the record does not support a 
finding that “the alleged shortcomings in the library or 
legal assistance program hindered [any plaintiff’s] efforts 
to pursue a legal claim.” Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 
93 (2d Cir. 2004). Therefore, the defendants are entitled 
to summary judgment on this claim. 
ii. Free Exercise of Religion 
 Plaintiffs claim that they were prevented from 
engaging in religious practices while in Q-Pod in violation 
of the First Amendment. As discussed above, Baltas and 
Tarasco may be able to prove that they were not allowed to 
engage in Native American religious practices in Q-Pod. 
Even if they were permitted to smudge, they might still be 
able to prove that they were deprived of a “constitutional 
right to participate in congregate religious services.” 
Salahuddin v. Coughlin
, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993). 
In Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 999 F. Supp. 526, 538-39 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), the court held that there must be 
individualized findings to justify depriving a particular 

31 
inmate of congregate services. In other words, mere 
segregation status on a particular unit is not enough. See 
also LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 n.9 (2d Cir. 
1972) (noting that not all prisoners in segregation 
“lawfully can be prevented from attending church services 
in the chapel. Not all segregated prisoners are potential 
troublemakers; so some discrimination must be made by 
prison authorities among the inmates in the segregation 
unit.”). Furthermore, this claim is distinguishable from 
other cases that have declined to allow religious freedom 
claims related to the Q-Pod to go forward. In Shakur v. 
Sieminski, No. 3:07-cv-1239C, 2009 WL 2151174 (D. Conn. 
July 15, 2009), summary judgment was granted on the First 
Amendment claims of a prisoner in Q-Pod. However, in that 
case, the plaintiff “[did] not allege . . . that he was 
denied the ability to practice his religion or attend 
congregate religious services.” 
Id. at *7. Instead, he only 
alleged that congregate services were “provided in Q-Unit, 
instead of the main building.” Id. Here, Tarasco 
specifically alleges that he was denied both the ability to 
practice his religion and to attend congregate religious 
services. 

32 
 Nevertheless, I conclude that the defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity. No relevant case authority 
has been cited or found that addresses the First Amendment 
free exercise rights of inmates to participate in sweat 
lodge or smudging services. See, e.g., Baltas v. Erfe, No. 
3:19-cv-1820 (MPS), 2022 WL 4260672, *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 
15, 2022) (“N either party has cited, and the Court is 
unaware of, any Second Circuit or U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent that specifically addresses an 
inmate's First Amendment right either to demand 
construction of a sweat lodge within a prison facility, or 
to transfer to a prison facility with sweat lodge access, 
to accommodate the inmate's free exercise of the Native 
American religion”); Buckles v. Crowe, 2021 WL 1341887, * 6 
(D. Mont. Feb. 22, 2021) (finding based on a review of 
federal case law that there is “no clearly established 
constitutional right to access a sweat lodge in prison to 
practice the Native American religion”). In the absence of 
clear case law, qualified immunity applies to the claims of 
Baltas and Tarasco against the defendants in their 
individual capacities. And their claims for injunctive 
relief are moot, as discussed earlier. 

33 
D. State Law Claims 
Because summary judgment is properly granted on all the 
federal claims, the state law claims will be dismissed 
without prejudice. “[I]n the usual case in which all 
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance 
of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise 
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Kolari 
v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 
2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). In 
addition, “district courts may decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction” where “the claim raises a novel 
or complex issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). 
In this case, it is unclear whether there are private 
rights of action for many of plaintiffs’ state 
constitutional claims. See Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 
700 (Conn. 1998) (“Whether to recognize a cause of action 
for alleged violations of other state constitutional 
provisions in the future must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.”). This counsels against exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction. 
See Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F. 
Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D. Conn. 2005) (declining jurisdiction 

34 
over state constitutional claims, citing Binette and 
“federalism and comity concerns”). Accordingly, those 
claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state 
court. See Kolari, 455 F.3d at 124. 
IV. Conclusion 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with 
regard to the federal claims and plaintiffs’ partial motion 
for summary judgment is denied. The state law claims are 
dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk may enter judgment 
and close the file. 
 So ordered this 30th day of September 2022. 
 
 /s/ Robert N. Chatigny ____ 
Robert N. Chatigny 
 United States District Judge 
 

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