govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-3_21-cv-13807-1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
WINVIEW IP HOLDINGS, LLC, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
FANDUEL, INC., et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 21-13807 (GC) (JTQ) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
CASTNER, District Judge 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants FanDuel, Inc., FanDuel Group, 
Inc., FanDuel Group Parent LLC, and Betfair Interactive US LLC’s (collectively, FanDuel) Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff WinView IP Holdings, LLC’s (WinView) Second Amended Complaint (SAC) 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 123.) WinView opposed, 
(ECF No. 126), and FanDuel replied, (ECF No. 127). The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ 
submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78(b) and Local Civil 
Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, FanDuel’s Motion is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. PageID:
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I. BACKGROUND1 
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, and outlines only the 
factual background necessary to resolve the instant Motion. 2 WinView is a limited liability 
company involved in “mobile gaming and interactive television” whose “technologies enable the 
creation of an online and mobile environment that enhances the sports viewing and gaming 
experience[.]” (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 3-4.) FanDuel is “a digital sports entertainment and gaming 
enterprise” that “provides users with daily fantasy sports, online sports betting, and casino-style 
gambling offerings” and “is also involved in th e design, development, and licensing of sports 
betting and casino gaming software for online and retail sportsbook and casino gaming products.” 
(Id. ¶ 6.) The premise of this action is FanDuel’s alleged infringement of WinView’s patents: U.S. 
Patent Nos. 10,721,543 (the ’543 pate nt) and 10,806,988 (the ’988 patent). 3 (See id. ¶¶ 1-2, 5.) 
The SAC asserts that these patents “introduce transformative advancements in distributed gaming 
and mobile technology, including real-time bookmaking, geographic integration, specific solutions 
to manage simultaneous contest participation, and mechanisms to ensure fairness and compliance 
with state laws.” (Id. ¶ 24.) 
The SAC now asserts infringement of exemplary claim 118 of the ’543 patent, a different 
claim of the patent than that asserted in the FAC.4 (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 114, 120-121 (asserting claim 
 
1 On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts as true, but 
courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
2 The Court has subject ma tter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). 
3 WinView previously also alleged infringe ment of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,878,243 (the ’243 
patent) and 9,930,730 (the ’730 patent), but those counts have been dismissed. (ECF No. 65.) 
4 The FAC alleged infringement of claims 1 and 9 of the ’543 patent . (ECF No. 8 ¶ 90 
(asserting claims 1 and 9).) The claim of the ’988 patent infringed upon as alleged in the SAC 
also differs from the ’988 patent claim at issue in the FAC, but FanDuel does not move to dismiss PageID:
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118).) The ’543 patent details a “method of and system for enab ling a distributed entertainment 
system over a computing device” where “the entert ainment system is direct ly correlated to live 
events or televised programs[ .]” (ECF No. 117-1 at 2.) 5 Claim 118 of the ’543 patent provides 
the following: 
A method implemented on a server device comprising: 
sending a set of service related information related to a location 
of the mobile Internet-connected computing device to an activity 
client, wherein the location determines the set of service related 
information to be loaded; 
receiving a selection of a servi ce from the activity client to be 
utilized by a user; 
sending a set of service-specific information related to the 
service to the mobile Internet -connected computing device 
including: 
sending a list of assets to th e mobile Internet-connected 
computing device; 
comparing the list of assets with a first set of assets; 
sending only a second set of assets within the li st of assets 
that are not already resident on the mobile Internet-
connected computing device, wherein the second set of 
assets are grouped into a set of necessary assets and a set of 
preferred assets; and 
executing an application related to the service within the activity 
client on the mobile Internet-connected computing device. 
(ECF No. 117-1 at 20-21; ECF No. 117 ¶ 120.) 
 
WinView’s direct infringement claim for the ’988 patent. (Compare ECF No. 117 ¶ 165 (asserting 
exemplary claim 64 of the ’988 patent), with ECF No. 8 ¶ 110 (asserting claim 1 of the ’988 patent); 
ECF No. 123-1 at 10.) The ’988 patent identifies “[a] method and system for conducting multiple 
competitions of skill for a single performance[.]” (ECF No. 117-1 at 25 (’988 patent abstract).) 
5 Page numbers for record cites ( i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the 
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties. PageID:
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The SAC alleges that four of FanDuel’s products infringe upon WinView’s patents: 
FanDuel Sportsbook & Casino (FD Sportsbook), FanDuel Racing (FD Racing), FanDuel Fantasy 
Sports (FD Fantasy), and FanDuel Casino (FD Ca sino) (the Accused Products). (ECF No. 117 
¶ 40.) FD Casino and FD Racing ar e described for the first time in the SAC. The SAC alleges 
that FD Casino “allows customers to bet on a range of games of chan ce, including casino games 
such as blackjack, roulette, and slot machines as well as bingo and machine-gaming terminals.” 
(Id. ¶ 82.) FD Racing “offers betting on horse races . . . [and] the relevant functionality in FD 
Racing, FD Sportsbook, and FD Casino is the same.” (Id. ¶ 71.) 
The method detailed in claim 118 of the ’543 patent outlines communication of information 
to a product user. The method comprises (1) sending service-related information to a user, where 
the information sent is based on the geographic lo cation of the user, (2) r eceiving a selection of 
service from the user, (3) sending service-related information specific to the user’s selection to the 
user’s device, including (a) an initial list of assets, (b) comparing that list with a “first set” of assets, 
and (c) sending to the user an additional “second se t of assets” that were not already sent to the 
user’s device, grouped into sets of “necessary” and “preferred” assets, and (4) executing an 
application related to th e service selected. (ECF No. 117- 1 at 20-21.) The SAC asserts that 
FanDuel performs this method on a server device that interacts with us ers on FanDuel’s app or 
website. (ECF No. 117 ¶ 122.) The SAC asserts that the Accused Produc ts use this method to 
operate, alleging: (1) FanDuel se nds service-related information, determined by user location, to 
user devices, (2) users select service, (3) ba sed on the user selection, FanDuel sends back 
information related to the selected service including (a) an initial list of assets, (b) comparing that 
list with a “first set” of assets, and (c) sending to the user an additional “second set of assets” that PageID:
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were not already sent to the user’s device, classified as “necessary” and “preferred” assets, and (4) 
FanDuel executes an application related to the service selected. (Id. ¶¶ 129-143.) 
Previously, FanDuel sought to dismiss WinView’s fourth count in the FAC, which alleged 
infringement of the ’988 patent, arguing that the ’988 patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (See 
ECF No. 25.) FanDuel did not previously challenge WinView’s claims regarding the ’543 patent. 
(See id.) The Court denied FanDuel’ s Motion to Dismiss, holding th at “because the ’988 patent 
contains technical subject matter, the Court is unable to effectively evaluate the patent on its face 
alone and therefore it would be inappropriate at this early stage in the litigation to disregard 
allegations in the FAC about how the patent is an improvement on technology.” (ECF No. 82 at 
17-18, 19; ECF No. 83.) The Court allowed WinView’s count for direct infringement of the ’988 
patent to proceed. ( See ECF No. 83.) To narrow the issues in dispute and preserve resources, 
WinView filed an unopposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint, (ECF No. 115), which 
the Court granted, (ECF No. 116). WinView filed the SAC on November 13, 2025, (ECF No. 
117). The SAC removed allegations of infring ement regarding the ’243 and ’730 patents and 
asserts counts for direct infringement, willful infringement, induced infringement and contributory 
infringement for the ’543 and ’988 patents. ( See ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 113-202.) On December 12, 
2025, FanDuel filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 123.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Generally, district courts adjudicating patent cases apply the substantive law of the Federal 
Circuit.” NovaPlast Corp. v. Inplant, LLC , Civ. No. 20-7396, 2021 WL 5770264, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 6, 2021) (quoting Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc. , 686 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
However, “[t]he standard governin g [the] grant or denial of a Ru le 12(b)(6) motion[] . . . ‘is a 
purely procedural question not pertaining to patent law,’ to which this court, and the Federal Circuit 
on review, applies the rule of the regional circuit.” Id. (quoting C&F Packing Co. v. IBP , Inc., 224 PageID:
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F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Therefore, the Court will apply Rule 12(b)(6) precedent from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for purposes of deciding this Motion. 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts “accept the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferen ces in favor of the plaintiff, and assess whether 
the complaint and the exhibits attached to it ‘contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting 
Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of City of Scranton , 975 F.3d 406, 412 (3d Cir. 2020)). “A claim is 
facially plausible when the plai ntiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Clark v. Coupe, 55 
F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019)). When assessing the factual allegations in a complaint, 
courts “disregard legal conclusi ons and recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are 
supported only by mere conclusory statements.” Wilson, 57 F.4th at 140 (citing Oakwood Lab’ys 
LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 904 (3d Cir. 2021)). The defendant bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
bears the burden of “showing that a complaint fails to state a claim[.]” In re Plavix Mktg., Sales 
Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 
824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
In the context of patent infringement, while “[a] plaintiff is not required to plead 
infringement on an element-by-el ement basis,” a plaintiff “cannot assert a plausible claim [for 
relief] . . . by reciting the [patent] claim elements and merely concluding that the accused product 
has those elements.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 
Such an element-by-element pleading standard would go beyond what is required to survive a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 1352. Rather, “[t]here must be some factual PageID:
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allegations that, when taken as true, articulate why it is plausible that the accused product infringes 
the patent claim.” Id. at 1353. Moreover, while “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level, . . . it [is also true] that [s]pecific facts are not necessary; 
the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim [for relief] is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (cleaned up). Importantly, “[t]he level of detail required in any 
given case will vary depending upon a number of factors, including the complexity of the 
technology, the materiality of any given element to practicing the a sserted [patent] claim(s), and 
the nature of the allegedly infringing device.” Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
As previously stated, the SAC asserts counts for direct infringement, willful infringement, 
induced infringement and contributory infringement for the ’543 and ’988 patents. (See ECF No. 
117 ¶¶ 113-202.) FanDuel moves to dismiss the direct infringement claim as to the ’543 patent as 
well as the willful infringement and induced a nd contributory infringement claims as to both 
the ’543 and ’988 patents.6 (ECF No. 123-1 at 8.) The Court addresses each claim in turn. 
A. Direct Infringement of the ’543 Patent 
The Court finds that the SAC plausibly pleads a claim for di rect infringement of the ’543 
patent. “To prove direct infringement, [a plaintiff] ‘must either point to specific instances of direct 
infringement or show that the [accused product] necessarily infringes the patent in suit.’” 
NovaPlast, 2021 WL 5770264, at *5 (quoting ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co. , 501 
F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, a plaintiff “must identif y [a] [d]efendant[’s] 
products which allegedly infringe the [patent asserted], describe the alleged infringement, and 
 
6 FanDuel does not move to dismiss WinView’ s direct infringement claim as to the ’988 
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‘relate factual assertions to the pertin ent claims’ of the [a sserted patent].” Id. (quoting Robern, 
Inc. v. Glasscrafters, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1011 (D.N.J. 2016)). 
FanDuel argues that the Court should at leas t dismiss “WinView’s allegation of patent 
infringement against FD Racing and FD Casino, wh ich the SAC accuses for th e first time in this 
case” because WinView omits allegations necessary to state a claim of infringement of the ’543 
patent for these products. (ECF No. 123-1 at 11, 15-18.) In the alternative, FanDuel argues more 
broadly that WinView’s direct infringement claim for the ’543 patent shoul d be dismissed in its 
entirety. (Id. at 11, 12-15.) FanDuel argue s that WinView fails to provide fair notice of what is 
accused for the alleged patent infringement and does not adequately plead facts supporting that 
FanDuel’s Accused Products perform an element necessary to the patent claim now asserted, 
namely that when a second set of assets is sent to a user device, those “a ssets are grouped into a 
set of necessary assets and a set of prefe rred assets,” (the “grouping limitation”). ( Id. at 12 
(quoting ’543 patent); id. at 13.) 
In response, WinView argues that it “was not required to provide additional discussions of 
FD Racing and FD Casino because there is no requirement that a complaint discuss every accused 
product with respect to every limi tation in order to st ate a patent infringement claim.” (ECF 
No. 126 at 16.) WinView argues that the SAC states a plausible claim th at FanDuel infringes 
the ’543 patent “by providing detailed factual al legations identifying FanDuel’s infringing 
products [] and describing on an element-by-elem ent basis how they meet the limitations of 
exemplary [c]laim 118.” (Id. at 8-9.) 
The Court will address each of FanDuel’s arguments in turn. 
1. Infringement Allegations Against FD Racing and FD Casino 
FanDuel argues that the infringement allega tions as to two of its Accused Products—FD 
Racing and FD Casino—must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. (ECF No. 123-1 PageID:
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at 15-16.) WinView responds that the SAC plausibly alleges that these Accused Products infringe 
claim 118 of the ’543 patent. (ECF No. 126 at 13-16.) The Court finds that WinView has plausibly 
pled infringement of the ’543 patent by these two Accused Products. 
The SAC alleges three of the Accused Products (FD Sportsbook, FD Casino, and FD 
Racing) directly infri nge upon exemplary claim 1 18 of the ’543 patent. 7 It details the alleged 
infringement of claim 118 by reference to and descriptions of the workings of these three Accused 
Products. (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 113-149.) Courts have found that “providing ‘specific examples of at 
least one product [the defendant] manufactures or sells that contains mechanisms or processes 
performing the identified functio ns, and specific examples of th e class of products which also 
contain’ the identified functions” sufficiently provided notice to satisfy the pleading requirements 
under Rule 12(b)(6). Promos Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. , Civ. No. 18-307, 2018 WL 
5630585, at *3 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2018) (quoting Philips v. ASUSTeK Comput. Inc, Civ. No. 15-
1125, 2016 WL 6246763, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2016)). WinView has plausibly alleged that the 
Accused Products it identifies in the SAC—including the two products FanDuel challenges—are 
part of a “class” and that the three relevant Accused Products directly infringe claim 118 of the ’543 
patent. 
The SAC describes the three Accused Products and their functionalities that allegedly 
infringe the ’543 patent. See Telebrands Corp. v. Ragner Tech. Corp., Civ. No. 15-3163, 2016 WL 
11654380, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2016) (finding pl eading standard sati sfied where pleading 
included “allegations that describe the accused products” and “the functionalities of those products 
that allegedly infringe the [] patent, that the accused products meet claims of the [] patent, and that 
 
7 The SAC alleges that only FD Sports book, FD Casino, and FD Racing infringe upon the 
’543 patent while FD Fantasy is alleged to in fringe upon the ’988 patent. (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 114, 
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[defendant’s] products practice one or more claims of the [] patent”). WinView describes the 
Accused Products in detail, (see ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 54-69 (FD Sportsbook); id. ¶¶ 70-75 (FD Racing); 
id. ¶¶ 82-84 (FD Casino)), and alleges that they infringe upon the ’543 patent, (id. ¶ 114). Contrary 
to what FanDuel argues, ( see ECF No. 126 at 9), WinView alleges more commonalities between 
these Accused Products than their classification as “gambling products.” The SAC alleges that all 
the Accused Products share certain characteristics: they all operate through servers communicating 
with user devices, continuously mo nitor the location of those devi ces to ensure compliance with 
state laws, and are hosted on cloud-based platforms like Amazon Web Services. (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 
48-53, 91-94.) The SAC explicitly alleges that “for purposes of infringement, the relevant 
functionality in FD Racing, FD Sportsbook, and FD Casino is the same.” (Id. ¶ 71.) 
After describing the Accused Products and their commonalities, the SAC then describes in 
more detail the allegedly infringing functionality of these products. ( Id. ¶¶ 122-144.) The SAC 
alleges that like the method deta iled in claim 118, three of FanDuel’s Accused Products perform 
the method on a server that interacts with a customer’s device being used to operate an Accused 
Product. (Id. ¶¶ 121-128.) FanDuel sends se rvice-related information, determined by the user’s 
location, to user devices. (Id. ¶¶ 129-132.) Using FD Casino as an example, the SAC alleges that 
FanDuel determines the geographic location of user devices and then offers different games to 
customers based on their location. (Id. ¶ 132.) The user then selects a service, and that information 
is sent back to FanDuel. ( Id. ¶¶ 132-133.) FanDuel then sends back information related to the 
selected service, which may include things like graphical assets, game logic, and sound files. (Id. 
¶ 133.) FanDuel then continuously compares and sends additional lists of assets to users’ devices 
as they operate the selected service, comparing the potential assets with those already on a user’s 
device so that FanDuel is only sending lists with new assets. (Id. ¶¶ 134-135, 139.) Using sports PageID:
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betting as an example, the SAC alleges that duri ng a live gaming event a consumer selects to bet 
on, FanDuel would continuously send assets to a us er’s device such as updated odds for in-game 
betting, updated event information, or progressive odds updates depending on the product selected. 
(See id. ¶¶ 135-138.) The SAC alleges that assets sent to user devices are either “necessary” or 
“preferred,” where the former are necessary to ex ecute the application and the latter improve the 
user experience but are not required for the A ccused Products to perf orm their function of 
accepting wagers. (Id. ¶¶ 140-141.) “Necessary” assets would be updated odds information, while 
“preferred” assets would be event live streams and game scores. ( Id. ¶¶ 140-141.) Throughout 
the SAC, WinView provides examples showing how the patented functionality is employed by the 
Accused Products. (See id. ¶ 132 (giving example of FD Casino for allegation that FanDuel sends 
service-related information to user’s devices based on their location); id. ¶¶ 135-137 (detailing 
how FanDuel continuously compares and sends new information, such as updated odds and price 
data throughout a game, to users on FD Sportsbook); id. ¶ 139 (providing example of FD Racing 
for allegation that a second set of assets are sent to user devices after service has been selected).) 
Regarding the FD Casino product specifically, FanDuel argues that the SAC distinguishes 
between this product (an “iGaming offering[]”) and the other three Accused Products, which are 
sports betting products. (ECF No. 123-1 at 16.) As such, FanDuel argues that “WinView’s 
allegations regarding sports betting cannot state a claim for infringement by FD Casino, which the 
SAC itself acknowledges does not involve sports betting.” ( Id. at 17.) But FanDuel’s argument 
does not account for the functionalities alleged to be shared between the Accused Products, such 
as their server operation, location monito ring, cloud hosting, and continuous comparison and 
communication of assets. (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 48-53, 71, 91-94, 134-135.) Additionally, the SAC 
alleges that FD Casino is based on live events like the other Accused Products, which all the PageID:
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methods described in the ’543 patent engage with. (ECF No. 117-1 at 2 (abstract for ’543 patent, 
specifying that the present invention “implement[s] a distributed entertainment system wherein the 
entertainment system is directly correlated to live events or televised programs”); see ECF No. 117 
¶ 84 (“FanDuel offers online poker as a peer -to-peer game via several platforms”); id. ¶ 122 
(“FanDuel’s servers communicate with customers’ devices . . . and store data files there relating to 
odds and scores of the live spor ting events, casino games, and horse racing that customers bet 
on.”); id. ¶ 134 (“FanDuel continuously communicates with servers and the customers’ devices 
that are running the ’543 Accused Products in order to provide information such as real-time game 
statistics and betting informa tion during a live gaming event (F D Sportsbook or FD Racing) or 
casino game (FD Casino)”); id. (including screenshot of FD Casino’s live gaming offerings); id. ¶ 
142 (explaining that an FD Casino preferred asset is an event live stream).) 
Accepting all factual allegations in the SAC as true and construing it in the light most 
favorable to WinView as it must, the Court finds that WinView has alleged facts sufficient to 
provide FanDuel fair notice of the alleged infringement from the FD Casino and FD Racing 
products. The SAC parallels the pleadings of ot her exemplary products which have been found 
sufficient to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Promos, 2018 WL 5630585, at *3 (“The identified 
product is a specific example of the class of products . . . which [p]laintiff alleges also contain the 
identified functions. . . . Therefore, [p]laintiff’s identification of infringing products and methods 
is sufficient under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Philips, 2016 WL 6246763, at *4 (finding it sufficient that the 
plaintiff “provides specific details of at least one of the method and device [patent] claims allegedly 
infringed under each patent-in-suit, specific examples of at least one product [defendant] 
manufactures or sells that contains mechanisms or processes performing the identified functions, PageID:
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and specific examples of the class of products which also contain these Accused Functionalities”) 
(citations omitted). 
2. Infringement Allegations Regarding Claim 118 of the ’543 Patent 
In the alternative, FanDuel argues that total dismissal of this count is warranted because 
WinView has failed to provide FanDuel with fair notice of the alleged in fringement of the ’543 
patent. (ECF No. 123-1 at 12-15.) Specifically, FanDuel argues that WinView fails to allege 
infringement of claim 118 by failing to plead the grouping limitation included in that patent claim. 
(Id. at 13-14; ECF No. 117 ¶ 120 (an element of the claim requiring “sending only a second set of 
assets within the list of assets that are not already resident on the mobile Internet-connected 
computing device, wherein the second set of assets are grouped into a set of necessary assets and 
a set of preferred assets,” referred to as the “grouping limitation”).) FanDuel argues that while the 
SAC alleges FanDuel sends a second set of assets to user’s devices and discusses necessary and 
preferred assets generally, it does not specifically allege that the Accused Products send users a 
second set of assets grouped into necessary and preferred assets , and thus does not fulfill its 
obligation to provide FanDuel w ith fair notice of how the Accused Produc ts plausibly infringe 
the ’543 patent. (See ECF No. 123-1 at 16-20.) The Court finds that the SAC sufficiently pleads 
infringement. 
Relevant to the grouping limitation, the SA C alleges that “FanDuel continuously 
communicates with customers’ de vices that are running the ’543 Accused Products in order to 
provide information” and “FanDuel sends lists of assets to users’ devices which can be compared 
to the existing list of assets on the device or subse quent lists that are gene rated on the device[.]” 
(ECF No. 117 ¶ 134.) Additionally, the SAC specifies that “[t]he ’543 Accused Products receive[] 
only a second set of assets within the list of asse ts that are not already resident on the mobile 
Internet-connected computing device” and “[t]here are multiple second sets of assets that are only PageID:
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transmitted to customers’ devices when the information changes (a new asset).” (Id. ¶ 139.) The 
SAC alleges that this second lis t of assets can include “real- time game statistics and betting 
information” such as “updated odds for in-game betting (FD Sportsbook or FD Racing) or updated 
event information or progressive odds updates (FD Casino)” (Id. ¶¶ 134-135.) 
The SAC also alleges that assets sent are grouped as either “necessary” and “directly affect 
the operation of the applicati on” such as updated odds informat ion, or “preferred” and “are not 
necessary to operate to accept wagers” such as live streams of events or game score and statistics. 
(Id. ¶¶ 140-141.) Preferred assets are sent only when a user’s network is sufficiently stable, while 
necessary assets are always sent as the Accu sed Products cannot execute their function without 
those assets. ( Id. ¶¶ 141-142.) Using FD Sportsbook as an example, the SAC alleges that 
“[w]hereas the wagering odds and game state information is always displayed and updated, being 
necessary to Sportsbook’s functionality, the live stream assets are updated only preferentially[.]” 
(Id. ¶ 141.) WinView argues that the SAC’s “detaile d factual allegations identify the accused 
functionality and explain how the systems differentiate assets in execution, satisfying the Grouping 
Limitation, which is more than sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim [for relief].” (ECF 
No. 126 at 11.) The Court agre es, and finds that th e SAC provides FanDuel fair notice of the 
functionality of its products’ alleged infringement of claim 118 of the ’543 patent. 
WinView does not dispute that the grouping limitation is material to claim 118 of the ’543 
patent.8 ( See ECF No. 126 at 9-13.) While the level of detail required in a pleading varies 
 
8 Regardless, “[b]oth [the Fede ral Circuit] and the Supreme Co urt have made clear that all 
elements of a patent claim are material, with no single part of a claim be ing more important or 
‘essential’ than another.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 988 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine v. AK Steel Corp., 
908 F.3d 1267, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is well esta blished that ‘[e]ach element contained in a 
patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention.’”) (quoting 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. , 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)); Two-Way Media Ltd PageID:
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depending on the complexity of the patented technology and the materiality of any given element, 
this does not disturb the overarchi ng rule that “[a] plaintiff is not required to pl ead infringement 
on an element-by-element basis.” Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1352; see also Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hosp. 
Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The Rule 12(b)(6) pleading requirements 
for a complaint of infringement cannot be extended to require a pl aintiff to speci fically include 
each element of the claims of the asserted patent.”). “[I]n matters involving complex technology, 
the plaintiff ‘must show how the defendant plausibly infringes by alleging some facts connecting 
the allegedly infringing product to the [patent] clai m elements.’ To satisfy this standard, ‘[t]here 
needs to be something set out beyond a legal conclusion—i.e., some facts alleged that shows why 
it is plausible that the products infringe[.]’” Biotech v. Amgen, Inc. , Civ. No. 22-35, 2024 WL 
1299930, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 27, 2024) (emphasis in or iginal) (first quoting Bos. Sci. Corp. v. 
Nevro Corp., 415 F. Supp. 3d 482, 489 (D. Del. 2019); then quoting DIFF Scale Operation Rsch., 
LLC v. MaxLinear, Inc., Civ. No. 19-2109, 2020 WL 2220031, at *2 (D. Del. May 7, 2020), report 
and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6867103 (D. Del. Nov. 23, 2020)). 
FanDuel cites case law where motions to di smiss rose and fell based on whether the 
complaint specifically addressed patent claim el ements, arguing that these cases dictate that 
FanDuel’s Motion must be granted due to WinView’ s failure to allege ever y single patent claim 
element. (ECF No. 123-1 at 15 (citing Miller Indus. Towing Equip. Inc. v. NRC Indus. , 582 F. 
Supp. 3d 199, 204 (D.N.J. 2022) (denying motion to dismiss because “the [c]omplaint sufficiently 
sets forth how the accused product infringed on every element of at least one claim in each of the 
 
v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Civ. No. 14-1006, 2015 WL 2345432, at *4 (D. Del. May 13, 
2015) (holding when considering a motion to dismi ss that “[e]ach element contained in a patent 
claim [of a method patent] is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention”) 
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted). PageID:
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plaintiff’s patents”) (quotation omitted); Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Zenpayroll, Inc., Civ. No. 19-1075, 
2021 WL 271800, at *4 (D. Del. Jan. 27, 2021) (recomm ending a grant of dismissal because the 
complaint “fails to plausibly allege facts that the accused [infringing product] includes [elements 
of the asserted patent claim] beyond the bare recitation that the alle ged [infringing product] 
comprises [the specified elements of the patent claim]”); NovaPlast Corp. v. Inplant, LLC , Civ. 
No. 20-7396, 2021 WL 389386, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss because 
complaint “fails to allege factually that each an d every element of at least one [patent] claim is 
met”).) But these cases are distinguishable. NovaPlast and Miller rely on the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Disc Disease Solutions In c. v. VGH Solutions, Inc. , 888 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
See NovaPlast, 2021 WL 389386, at *7-8 (quoting Disc Disease); Miller, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 204-05 
(first quoting Batinkoff v. Church & Dwight Co., 2020 WL 1527957, at *15 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2020) 
(quoting Disc Disease); then quoting NovaPlast, 2021 WL 389386 at *7). In Disc Disease, the 
Federal Circuit held that in the context of a case involving a “simple t echnology” with only four 
independent patent claims, a plain tiff plausibly pled infringement wh en it specifically identified 
the accused products, and “alleged that the accused products me[t] ‘each and every element of at 
least one [patent] claim[.]’” 888 F.3d at 1260. As alleged, the technology here is not so simple; 
the ’543 patent includes over 100 claims. (See ECF No. 117-1 at 17-21 (’543 patent claims).) And 
in Uniloc, the court disclaimed that “‘the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff 
to plead facts establishing that each element of an asserted claim is met,’ and a patent infringement 
plaintiff need not ‘prove its case at the pleadi ng stage’” but recommended dismissal because the 
complaint only included conclusory allegations and lacked allegations connecting the allegedly 
infringing product to the patent claim elements. See 2021 WL 271800, at *2-4 (quoting Nalco Co. 
v. Chem-Mod, LLC , 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Here, by contrast, WinView has PageID:
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provided detailed allegations of how the Accu sed Products function and communicate service-
related information to users’ devices, directly infringing upon the method outlined in claim 118. 
Courts have found dismissal is not warranted where a complaint “connects elements from 
the [allegedly infringed patent] to elements of [the defendant’s] accused product . . . [because] the 
complaint puts [the defendant] on notice as to what activity is being accused and how that activity 
infringes the [] Patent.” Biotech, 2024 WL 1299930, at *4; see also Woodstream Corp. v. Bird 
Buddy, Inc., Civ. No. 24-01236, 2025 WL 2432506, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2025) (“Even under 
the materiality consideration espoused in Bot M8, plaintiffs’ complaint presented ‘a higher level 
of detail in pleading infringement.’ . . . [The p]laintiffs did much more than ‘nakedly alleg[e] that 
the accused product practices the claimed invention’s point of novelty.’ Thus, defendant was given 
‘fair notice of what the claim [for relief] is and th e grounds upon which it rests.’”) (internal 
citations omitted) (first quoting Vervain, LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 21-00487, 2022 WL 
23469 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2022); then quoting Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1353); Staton Techiya, LLC v. 
Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. , 734 F. Supp. 3d 354, 373 (D. Del. 2024) (“The allegations meet the 
Iqbal/Twombly standard by identifying the infringing accused pro duct [] and the specific 
functionality that is infringing . . . . The lack of the words [specified in the patent claim limitation] 
is not detrimental to the sufficiency of the pleadi ng of the allegations, as [the plaintiff] does not 
need to plead every single element for its claim.”); Olink Proteomics AB v. Alamar Biosciences, 
Inc., Civ. No. 23-1303, 2025 WL 275604, at *9 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2025) (granting motion to dismiss 
where complaint did not plead that the accused product practiced a limitation outlined in the patent 
but noting “[p]erhaps if [plaintiff’s] [c]omplaint had clearly asserted infringement as to all of 
the remaining limitations in [the claim], then drawing all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff’s] PageID:
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favor, it would be plausible to co me to a different conclusion.”), report and recommendation 
adopted, 2025 WL 459697 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2025) (emphasis in original). 
Here, WinView has put FanDuel on notice of how its Accused Produc ts are alleged to 
infringe upon the method in claim 118. It has done more than “nakedly allege” infringement. See 
Woodstream Corp., 2025 WL 2432506, at *4. The SAC runs through the method enumerated in 
claim 118, alleging that FanDuel operates the Accused Products on servers and (1) FanDuel sends 
service-related information, determined by the user s’ location, to users’ devices, (2) users select 
service, (3) FanDuel sends back service-specific information including a first list of assets, 
compares that list with a second set of assets, and sends a second set of assets not previously 
received by the user, and all assets are classifi ed as either “necessary” or “preferred,” and (4) 
FanDuel executes applications related to the service selected. (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 129-143.) 
Although WinView may not explicitly allege that FanDuel groups th is second set of assets as 
outlined in claim 118, this omission is not fatal. Staton Techiya, LLC, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (“The 
lack of the words [specified in the patent claim limitation] is not detrimental to the sufficiency of 
the pleading of the allegations, as [the plaintiff] does not need to plead every single element for its 
claim.”); see also Nasdaq, Inc. v. IEX Grp., Inc. , Civ. No. 18-3014, 2019 WL 102408, at *12 
(D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2019) (finding compla int sufficiently provided defe ndant with notice of alleged 
infringement and holding that “[t]o the extent [defendant] argues the [c]omplaint does not specify 
the precise methods [defenda nt] use[s] in its infringing device, at this stage of the litigation, all 
[plaintiff] has access to is [defendant]’s public statements, which it used to fashion the [c]omplaint. 
The specifics of how [defendant]’s purportedly infringing device works is something to be 
establish[ed] through discovery.”). Therefore, Wi nView’s count alleging di rect infringement of 
the ’543 patent shall proceed. PageID:
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B. Willful Patent Infringement 
FanDuel argues that the Court should dismiss WinView’s counts for willful infringement 
for both the ’543 and ’988 patents because neither the pre-suit nor post-suit knowledge alleged in 
the SAC is sufficient to state a claim for relief. (ECF No. 123-1 at 19-26.) The Court agrees. 
To sustain an allegation of willful infringe ment, WinView “must al lege facts plausibly 
showing that as of the time of the [lawsuit]’s filing, [FanDuel]: (1) knew of the [patents]; (2) after 
acquiring that knowledge, it infringed the [patents]; and (3) in doing so, it knew, or should have 
known, that its conduct amounted to in fringement of the [patents].” NovaPlast, 2021 WL 
5770264, at *9 (quoting Batinkoff, 2020 WL 1527957, at *19). The third element, that the 
defendant knew or should have known its conduct amounted to infringement, speaks to “a finding 
of ‘deliberate or intentional’ infringement,” which is necessary for a claim of willful infringement. 
Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 801 F. Supp. 3d 495, 522 (D. Del. 
2025) (quoting Purewick Corp. v. Sage Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 3d 419, 440 (D. Del. 2023)); see 
also Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc. , 989 F.3d 964, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[W]illfulness 
requires deliberate or intentional infringement.”). “[W]here a complaint permits an inference that 
the defendant was on notice of the potential infringement and still continued its infringement, the 
plaintiff has pled a plausible cl aim of willful infringement.” Nasdaq, Inc., 2019 WL 102408, at 
*14 (quoting Kyowa Hakka Bio, Co. v. Ajinomoto Co., Civ. No. 17-313, 2018 WL 834583, at *13 
(D. Del. Feb. 12, 2018)). 
The SAC alleges that the ’543 patent was issued on July 21, 2020, and that “FanDuel 
became aware of the ’543 Patent and aware that its activities concerning the ’543 Accused Products 
infringed the ’543 Patent no later than upon its issuance on July 21, 2020.” (ECF No. 117 ¶ 146.) 
The SAC alleges that the ’988 patent was issued on October 20, 2020, and that “FanDuel became 
aware of the ’988 patent and aware that its activities concerning th e ’988 Accused Products PageID:
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infringed the ’988 patent no later than upon its issuance on October 20, 2020.” ( Id. ¶ 184.) The 
SAC further asserts that in “early 2017” WinView and FanDuel exchanged communications 
regarding their “similar interests,” (id. ¶ 105), and in “early 2019” WinView and FanDuel engaged 
in discussions about WinView’s intellectual property under a nondisclosure agreement (NDA), (id. 
¶¶ 106-107). The SAC generally a lleges that FanDuel “investigat ed WinView and its business, 
including its patents,” and WinView shared “detailed information regarding WinView Inc. and its 
patented technology” with FanDuel in early 2019,
9 including “specifically identif[ying] the 
respective parent patent applications fo r the asserted ’543 and ’988 Patents[.]” 10 ( Id. ¶ 107.) 
However, these allegations are insufficient to assert a claim for willful infringement because they 
predate the issuance of both patents. 
As the Federal Circuit has articulated, “[i]t is obvious that a party cannot be held liable for 
‘infringement’, and thus not for ‘willful’ infringement, of a nonexistent patent[.]” Gustafson, Inc. 
v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc. , 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “To willfully infringe a 
patent, the patent must exist and one must have knowledge of it. A ‘patent pending’ notice gives 
one no knowledge whatsoever. . . . What the scope of claims in patents that do issue will be is 
 
9 Furthermore, the Court notes that while the SAC generally alleges WinView disclosed 
information about its patent applications in FanDuel in “early 2019,” (ECF No. 117 ¶ 107), 
applications for both patents were not published until April 2019, (ECF No. 123-4 at 2 (application 
for ’543 patent, published Apri l 11, 2019); ECF No. 123-5 at 2 (application for ’988 patent, 
published April 25, 2019)). See Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1008 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that “[ p]rosecution histories constitute public records” of which a court 
may take judicial notice). 
10 FanDuel asserts that because WinView alleges it identified these applications in a “Status 
Report” provided to FanDuel, and WinView did not attach any such Status Report to the SAC, 
“there is no evidence that such ‘Status Report’ exists.” (ECF No. 123-1 at 21.) However, a 
plaintiff “is not required to attach specific documents or sources to which [its] complaint refers to 
survive a motion to dismiss.” Lockhart v. Dorrance Publ’g Co., Inc. , Civ. No. 22-02929, 2023 
WL 157323, at *9 n.6 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2023). PageID:
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something totally unforeseeable.” State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). “Filing an application is no guarantee any patent will issue and 
a very substantial percentage of app lications never resu lt in patents.” NexStep, Inc. v. Comcast 
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Civ. No. 19-1031, 2019 WL 5626647, at *3 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2019), report 
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Nexstep, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’n, LLC, Civ. No. 
19-1031, 2019 WL 11663798 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2019) (quoting Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
21 F. Supp. 3d 320, 334 (D. Del. 2014)). 
The allegations that FanDuel had knowledge of the family members of the ’543 and ’988 
patents, standing alone, are also insufficient to plead knowledge of the patents-at-issue. (ECF No. 
117 ¶ 107; ECF No. 126 at 22-23.) “Although ‘alleged knowledge of patent family members and 
related patents, along with other allegations, can be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss,’” 
the complaint must also include “other allegations.” Cleveland Med. Devices Inc. v. ResMed Inc., 
696 F. Supp. 3d 4, 11 (D. Del. 2023) (quoting Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
Civ. No. 14-1430, 2015 WL 5725768, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2015), report and recommendation 
adopted 2016 WL 1274812 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016)). For example, in Novozymes North America, 
Inc. v. Danisco US Inc. , the court found the defendant’s know ledge of the patent at issue was 
sufficiently pleaded because not only did the plaintiff allege that the defendant had knowledge of 
patent family members and relate d patents, the plaintiff also alleged that the defendant was 
informed of the plaintiff’s published patent app lication on three separate occasions during the 
prosecution of the defendant’s own patents a nd the defendant attended a workshop where the 
plaintiff presented on the patent after it had issued. Civ. No. 19-01902, 2020 WL 12895027, at *2-
3 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2020). The SAC does not include “other allegations” that, when coupled with PageID:
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the plausible allegation that FanDuel had knowle dge of patent family members, lead to the 
inference that FanDuel had the requisite knowledge of the ’543 and ’988 patents after they issued. 
The SAC’s allegations that WinView “widely disclosed” the asserted patents to the “online 
gaming industry” and issued press releases, an d that FanDuel was “well aware” of WinView 
because it is “an entity that conducts significant market resear ch,” also do not create a plausible 
inference that FanDuel knew of the asserted patents and knew or should have known its conduct 
infringed the patents. (See ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 101-104.) Plaintiffs “may not depend on conclusory 
allegations to state a willfulness claim.” Cleveland Med. Devices Inc. , 696 F. Supp. 3d at 11. 
“[T]he simple fact that [defendant] and [plaintiff] are competitors,” without more, is “insufficient 
to state a plausible claim based on pre-suit knowledge of the [patent].” Novozymes North America, 
Inc., 2020 WL 12895027, at *3. WinView makes these cursory allegations in the SAC, citing to 
exhibits that predate the patent applications and the patents issu ing by several years. (ECF No. 
117 ¶¶ 101-102 (citing to ECF No. 117-5 at 6- 8 (website dated December 2015); ECF No. 117-8 
at 26-31 (press release dated 2017)).) An allegation of “media publicity surrounding an invention 
does not support an allegation of pre-suit knowledge absent allega tions ‘bridging’ knowledge of 
the publicity with knowledge of the patent.” Robocast, Inc. v. YouTube, LLC, Civ. No. 22-304, 
2022 WL 16922035, at *3 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2022) (quoting PPG Indus. Ohio, Inc. v. Axalta 
Coating Sys., LLC, Civ. No. 21-346, 2022 WL 610740, at *4 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2022)). WinView’s 
general allegation that it “regularly updated [its] website, disclosing the [a]sserted [p]atents as they 
issued,” (ECF No. 117 ¶ 101), is insufficient. See Lippert Components Mfg., Inc. v. MOR/ryde, 
Inc., Civ. No. 16-263, 2018 WL 345767, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2018) (finding knowledge 
insufficiently pled when plaintiff alleged it “mai ntained a list of its patents on a website and the 
parties are competitors who monitor each other’s intellectual property”). PageID:
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Contrary to WinView’s arguments in its opposition brief, (ECF No. 126 at 21-22), the SAC 
contains only general and conclusory allegations that FanDuel monitored or investigated WinView 
and its patent portfolio after declining WinView’s offer to partner in “early 2019.” (ECF No. 117 
¶ 109 (“Given FanDuel’s efforts to monitor the marketplace and i nvestigate relevant technology 
and intellectual property and given FanDuel’s diligence into WinView’s patents . . . on information 
and belief, FanDuel continued to monitor the applic ations that issued as the Asserted Patents and 
was aware when they issued.”).) The SAC includes no allegations that FanDuel was informed the 
patents had issued in 2020 or that it monitored WinView’s patent portfolio post-issuance in 2020. 
The lack of more concre te allegations distinguishes the pres ent matter from thos e cases cited by 
WinView, (ECF No. 126 at 22), where courts found knowledge of the asserted patents sufficiently 
pled due to allegations that defendants monitored the plaintiff’s patent portfolios. See VoIP-
Pal.com, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., Civ. No. 21-00665, 2022 WL 1394550, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 3, 
2022) (finding defendant’s knowledge of the assert ed patents could be inferred where “the 
[a]mended [c]omplaint relie[d] on the [pre-suit] noti ce letters that identify the [first p]atent and a 
patent application that ultimately led to the [second p]atent in further combination with monitoring 
of that patent application, resu lting in knowledge of the [second p]atent on or after the issuance 
date”); Technoprobe S.p.A. v. Formfactor, Inc., Civ. No. 23-00842, 2024 WL 2271885, at *7 (D. 
Del. May 20, 2024) (concluding “that the [a]mended [c]omplaint alleges facts plausibly showing 
that [the d]efendant, through actively attending [the p]laintiff’s [ . . . c]onference presentation and 
continuing to promote and sell the [a]ccused [p]r oducts thereafter, was aw are of the [asserted 
p]atent and its potential infringement sufficient to support a pre-suit willful infringement claim.”). 
Even assuming that FanDuel did have notice of the patents-in-suit, the SAC lacks sufficient 
allegations for this Court to infer that FanDuel kne w or should have k nown that its conduct PageID:
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amounted to infringement. See NovaPlast, 2021 WL 5770264, at *9. WinView alleges that it filed 
suit because of “FanDuel’s infringement and unwillingness to participate in discussions regarding 
WinView’s intellectual property” but does not detail whether WinVie w is referring to the “early 
2019” discussions before the patents issued, or so me potential interaction after the patents issued 
(none of which are alleged in the SAC). (ECF No. 117 ¶ 110.) In addition, WinView makes no 
specific allegations that it disclosed the patents afte r they issued or directly informed FanDuel of 
its allegedly infringing activity before filing this lawsuit. WinView’s allegations are insufficient. 
See Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P . v. Cequel Commc’ns, LLC, Civ. No. 18-1752, 2022 WL 421336, at 
*1 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2022) (finding no willfulness when facts offered in support of claim for relief 
included a letter “sent to [defendant’s] gene ral counsel to ‘request a meeting between our 
companies regarding [plaintiff’s] patent portfolio and how it may apply to the operations of your 
company’” but “[t]he letter d[id] not mention in fringement, list any pate nts, or describe any 
particular technology”) (citations omitted); Cleveland Med. Devices Inc. , 696 F. Supp. 3d at 14 
(holding plaintiff did not plead facts plausibly showing defendant knew or should have known of 
its alleged infringement where it made conclusory allegations and “plainly d[id] not assert any 
nonconclusory facts supporting an inference of ‘deliberate or intentional infringement’”). 
Contrary to WinView’s argument, (ECF No. 126 at 20-21), the allegations in the SAC are 
unlike those in University of Massachusetts Medical School v. L’Oréal S.A., Civ. No. 17-868, 2018 
WL 5919745, at *9 (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), report and recommendation adopted , 2019 WL 
2151701 (D. Del. May 17, 2019), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 36 F.4th 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2022). The L’Oréal court found the complaint adequately pled knowledge because it alleged that 
the defendant cited the patents-in-suit (one still at the application stage) in its own patent 
application, and the defendant later contacted the plaintiff after both patents-in-suit had issued to PageID:
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obtain a license. Id. Without plausible allegations that FanDuel had knowledge of the patents 
post-issuance and its allegedly infringing conduc t, WinView cannot plead a claim for willful 
infringement. See NexStep, Inc., 2019 WL 5626647, at *3 (“[The plaintiff] has failed to plausibly 
plead pre-suit knowledge of the patents-in-suit b ecause, when [the plaintiff] met with [the 
defendant], none of the patents-in-suit had issued.”); see also iFIT Inc. v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 
Civ. No. 21-507, 2022 WL 609605, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 28, 2022) (“Knowledge of a patent 
application alone, however, is not enough to establish knowledge of the patent(s) that issued from 
that application and therefore not enough to establish willfulness.”). 
While “acts occurring before a patent’s issuance may remain relevant to an [] infringement 
claim where the acts . . . continue after the patent’s issuance,” Gamon Plus, Inc. v. Campbell’ s Co., 
764 F. Supp. 3d 690, 704-05 (N.D. Ill. 2025), 11 the Court cannot infer Fa nDuel had the requisite 
post-issuance knowledge of the pa tents or that its conduct was infringing based on the existence 
of this lawsuit. (See ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 110-111.) Allegations of pre-issuance knowledge, without a 
tie to facts showing infringement post-issuance, are insufficient. Cf. Barkan Wireless IP Holdings, 
L.P . v. T-Mobile US, Inc., Civ. No. 21-00034, 2021 WL 12310942, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2021) 
(finding allegations of knowledge sufficient, despite facts focusing on knowledge in the time 
before patent issued, when complaint also assert ed (1) defendants cited the patent application 
during the prosecution of its ow n patent and (2) defendants made public announcements pre-
lawsuit regarding their development of the allegedly infringing technology). 
 
11 While the Gamon Plus court considered induced infringement rather than willful 
infringement, the Federal Circuit has “acknowledged that ‘[i]n some respects, the intent standard 
for inducement is akin to the one for willfulness, as both rest on the subjective intent of the accused 
infringer.’” SynQor, Inc. v. Vicor Corp., No. 2024-1879, 2026 WL 410931, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 
13, 2026) (alteration in original). As such, the Gamon Plus court’s analysis of whether infringing 
acts were intentional in the induced infringement context is instructive in the willful infringement 
context. Id. (“[E]vidence of indirect infringement may be probative of willfulness[.]”). PageID:
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Lastly, WinView argues that because the Federal Circuit has held a patentee may “rely, for 
the knowledge element of [willful infringement or] inducement, on the knowledge the defendant 
gained from the original complaint,”12 GoTV Streaming, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 166 F.4th 1053, 1068 
(Fed. Cir. 2026) (citing In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 
1323, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), its allegations of knowledge are sufficient here. (ECF No. 129; see 
also ECF No. 126 at 23-27; see id. at 17 (citing Bill of Lading).) But the cases WinView relies 
upon do not hold that knowledge ga ined from the filing of the co mplaint, standing alone, is 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement that an al leged infringer knew of th e asserted patent(s) and 
that its conduct infringed upon them. 13 The Federal Circuit in Bill of Lading noted that 
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausi ble claim for relief is a very ‘context-specific 
task,’” 681 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)), and found that the 
complaint adequately stated a claim of induced infringement because reasonable inferences could 
be drawn that the defendants knew the induced acts constituted infringement, id. at 1328, 1330, 
1339-40. 
The facts here differ from those in Bill of Lading. In Bill of Lading, the plaintiff sent cease-
and-desist letters to several defendant s it suspected of direct infringement before the lawsuit was 
initiated. Id. at 1329. Additionally, the Bill of Lading court concluded that reasonable inferences 
 
12 This quoted language refers to an argument put forth by the plaintiff-appellant in the GoTV 
case, and although the Federal Circuit noted it was a “substantial argument[] that the district court 
committed error,” the court explicitly did “not decide the merits of [that] contention” as it entered 
judgment for defendant-appellee on other grounds. GoTV Streaming, LLC, 166 F.4th at 1068. 
13 Faced with this same question, another district court in the Central Di strict of California 
agreed with this Court’s interpretation of GoTV Streaming and Bill of Lading. Innovation Techs. 
Partners LP v. Hulu, LLC, Civ. No. 25-10969, 2026 WL 1218105, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2026) 
(citing DraftKings I MTD II , 2026 WL 746932, at *12) (“ Bill of Lading did not hold that the 
knowledge gained from the filing of a complaint, standing alone, establishes the knowledge and 
intent required to plead induced infringement.”). PageID:
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of knowledge and intended infringement could be drawn based on “the context of the technology 
disclosed in the [] patent and the industry to which [defendants] sell and tout their products[.]” Id. 
at 1340. The industry at issue was the shipping/trucking industry, and the asserted patent was for 
a method of transferring shipping documentation data by scanning documents in the truck cab and 
transmitting them while the truck was en route, which was meant to improve asset utilization and 
efficiency. Id. at 1329, 1341. The court found it significant that the de fendants advertised they, 
too, could “improve asset utili zation and provide operational effi ciency,” even though there was 
no method by which to accomplish that outcome except through use of the plaintiff’s patented 
method. Id. at 1341. As such, the Bill of Lading court concluded that “[c]ommon sense indicates 
that advertising that your product can be used [to accomplish the relevant benefits] gives rise to a 
reasonable inference that you intend to induce your customers to accomplish these benefits through 
utilization of the patented method.” Id. at 1341-42. As such, that court found the complaint gave 
defendants fair notice of the alleged infringement and reversed dismissal. Id. at 1342. 
The SAC generally alleges that FanDuel advertises its products to customers, (see ECF No. 
117 ¶¶ 85-90), but these allegations do not support a reas onable inference that FanDuel knew of 
the ’543 and ’988 patents or that it knew or should have known its conduct amounted to 
infringement of those patents pre-suit. (Compare ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 85-90 (alleging that “FanDuel 
encourages it[s] customers to use the Accused Products in the United States by providing new and 
existing customer promotions and incentives[,]” and that “FanDuel utilizes a variety of marketing 
channels” as well as “media, sports, and entertainment partnerships to promote customer usage of 
the Accused Products”), with Bill of Lading , 681 F.3d 1339 (holding that complaint sufficiently 
alleged defendants’ knowledge of patents and infringement upon them in part because the 
defendants advertised that their products could perform functions only possible through use of the PageID:
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plaintiff’s patented technology).) Further, unlike in Bill of Lading, although the SAC asserts that 
WinView’s patents make “transformative advancements,” (ECF No. 117 ¶¶ 24-38), the allegations 
do not lead the Court to infer that the methods claimed in th e ’543 and ’988 patents are the only 
methods by which one could “enable a distributed entertainment system over a computing device 
. . . wherein the entertainment system is directly correlated to live events or televised programs,” 
(ECF No. 117-1 at 2 (abstract of ’543 patent)), or “conduct[] mult iple competitions of skill for a 
single performance,” (id. at 25 (abstract of ’988 patent)). 
The SAC’s post-suit allegations of knowledge ar e also insufficient to plead a claim for 
relief. As this Court has previously ruled, “thi s Court joins other distri ct courts throughout the 
country that have determined th at ‘the complaint itself cannot be the source of the knowledge 
required to sustain claims of i nduced infringement and willfulne ss-based enhanced damages.’” 
WinView Inc. v. DraftKings Inc. (“DraftKings I”), Civ. No. 21-13405, 2025 WL 1908757, at *10 
(D.N.J. July 11, 2025) (quoting ZapFraud Inc. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 3d 247, 
250 (D. Del. 2021)); see also id. (collecting cases); see also DraftKings I, Civ. No. 21-13405, 2026 
WL 746932, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2026) (same). WinView’s notice letter sent on July 25, 2025, 
(ECF No. 117 ¶ 111), does not change the Court’ s previous determination that the requisite 
knowledge cannot be inferred by or subsequent to the filing of a complaint. DraftKings I, 2025 
WL 1908757, at *10-11. The Court agrees, like other courts have held, that “sending letters after 
the initial filing of the present action does not provide evidence of the requisite pre-suit knowledge 
for indirect infringement[.]” Secured Mail Sols., LLC v. Advanced Image Direct, LLC , Civ. No. 
12-01090, 2013 WL 8596579, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 11-1681, 2012 WL 1835680, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 
2012)). Even considering the allegations in the SAC “as a whole,” WinView fails to adequately PageID:
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allege FanDuel’s knowledge of the patents or alleged infringement for the reasons stated. 
Novozymes N. Am., Inc., 2020 WL 12895027, at *2 (“[T]he Court need not evaluate whether each 
allegation, standing alone, gives rise to a reas onable inference that [d efendant] had pre-suit 
knowledge of the patent. Instead , the [c]ourt may consider the allegations as a whole.”). 
Therefore, WinView’s claims for willful infringement of the ’543 and ’988 patents are dismissed. 
C. Indirect Patent Infringement 
There are two types of indirect patent infringement: induced and contributory. InvenTel 
Prods., LLC v. Li, 406 F. Supp. 3d 396, 404 (D.N.J. 2019). FanDuel argues that WinView’s claims 
for induced and contributory infringement for both the ’543 and ’988 patents should be dismissed 
as WinView has not pled the requisite knowledge of the patents or alleged infringement. (ECF 
No. 126-1 at 25-29.) The Court agrees. 
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall 
be liable as an infringer.” “Inducement requires a showing that the alleged inducer knew of the 
patent, knowingly induced the infr inging acts, and possessed a sp ecific intent to encourage 
another’s infringement of the patent.” Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co. , 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
Inducement also requires a showing of direct infringement.14 Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Lab’ys, 
Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 490, 515 (D.N.J. 2006). Regarding intent, the Federal Circuit has recognized, 
“[i]ntent can be shown by ci rcumstantial evidence, but th e mere knowledge of possible 
infringement will not suffice.” Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d at 1328. 
 
14 Because the Court finds that WinView has sufficiently pled its claim of direct infringement 
for the ’543 patent, see supra Section III.A, and FanDuel has not challenged WinView’s claim for 
direct infringement for the ’988 patent, this element is satisfied. PageID:
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Contributory infringement is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). “Stated simply, ‘[a] party is 
liable for contributory infringement if that party sells, or offers to sell, a material or apparatus for 
use in practicing a patented process.’” BTG Int’l Ltd. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 352, 
399 (D.N.J. 2018) (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850-51 (Fed. Cir. 
2010)). In order to establish contributory infringement, “a patent owner must prove the following: 
‘1) that there is direct infringement, 2) that the accused infringer had knowledge of the patent, 3) 
that the component has no substantial noninfringing uses, and 4) that the component is a material 
part of the invention.’” Id. (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2010)). 
Both induced and contributo ry infringement re quire knowledge of the patent and 
knowledge of infringement, just like willful infringement. See Dynamic Data Techs. v. Google 
LLC, Civ. No. 19-1529, 2020 WL 1285852, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2020), report and 
recommendation adopted sub nom., Dynamic Data Techs., LLC v. Google LLC, Civ. No. 19-1529, 
2020 WL 3103786 (D. Del. June 11, 2020) (“Claims fo r induced and willful patent infringement 
each require that the infringer had knowledge of the patent and knowledge of its infringement.”); 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc. , 575 U.S. 632, 639 (2015) (“[C] ontributory infringement 
requires knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.”); ZapFraud, 528 
F. Supp. 3d at 249 (“Claims of indirect infringement . . . require proof that the defendant’s conduct 
occurred after the defendant (1) knew of the existe nce of the asserted patent and (2) knew that a 
third party’s acts constituted infringement of the patent. Claims for . . . willful infringement 
similarly require proof that the defendant knew about the asserted patents and knew or should have 
known that its conduct amounted to infringement of those patents.”) (citations omitted). Again, 
the Court finds that the SAC fails to allege su fficient facts for the Court to infer FanDuel’s PageID:
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knowledge of the ’543 or ’988 patents or of its a lleged infringement prio r to the filing of the 
Complaint. FanDuel’s knowledge cannot be establ ished by or subsequent to the filing of a 
complaint.15 See, e.g., ZapFraud, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 250-52 (“[T]he operative complaint in a 
lawsuit fails to state a claim for indirect pate nt infringement where the defendant’s alleged 
knowledge of the asserted patents is based solely on the content of that complaint or a prior version 
of the complaint filed in the same lawsuit.”). Because WinView has not alleged knowledge as is 
required for these counts, the Court need not proc eed to analyze the parties’ arguments regarding 
whether the SAC successfully alleges that FanDuel specifically intended to infringe (as is required 
for induced infringement) or whether WinView supplied a component that has no substantial non-
infringing uses and is a material part of the invention (as is required for contributory infringement). 
WinView’s claims of induced a nd contributory infringement of the ’543 or ’988 patents are 
dismissed. 
D. Dismissal with Prejudice 
Lastly, FanDuel argues that it is entitled to di smissal with prejudice because “[a]fter two 
rounds of amendments, WinView has had ampl e opportunity to come forward with facts 
supporting its claims” and WinView still failed to plead plausible claims. (ECF No. 123-1 at 29.) 
 
15 WinView argues that because “there is no legal impediment to having an indirect 
infringement cause of action limited to post-litig ation conduct,” FanDuel’s alleged infringement 
after its receipt of the Notice Letter is sufficient to progress this claim past the pleading stage. 
(ECF No. 126 at 28 (quoting Telecomm Innovations, LLC v. Ricoh Co., Ltd., 966 F. Supp. 2d 390, 
393 (D. Del. 2013).) While other courts may be split on this issue, this Court has now repeatedly 
“reject[ed] WinView’s argument that knowledge can be established based on the filing of the 
complaint and subsequent amendments,” and he ld that “[b]ecause Wi nView has not alleged 
sufficient facts to show pre-suit knowledge of infringement, it s claim for willful infringement 
based solely on post-suit knowledge cannot stand.” DraftKings I MTD I , 2025 WL 1908757, at 
*10, *11; see also DraftKings I MTD II, 2026 WL 746932, at *14 n.13 (sam e). The Court again 
applies its finding to the indirect infringement context as well. See also Secured Mail Sols., LLC, 
2013 WL 8596579, at *9. PageID:
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FanDuel also notes that “the Court already dismissed an amended complaint in DraftKings I [] that 
is similarly worded to the [S]AC in this cas e—with analogous pleading deficiencies” and any 
further amendment would be futile. ( Id. at 29-30.) WinView counters that it “will provide these 
detailed allegations in its infr ingement contentions once discovery begins” or should be given 
leave to amend the SAC. (ECF No. 126 at 33.) 
In its prior Opinion in DraftKings I , an Opinion WinView cites numerous times in its 
briefing, (see ECF No. 126 at 20-21, 24, 25, 28), and was filed months before the SAC in this case, 
the Court stated that while WinView “is required to provide detailed information regarding alleged 
claims being infringed upon after the initial scheduling conference, the Local Patent Rules do not 
relinquish WinView from its obligation to allege facts in accordance with [] Rule 12(b)(6).” 2025 
WL 1908757, at *8 n.10. In that same Opinion, this Court extensively described the deficiencies 
to be remedied in dismissing WinView’s complaint in that case, most of which are also present in 
the SAC herein that brings the same claims. See generally DraftKings I, 2025 WL 1908757. 
“Courts have discretion to dismiss complaints with prejudice after ‘repeated failures to cure 
the deficienc[ies] by amendments previously allowed.’” Pryce v. PrimeCare Med., Civ. No. 21-
753, 2024 WL 3761733, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2024) (quoting Stovall v. Grazioli, Civ. No. 20-
2041, 2023 WL 3116439, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 27, 2023)), aff’d as modified, Civ. No. 24-2685, 2025 
WL 1293077 (3d Cir. May 5, 2025). The SAC, which was intended to “provid[e] further factual 
allegations as to FanDuel’s infr ingement of the ’543 and ’988 Pate nts, willful infringement, and 
indirect infringement,” remains deficient. (ECF No. 115-1 at 5.) “While leave to amend must be 
freely given when justice so requires, leave may be denied where amendment would be futile.” 
Pacira Biosciences, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 3d 654, 662 (D.N.J. 
2022), aff’d, 63 F.4th 240 (3d Cir. 2023). Given the C ourt’s repeated holdings that knowledge PageID:
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necessary for claims of willful and indirect infringement cannot be established based on the filing 
of a complaint and subsequent communications, DraftKings I, 2025 WL 1908757, at *10-11, *12; 
DraftKings I, 2026 WL 746932, at *13, *14, and the dearth of allegations regarding FanDuel’s 
knowledge of the patents or allege d infringement after the patents’ issuance and before the filing 
of this lawsuit, amendment would be futile, 16 see Kennedy v. Envoy Airlines Inc. , Civ. No. 15-
8058, 2018 WL 895871, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Kennedy v. Am. Airlines Inc., 
760 F. App’x 136 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Allowing leave to amend where there is a stark absence of any 
suggestion by the plaintiffs that they have developed any facts since the action was commenced . . . 
would frustrate Congress’s objective to filter out lawsuits that have no factual basis.” (quoting Cal. 
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp. , 394 F.3d 126, 164 (3d Cir. 2004 ))) (internal quotations 
omitted); Lelina v. 1st 2nd Mortg. Co. of NJ, Civ. No. 11-05517, 2012 WL 3079185, at *6 (D.N.J. 
July 30, 2012) (dismissing complaint as it presented identical claims and nearly identical factual 
allegations to those raised in prior cases, which had been dismissed as they failed to state a claim 
upon which relief might be granted); Karupaiyan v. Shalimar Grp. of Rests., Civ. No. 23-844, 2023 
 
16 The parties’ arguments and briefs in this matter are nearly identical to those made and 
considered by this Court upon a Motion to Dismiss in a parallel case brought by WinView against 
a similar gaming company defendant, DraftKings I, Civ. No. 21-13405. Compare Brief in Support 
of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, DraftKings I, Civ. No. 21-13405 (D.N.J. Sep. 26, 2025), Dkt. 
No. 109-1, with Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, WinView IP Holdings, Inc. v. 
FanDuel, Inc. (“FanDuel I”), Civ. No. 21-13807, (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2025), Dkt. 123-1; compare 
Winview IP Holdings, LLC’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, DraftKings I, Civ. 
No. 21-13405 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2025), Dkt. No. 119, with WinView IP Holdings, LLC’s Opposition 
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, FanDuel I¸ Civ. No. 21-13807, (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2025), Dkt. 
126; compare Reply Brief in Support of Defe ndants’ Motion to Dismiss, DraftKings I, Civ. No. 
21-13405 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2025), Dkt. No. 121, with Reply Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, FanDuel I¸ Civ. No. 21-13807, (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2025), Dkt. 127. See also DraftKings 
I, 2026 WL 746932. And after the Court’s ruling today, the same infringement claims remain in 
both cases. Going forward, the Court notes that it has broad discretion to consolidate like matters 
sua sponte, even when “there is not a perfect overlap in parties.” Grivas v. Sorace, Civ. No. 24-
6923, 2025 WL 1795113, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2025). PageID:
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