govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_14-cr-00022-8

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :  
  
Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:14-cr-022-1 
    
v. : Judge Michael R. Barrett 
  
JEFFREY EDMERSON, :       ORDER DENYING 
  MOTIONS FOR  
Defendant. :       COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
  
 
This matter is before the Court on two (pro se) motions for compassionate release filed by 
Defendant Jeffrey Edmerson .  ( See Docs. 220, 224, 227).  The United States opposes release.               
(Doc. 226).1 
Defendant seeks compassionate release based on his “unusually long sentence” received 
as part of a “stash house sting.” 2  (Doc. 220 PAGEID 1219–24).  He asks that his sentence be 
reduced to time served.  Defendant’s emergency supplemental motion is based on him “being the 
only available caregiver for his minor child.”  (Doc. 224 PAGEID 1257).      
I. BACKGROUND 
On February 4, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to criminal conspiracy to possess and distribute 
 
1 Defendant’s first motion for compassionate release, filed by pro bono counsel, was denied (Doc. 191), as was his 
(pro se) motion for a sentence reduction (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)) (Docs. 222, 223). 
  
2 As explained by the Sixth Circuit in a different (and unrelated) appeal, “This case is one in a long series of 
elaborate, nearly-identical sting operations conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(‘ATF’).  In these operations, referred to as ‘stash house stings,’ an undercover agent recruits individuals to steal a 
large quantity of drugs from a house protected by an armed guard.  The house, the drugs, and the guards, however, 
are all fictional—and would- be participants are arrested before they reach the invented location.”  United States v. 
Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).  “Because these stings are wholly inventions of law 
enforcement agents, they can and do include powerful inducements to participate in one big ‘hit,’ a hit that is 
conveniently large enough to qualify for mandatory minimum sentences.”  Id. at 509 (Stranch, J. concurring).  These 
remarks aside, the convictions and sentences of the five targeted defendants in Flowers were affirmed.   
 
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cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count 3).  (Docs. 49, 50).   
He eventually was sentenced to a total term of 216 months of imprisonment, followed by five years 
of supervised release.  (Docs. 106, 112, 113).  Defendant, who is 38 years-old, is currently housed 
at FDC Miami.  “Find an inmate,” Federal Bureau of Prisons available at 
(https://www.bop.gov/inmate loc/ (last visited 06/01/2026).  His projected release date is July 4, 
2029.  Id.  
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Availability of Compassionate Release 
A court “may not modify a term of imprisonment” based on a defendant’s compassionate 
release motion until “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a 
failure of the BOP to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the 
receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).  The Sixth Circuit has ruled that  the exhaustion requirements found in
                         
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) are mandatory and thus present “a glaring roadblock foreclosing compassi onate 
release.”  United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Raia, 
954 F.3d 594, 597 (3rd Cir. 2020)).  Prisoners have two routes, then, to directly petition courts for 
compassionate release: (1) file a motion after fully exhausting administrative appeals of the BOP’s 
decision not to file a motion for compassionate rele ase, or (2) file a motion after “the lapse of 30 
days from the receipt ... of such a request” by the warden of the prisoner’s facility. 18 U.S.C.              
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 
Defendant asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedy—at least as to his first ( pro 
se) motion—a nd, to this end, attaches the November 16, 2023 denial letter he received (while 
housed at FCI Gilmer) from Warden Brown.  (See Doc. 220 PAGEID 1230, 1234).  The United 
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States does not contest exhaustion.  Thus, the undersigned can proceed to the merits of Defendant’s 
motions. 
B. No Extraordinary or Compelling Reasons Support a Reduction in Sentence 
Standard.  “The ‘compassionate release’ provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 allows district 
courts to reduce the sentences of incarcerated persons in ‘extraordinary and compelling’ 
circumstances.”  United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1100 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C.        
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)).  A three-step inquiry is necessary.  Id.  at 1101.  “[A]t steps one and two of the     
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry, district courts must find both that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warrant [a sentence] reduction’ and ‘that su ch a reduction is consistent with applicable  policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  Id.  at 1109 ( italics emphasis in original).  
Assuming an extraordinary and compelling reason is found, step three then requires consideration 
of the “applicable” sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Id.  at 1106 (citing United 
States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1003–06 (6th Cir. 2020)). 
Unusually Long Sentence.  The policy statement of the Sentencing Commission appears 
at § 1B1.13 of the Guidelines.  It was amended on November 1, 2023 (“Amendment 814”) to 
clarify that it applies to motions filed by inmates (as well as by the Director of the BOP on an 
inmate’s behalf).  Amendment 814 also added six reasons that may justify compassionate release.  
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1) –(6).  Relevant here, according to Defendant, is the sixth reason, 
which reads: 
(6) UNUSUALLY LONG SENTENCE. — If a defendant received an 
unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of 
imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be c onsidered 
in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and 
compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross 
disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be 
imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the 
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defendant’s individualized circumstances. 
 
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6).  Subsequent to Defendant filing his ( first) pro se motion, however, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that the Commission “overstepped its authority and issued a policy statement 
that is plainly unreasonable under the statute and in conflict with the separation of powers.”  United 
States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2025).
3  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), accordingly, was 
deemed “invalid.”  Id.4 “In reaching its conclusion, the Bricker  majority clarified that the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. McCall , 56 F. 4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc), which 
predates the amended policy statement, remains the law of this Circuit.”  United States v. Mitchell, 
Nos. 3:04-CR-82-TAV-HBG-1, 3:04-CR-172-TAV-HBG-1, 2025 WL 1386210, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. 
May 13, 2025).  “In contrast to the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) , the 
McCall court held that the fact ‘that a defendant might receive a different sentence today than he 
received years ago represents the routine business of our l egal system’ and ‘cannot supply an 
extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a lawful sentence whose term Congress enacted, 
and the President signed, into law.’”  Id. (quoting McCall, 56 F.4th at 1065) (cleaned up). 
 Bricker plainly forecloses Defendant’s contentions
5 that: (1) he “wouldn’t even charged 
today;” (2) he would have been charged “only” with (Hobbs Act) conspiracy to commit robbery 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); or (3) h is guideline range would have  just been 110–137 
 
3 “To cut to the heart of this, because some recent revisions to federal sentencing law are not retroactive, old inmates 
are serving prison sentences that are much longer than the sentences of new inmates who committed the exact same 
crimes. Recognizing the unfairness, the Commission decided that the disparity was a good reason to grant these old-
timers early release, or was at least a factor worth considering when deciding whether an individual old- timer had an 
‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ for early release. That is understandable and even laudable. The question is 
whether the Commission has the authority to do that under the law, particularly the Constitution.”  Bricker, 135 
F.4th at 430.  
 
4 See United States v. Leboeuf, No. 3:05-CR-2-TAV-JEM-1, 2026 WL 1348108, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. May 14, 2026) 
(“[I]n April 2025, the Sixth Circuit invalidated section 1B1.13(b)(6).”). 
 
5 (See Doc. 220 PAGEID 1222–23). 
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months.  So, too, does the recent holding in Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-820, 608 U.S. --, 
2026 WL 1485535, at *10 (U.S. May 28, 2026) (“The statutory text and structure make clear that 
Congress's nonretroactive change to § 924(c) —considered by itself or in combination with other 
factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.”) . 
 Defendant additionally argues that Amendment 814’s fifth reason supports his release: 
(5)  OTHER REASONS.––The defendant presents any other circumstance 
or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or 
together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are 
similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).  
  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5).  It does not.  See United States v. Washington, 122 F.4th 264, 267 (6th 
Cir. 2024) (“[T]he catch-all provision is not a home for complaints that the generally applicable 
penalties set by Congress are too harsh.”) ; United States v. Robinson, No. 5:08-031-DCR, 2026 
WL 1506664, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 28, 2026) (citing Washington, “There is nothing ‘extraordinary’ 
about leaving untouched the exact penalties that Congress prescribed for the violation of a statute.  
A criminal defendant serving the duration of a lawfully imposed sentence is routine —not 
‘compelling.’”) (cleaned up).  See also United States v. Norris, No. 8:08-cr-163-KKM-TGW, 2026 
WL 1506180, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2026)  (“Norris also posits that his lengthy sentence 
qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief ‘ under the catchall provision of 
1B1.13(b)(5).’ Mot. at 2. While Rutherford [v. United States, No. 24-820, 608 U.S. --, 2026 WL 
1485535 (U.S. May 28, 2026)] is equally fatal to this argument, I note that neither the length of a 
sentence nor a change in the law are similar in kind or ‘similar in gravity to those [circumstances] 
described in paragraphs (1) through (4),’ which focus on the defendant's medical circumstances, 
age, family, and abuse while in custody. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4).”). 
 Family Circumstances.  The “incapacitation” of “the caregiver of the defendant’s minor 
child” can likewise serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction in sentence.  
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See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A).  The minor child to which Defendant referred—a daughter whose 
date of birth is 5/4/20086—is now an adult .  Accordingly, this issue is moot.   
Rehabilitation.  Defendant calls the Court’s attention to his post-sentencing rehabilitation 
efforts in support of compassionate release.  (See Doc. 220 PAGEID 1227–29, PAGEID 1233).    
To his credit, ( see Doc. 220 PAGEID 1227), Defendant acknowledges that rehabilitation 
alone “shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason” for sentence reduction.  
28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (bold emphasis added).7  However, it “may be considered in combination with 
other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a reduction in the defendant’s term 
of imprisonment is warranted.”  U.S.S.G. §1B1.13(d) (bold emphasis added). 
The Court commends Defendant’s endeavors toward self -improvement—t o include 
earning his GED, completing a Non -Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program  course, and 
consistent assignment as a unit orderl y—a nd applauds the thoroughness of his proposed release 
plan.  But without a separate extraordinary and compelling reason in play, the undersigned cannot 
consider any of this as a means to reinforce sentence reduction. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Having found no extraordinary and compelling reason in support of a sentence reduction, 
the compassionate release analysis ends.  United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021); 
see also United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Elias ).8  Defendant 
Jeffrey Edmerson’s motion for compassionate release based on  his “unusually long sentence” 
 
6 (Doc. 224 PAGEID 1260 (¶ 1)).  Defendant has been incarcerated since his daughter was three years old.  ( Id. 
PAGEID 1262 (¶ 7)).  
  
7 See United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1009 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), “Congress has made 
clear that rehabilitation ‘alone’ does not provide a proper basis for relief.”). 
   
8 Thus, the Court need not proceed to step three of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry, “considering” the “applicable” 
sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Elias, 984 F.3d at 519; United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 
954 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Elias).     
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(Doc. 220) is DENIED and his “emergency supplemental motion” based on “family 
circumstances” (Doc. 224) is DENIED as moot.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
     /s/ Michael R. Barrett 
      Michael R. Barrett, Judge  
      United States District Court 
 
 
 
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