govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01912-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
JUSTIN M. DAVENPORT, #S07433, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
 vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-01912-SMY 
 ) 
MEGAN SZOPINSKI, ) 
JOHN BARWICK, ) 
KARALES (Warden 2), ) 
CHRISTIAN THOMAS, ) 
OFFICER VAUGHN, ) 
GREGORY D. LITTLE, ) 
LATOYA HUGHES, and ) 
NURSE SARAH, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
YANDLE, Chief Judge: 
 Plaintiff Justin M. Davenport , an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections 
(“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights . He claims 
defendants failed to prevent his exposure to second-hand smoke from his cellmates, in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. Plaintiff 
seeks a TRO and monetary damages. (Doc. 1). 
 This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious 
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, 
fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be 
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Page ID
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The Complaint 
 Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff has been 
housed at Pinckneyville with multiple cellmates who smoked paper s containing substances such 
as roach spray, fentanyl, and/or K2 (Doc. 1, p. 7). The smoke exposure gave Plaintiff horrible 
anxiety and a “contact high” that made him dizzy and caused him to vomit (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff 
is a drug addict who went through detox before coming to prison and has stayed sober through his 
entire imprisonment. He wants to sta y sober after his release. He suffers from bipolar disorder, 
major depressive disorder, PTSD , and seizures. When he sought help for seizures, Defendant 
Nurse Sarah gave him “little to no help” and accused him of smoking (Doc. 1, p. 9). 
Plaintiff begged mental health providers to move him away from the smokers , which 
succeeded once for a limited time until he got another cellmate who smoked (Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff 
purposely violated a rule so he would be sent to segregation and get away from the smoke. Before 
his segregation term ended, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Szopinski (mental health provider), telling 
her if he was housed with another smoker, he would harm that person to get away. In response, 
Szopinski visited Plaintiff who was single-celled at the time. He confirmed to Szopinski he would 
hurt someone if he was assigned a cellmate who smoked. 
 On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff was housed with a smoker (Doc. 1, p. 7) . Plaintiff went for a 
sick call on May 4, 2025 and spoke with Szopinski. He reminded her of his letter, told her he was 
given another smoker as a cellmate, and stated he would hurt somebody. Szopinski asked him to 
give her 24 hours, which Plaintiff rejected. Later that night, Plaintiff got into a fight and injured 
the other inmate. Officers used pepper spray on Plaintiff to stop the altercation and returned him 
to segregation (Doc. 1, p 8). Plaintiff did not want to hurt the person but felt it was necessary to 
show how badly he wanted to escape the smoke. He wants to remain mentally and physically safe, Page ID
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thus he has refused to leave segregation. 
 Plaintiff wrote Szopinski again on May 9, 2025 to say “it will only get worse” if she keeps 
giving him cellmates who smoke (Doc. 1, p. 8). On May 15, 2025, he wrote Mental Health again 
stating he would do whatever was necessary for his own well -being including refusing to leave 
segregation until his release date of March 26, 2026. He wrote Defendants Warden Barwick, 
Karales (Warden 2) , and “I.A.” ( Plaintiff identifies Defendants Christian Thomas and Officer 
Vaughn as Internal Affairs staff (Doc. 1, p. 3) ) informing them he refused to leave segregation 
because the conditions of his confinement – fumes and second-hand smoke – violated his rights 
and harmed his mental and physical health (Doc 1, p. 8). He personally handed letters to Szopinski 
and Defendant Lt. Gregory Little to explain his refusal to leave segregation. 
 Plaintiff wrote grievances complaining about smoke coming through the vents to his cell 
and causing anxiety attacks. Defendants Hughes denied a grievance (Doc. 1, p. 9). 
 Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designate s the following claims in 
this pro se action: 
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against defendants for housing Plaintiff 
in unconstitutional conditions of confinement where he is exposed 
to second-hand smoke from various chemical substances. 
 
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifferen ce to serious mental 
health/medical needs claim against Szopinski for failing to protect 
Plaintiff from second -hand smoke exposure that exacerbates his 
mental health conditions. 
 
Count 3: Rehabilitation Act claim against defendants for failing to 
accommodate Plaintiff’s mental health conditions by mitigating his 
exposure to second-hand smoke. 
 
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be 
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading 
standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a Page ID
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claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is 
plausible on its face.”). 
Discussion 
Count 1 
Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs (food, medical care, 
sanitation, or physical safety) may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 346 (1981); see also James v. Milwaukee Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). To state 
an Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff must plead 
facts suggesting he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” creating an 
excessive risk to his health or safety (the objective element). Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
834 (1994). He must also sufficiently plead that the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to 
a substantial risk of serious harm to him, despite the defendant’s knowledge of the conditions. 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. For a defendant to be personally liable under § 1983, the individual 
“must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 
430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). 
Involuntary e xposure to second- hand tobacco smoke in prison may support an Eighth 
Amendment claim for present injury and/or future injury to the prisoner’s health. See Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999); Glick 
v. Walker, 272 F. App’x 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2008) . Exposure to second -hand smoke from other 
potentially dangerous substances may likewise state a claim. 
Plaintiff alleges he informed Szopinski, Barwick, Karales, Thomas, Vaughn, and Little 
about the dangerous effects on him from the exposure to smoke and fumes, but these defendants Page ID
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did not act to mitigate the risk to him. These allegations state a viable Eighth Amendment claim 
against these defendants. 
However, Plaintiff does not indicate that he requested help from Nurse Sarah to escape the 
effects of the smoke; only that he sought her help for his seizures. Nurse Sarah will therefore be 
dismissed from Count 1. IDOC Director Hughes will also be dismissed from this claim as her 
only involvement was denying Plaintiff’s grievance. The alleged mishandling of grievances “by 
persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” 
Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). 
The claim in Count 1 will proceed only against Szopinski, Barwick, Karales, Thomas, 
Vaughn, and Little. 
Count 2 
Prison medical and mental health staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 
medical/mental health needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a 
claim, a prisoner must plead facts suggesting (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical 
condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. An 
objectively serious condition includes a condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 
activities or which involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 Plaintiff’s allegations that Szopinski took no action after Plaintiff informed her of the 
harmful effects of the smoke exposure on his mental health conditions are sufficient to state a 
claim for deliberate indifference against her in Count 2. Page ID
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Count 3 
 Plaintiff’s allegations may support a viable RA claim. However, because individual 
employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA, t his claim cannot proceed against 
the individual defendants. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs, 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). The 
proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. §12131(1)(b); Jaros, 
684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the 
agency or its director, in his/her official capacity). Plaintiff includes IDOC Director Latoy a 
Hughes as a defendant, and the RA claim in Count 3 may proceed against her in her official 
capacity only. All other defendants and any claim against Hughes in her individual capacity are 
dismissed from Count 3. 
Injunctive Relief 
 Because t he Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief , Pinckneyville Warden 
Barwick will remain as a defendant in his official capacity regarding this request. See Gonzales v. 
Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief 
claim as he would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out). As 
noted above, Count 1 will also proceed against Barwick in his individual capacity. 
Official Capacity Claims 
 Plaintiff raises claims against each d efendant in his or her individual and 
professional/official capacities (Doc. 1, p. 9) . The RA claim is properly brought against IDOC 
Director Hughes in her official capacity. However, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages may 
only be pursued against state officials in their individual capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 
918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, t he 
official capacity claims against the remaining individual defendants (with the exception of Page ID
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Barwick) are dismissed without prejudice. 
Disposition 
 The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 1 against Szopinski, Barwick, Karales, 
Thomas, Vaughn, and Little; in Count 2 against Szopinski; and in Count 3 against Hughes in her 
official capacity as the IDOC Director. Nurse Sarah is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
 The Clerk shall prepare for Megan Szopinski, John Barwick (in his individual and official 
capacities), Karales, Christian Thomas, Officer Vaughn, Gregory D. Little , and Latoya Hughes 
(official capacity only) : (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a 
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail 
these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place 
of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of 
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the 
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will 
require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer 
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the 
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as 
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be 
retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. 
 Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the 
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to 
Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues Page ID
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stated in this Merit Review Order. 
 Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes 
the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the 
costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(f)(2)(A). 
 Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of 
Court and the opposing part ies informed of any change in his address; the Court will not 
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days 
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a 
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of 
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, t he Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to 
ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED: June 8, 2026 
 
 
 
________________________ 
 STACI M. YANDLE 
Chief U.S. District Judge 
 
Notice to Plaintiff 
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve 
them with a copy of your Complaint . After service has been achieved, Defendant s will enter an Page ID
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appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date 
of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days 
or more. When Defendant s have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order 
containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to 
wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant s before filing any motions, to give the Defendant s 
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant s’ counsel 
has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any 
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so. Page ID
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