govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_24-cr-00072-4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. l:24-cr-72(1) 
Plaintiff, Judge Matthew W. McFarland 
V. 
CESAR CERVANTES, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND OPINION 
This matter is before the Court on the Government's Motions in Limine (Docs. 181, 
182, 183). Defendant filed a Response (Doc. 190). Thus, these matters are ripe for the 
Court's review. 
Courts have the discretion to determine motions in limine pursuant to their 
"inherent authority to manage the course of trials." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 
n. 4 (1984). The purpose of motions in limine is "to avoid delay and ensure an evenhanded 
and expedient trial by ruling on certain evidentiary issues in advance of trial." Enoch v. 
Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff, 588 F. Supp. 3d 806, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (quotation omitted). 
"When a court is unable to determine whether or not certain evidence is clearly 
inadmissible, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of 
foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice can be resolved in the proper context." 
United States v. Kistler, No. 2:22-CR-67, 2023 WL 1099726, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2023) 
(quotation omitted). Following this principle, courts often defer ruling on broad 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 1 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
categories of evidence in limine. See id. A ruling on a motion in limine is a preliminary 
ruling that the Court may change at trial "for whatever reason it deems appropriate ." 
United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court will hear objections 
to such evidence if and when they arise at trial. Gresh v. Waste Serus. of Am., Inc., 738 F. 
Supp. 2d 702, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2010). With this framework in mind, the Court reviews each 
of the Motions in turn. 
I. Motion in Limine and Notice Regarding Direct Evidence, Inextricably 
Intertwined Evidence, and Rule 404(b) (Doc.181) 
The Government's first Motion in Limine (Doc. 181) addresses evidence gathered 
after the charged conspiracy period ended in August 2023, but before the Indictment. (See 
Motion, Doc. 181, Pg. ID 851.) The Government argues that this evidence is admissible as 
"direct evidence, or 'inextricably intertwined' evidence, of the charged crimes." (Id.) 
Alternatively, the Government seeks its admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b), with the Motion serving as pre-trial notice under the rule. (Id.) 
As part of its Motion, the Government describes the evidence it seeks to admit, 
referring to it collectively as the "Material Evidence." (Motion, Doc. 181, Pg. ID 852.) This 
evidence includes: (1) intercepts of four phone calls between Defendant and co­
Defendant Johnnie Clausell that occurred on November 1, 2023, November 30, 2023, 
January 8, 2024, and March 7, 2024; (2) evidence gathered from surveillance and a search 
of Defendant's GMC Sierra vehicle on January 24, 2024; and (3) evidence from search 
warrants executed in Arizona of Defendant's home and the home of his co-conspirator 
and cousin, "Lalo," which occurred at the same time as Defendant's arrest on July 19, 
2 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 2 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
2024. (Id.) 
The Government first argues that the Material Evidence is direct evidence of the 
crimes charged and thus admissible. (Motion, Doc. 181, Pg. ID 853.) To start, the 
Government notes the standard for relevancy as "extremely liberal," under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 401. (Id. (quoting Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396,400 (6th Cir. 2009)) (cleaned 
up).) Relevant evidence "has any tendency to make a fact [of consequence in determining 
the action] more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 
401. In the criminal context, "[r]elevant evidence includes evidence required to prove the 
existence of a conspiracy between Defendant and his co-conspirators, as well as the 
Defendant's involvement and intent to commit the charged crimes." United States v. Bakke, 
942 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1991). The Material Evidence, the Government asserts, is also 
"relevant to corroborate the testimony of certain government witnesses concerning the 
charged crimes." (Id. (citing United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736,739 (6th Cir. 2006)).) 
To this point, the Government reiterates that Defendant is charged with: (1) cocaine 
trafficking conspiracy; (2) aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine; and (3) money 
laundering conspiracy. (Id. at Pg. ID 854; see also Redacted Indictment, Doc. 76.) 
Beginning with the phone intercepts, the Government contends that these show 
two co-conspirators, Defendant and Clausell, "discussing their past drug conspiracy 
(Count 1), money owed from that conspiracy, future drug work to pay back the money 
owed, and efforts to avoid law enforcement." (Motion, Doc. 181, Pg. ID 855.) The Motion 
specifies the topics of conversation from intercepted phone call, including "(1) paying 
back the debts owed based on the drugs and money lost in the charged conspiracy; (2) 
3 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 3 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
how they met through a different drug trafficker; (3) how many kilograms Clausell 
received from [Defendant] that were seized by law enforcement; ( 4) the costs of the drugs 
[Defendant] sold Clausell; and (5) potential recourse that Clausell might have to get the 
seized money back." (Id. at Pg. ID 856.) Additionally, in the Government's estimation, the 
calls show Defendant's efforts to avoid law enforcement detection and "corroborate the 
testimony of at least three witnesses who will testify." (Id.) According to the Government, 
Defendant's past statements indicate that a likely defense will be that he "did not know 
the witnesses, and was not involved in drug trafficking or money laundering with them." 
(Id.) Thus, the phone intercept evidence will counter those defenses, if Defendant does 
testify and opens the door to this argument. 
In his Response, Defendant argues that these phone calls are not relevant because 
they are related to an Arizona case, not this one . (Response, Doc. 190, Pg. ID 999-1000.) 
However, the Government represents that these phone calls contained drug trafficking 
conversations between Clausell, a co-defendant in this case, and Defendant. (Motion, 
Doc. 181, Pg. ID 856.) Thus, the Court finds that the phone call evidence, as described by 
the Government, clearly acts as relevant direct evidence of the charged crimes and is 
admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Bakke, 942 F.2d at 983; Whittington, 455 F.3d at 739. 
Defendant also argues that the evidence is highly prejudicial to him and thus should be 
excluded. (Response, Doc. 190, Pg. ID 999-1000.) To this point, the Court notes that unfair 
prejudice "means the undue tendency to suggest a decision based on improper 
considerations, not the damage to a defendant's case that results from legitimate 
probative force of the evidence." United States z1. Lantzy, 538 F. Supp.3d 745, 755 (E.D. 
4 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 4 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
Mich. 2021) (quoting United States v. Bilderbeck, 163 F.3d 971,978 (6th Cir. 1999)) (cleaned 
up). The evidence is highly probative and is not based on improper considerations. Thus, 
it is not unfairly prejudicial to Defendant. 
Next, the Government seeks to admit evidence gathered from Defendant's GMC 
Sierra in Arizona. (Motion, Doc. 181, Pg. ID 856.) According to the Government, law 
enforcement in Arizona surveilled the vehicle and obtained a warrant to seize and enter 
the vehicle to install covert audio/video surveillance devices. (Id.) While in the vehicle, 
law enforcement observed "(1) at least three cell phones; (2) a baggie of cocaine; and (3) 
paper material in Cervantes' name." (Id.) The phones were then seized and searched 
pursuant to a warrant and contained "evidence related to the charged conspiracy and 
from the same time period as the charged conspiracy." (Id.) This evidence included text 
and phone conversations between Defendant and Clausell, as well as Defendant and his 
cousin, "Lalo," discussing logistics of the drug delivery and proceeds during the 
conspiracy period. (Id. at Pg. ID 856-57.) The search also revealed a Google search history 
with terms related to money laundering and photos of currency consistent with drug and 
money laundering transactions. (Id. at Pg. ID 857.) 
While Defendant claims again that evidence from Arizona is not relevant and 
highly prejudicial to him (see Response, Doc. 190, Pg. ID 999-1000), the Court finds that 
this evidence directly addresses the charged crimes and is not unfairly prejudicial. Not 
only do the conversations, Google searches, and photographs provide evidence of 
Defendant's knowledge of-and involvement in-the drug trafficking and money 
laundering conspiracies, but the bulk of the conversations occurred during the charged 
5 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 5 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
conspiracy period. Although Defendant also argues that any evidence involving his 
cousin is highly prejudicial and outweighs its probative value (Response, Doc. 190, Pg. 
ID 999-1000), the Court disagrees, as their conversations center on drug trafficking and 
drug delivery, during the conspiracy period. This evidence is thus relevant under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 401 and highly probative of the charged offenses under Rule 403. 
Finally, the Government seeks to admit evidence gathered from the searches of 
Defendant's home and the home of his cousin, and Defendant's arrest, in July 2024. 
(Motion, Doc. 181, Pg. ID 857-61.) These searches uncovered several items related to the 
drug conspiracy and Defendant's connection with Cincinnati, including a Cincinnati 
Reds baseball, firearms, ammunition, body armor, a digital scale, sixteen cell phones, 
cocaine, plastic wrap that matched the type used to wrap the cocaine seized in Cincinnati, 
and $405,283 in cash. (Id. at Pg. ID 858-59.) During Defendant's arrest, the law 
enforcement officers uncovered a cell phone, which contained material that the 
Government maintains will be used to impeach Defendant, if he testifies, and a quantity 
of cocaine, which the Government intends to use to counter Defendant's potential 
arguments that he was not involved with cocaine. (Id. at Pg. ID 861.) Defendant again 
argues that this is more prejudicial to him than probative of the allegations arising from 
Cincinnati. (Response, Doc. 190, Pg. ID 999-1000.) 
The Court finds that the evidence is highly probative, see Lantzy, 538 F. Supp.3d at 
755, but is less convinced that this material constitutes direct evidence of the charges, as 
compared to the evidence from the phone calls and GMC Sierra seizure. Nevertheless, it 
agrees with the Government that the evidence from the search warrants and Cervantes' 
6 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 6 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
arrest constitutes inextricably intertwined evidence, or res gestae. This material explains 
the "prelude to the charged offense[s], is directly probative of the charged offense[s], 
arises from the same events as the charged offense[ s ], forms an integral part of a witness's 
testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense[s]." United States v. Grogan, 133 
F.4th 553, 563 (6th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted). The search and arrest evidence is thus 
admissible under the doctrine of inextricably intertwined evidence because it "put[s] the 
charges in the appropriate context." United States v. Gibbs, 797 F.3d 416,424 (6th Cir. 2015). 
In sum, the Court finds that all evidence here is admissible- at this juncture- especially 
as Defendant has not shown that the probative value of this evidence is substantially 
outweighed by any unfair prejudice to him. See Bilderbeck, 163 F.3d at 978. 
II. Notice of Intent to Impeach Defendant Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
609 (Doc. 182) 
The Government next gives notice of its intent to impeach Defendant with 
evidence of his prior conviction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, and requests 
an evidentiary ruling on the same. (Motion, Doc. 182.) Rule 609(a) allows a party to attack 
a witness's character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction "for a crime 
that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more 
than one year"; that evidence "must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness 
is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
that defendant." Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). Meanwhile, "if more than 10 years have passed 
since the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later," then 
Rule 609(b) applies. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Under this subsection, the evidence of this 
7 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 7 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
conviction is admissible if "(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and 
circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives 
an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a 
fair opportunity to contest its use." Id. 
The Sixth Circuit has not definitively interpreted Rule 609(b) for the purpose of 
determining when a witness is said to have been released from confinement. United States 
v. Peatross, 377 F. App'x 477, 489 (6th Cir. 2010). But, it has "commented, without being 
asked to decide the issue, that evidence of a prior conviction is admissible so long as less 
than ten years have passed since the witness was release[d] from confinement, or the 
period of his parole or probation had expired." Id. (quotation omitted). To this end, the 
Government notes that Defendant has a prior conviction in a drug trafficking case for 
manufacturing/ delivering 900 or more grams of cocaine. (Motion, Doc. 182, Pg. ID 870.) 
He was convicted in 2009, sentenced to fifteen years in prison, released on parole in 2014, 
and remained on parole until February 27, 2017. (Id.) Accordingly, based on the Sixth 
Circuit's comment, fewer than ten years have passed since the expiration of Defendant's 
parole period, making the evidence of his prior conviction admissible subject to Rule 
609(a). As the Sixth Circuit has yet to make a finding in the alternative, the Court finds 
that Defendant's parole counts as confinement, and evidence of his prior conviction is 
indeed admissible under Rule 609(a). 
Still, the Court is wary to adopt a rule not yet conclusively decided by the Sixth 
Circuit. See United States v. Tawfik, No. CR 17-20183, 2022 WL 866395, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 23, 2022). The Government seemingly shares the same concern and so its Motion 
8 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 8 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
continues by arguing that the prior conviction is nevertheless admissible under Rule 
609(b). Under this rule, the conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes if "its 
probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs 
its prejudicial effect," and pretrial notice is given. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Courts consider 
the following factors when determining admissibility of a prior felony for impeachment 
purposes: "(1) The impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) The point in time of the 
conviction and the witness' subsequent history; (3) The similarity between the past crime 
and the charged crime; (4) The importance of the defendant's testimony; [and] (5) The 
centrality of the credibility issue." United States v. Frazier, 314 Fed. App'x 801, 804 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215,234 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Court still 
"has broad discretion to admit evidence of prior convictions after conducting the 
probative value/ prejudicial effect inquiry." United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 181 (6th 
Cir. 1990). 
To this end, courts "should conduct a hearing on the matter." United States v. 
Peatross, 377 F. App'x 477, 489 (6th Cir. 2010). "In order to admit such evidence, a court 
must make an on-the-record finding based on the facts that the conviction's probative 
value substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact." United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 
571 (6th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). "This hearing on the record, which need not be extensive, 
should include a consideration of the [five] factors." Id. "In the Sixth Circuit, 
impeachment under Rule 609 is generally limited to the fact of conviction and should not 
include the details and circumstances surrounding the conviction unless the defendant's 
testimony opens the door to such evidence." United States v. Bre7.uer, No. 3:17-CR-37, 2018 
9 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 9 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
WL 773137, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2018) (quotations omitted). At the Final Pretrial 
Conference, the Court offered the Government the opportunity to put evidence on the 
record as to the five factors. The Government maintains, both in its Motion and at the 
hearing, that each of the five factors weighs in favor of admitting the prior conviction 
under Rule 609. (Motion, Doc. 182, Pg. ID 873.) The Court considers each in turn, taking 
the matter under advisement and deferring any order until trial in the event that 
Defendant chooses to testify and opens the door to this evidence. 
The first factor examines the impeachment value of the prior cnme. The 
Government notes that Defendant "has repeatedly claimed that he was not involved in 
cocaine trafficking." (Motion, Doc. 182, Pg. ID 873.) Meanwhile, the prior conviction for 
drug trafficking directly rebuts this; thus, if Defendant testifies and opens the door to the 
issue, then the "probative value of the evidence of [the prior conviction] outweigh[s] its 
potential prejudice." (Id. (quoting United States ·v. McDonel, 362 F. App'x 523,529 (6th Cir. 
2010)) (cleaned up).) The Court agrees that, if Defendant indeed makes this claim, then 
the prior conviction's probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. See 
United States v. Bender, 265 F.3d 464,471 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States ·v. McDonel, 
362 F. App'x 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2010). This factor weighs in favor of admissibility, to the 
degree that Defendant opens the door to with his testimony. 
The second factor examines the point in time of the prior conviction and the 
subsequent history. The Government points out that Defendant's parole period lasted 
until February 2017, and his cocaine distribution with his co-Defendants began in 2016. 
(Motion, Doc. 182, Pg. ID 874.) According to the Government, this "closeness in time 
10 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 10 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
supports the admissibility of the conviction," because the conviction is not" ancient," but 
rather shows "an ongoing pattern of activity." (Id.) Once again, the Court finds that if 
Defendant does attempt to disclaim this activity at trial, then the probative value of the 
conviction outweighs any prejudice; this factor also weighs in favor of admissibility. 
The third factor compares the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime. 
The Government states that, in the prior conviction, Defendant helped deliver over 100 
kilograms of cocaine in a semi-truck, where the tractor had Arizona plates and the trailer 
had Ohio plates. (Motion, Doc. 182, Pg. ID 87 4.) Defendant delivered the cocaine from 
Tucson to Chicago, handed twenty-five kilograms to a co-conspirator, and was found 
with the remaining seventy-five kilograms. (Id.) The Government thus asserts that these 
two crimes are sufficiently similar; and, to the extent that the similarity could cause 
prejudice, the Government notes that an appropriate limiting instruction can ameliorate 
any risk of prejudice. (Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215,235 (6th Cir. 1990)).) 
The Court agrees that the crime and the charge are sufficiently similar for purposes of 
Rule 609(b). To this end, though, the Court will issue the appropriate, immediate 
admonition to the jury regarding their consideration of the prior conviction if the 
Government uses it to impeach Defendant. 
The Government addresses the fourth and fifth factors, the importance of 
Defendant's testimony and the centrality of his credibility, together. (Motion, Doc. 182, 
Pg. ID 875.) According to the Government, if Defendant testifies, his "testimony would 
be critically important, as would his lack of credibility." (Id.) The Government contends 
that, based on Defendant's actions during the pendency of this case, "it is apparent that 
11 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 11 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
the Defendant will seek to undercut the credibility of the three cooperating witnesses, 
and claim that all of them are lying, while he is the only one telling the truth." (Id.) It would 
therefore be "inappropriate" to allow Defendant to attack the credibility of the 
Government's witnesses while the Government could not do the same. (Id.) Assuming 
Defendant testifies, and downplays or refutes any involvement in drug trafficking, the 
Court agrees that Defendant's testimony is critical to the case; it follows naturally, then, 
that his credibility is central to the case as well, especially if he attempts to impeach other 
witnesses. The Court finds that these two factors weigh in favor of admissibility. While 
Defendant summarily states that evidence of his "background" is more prejudicial than 
probative (see Response, Doc. 190, Pg. ID 999), the Court finds that, under Rule 609(b), if 
Defendant opens the door to this evidence, his prior conviction may be used for 
impeachment purposes. Its probative value will substantially outweigh the prejudicial 
effect on Defendant. Nevertheless, as the Government suggests, the Court finds that any 
potential prejudicial effect can be mitigated by a jury instruction. 
To that end, at this point, the Court refrains from issuing an order explicitly 
allowing this evidence. At trial, if Defendant chooses to testify and opens the door to this 
evidence, and the Government chooses to impeach Defendant with his prior conviction, 
the Court will rule on the admissibility under Rule 609(b). If applicable, the Court will 
then provide an immediate jury instruction, following the Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal 
Jury Instruction 7.05A; the same instruction will be given prior to jury deliberation. 
III. The Government's Trial Brief and Motions in Limine (Doc. 183) 
Finally, the Court turns to the Government's Trial Brief and Motion in Limine 
12 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 12 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
(Doc. 183). While the Government makes many requests in its Motion, some do not seek 
a court order and were addressed on the record at the Final Pretrial Conference. The 
following will thus focus on the Government's remaining requests. Many of these 
implicate the special circumstances involved with Defendant's pro se status. The 
Government's first request involves the content and form of opening statements and 
closing arguments. Specifically, the Government requests that Defendant not be 
permitted to testify during opening statements and closing arguments. The Court has 
discretion in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of the opening statements 
and closing arguments. United States v. Poindexter, 942 F.2d 354,360 (6th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Chapple, 801 F. App'x 379, 382 (6th Cir. 2020). And, the Government is correct 
that any assertion of personal fact when the speaker is not under oath on the stand is 
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 603. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 881.) Instead, 
the Court reminds the parties that the opening statement is meant to briefly state the 
issues and outline what evidence will be presented. United States v. Thomas, 41 F.3d 1508, 
1994 WL 645725, at *4 (6th Cir. 1994) (table). 
The Government makes a similar request for the closing arguments, asking that 
the Court order Defendant not to testify during the closing arguments. (Motion, Doc. 183, 
Pg. ID 882-83.) The Government also asks that the Court prohibit Defendant from 
commenting on potential punishment, pretrial legal issues, his status as a pro se 
defendant, or other forms of attempting to seek sympathy unrelated to the facts at issue. 
(Id. (collecting cases).) The Court agrees that these potential comments and testimony 
would be improper during a closing argument and therefore orders that neither party 
13 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 13 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
include them in the closing arguments. Moreover, closing arguments may not call for 
speculation or assume facts that were not in evidence or otherwise supported by the 
record. See United States v. Vining, 224 F. App'x 487,497 (6th Cir. 2007). 
Accordingly, with regard to the opening statements and closing arguments, the 
Court orders that: (1) neither party may use the open or close to testify as to the facts of 
the case; (2) the parties shall phrase opening arguments in terms of "what the evidence 
will show"; and (3) the parties shall refrain from addressing irrelevant or prejudicial 
material- including potential punishment, pretrial legal issues like suppression, 
personal attacks on law enforcement or prosecutors (except for proper impeachment), 
Defendant's status as a pro se defendant, or Defendant's ability to access discovery. If 
either party does not abide by this order, the Court will intervene as necessary. 
Next, the Government addresses the direct and cross examination procedures. 
Specifically, the Government mentions concerns that Defendant will attempt to testify 
through his questioning, improperly attack witness credibility, and ask questions about 
irrelevant information - such as discovery issues, pretrial legal issues, potential 
punishment, and his prose status. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 884-85.) Federal Rule of 
Evidence 611 allows the Court to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
examining witnesses "so as to (1) make those procedures effective for determining the 
truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment." Furthermore, Rule 61l(b) limits the scope of cross-examination to only 
those subjects covered on direct examination, along with matters affecting the witness's 
credibility. Coupled with the other applicable Rules of Evidence, like Rule 603's 
14 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 14 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
requirement that an individual be under oath to testify, the Court finds it appropriate to 
limit any attempts to ask inappropriate or irrelevant questions, testify, or improperly 
attack a witness's credibility. To that end, the Court orders that all parties ask questions 
in interrogatory form and refrain from any questions that are irrelevant to the trial. 
The Government also asks that the Court address, in a pretrial order, general limits 
on any potential references to the discovery process, Defendant's pro se status, and any 
other pretrial issues, like Fourth Amendment concerns, during the trial. (Motion, Doc. 
183, Pg. ID 887-88.) As the Court has noted above, these topics would indeed be 
inappropriate. See United States v. Stuart, 507 F.3d 391,395 (6th Cir. 2007) (" As with most 
evidentiary rulings, ... courts rather than juries must ultimately decide whether a Fourth 
Amendment claim requires the suppression of evidence."); United States v. Mandell, No. 
12-CR-842, 2014 WL 287520, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2014) (explaining that comments on 
discovery issues are inappropriate); United States ·v. Krug, No. CR 09-1148, 2013 WL 
12219025, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013) (highlighting that pro se status discussion is 
inappropriate because it does not make the facts of the case more or less likely). 
Additionally, the Government reiterates, and the Court has noted on several occasions, 
that its attorneys have diligently complied with all discovery obligations up to this point, 
and they represent that they will continue to do so. Thus, the Court does indeed find it 
appropriate to order that the parties refrain from any discussion during the trial of the 
discovery process and related complaints, Defendant's pro se status, and any other 
pretrial issues. 
Finally, the Government requests an order "prohibiting the defendant from 
15 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 15 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
referencing or introducing any out-of-court statements made by non-testifying witnesses 
unless they have provided a prior proffer to the Court establishing a valid exception." 
(Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 886.) Certainly, under Federal Rule of Evidence 802, hearsay 
statements are inadmissible, barring the narrow exceptions under Rules 803 and 804. That 
said, neither party is permitted to introduce hearsay statements, unless an exception 
applies. During the trial, if a proper objection to a hearsay statement is made, the Court 
will sustain the objection and strike the hearsay statement from the record. 
The remaining requests the Government makes are not couched in the context of 
a motion for pretrial order. Accordingly, the Court finds that these concerns were best 
addressed at the Final Pretrial Conference on June 4, 2026. Nevertheless, the Court briefly 
mentions the requests here. The Government seeks: (1) that the Court issue its proposed 
voir dire questions to the parties ahead of the trial; (2) that the Court adopt the more 
common method for a pro se defendant to conduct his own direct examination wherein 
Defendant will ask a question and then respond to it; (3) that the Court remind Defendant 
he may not engage in hybrid representation, unless his behavior at trial requires it, and 
that, if this becomes an issue, the Government be allowed to brief the issue; (4) that the 
Court issue jury instructions pertaining to Defendant's pro se status, which the Court 
notes it plans to issue; (5) that the Court warn Defendant about improper character 
evidence and impeachment, and that the Court preclude such evidence and 
impeachment at trial; (6) that the Court warn Defendant that he is not permitted to 
introduce positive character evidence, unless submitted under Rule 404(a)(2)(A), or put 
on a witness to testify to Defendant's own statements or the statements of co-conspirators; 
16 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 16 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
and (7) that the Court preclude Defendant from making any arguments intended only to 
illicit sympathy, while unrelated to the facts at issue. (Motion, Doc. 183.) 
Finally, the Government addresses some of its own potential evidentiary issues 
and provides possible avenues for admissibility. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 890-901, 907-
08.) First, the Government notes that it intends to introduce out-of-court statements that 
are either non-hearsay under Rule 801(d) or qualify for a hearsay exception under Rules 
803 and 804. (Id. at Pg. ID 890.) These will include (1) statements by the Defendant, a 
party-opponent (not hearsay under Rule 801(d)); (2) the other side of certain 
conversations with the Defendant to provide context or show knowledge (not hearsay 
when used to provide context, see United States v. Alsop, 12 F. App'x 253, 259 (6th Cir. 
2001)); and (3) statements of co-conspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy 
(not hearsay under Rule 801(d)). (Id. at Pg. ID 890-91.) If the Government does introduce 
this evidence within this context, then the Court finds that it is admissible; however, this 
finding shall not preclude any objections to improper hearsay evidence. 
The Government continues to the admission of wiretap recordings. The Court 
notes that these recordings have been properly authenticated pursuant to Rule 901 (see 
Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 893-94; Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence as Self­
Authenticating, Doc. 179). Although, they may still be subject to hearsay and relevance 
objections, which Defendant may raise at trial. The Government also notes that it may 
seek to introduce jail calls or messages from Defendant, used either to prove his identity 
on the wiretap calls or for the inculpatory content in the jail calls. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. 
ID 896.) To that end, the Government notes that the Sixth Circuit "regularly upholds the 
17 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 17 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
admission of jail calls at trial." (Id. (collecting cases).) The Court agrees that these will be 
admissible, subject to proper objections. Similarly, the Government indicates that it 
intends to verify Defendant's voice on the phone with the testimony of a law enforcement 
witness who became familiar with Defendant's voice throughout the investigation and 
during jail calls. (Id. at Pg. ID 896-97.) The Government asserts that this testimony is 
appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5), and that the Sixth Circuit allows 
voice identification by someone who became familiar with the voice at any time. (Id. 
(quoting United States v. Simms, 351 F. App'x 64, 69 (6th Cir. 2009)).) While Defendant 
objects to the use of officers to testify to his voice as a waste of time and resources (see 
Response, Doc. 190, Pg. ID 1000), the Court notes that this testimony is necessary to 
authenticate the jail calls and the testimony and jail calls are otherwise admissible, subject 
to proper objections. 
Next, the Government indicates that it plans to use summary exhibits under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 "[t]o more efficiently present certain voluminous or 
otherwise difficult to review evidence to the jury." (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 897.) 
Summary evidence under this rule has five requirements: (1) the items must be so 
voluminous that they cannot conveniently be examined in court by the jury; (2) the 
proponent of the summary must also have made the items available for examination or 
copying, or both, by the other parties at a reasonable time and place; (3) the proponent of 
the summary must establish that the underlying documents are admissible in evidence; 
(4) the summary document must be accurate and nonprejudicial; and (5) the summary 
document must be properly introduced before it may be admitted into evidence. Fed. R. 
18 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 18 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
Evid. 1006. The Government represents that the summary evidence it intends to 
introduce, namely bank records, trucking records, and location data records, meets all of 
these requirements. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 897-99.) To that end, the Court finds it is 
admissible, pending proper introduction at trial and barring any other proper objections. 
The Government next seeks to present jury transcripts of the audio recordings 
offered into evidence at trial. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 899.) These transcripts correspond 
to recordings of phone calls with Defendant. (Id.) The Sixth Circuit explicitly allows this. 
United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872,876 (6th Cir. 1983). And, where the parties stipulate 
to the accuracy of the transcripts, they may be submitted as evidence. Id. In the absence 
of a stipulation, the transcripts may still be admitted, provided the transcriber "verif[ies] 
that he or she has listened to the tape and accurately transcribed its content," and the 
district court "make[s] an independent determination of accuracy by reading the 
transcript against the tape." United States v. Fults, 639 F. App'x 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(cleaned up). The Government states that it has provided draft transcripts to Defendant, 
invited his edits, and offered Defendant an opportunity to stipulate to the accuracy so 
that the transcripts can be admitted as evidence. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 900.) However, 
in the event that the parties cannot stipulate to the transcripts, the Government maintains 
that the transcripts can still be admitted pursuant to the procedure in Fultz. (Id.) To that 
end, the Court finds that if the parties cannot stipulate to the transcripts, and the 
Government so requests admission, the Court will examine the transcripts against the 
recordings to make an independent determination of accuracy. 
The Government also plans to introduce business records and phone evidence 
19 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 19 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
based on certificates of authenticity. (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 900-01.) Regarding 
business records, the Government states that this evidence was obtained from various 
companies by way of subpoena, and certificates of authenticity were filed in the 
Government's Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence as Self-Authenticating (Doc. 179). 
(Id. at Pg. ID 900.) Accordingly, the Government contends that this evidence falls into the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. (Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)).) The 
Government intends for its Motion to serve as notice of its intent to use these records and 
states that all other elements for admissibility have been met. (Id.) The same is true for 
the phone evidence that the Government intends to introduce at trial by way of a 
certificate of authenticity. (Id. at Pg. ID 901.) The Government notes that the phone 
evidence, including "records generated by an electronic process or system, and data 
copied from an electronic device," are "largely extractions from the cell phones of 
Defendant or his co-conspirators." (Id.) According to the Government, this evidence is 
self-authenticating and was certified pursuant to Rule 902(13). (Id.; see Notice of Intent to 
Introduce Evidence as Self-Authenticating, Doc. 179.) On this point, the Government 
indicates that it does not intend to call records custodians to provide authentication 
testimony for the corresponding records and forensic extractions. (Id.) Based on these 
representations, the Court agrees that these items will be admissible, still subject to 
proper objections at trial. 
Last of all, the Government states that it will introduce at trial evidence obtained 
from publicly available websites and social media accounts, including "Google Maps, 
screenshots of resort information taken from websites, and screenshots/videos from 
20 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 20 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
social media accounts." (Motion, Doc. 183, Pg. ID 907.) The Government provides notice 
to the Court that it intends to have a law enforcement witness testify that this evidence 
was viewed on publicly available websites and that the relevant exhibit "fairly and 
accurately depicts the material observed on or in those locations." (Id. (citing United States 
v. Needham, 852 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2017)).) As authentication "is a relatively low 
hurdle," see United States 'O. Quintana, 763 F. App'x 422,426 (6th Cir. 2019), the Court finds 
that, if the witness authenticates the documents as the Government describes, they will 
be admissible, still subject to proper objections. 
* * * 
Thus, based on the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following: 
1. The Government's Motions in Limine (Docs. 181, 182, 183) are GRANTED; 
2. The Government's evidence, as described in its Motions, IS ADMISSIBLE as 
outlined above, subject to proper objections; and 
3. The parties SHALL ABIDE by the Court's Order and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, as outlined above, regarding the content and form of his opening 
statement and closing argument, direct and cross examination of witnesses, 
and throughout the trial generally. Additionally, the parties SHALL REFRAIN 
from including arguments based on pretrial issues, like discovery or Fourth 
Amendment claims, his status as a pro se defendant, and personal attacks on 
law enforcement officers or prosecutors. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
21 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 21 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT o~ o IO 
~w.71~ 
By: --- ----- - --­
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND 
22 
Case: 1:24-cr-00072-MWM Doc #: 194 Filed: 06/05/26 Page: 22 of 22  PAGEID #: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight