govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_24-cr-00072-5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 1:24-cr-72(1) 
Plaintiff, Judge Matthew W. McFarland 
V. 
CESAR CERVANTES, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED ORDER AND OPINION 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine, Suppress 
Evidence, and Dismiss Indictment (Doc. 184). The Government has filed a Response to 
this Motion (Doc. 188). The Government filed a Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief to 
supplement the Response, which the Court granted. (See Motion, Doc. 192; 6/4/2026 
Notation Order.) The Court provided opportunity for Defendant to reply to this Reply 
and Defendant filed a sur-reply (Doc. 195). Thus, this matter is ripe for the Court's review. 
The Court amends its previous Order (Doc. 193) to address these most recent filings 
(Docs. 192-1, 195) and begins by addressing Defendant's Exclusions, then will address his 
request to suppress evidence, and finally will examine his request to dismiss the 
Indictment. 
I. Exclusions 
Defendant first seeks to exclude certain evidence at trial pursuant to Rules 402, 
403, and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 911.) Specifically, 
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Defendant first states that all jail calls and "chirps" (a form of electronic messaging in jail) 
are irrelevant and create unfair prejudice. (Id.) In response, the Government points out 
that Defendant failed to identify a specific call, statement or further explanation of 
prejudice. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 934.) This deficiency alone, according to the 
Government, defeats Defendant's argument. (Id.) Nevertheless, the Government 
concedes that many of the call recordings contain highly prejudicial and irrelevant 
statements, but notes that some of his calls are "directly relevant." (Id.) The Government 
then provides an example where Defendant is heard talking on the jail call about the 
amount of drugs that agents found and which of those were attributable to him. (Id. at 
Pg. ID 934.) The Government reiterates that evidence like this is highly relevant, whereas 
other evidence from the calls is less relevant, but may become more relevant if Defendant 
opens the door to certain arguments that the calls will rebut. (Id.) On that point, the 
Government states that, when it seeks to introduce this evidence at trial, Defendant "is 
free to object to the relevance," but "there is no blanket pretrial exclusion of statements 
by a Defendant simply because they were made in jail." (Id.) The Court agrees. As 
Defendant failed to specify what pieces of evidence from these calls he seeks to exclude, 
he cannot argue that they are irrelevant or that their prejudicial effect outweighs the 
probative value. Once the Government introduces a piece of evidence, Defendant can 
object to the relevance at that time, and the Court will rule on the objection. 
Defendant next asks that the Court exclude his background. (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. 
ID 911.) Again, the Government notes that this request is a blanket pretrial exclusion 
where Defendant has failed to specify what evidence from his background he wants to 
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exclude. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 934-35.) The Court agrees. Just as above, Defendant 
may object to a specific piece of evidence related to his background when the Government 
seeks to introduce it at trial. 
Moving on, Defendant asks first that all Ohio wiretaps be "sanitized
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to eliminate 
references to II doing time,
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as "prejudicial references are inseparable from conversation 
and substantially outweigh □ probative value." (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 912.) He also 
asks that all Ohio wiretaps be excluded entirely because the Government "failed to 
provide initial call which is exculpatory and material to the outcome of the case." (Id.) On 
the first point, the Government responds that Defendant "cites no authority for 
categorical sanitization of wiretap recordings." (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 935.) And, the 
Government offers to consider more specific requests of sanitization if Defendant 
provides those. (Id.) But, the Government maintains that the Court should reject such a 
broad request and that targeted objections or limiting instructions are otherwise the 
"appropriate vehicles to remedy Defendant's concerns." (Id.) The Court agrees with the 
Government on this point. Regarding the Ohio wiretaps' exclusion entirely, the 
Government asserts that all recordings have indeed been produced, including the initial 
call. (Id.) These recordings were produced to prior counsel as "General Discovery" in 
2024, and then again to Defendant directly in April 2026. As this Court has said before, 
absent evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, the Government's assurances that it has 
complied with its discovery obligations is sufficient, see Order, Doc. 186, and the Court 
sees no need to exclude this evidence pursuant to the unfounded Brady allegation 
Defendant makes. 
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Lastly, Defendant argues for the exclusion of "jail snitch statements and audios," 
referring to the recordings by a government agent of Defendant while at Butler County 
Jail. (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 912.) Defendant contends that these recordings create 
prejudice and that he has not received them. (Id.) Again, though, the Government 
reiterates that he did receive these recordings, marked as Attorneys' Possession Only 
materials, on April 10, 2026, and prior counsel received them in August 2025. (Response, 
Doc. 188, Pg. ID 936.) Moreover, the Government maintains that it does not intend to use 
these recordings at trial, so the argument is moot. (Id.) And last of all, the Government 
states that the request fails on the merits, as the Supreme Court "has clearly established 
that law enforcement officials may question an indicted defendant who has invoked his 
right to counsel if the questioning relates to offenses other than those that form the basis 
of his/her indictment." (Id. (quoting United States v. Ford, 176 F.3d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 
1999)).) Here, the jail cell recordings involved Defendant soliciting murder-for-hire of a 
perceived witness. (Id.) And, the Sixth Circuit has "consistently held that other-acts 
evidence involving threats or attempted acts of violence by defendants against trial 
witnesses is admissible to show consciousness of guilt." (Id. (collecting cases).) 
Moreover, a sister court dealt with a similar issue. United States v. Cope, No. 03-91-
JMH, 2011 WL 1576705 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2011). The Government briefly restates the 
circumstances in Cope: "While in pretrial detention on multiple drug-related charges, the 
defendant approached a fellow inmate and offered to pay him $10,000 to murder the 
AUSA who was investigating and prosecuting the drug cases." (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. 
ID 937 (citing Cope, 2011 WL 1576705, at *1, 7).) The inmate told his wife shortly thereafter, 
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and the FBI then contacted the inmate who agreed to wear a wire so the FBI could record 
conversations with the defendant. (Id. (citing Cope, 2011 WL 1576705, at *1, 7).) While the 
defendant later tried to suppress the evidence, the district court held that "the fact that 
law enforcement officials arranged for an informant to converse with an indicted 
defendant about offenses other than those for which the defendant had been indicted is 
not unawlful." (Id. (quoting Cope, 2011 WL 1576705, at *1, 7) (cleaned up).) The 
Government argues that the same logic applies here, making the jail recordings, if the 
Government did use them, lawful. (Id.) The Court agrees that this request for exclusion 
thus fails on the merits. 
II. Suppression of Evidence 
Next in his Motion, Defendant seeks to suppress several items of evidence. 
(Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 912.) Defendant first points to the warrant acquired on October 
28, 2023, through April 3, 2024, and claims that the monitoring was not limited to the 
scope of the investigation, officers omitted vital facts, used stale information, and lacked 
probable cause, did not minimize irrelevant communications, and had a cooperating 
Defendant speaking with Defendant "on a consensual line." (Id.) Defendant specifically 
takes issue with the pole camera footage installed near his home in Arizona, pursuant to 
the warrant. (Id. at Pg. ID 912-13.) The Government first states that this argument is moot 
because it does not intend to use this footage at trial. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 941.) 
But, the Response also notes that no warrant is needed to install a pole camera, as officers 
"had a right to access the public utility pole, and the camera captured only views plainly 
visible to any passerby." (Id. (citing United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 288 (6th Cir. 
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2016).) Put differently, "[w]arrantless observation from a public vantage point does not 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy." (Id. at Pg. ID 942 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207,213 (1986)).) 
Defendant continues his argument, though, next stating that, because the police 
found nothing from the pole cameras, they expanded their surveillance with a wiretap, 
and this wiretap was acquired with stale information and omissions of fact, and points to 
a few facts that he claims are just some examples of the false statements in the affidavit 
used to acquire the Arizona wiretap. (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 913.) The Government 
again states that this is moot, as the Arizona wiretap evidence will not be used at trial. 
(Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 937.) The Response also states that the argument is still 
meritless, as Defendant can only point to "factual quibbles," that, even in the aggregate, 
fall far short of the standard warranting a Franks hearing. (Id.) Rather, to obtain a hearing, 
a defendant "must make a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant deliberately 
or recklessly included a false statement-not simply dispute the affidavit's 
characterizations." (Id. (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); United States 
v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554,577 (6th Cir. 2006). Indeed, in Abboud, the Sixth Circuit made clear 
that the defendant "has the burden to prove the falsehoods made in the affidavit," and 
the "mere fact that [he] disagree[s] with the affidavit is insufficient to meet this burden." 
438 F.3d at 577. The Government asserts that Defendant has not offered this proof, and 
the Court agrees. Defendant's issues with the affidavit amount to nothing more than a 
"dispute [of] the affidavit's characterizations." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 
Defendant next challenges the execution of the search warrant in January 2024 of 
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his vehicle, claiming that police exceeded the scope of the warrant by removing it from a 
parking lot, searching and photographing its contents, and retaining cell phones and 
other items found inside. (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 914-15.) But the Government is quick 
to point out that Defendant cites the wrong warrant, as the warrant controlling this search 
was the wiretap application, which "expressly and repeatedly authorized what law 
enforcement did." (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 938.) The Government goes on to cite 
specific lines in the wiretap application that explicitly authorize the search performed on 
·Defendant's vehicle. (Id. at Pg. ID 938-39.) To this point, the Court finds Defendant's 
argument that the search exceeded the scope unconvincing. Additionally, the 
Government argues that, as far as the items seized, many of these items, specifically, the 
baggie of cocaine, one of the phones, and the body armor, were in plain view, and thus 
they were appropriately seized under the plain-view doctrine. (Id. at Pg. ID 939; Reply, 
Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 1027.) The Court agrees with this argument as well. 
As far as the remaining items from the car, the Government argues that this 
evidence was properly found pursuant to the automobile exception. (Reply, Doc. 192-1, 
Pg. ID 1030.) Under this exception, officers can search a vehicle without a warrant if they 
have "probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime." United 
States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2007). The Government points to several cases 
where officers witnessed drugs in a vehicle in plain view, which gave them probable 
cause to search the remainder of the vehicle without a warrant. (Reply, Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 
1030 (collecting cases).) Indeed, the officers in these cases "were therefore justified in 
searching the car beyond the passenger compartment," without a warrant after seeing 
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drugs in plain view. United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 542 (6th Cir. 2002). The 
Government thus argues that the officers' search of the vehicle was justified after they 
witnessed the bag of cocaine in plain view; this includes their search of compartments 
and containers in the vehicle. (Reply, Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 1030-31.) And, the Government 
points out that law enforcement already had ample authority to be in the car pursuant to 
several state court warrants and orders. (Id. at Pg. ID 1031.) 
Defendant argues that the automobile exception does not apply because the entire 
operation was "staged." (Sur-Reply, Doc. 195, Pg. ID 1113.) However, beyond these 
conclusory claims that the search was wrong, not ordinary, and that the officers "made it 
all up," Defendant does not point to evidence on the record of the officers' misconduct. 
(See id. at Pg. ID 1114.) And, his argument that the automobile exception does not apply 
because the install warrant did not authorize a search (see id.) does not convince. 
Defendant fails to realize that, after the officers saw cocaine in plain view, the automobile 
exception authorized a full search of the vehicle, even without a search warrant in place. 
The Court agrees with the Government's arguments and finds that the automobile 
exception applies here. A body of case law in the Sixth Circuit supports this finding. See 
Burns, 298 F.3d at 542; Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Moralez, No. 21-5859, 2022 WL 3500192, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2022); United States v. 
Vance, No. 3:10-CR-70, 2017 WL 2469955, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 7, 2017). 
Out of an abundance of caution, the Government also maintains that the search of 
the vehicle was proper as a valid inventory search and under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. Addressing the inventory search theory first, the Government states that, 
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pursuant to a court order, the vehicle was lawfully seized and towed to a law enforcement 
facility; at this point, Tucson's Police Department required an inventory search. (Reply, 
Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 1031.) The Reply goes on to quote the department's General Orders 
requiring an inventory of any vehicle brought to the impound lot. (Id.) Importantly, the 
Government notes that, in the Sixth Circuit, it is "clear that inventory searches are now a 
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." (Id. at Pg. 
ID 1032 (quoting United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up).) 
Accordingly, the Government maintains that the inventory search of Defendant's car was 
proper. Based on the policy and Sixth Circuit case law, the Court agrees. 
Moving onto the inevitable discovery argument, the Government contends that 
the search also falls under this doctrine. (Reply, Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 1033.) Under this 
doctrine, the exclusionary rule does not apply "where the evidence would have 
inevitably been discovered through lawful means." (Id. (citing Nix v. Williams, 476 U.S. 
431 (1984)).) The Sixth Circuit defines discovery as inevitable by asking "what would 
have happened if the search had never occurred." (Id. (citing United States v. Clayton, No. 
25-5713, 2026 WL 973956, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026)).) Thus, the Government states that, 
assuming there was an issue with the applicability of the automobile exception, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply because the law enforcement officers would have 
inevitably found and seized the items pursuant to the valid inventory search. (Id. at Pg. 
ID 1033-34.) Defendant takes issue with both these arguments by stating that the officers 
did not complete the Vehicle Inventory Form, ignoring the policy requiring them to do 
so; thus, according to Defendant, the search was not a valid inventory search, and thus 
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the inevitable discovery doctrine should not apply either. (Sur-Reply, Doc. 195, Pg. ID 
1114.) Defendant claims he did not receive the form "back then nor in discovery." (Id.) 
However, the policy states that the officers must create a list and "submit it to Records." 
(Tucson Police Department Policy, Doc. 192-2, Pg. ID 1072.) It is therefore not clear why 
Defendant believes he should have received the form back then, or why it would be 
included in discovery now. It is speculative to claim that the officers did not complete the 
proper form simply because Defendant does not have it. The Court is not persuaded by 
Defendant's arguments and finds that the inventory search and inevitable discovery 
doctrine apply here as well. 
The Government continues by stating that, when the police advised Defendant of 
what they had recovered, he claimed ownership only of two phones, and denied that the 
remaining three were his. (Response, Doc.188, Pg. ID 939; Reply, Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 1034.) 
That disavowal, the Government claims, was abandonment, and so Defendant does not 
have standing to contest the search and seizure of those phones. (Id. at Pg. ID 939-40 
(collecting cases); see also Reply, Doc. 192-1, Pg. ID 1034.) 
Nevertheless, the Government states that Arizona law enforcement obtained a 
search warrant for the abandoned phones, and the U.S. Attorney's Office in this District 
also obtained a search warrant for them. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 940.) Put simply, 
"[e]ach search was authorized," and "[e]ach item was properly seized." (Id. at Pg. ID 941.) 
Finally, to the extent Defendant claims that the recordings taken from the vehicle 
"exceeded the scope of the investigation," and "violated minimization procedures," (see 
Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 917), the Government notes that these arguments fail because 
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they are "wholly conclusory." (Id. (collecting cases).) Defendant points to no specific 
recording, conversation, or minimization failure. (Id.) The Court agrees; this request for 
relief is broad and unspecified, and so it must fail. See United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 
470, 478-83 (6th Cir.1988) (where defendants had necessary information to make a proper 
minimization challenge if warranted, the court did not abuse discretion in denying a 
hearing when defendants failed to make any showing). 
In general, the Government notes that, to the extent the Defendant challenges the 
execution of the search warrants under the Fourth Amendment, that challenge fails. 
(Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 942, Sur-Reply, Doc. 195, Pg. ID 115-16; see also Reply, Doc. 
192-1, Pg. ID 1035.) According to the Government, the warrant was valid upon issuance, 
and so execution is proper if "the scope and timing of the search is conducted in 
accordance with the terms of the warrant." (Id. (quoting Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown 
Agents, 452 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2006) (en bane)).) The Government maintains that the 
search warrant meets these requirements. (Id.) As Defendant has not provided any 
showing to the contrary, the Court finds that the search warrant's execution was 
reasonable. To the extent that Defendant argues that the police obtained a search warrant 
after they had already searched his vehicle, making the search invalid (Sur-Reply, Doc. 
195, Pg. ID 1115-16), the Court notes, once again, that the officers did not need a warrant 
to search his vehicle because of the exceptions described above. 
And, lastly, the Government points out that, even if there was evidence to exclude, 
"the exclusionary rule applies only when the deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial 
social costs." (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 942 (quoting Utah v. Strief!, 579 U.S. 232 (2016)).) 
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But, here, where officers relied in good faith on warrants issued by neutral magistrates, 
"exclusion serves no deterrent purpose." (Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
922 (1984)).) And, the Government notes that "none of the four circumstances that defeat 
the good-faith exception are present," meaning that suppression as a whole should be 
denied. (Id. (citing United States 'V. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2005)).) While the 
Court has already determined that Defendant's requests for suppression of evidence 
individually fail, the Court is also inclined to agree with the Government. Without 
evidence of bad faith, the exclusionary rule does not apply here as a whole. 
III. Dismissal of the Indictment 
Finally, Defendant asks that the Court dismiss the indictment based on the 
Government's failure to provide full access to Attorneys' Possession Only discovery 
materials. (Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 917-18.) Defendant claims that he was provided" only 
limited time to review" this discovery and that numerous items of discovery "were not 
made available for meaningful inspection and review." (Id.) The Government is quick­
and correct-to point out that this precise issue has been repeatedly discussed, briefed, 
and ruled on by the Court. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 943.) The Government has fulfilled 
and will fulfill all its discovery obligations, the Court has repeatedly provided Defendant 
with an opportunity to continue his trial date to allow him more time for discovery 
review, and all parties, and non-parties, have worked to alleviate some of the restrictions 
Defendant faces as a prose defendant in custody. And, now, the Government continues 
to offer to work with Defendant in reducing redactions. (Id. at Pg. ID 944.) With no signs 
of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court finds that the Government's representations that 
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it has provided Defendant with discovery as outlined in the Amended Protective Order 
is sufficient. Furthermore, knowing the volume of discovery and his own hurdles as a 
pro se defendant, Defendant has insisted, as recently as June 2, 2026, at an in-person 
status conference, that he wants to move forward with his June 9, 2026, trial date and that 
he will be prepared for trial that day. Considering all of this, the Court finds dismissal of 
the indictment based on Defendant's access to discovery unwarranted. 
Nevertheless, the Government argues that dismissal is improper for three distinct 
reasons. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 943.) First, Defendant cannot identify any specific 
withheld document. (Id.) The Court finds this persuasive, as, for a Brady violation, 
Defendant must show that the withheld evidence was favorable for the defense and 
material to the case; but, by not pointing to a specific piece of evidence, he cannot show 
that the evidence was favorable or material. See United States v. Baker, 562 F. App'x 447, 
454 (6th Cir. 2014). Defendant has failed to establish a Brady violation. See id. Furthermore, 
Brady does not create pretrial discovery rights or remedies. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 
U.S. 545,559 (1977). For this reasoning alone, the Court finds that his motion for dismissal 
should be denied. 
Next, though, the Government states that dismissal is an "extraordinary remedy 
reserved for the most egregious government misconduct that actually prejudiced the 
defendant." (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 944 (citing United States 'V. Ross, No. 3:23-CR-128, 
2024 WL 6047397, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2024)).) The Government is correct that 
Defendant has pointed to no such misconduct here. 
Finally, the Government points to Defendant's claim that he had only twenty-two 
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hours to review the Attorneys' Possession Only materials. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 
944; Motion, Doc. 184, Pg. ID 917.) The Government reiterates that an affidavit submitted 
by Campbell County Detention Center's Major Grosser attests that Defendant has had 
ample time and opportunity to review discovery. (Response, Doc. 188, Pg. ID 944; see also 
Grosser Aff., Doc. 176-1.) And, as the Court has already noted, the remedy for more time 
to review is not dismissal, but a continuance, which is a remedy the Court has offered, 
and Defendant has refused. (Id.) The Court thus agrees with the Government: dismissal 
is unwarranted. 
* * * 
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion in Limine 
(Doc. 184). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
By 1{~ rw, 11 ~&4-; 
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND 
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