govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01149-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
JASON MURRELL, #M51664, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
 vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-01149-SMY 
 ) 
DR. CHAPMAN, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
YANDLE, Chief Judge: 
 Plaintiff Jason Murrell , an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) 
currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights . He claims defendant was 
deliberately indifferent to his serious dental condition and seeks monetary damages. (Doc. 30). 
Plaintiff’s original Complaint (Doc. 13) was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, and he was allowed to amend his pleading (Doc. 27). 
 This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to 
filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is 
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an 
immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 
The First Amended Complaint 
 Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Amended Complaint (Doc. 30): Dr. 
Chapman (Pinckneyville dentist) extracted a tooth from the right side of Plaintiff’s jaw on January 
28, 2025 (Doc. 30, pp. 5-6). After pulling the tooth, “Dr. Chapman examine[d] the extraction site Page ID
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to make sure it was properly removed and the extraction site was clean. . . . Therefore Defendant 
Dr. Chapman knew there [were] tooth fragments inside Plaintiff[’s] extraction site still. Dr. 
Chapman intentionally failed to remove the tooth fragments from Plaintiff[’s] mouth.” (Doc. 1, p. 
5). Plaintiff suffered pain from that day through July 9, 2025. 
 Two days after the extraction, Plaintiff’s jaw was swollen, he had difficulty chewing food, 
severe headaches, and difficulty sleeping on his right side (Doc. 30, p. 6). Plaintiff visited Dr. 
Chapman on February 5, 2025. He informed Plaintiff there were tooth fragments inside the 
partially healed extraction site, causing pain and improper healing. Dr. Chapman reopened the 
wound and removed the tooth fragments. He gave Plaintiff Tylenol and penicillin. 
 Plaintiff continued to have difficulty chewing and his pain was at “level 10” on February 
7, 2025 (Doc. 30, p. 6). He saw Dr. Chapman again on February 11, 2025 and was told his mouth 
was still in the healing process (Doc. 30, p. 7). 
 By May 22, 2025, Plaintiff still had pain on the right side of his mouth every time he 
yawned or chewed. Dr. Chapman examined Plaintiff again on May 28, 2025 and said his mouth 
could still be in the healing process from the removal of the tooth fragments. An x -ray was 
performed which, according to Dr. Chapman, showed the tooth next to the extraction site was 
“having some type of recession.” (Doc. 30, p. 7). 
 Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court designate s the 
following claim in this pro se action: 
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious dental needs 
claim against Dr. Chapman for the incomplete extraction of 
Plaintiff’s tooth on January 28, 2025 and follow -up surgery on 
February 5, 2025, causing ongoing pain and suffering. 
 
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be 
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading Page ID
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standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is 
plausible on its face.”). 
Discussion 
Count 1 
 Prison medical and dental staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical 
or dental needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a 
prisoner must plead facts suggesting (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical /dental 
condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his condition. Id. An 
objectively serious condition includes a condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 
activities or which involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
“Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard that is met if a defendant either ‘knows of 
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety’ or ‘is both aware of facts from which 
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he draws the 
inference.’” Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 961 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Johnson v. Dominguez, 
5 F.4th 818, 824- 25 (7th Cir. 2021) ; internal quotation marks omitted). Mere negligence or 
medical/dental malpractice does not amount to deliberate indifference. Jackson, 105 F.4th at 961. 
The Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best 
care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” 
Forbes v. Edgar , 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Ineffective treatment is not deliberate 
indifference. See Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2008). Page ID
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Plaintiff’s original Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim because his factual 
allegations did not suggest Dr. Chapman was deliberately indifferent to his dental condition. The 
First Amended Complaint is similarly flawed. 
Plaintiff’s tooth condition and pain were objectively serious. However, the First Amended 
Complaint contains only a conclusory statement that Dr. Chapman knew or should have known 
immediately after the extraction that tooth fragments remained in Plaintiff’s jaw. Plaintiff does 
not support this conclusion or his claim that Dr. Chapman intentionally failed to remove the tooth 
fragments with any factual allegations. Conclusory legal statements are not sufficient to state a 
plausible constitutional claim. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). 
The allegation that Dr. Chapman knew or should have known the extraction was 
incomplete amounts to negligence , mistake, or, at worst, malpractice. Th at does not rise to the 
level of unconstitutional deliberate indifference. To the contrary, Dr. Chapman provided ongoing 
assessment and follow -up treatment for Plaintiff’s condition. He removed the tooth fragments, 
gave Plaintiff medications for pain and infection , saw Plaintiff for two other follow -up 
examinations, and gave him an x-ray. Count 1 will therefore be dismissed. 
Disposition 
Plaintiff’s claim in Count 1 and this case are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. When a C omplaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the plaintiff is ordinarily given an 
opportunity to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies, as was done in this case. See F
ED. 
R. CIV. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend need not be granted if further amendment would be 
futile. See Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021); 
Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff has had two opportunities Page ID
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to plead his claims and set forth additional supporting facts, but his description of events fails to 
support a deliberate indifference claim. The Court concludes that further amendment of Plaintiff’s 
claims in this action would be futile. As such, the dismissal of this case is with prejudice and 
without leave to amend. T he Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. The Court 
counts the dismissal of this action as one of Plaintiff’s three “strikes” within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this Court 
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. F
ED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A proper and timely 
motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty- eight (28) days 
after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended. If the appeal is found 
to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.” 
A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must set forth the issues Plaintiff 
plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he 
will be liable for the $ 605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 
2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858- 59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch , 133 F.3d 464, 
467 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED: June 8, 2026 
 
_____________________ 
 STACI M. YANDLE 
Chief U.S. District Judge Page ID
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