govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_24-cv-01779-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
MERRICK STEDMAN, * 
 * 
Plaintiff, * 
v. * Civil Case No. SAG-24-1779 
 * 
ROBERT S. DEAN, JR., et al., * 
 * 
Defendants. * 
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiff Merrick Stedman (“Plaintiff”) seeks leave to file an Amended Complaint in this 
lawsuit asserting constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1983 and associated state law 
claims. ECF 31. Defendant Michelle A. Taylor opposes the motion, arguing sovereign immunity, 
futility, and statutory immunity. ECF 33. Plaintiff has filed a reply. ECF 34. For the reasons stated 
herein, Plaintiff’s motion to amend will be granted, without prejudice to Defendants’ ability to 
renew their substantive arguments in a motion to dismiss.1 
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 2, 2025, this Court partially granted a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original 
Complaint. ECF 12, 13. This Court appointed counsel for Plaintiff, and discovery has proceeded. 
Plaintiff now seeks to file a proposed Amended Complaint, which (1) adds new factual allegations 
and (2) reasserts claims against the State of Maryland and two wardens of its correctional 
institutions, Robert S. Dean, Jr. and Gregory A. Werner. ECF 31-1. 
 
1 Although the presently proposed Amended Complaint will be docketed as a result of this ruling, 
in light of footnote 1 in his reply, Plaintiff will be afforded fourteen days to file (1) a Second 
Amended Complaint omitting the Longtin claim and (2) a motion voluntarily dismissing the 
State as a defendant in this federal case. ECF 34 at 3 n.1. 
 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that a party seeking to amend its pleading after 
twenty-one days following service may do so “only with the opposing party’s written consent or 
the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, the Rule requires courts to “freely give leave 
when justice so requires.” Id. The Fourth Circuit’s policy is “to liberally allow amendment.” 
Galustian v. Peter , 591 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, leave to amend should be 
denied only if “prejudice, bad faith, or futility” is present. See Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 
F.2d 503, 509–10 (4th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted) (interpreting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 
(1962)); Hart v. Hanover Cnty. Sch. Bd., 495 F. App’ x 314, 315 (4th Cir. 2012). Ultimately, the 
decision to grant leave to amend rests in this Court’s discretion. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Laber v. 
Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 428 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
Defendant argues both that the proposed amendment would be futile and that Defendants 
retain statutory immunity from Plaintiff’s claims under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. ECF 33-1. 
Looking first at futility, a s the Fourth Circuit has stated, a proposed amendment is futile when it 
“is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510; see also 6 Arthur R. 
Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 (3d. ed. 2010) (“[A] proposed amendment that 
clearly is frivolous, advancing a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face, or that fails 
to include allegations to cure defects in the original pleading, should be denied.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
This review for futility “does not involve ‘an evaluation of the underlying merits of the 
case.’” Kolb v. ACRA Control, Ltd., 21 F. Supp. 3d 515, 522 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting MTB Servs., 
Inc. v. Tuckman-Barbee Constr. Co., No. RDB -12-2109, 2013 WL 1819944, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 
30, 2013)). “To the contrary, ‘[u]nless a proposed amendment may clearly be seen to be futile 

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because of substantive or procedural considerations, . . . conjecture about the merits of the litigation 
should not enter into the decision whether to allow amendment.’” Next Generation Grp., LLC v. 
Sylvan Learning Ctrs., LLC , No. CCB -11-0986, 2012 WL 37397, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 5, 2012) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 911 (1980))). T his Court has discussed the overlap between a court’s 
review for futility under Rule 15 and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6): 
There is no question, to be sure, that leave to amend would be futile when an 
amended complaint could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See U.S. ex rel. 
Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008). Yet the 
Court need not apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard when determining whether leave 
to amend would be futile. The Court applies a much less demanding standard: 
whether “the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” 
Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510. 
 
Aura Light US Inc. v. LTF Int ’l LLC , Civ. Nos. GLR -15-3198 & GLR -15-3200, 2017 WL 
2506127, at *5 (D. Md. June 8, 2017). 
 In sum , it does not follow that every plaintiff seeking leave to amend claims must 
demonstrate that the claims can withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Such a requirement would 
render superfluous the Fourth Circuit’s definition of a futile claim as one that is “clearly 
insufficient or frivolous on its face,” Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510, and would run contrary to the 
Fourth Circuit’s well-established “policy to liberally allow amendment in keeping with the spirit 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a),” Galusti an, 591 F.3d at 729; see also Coral v. Gonse , 
330 F.2d 997, 998 (4th Cir. 1964). 
In her opposition to the motion to a mend, Defendant Taylor argues that the restructured 
allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to state viable claims of supervisor liability against the 
wardens. ECF 33- 1. Without reaching the merits of those legal issues, Plaintiff’s proposed 
Amended Complaint cannot fairly be described as “clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” It 

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adds new facts regarding personal actions taken by the wardens to address the deficiencies raised 
by this Court in its earlier opinion. Futility does not provide a basis for its dismissal. 
Defendant Taylor also argues that this Court should deny Plaintiff leave to amend to 
reinstate his state law claims in Counts III –IV and VI–VII against the individual Defendants, on 
the basis of their statutory immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MCTA). ECF 33- 1. 
That statute conveys immunity from liability in tort for, in relevant part, “a tortious act or omission 
. . . made without malice or gross negligence.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 5-522. For 
the reasons stated in this Court’s earlier opinion, the proposed Amended Complaint does not allege 
malice. However, the proposed amendments include specific facts potentially suggesting “utter 
indifferen[ce] to the rights of others” sufficient to plead gross negligence. See Cooper v. Rodriguez, 
443 Md. 680, 708 (2015). Those amendments include, among others, the allegation that Defendant 
Taylor was aware of DPSCS written policy requiring release if the agency fails to assume custody 
on the release date, ECF 31 -1 ¶ 23, the allegation that Defendant Dean knowingly approved 
continued detention after being informed of the Court order demanding release, id. ¶ 32, and the 
allegation that Defendant Werner decided to “give” ICE three days to assume custody after being 
informed of the release order, id. ¶¶ 34–38. 
Accordingly, this Court will grant leave to amend and permit Plaintiff to file his Amended 
Complaint. Defendants, of course, are free to refile their futility arguments for this Court’s 
substantive consideration under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Though this procedure is somewhat 
lacking in efficiency, allowing Plaintiff ’s amendment will not prejudice Defendants and will 
produce the cleanest record for the parties to proceed with this case. 
A separate Order follows , which will reopen this case and direct the Clerk to file the 
Amended Complaint. In light of this Court’s granting leave to file a Second Amended Complaint 

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in n.1, supra, Defendants should await that filing (or the expiration of the deadline for its filing) 
before responding. 
 
Dated: June 8, 2026 /s/ 
Stephanie A. Gallagher 
United States District Judge 
 

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