govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00102-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
BRADSHAW GENARD NUNNALLY, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No. 26-CV-00102-SPM 
 
SECRETARY OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
McGLYNN, District Judge: 
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants 
Judge Patrick R. Foley and Morgan C. Ragsdale. (Docs. 10, 13). Plaintiff Bradshaw 
Genard Nunnally did not respond. Having fully considered the issues presented, both 
Motions are GRANTED. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
In 2023, Plaintiff Bradshaw Genard Nunnally’s home was foreclosed on after 
proceedings in the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit in St. Clair County, 
Illinois. (Doc. 2, ¶ 20, p. 12). A foreclosure sale deed was executed and recorded in 
April 2025, but Nunnally did not receive notice of the sale. (Id., ¶¶ 22–23). 
 
1 The facts are taken from the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of evaluating 
the Motions to Dismiss. See Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021). Page ID
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In September 2025, Defendant Morgan C. Ragsdale was apparently an 
employee of the office of the Circuit Clerk of St. Clair County. Ragsdale certified the 
issuance of an eviction summons on behalf of the Circuit Clerk’s office, informing 
Nunnally about an upcoming hearing. (Id., pp. 27–29). On November 4, 2025, Illinois 
20th Judicial Circuit Court Judge Patrick R. Foley signed an eviction order against 
Nunnally. (Id., pp. 32–33). 
Nunnally commenced this action against Defendants, including Judge Foley 
and Ragsdale in their official capacities. (Id., ¶ 18). Against Defendants Judge Foley 
and Ragsdale, Nunnally brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks 
declaratory relief that his due process rights were violated and that the eviction 
process was unlawful. (Id., ¶¶ 18, 28–31).2 Defendants Judge Foley and Ragsdale 
have moved to dismiss this action against them, and Nunnally has not filed any 
response. (Docs. 10, 13). 
ANALYSIS 
This action for declaratory relief against Judge Foley and Ragsdale requests 
that this Court declare that the eviction order in state court is illegal because 
Nunnally was not afforded due process. (See Doc. 2, ¶¶ 18, 28–31, pp. 27–29, 32–33). 
Because this action seeks a result that would either influence an ongoing state court 
 
2 Although Nunnally states that he seeks injunctive relief against Defendants Judge Foley and 
Ragsdale, Nunnally seeks only a temporary restraining order (which this Court denied, (Doc. 6)) and 
a preliminary injunction. (Docs. 2, 3, 7). Because this injunction relief is limited to the duration of the 
action, it need not be adjudicated as part of this Order on the Motions to Dismiss. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 
604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025), (quoting University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The 
purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a 
trial on the merits can be held”)). Page ID
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proceeding or contradict a state court order, it cannot be brought in federal district 
court. 
Under the abstention doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), federal courts must abstain from actions “where federal court intervention 
would intrude . . . into civil proceedings implicating a state’s interest in enforcing 
orders and judgments of its courts,” J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021) 
(citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013)). Similarly, under 
the abstention doctrine established in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), 
federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court may not adjudicate “cases 
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,” J.B., 997 F.3d at 722 
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). 
Here, Judge Foley issued an eviction order that, according to the Complaint, 
has yet to be effectuated. (Id., ¶ 25, pp. 32–33). If judicial proceedings are ongoing, 
Nunnally cannot bring a challenge relating to those ongoing proceedings because 
Younger abstention precludes this Court from hearing such an action. See Hollis v. 
Fear, No. 3:24-CV-1211-NJR, 2024 WL 2801529, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. May 31, 2024) 
(Younger abstention prevents federal district court from interfering with state court 
ongoing eviction action). Although abstention may not be appropriate where there is 
“great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff,” Moore v. Sims, 442 
U.S. 415, 423 (1979), “the burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff to show Page ID
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‘that state procedural law barred presentation of [its] claims,’” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (quoting Moore, 442 U.S. at 432). Nunnally has made no 
such showing here. 
If the eviction action has been concluded, Nunnally cannot bring this action 
against Defendants Judge Foley and Ragsdale because this Court does not have 
appellate jurisdiction over the state court eviction decision. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (quoting Rooker, 544 U.S. at 416) 
(“Federal district courts, the Rooker Court recognized, lacked the requisite appellate 
authority [to review state court decisions], for their jurisdiction was ‘strictly 
original.’”). Because this Court must abstain from hearing Nunnally’s claims against 
Judge Foley and Ragsdale, the claims must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. 
Nunnally’s claims against Judge Foley and Ragsdale are DISMISSED with 
prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 8, 2026 
 
 
 
Stephen P. McGlynn 
U.S. District Judge Page ID
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