govinfo:USCOURTS-txwd-5_23-cv-01182-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 
 
TODD BRAUCKMILLER, 
Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SAN 
ANTONIO, 
Defendant 
 
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§ 
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§ 
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 Case No. SA-23-CA-01182-XR 
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
On this date the Court considered United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney’s 
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 155) addressing the parties’ cross -motions for 
summary judgment (ECF Nos. 141, 143) and Plaintiff’s objections thereto (ECF No. 158). After 
careful consideration, the Court issues the following order. 
BACKGROUND 
This is an employment case arising out of Plaintiff Todd Brauckmiller’s termination from 
his employment at the University of Texas San Antonio (“UTSA”) following an investigation into 
whether he sexually harassed one of his colleagues. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, alleges that his 
termination was pretext for discrimination. He asserts claims for race and sex discrimination and 
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
I. Factual Background1 
Dr. Brauckmiller worked for UTSA in its Minority Business Development Agency 
(“MBDA”) Business Center as a senior manager and supervisor from November 2021 to July 
2022, when he was terminated for violating UTSA’s policy on sexual harassment and sexual 
misconduct. ECF No. 141-2 at 1 (Offer Letter); ECF No. 141-11 (Termination Notice). 
 
1 These facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

 
2 
 The termination occurred following an investigation by UTSA’s Equal Opportunity Office 
(“EOS”), which concluded that Dr. Brauckmiller had engaged in “inappropriate behavior” with 
one of his direct reports, Rosana Gomez, in violation of UTSA’s Handbook of Operating Procedures 
(“HOP”) 9.24. Id. HOP 9.24 implements Title IX’s and Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination and harassment in employment and sets forth a comprehensive administrative 
procedure for processing, investigating, and adjudicating complaints by UTSA employees. ECF 
No. 141-12 at 1–21. EOS issued its Final Report on June 24, 2022. ECF No. 141-9 at 2–27. 
According to the report, EOS received multiple reports from UTSA employees on March 
2, 2022, that Ms. Gomez was feeling unsafe and uncomfortable with her supervisor, Dr. 
Brauckmiller, due to his comments on her social media, his messages to her, and their interactions 
during working hours. Id. at 2 n.1. The next day, Dr. Brauckmiller was placed on administrative 
leave with pay pending the results of the EOS investigation. Id. at 2 n.2. 
The EOS report summarized Ms. Gomez’s allegations, paraphrased below: 
1. Dr. Brauckmiller engaged in inappropriate behavior with Ms. Gomez after texting her 
on her personal cell phone to request access to her social media accounts; 
a) He began to follow her on social media and sent her a text message and made 
the following comment, “You must have a lot of stalkers huh Lol?” 
b) In the same text conversation, Dr. Brauckmiller sent Ms. Gomez a message 
stating, “Wow Roxana I'm Speechless! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! What a page. Wow,” with 
three happy face emojis. 
c) On the same text message thread, Dr. Brauckmiller texted Ms. Gomez, “Gosh, 
I’m trying to stay professional!” and included two thinking face emojis and two 
hysterical smiling/laughing face emojis. 
2. Dr. Brauckmiller engaged in inappropriate behavior with Ms. Gomez by the manner in 
which he communicated with her on social media accounts. 
a) Dr. Brauckmiller made Ms. Gomez uncomfortable by asking to join her social 
media account Instagram and began posting responses on her account. 

 
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b) After Ms. Gomez posted a picture of herself from a recent vacation wearing a 
swimsuit, Dr. Brauckmiller posted on Ms. Gomez’s account three emojis with 
a “sizzling fire” and “hands raised up.”2 
c) Dr. Brauckmiller commented on Ms. Gomez’s In stagram video story of her 
working out, “Wow Roxana. Between you and I. Wow!!!!!” and included five 
emojis of “clapping hands.” 
d) Dr. Brauckmiller sent a Direct Message (DM) to Ms. Gomez on her Instagram 
account telling her to “have a good workout” with a “strong arm” emoji 
followed by the comment in Ms. Gomez’s DM, “You look great. I’m sure 
working out with you is great motivation!!!”. 
e) Dr. Brauckmiller reacted to a video story that Ms. Gomez posted with an image 
of Ms. Gomez and two friends with a “sizzling fire” emoji. 
3. Because of Dr. Brauckmiller’s interactions with Ms. Gomez through her social media 
account, Ms. Gomez has not felt comfortable around Dr. Brauckmiller as her direct 
supervisor. 
a) Ms. Gomez said that she feels that Dr. Brauckmiller’s “advances are unwanted” 
and is fearful that he will retaliate against her. Ms. Gomez stated that she felt 
that Dr. Brauckmiller was always giving her more attention than the other 
females in the office, even after she told him that she had a long-term boyfriend. 
b) Ms. Gomez stated that Dr. Brauckmiller inquired about her relocating to the 
University Heights office location that he occupies but did not make the same 
inquiry to other members of the team. Ms. Gomez stated that Dr. Brauckmiller 
told her “Don't you want to move over here with us” and suggested that she 
move even though she told him she did not want to relocate offices. 
4. Ms. Gomez was scheduled to attend a conference in Laredo in March, and Dr. 
Brauckmiller told her that he would take her and the other female attending to Padre 
Island, which made her uncomfortable. 
Id. at 2–3. 
As required under UTSA policy HOP 9.24, EOS investigated the reports and 
allegations and determined that they did not rise to the level of illegal sexual harassment as 
defined by Title IX. Id. at 5. But EOS found the allegations were nonetheless serious enough 
 
2 Throughout the EOS investigation and the course of this litigation, Dr. Brauckmiller has vociferously disputed that 
these emojis were directed at the vacation photo, insisting that they were directed at a photo of Ms. Gomez at the 
rodeo. 

 
4 
to proceed with the investigative process to evaluate whether they constituted “Other 
Inappropriate Sexual Conduct and Hostile Environment.” Id. 
In its investigation, EOS met with Dr. Brauckmiller and Ms. Gomez, interviewed an 
additional eight witnesses, and reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties and independently 
gathered. Id. at 6–17. EOS did not hold a hearing, although Dr. Brauckmiller insists that he should 
have been provided one. See, e.g., ECF No. 158 at 4, 6, 7, 11. 
EOS found Ms. Gomez’s allegations credible, as they had been corroborated by both 
witnesses and objective evidence. Based on this finding, EOS concluded that Dr. Brauckmiller had 
violated HOP 9.24 by engaging in “Other Inappropriate Sexual Conduct” as set forth in Section 
1.1 (“unwelcome romantic, flirtatious, or sexual advances”) and Section 1.4 (“gratuitous 
comments, jokes, questions, anecdotes or remarks of a sexual nature about clothing or bodies”) of 
the Policy. Id. at 23. EOS also found that Dr. Brauckmiller created a “Hostile Environment” as 
defined in the Policy. Id. at 27. 
On July 22, 2026, about a month after EOS issued its report, Dr. Brauckmiller received a 
termination notice, stating, in relevant part: 
The purpose of this letter is to notify you that your employment as a Senior Project 
Manager at The University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) is being terminated 
effective close of business today, 7/22/2022 for violating the Handbook of 
Operating Procedure s (HOP) 9.24 Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct 
Policy. 
 
On March 3, 2022, you were placed on administrative leave with pay pending the 
results of an investigation conducted by Equal Opportunity Services/Title IX Office 
(EOS). The investigation was based on allegations that you may have violated 
certain provisions of the Handbook of Operating Procedures (HOP) 9.24 Sexual 
Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy. Based on the EOS final report dated 
June 24, 2022, EOS found that you engaged in inappropriate behavior with your 
direct report, violating HOP 9.24. The c onduct outlined in the EOS final report is 
unacceptable and as a result, your employment is being terminated effective today. 
 
ECF No. 141-11 (Termination Notice issued by Rod McSherry). 

 
5 
After he was terminated, Dr. Brauckmiller requested a review of the EOS proceedings from 
Trey Atchley, the Chief Inquiry Officer of the University of Texas System, complaining the EOS 
conducted a biased investigation, altered and concealed evidence, and denied him his right to 
impartial proceedings. ECF No. 141 -10 at 1–2. Five days later, Mr. Atchley concluded, “The 
investigation performed by UTSA followed the guidelines set out in HOP 9.24 and appears to have 
been conducted fairly, impartially, objectively and professionally. Based on a review of the 
information provided, we consider this matter closed.” Id. 
II. Procedural History 
Plaintiff first filed this suit in state court against Defendant UTSA, alleging violations of 
the First Amendment, Title IX, Title VII, and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). ECF No. 1, 
Exh. A at 8–11. UTSA removed the petition to this Court based on f ederal question jurisdiction. 
See ECF No. 1. Following removal, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that, inter 
alia, abandoned his claims under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, FLSA, and Title 
IX. See ECF No. 28 (FAC); ECF No. 49 at 9 –10 (order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation as to the abandonment of certain claims).3 
In March 2025, Dr. Brauckmiller moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. 
ECF No. 66. In May 2025, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant the 
motion as to Dr. Brauckmiller’s Title VII retaliation claim but dismiss his ADA and hostile-work 
 
3 The Court further adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss several causes of action added in the 
FAC, including (1) claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act (“USERRA”), and 
federal and Texas whistleblower laws , for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Title VII claims against UTSA 
President Taylor Eighmy, because individuals cannot be liable under Title VI I; and (3) claims for violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and hostile-
work-environment claims under Title VII . See ECF No. 49 at 9 –10. The Court granted Dr. Brauckmiller permission 
to seek leave to file a further amended complaint cur ing the deficiencies in the FAC as to his ADA, ADEA, and 
hostile-work-environment claims. Id. at 11–12. 

 
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environment claims with prejudice for failure to allege sufficient facts in support of those claims. 
See ECF No. 86. 
UTSA moved for summary judgment on Dr. Brauckmiller’s remaining claims for race and 
sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII . ECF No. 141. Dr. Brauckmiller filed a cross -
motion for affirmative summary judgment. 4 ECF No. 143. The parties also filed various 
supplemental filings, responses, and replies to the motions. See ECF Nos. 146–48, 151–53. 
III. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
On March 31, 2026, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation on the 
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, recommending that the Court grant UTSA’s motion 
and deny Dr. Brauckmiller’s motion. ECF No. 155. 
A. Plaintiff’s claims for race and sex discrimination under Title VII 
To begin, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Dr. Brauckmiller had failed to make a prima 
facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework because he had failed to 
identify appropriate comparators outside of his protected classes who were treated more favorably 
under “nearly identical circumstances.” See id. at 14 (quoting Lee v. Kans. City S. Ry. Co. , 574 
F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)). The two comparators he proposed—Ms. Gomez and Jose Munoz, 
both younger Hispanic employees—were his direct reports and subordinates, not peers, defeating 
comparator status as a matter of law. See id. (citing Turner v. Kans. City S. Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 
893 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
 
4 Although Dr. Brauckmiller’s motion addresses both Title VII and an “ADA failure -to-accommodate” claim, his 
ADA claim was dismissed with prejudice in May 2025. See ECF No. 86 at 12. 

 
7 
The Magistrate Judge further reasoned that, even if Dr. Brauckmiller had established a 
prima facie case of discrimination, he had failed to produce evidence from which a factfinder could 
conclude that his race or sex was a motivating factor in his termination. See id. at 14–15. 
UTSA articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination: the EOS 
investigation concluded that Plaintiff engaged in “Other Inappropriate Sexual Conduct” toward a 
subordinate and violated UTSA’s sexual -harassment policy. Id. at 15 ; see ECF No. 141 -11 
(Termination Notice) (“ EOS found that you engaged in inappropriate behavior with your direct 
report, violating HOP 9.24. The conduct outlined in the EOS final report is unacceptable and as a 
result, your employment is being terminated effective today.”). 
The Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiff’s argument that alleged procedural deficiencies in 
the EOS investigation suggest that UTSA’s reliance on the EOS report was pretext for 
discrimination: 
Even if the conclusions of the EOS investigation had been mistaken, that would not 
be enough to show the decision -makers did not have a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason to terminate him. When a decision -maker relies on the 
results of an investigation by a third party, any evidence that th e third party’s 
investigation was flawed or yielded inaccurate results does not constitute evidence 
that the decision -maker’s decision in reliance on the investigation’s results was 
pretext for discrimination. 
 
ECF No. 155 at 15 (citing Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2005). 
The Magistrate Judge rejected Dr. Brauckmiller’s allegations of evidence tampering and 
investigative bias as insufficient , reasoning that even, e.g., Ms. Gomez’s purported removal of 
emojis from certain communications with Dr. Brauckmiller would not materially undermine 
EOS’s conclusion s because Plaintiff had admitted making suggestive comments about her 
appearance and Gomez provided an explanation for continuing to engage despite discomfort. Id. 
at 16–17. 

 
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Dr. Brauckmiller testified in his deposition that he believes his termination was the result 
of a conspiracy among various UTSA Human Resources and other employees to villainize him. 
ECF No. 141 -1, Brauckmiller Dep . at 96:6 –97:22. As the only evidence that this alleged 
conspiracy was rooted in sex and race discrimination, Dr. Brauckmiller cited a public comment on 
social media by Suzanne Patrick, Director of EOS and Title IX Coordinator, that purportedly 
demonstrated animus against older white men. Id. at 9 8:2–6, 186:22–25. In response to Ms. 
Patrick’s cover photo—a drawing of former Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a 
quote regarding a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion—one of her friends commented: 
I try so hard not to be political, but when will old white men decide that a woman 
aren’t smart enough or caring enough to be in charge of their own bodies . [sic] I 
am both furious and sad about what our Supreme Court has become. 
 
ECF No. 141 -3 at 1. Ms. Patrick responded, “I know…”. Id. Dr. Brauckmiller acknowledged , 
however, that Ms. Patrick had never made and race- or sex-based comments to him. ECF No. 141-
1, Brauckmiller Dep. at 184:18–24. 
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s stray-remarks framework,5 the Magistrate Judge reasoned that 
Ms. Patrick’s comment could not create a triable fact issue on discriminatory motive because it 
was unrelated to Dr. Brauckmiller, the investigation or his termination, and was not even made by 
the person who decided to terminate him. ECF No. 155 at 15. 
B. Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Title VII 
Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Dr. Brauckmiller’s 
retaliation claim . ECF No. 155 at 18 –20. Dr. Brauckmiller’s retaliation claim hinges on his 
 
5 The Fifth Circuit has explained that “comments are evidence of discrimination only if they are 1) related to the 
protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; 2) proximate in time to the complained -of adverse 
employment decision; 3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue; and 4) related 
to the employment decision at issue.” Jackson v. Cal -Western Packaging Corp. , 602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation omitted). “Comments that do not meet these criteria are considered ‘stray remarks,’ and standing 
alone, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. 

 
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assertion that he was terminated because he filed numerous complaints in which he alleged 
discrimination in the EOS investigation and a lack of due process from March to July 2022, and 
lodged a “counterclaim” against Ms. Gomez of sexual harassment related to a comment she made 
about his son on the same date he was placed on administrative leave. See ECF No. 78 at 6; ECF 
No. 141-1, Brauckmiller Dep. at 154:1–3. 
To begin, the Magistrate Judge found the timing of Dr. Brauckmiller’s complaints 
dispositive, concluding that because they were filed only after he was placed on administrative 
leave pending the investigation of Ms. Gomez’s report, “Dr. Brauckmiller’s complaints about the 
investigation of Ms. Gomez’s complaints cannot be the cause of the investigation; they were his 
reaction to it.” ECF No. 155 at 19 (emphasis added). 
As to termination, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Dr. Brauckmiller had not created a 
triable fact issue as to whether his complaints —about the EOS investigation and Ms. Gomez —
were the but-for cause of his termination because “[t]he only evidence connecting his complaints 
to the termination decision is the temporal relationship between the two .”6 ECF No. 155 at 20 
(citing Garcia v. Prof’l Contract Servs., 938 F.3d 236, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 
6 “[T]he ultimate determination in an unlawful retaliation case is whether the conduct protected by Title VII was a 
‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment decision.” Newsome v. Collin Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. , 189 F. App’x 353, 
356 (5th Cir. 2006). Even if retaliation is a motivating factor in a termination decision, no liability “arises if the 
employee would have been terminated even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield 
Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)). Thus, while temporal proximity alone between protected activity and 
termination can make out a prima facie case of retaliation, it cannot sustain the but -for causation requirement on its 
own. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden , 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001); Garcia v. Prof’l. Contract Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 
236, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2019). 

 
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DISCUSSION 
I. Legal Standards 
A. Review of Objections to a Report and Recommendation 
A party may serve and file objections to a Report and Recommendations within fourteen 
days. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), (b)(2). “Parties filing objections must specifically identify those 
findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the 
district court.” Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on other 
grounds by Douglass v. United States Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Courts must review de novo any of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions to which a party 
has specifically objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo 
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations 
to which objection is made.”). Any sections that were not clearly objected to are reviewed for clear 
error to determine whether they are contrary to law. Id.; see also United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 
1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989). 
B. Summary Judgment 
The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56. To establish that there is no genuine issue as to any materia l fact, the movant must 
either submit evidence that negates the existence of some material element of the non -moving 
party’s claim or defense, or, if the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support 
an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or defense. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 

 
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847 (5th Cir. 1992), on reh'g en banc, 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). 
Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that 
summary judgment is inappropriate. See Fields v. City of S. Hous ton, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th 
Cir. 1991). Any “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation 
are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment,” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 
539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003), and neither will “only a scintilla of evidence” meet the nonmovant ’s 
burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 3 7 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Rather, the 
nonmovant must “set forth specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning 
every essential component of its case.” Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 
380 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court will not assume “in the absence of any proof . . . that the nonmoving 
party could or would prove the necessary facts” and will grant summary judgment “in any case 
where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a 
judgment in favor of the nonmovant.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. 
For a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be 
satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words, 
that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enab le a reasonable jury to return a 
verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In 
making this determination, the court should review all the evidence in the record, giving credence 
to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as the “evidence supporting the moving party that 
is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from 
disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000). 
The Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion 

 
12 
for summary judgment, id. at 150, and must review all facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 2009). 
“On cross-motions for summary judgment, we review each party’s motion independently, 
viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 
Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010). 
II. Analysis 
Plaintiff raises several, overlapping categories of objections . He asserts that the R&R 
(A) improperly resolved disputed facts in UTSA’s favor; (B) applied the wrong Title IX regulatory 
framework; and (C) failed to address evidence of pretext, retaliation causation, and spoliation. See 
ECF No. 158. 
A. The Magistrate Judge’s Purported Weighing of Evidence 
Dr. Brauckmiller objects that the R&R relies on a selective reading of the record , makes 
impermissible credibility determinations, and improperly resolves disputed facts in favor of 
UTSA, despite his competing sworn declarations and UTSAPD’s findings identifying possible 
tampering, incomplete documentation, and the need for further interviews. ECF No. 158 at 2–3, 5. 
But the question on summary judgment is not whether Dr. Brauckmiller disputes the 
findings in the EOS report or even whether EOS’s finding were accurate. The question is whether 
UTSA was entitled to rely on the EOS report and, if not, whether its bad-faith reliance was pretext 
for discrimination or re taliation. As the Magistrate Judge accurately expl ained, “[i]t is not this 
Court’s role to evaluate the veracity of Ms. Gomez’s allegations but rather whether UTSA 
‘reasonably believed the employee’s allegation and acted on it in good faith.’” ECF No. 155 at 16 
(quoting Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010). 

 
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Dr. Brauckmiller has not identified competent summary judgment evidence suggesting that 
UTSA’s reliance on the EOS report was pretext for either sex-discrimination or retaliation. Little, 
37 F.3d at 1075 ; Brown, 337 F.3d at 541. Plaintiff argues that his sworn submissions constitute 
competent summary -judgment evidence that cannot be disregarded in favor of unsworn EOS 
summaries. ECF No. 158 at 3. 
But the Magistrate Judge did not disregard Dr. Brauckmiller’s submissions; rather, she 
concluded that, even crediting his sworn statements, the record does not raise a material fact issue 
as to either of his Title VII claims. See ECF No. 155 at 16–18; cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (directing 
courts to give cred ence to evidence that is “uncontradicted and unimpeached . . . the extent that 
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses”) (emphasis added) . In other words, even 
accepting his a llegations as true, “no reasonable trier of fact could have found for [Dr. 
Brauckmiller],” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
Similarly, Dr. Brauckmiller objects that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized the record 
by (1) introducing the term “backside,” which he states appears nowhere in the underlying 
materials; and (2) by implying that he asked for Ms. Gomez’s phone number, when she provided 
it without p rompting. See ECF No. 158 at 2. The term “backside” accurately and impartially 
describes the camera’s point of view in the photograph of Ms. Gomez in her swimsuit at issue in 
the underlying EOS investigation. See ECF No. 141 -9 at 36. The specific terminology the 
Magistrate Judge chose to describe the photo is immaterial to her recommendation. Whether Ms. 
Gomez provided her phone number without prompting is also immaterial in light of the summary 
judgment record. Even if Dr. Brauckmiller did not solicit her number: 
Certain findings by the investigation are not in dispute. Notably, Dr. 
Brauckmiller has admitted to texting and direct messaging Ms. Gomez —
his subordinate employee —on numerous occasions, including after 9:00 

 
14 
p.m. on a Saturday night with comments that are objectively suggestive and 
concern Ms. Gomez’s physical appearance. 
 
ECF No. 155 at 16 (citations omitted). 
Moreover, even if the EOS ’s report contained some inaccuracies, an employer “may fire 
an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous fact s, or for no reason 
at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Eugene v. Rumsfeld, 168 F. Supp. 
2d 655, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 
624 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Title VII does not shield employees from general unfairness; it prohibits 
adverse actions taken because of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”). 
Dr. Brauckmiller did not depose Ms. Gomez, a UTSA representative, or any other witness 
in support of his discrimination claim . Rather, he insists that UTSA is liable for discrimination 
under a “cat’s paw” theory, asserting that Ms. Patrick, a purportedly biased supervisor, shaped the 
evidentiary inputs on which the termination decision rested. ECF No. 15 8 at 5 (citing Staub v. 
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011)). But it is undisputed that Ms. Patrick did not author the 
EOS report, did not interview Plaintiff during the investigation, and was not the decision -maker 
for termination. Thus, Plaintiff has not produced competent evidence that Ms. Patrick ’s alleged 
bias was the proximate cause of his termination. 
In short, nothing in Dr. Brauckmiller’s submissions beyond his own subjective belief 
suggests that UTSA relied on the EOS report in bad faith as pretext for sex -discrimination or 
retaliation. Subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, cannot be the basis of judicial 
relief. See Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991). 
B. Application of Incorrect Title IX Regulatory Framework 
Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge applied the 2024 Title IX regulations rather than 
the 2020 regulations in effect at the time of the 2022 investigation. ECF No. 158 at 4 (referring to 

 
15 
a footnote in which the Magistrate Judge stated that “[t]he regulations implementing Title IX do 
not require a live hearing.” ECF No. 155 at 9 n.5 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.46(g)). 
While it appears that the 2020 regulations did require postsecondary institutions to provide 
for a live hearing, see 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (2020) , that discrepancy has no bearing on 
Plaintiff’s claims in this case, for two reasons. 
To begin, procedural deficiencies in an internal investigation may be relevant to a Title IX 
claim, but they do not establish that Plaintiff’s termination was motivated by race or sex 
discrimination under Title VII. 
Moreover, given that EOS found in Dr. Brauckmiller’s favor as to the Title IX complaint—
i.e., that his conduct did not rise to the level of illegal sexual harassment under Title IX—it is not 
clear that he would have standing to challenge any procedural deficiency even under Title IX. See 
ECF No. 141-9 at 5. 
Thus, Plaintiff’s objection that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized the Title IX 
regulations applicable at the time of the investigation is overruled. 
C. Alleged Failure to Address Evidence of Spoliation 
Dr. Brauckmiller argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to address the destruction of 
evidence after litigation notice. ECF No. 158 at 7, 11. The Magistrate Judge separately addressed 
this issue in denying Plaintiff ’s Motion to Correct and Clarify the Record (ECF No. 140), which 
she construed as a motion for reconsideration of the prior order denying sanctions (ECF No. 139), 
and found no manifest error of law or fact. Plaintiff ’s objections do not identify new evidence or 
legal authority warranting reconsideration of that determination. See generally ECF No. 158. 
Having conducted a de novo review of the challenged portions of the R&R, the Court finds 
the Magistrate Judge’s analysis sound and supported by the record. 

 
16 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Brauckmiller’s objections (ECF No. 158) are 
OVERRULED, and the R&R (ECF No. 155) is ADOPTED in its entirety. 
Accordingly, UTSA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 141) is GRANTED, 
Brauckmiller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 143) is DENIED, and his claims are 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A final judgment will issue pursuant to Rule 58. 
 It is so ORDERED. 
 SIGNED this 5th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
XAVIER RODRIGUEZ 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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