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govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_25-cv-02915-0

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee · 2026-06-08

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
 
JAMES MILTON PADBERG, JR., 
 
Petitioner, 
 
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 No. 2:25-cv-02915-TLP-atc 
v. ) 
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WARDEN C. HARRISON, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE, CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN 
IN GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS ON APPEAL 
 
 
In September 2025, Petitioner James Milton Padberg, Jr. petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 2.) 
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 
(“Habeas Rules”) requires the Court to conduct a preliminary review of a habeas petition to 
determine what response is required. A federal court may immediately dismiss a petition if it 
concludes that “the petition is frivolous[] or obviously lacking in merit” on its face. Allen v. 
Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970); Pillow v. Burton, 852 F. App’x 986, 989 (6th Cir. 
2021). Habeas Rule 4 says “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits 
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition 
and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 
As explained below, the Court DISMISSES the Petition WITHOUT PREJUDICE. PageID
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BACKGROUND 
In October 2021, Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport illegal aliens, in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (B)(i). (ECF No. 2 at PageID 4; see also United 
States v. Padberg, No. 2:21-cr-01355-AM (W.D. Tex.) (“Criminal Case”), ECF Nos. 21, 40, 60, 
62.) The district court sentenced him to eighty-four months with credit for time served since 
July 29, 2021, with three years of supervised release. (Criminal Case, ECF No. 62.) Petitioner 
did not appeal his sentence. In August 2024, the sentencing court denied Petitioner’s motion to 
reduce his sentence. (Criminal Case, ECF No. 76.) Petitioner did not appeal that decision either. 
The sentencing court recommended that Petitioner “serve this sentence at the [Federal 
Correctional Institute in] Bastrop[, Texas,] if possible.” (Criminal Case, ECF No. 62.) The 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) confines Petitioner at the Satellite Prison Camp, Millington 
(“SPC-Millington”) of the Federal Correctional Institute in Memphis, Tennessee (“FCI-
Memphis”). (ECF No. 2 at PageID 2, 4, 10; ECF No. 2-3 at PageID 18.) 
Petitioner asserts two claims. First, he alleges that “[t]he Warden has failed to award 
[Petitioner] his proper [(FSA1) (SCA2) (FTC)] time credits[,] keeping him in prison beyond his 
 
1 Under the First Step Act (“FSA”), eligible prisoners may earn time credits (“FTCs”) toward 
prerelease custody or supervised release when they successfully complete “evidence-based 
recidivism reduction programming” or “productive activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). An 
eligible inmate can earn 10 FTCs “for every 30 days of successful participation in evidence-
based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). 
An inmate can earn an additional 5 FTCs during those 30 days if (1) his or her recidivism-risk 
rating is minimum or low and (2) his or her risk of recidivism has not increased for two 
consecutive recidivism assessments by the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii); see also 28 
C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(2). 
2 Along with the FTCs, the BOP also assesses each inmate individually under the Second Chance 
Act (“SCA”) to determine whether they might qualify for up to 365 additional days of early 
transfer to prerelease custody. The Second Chance Act provides that the BOP shall “ensure that 
a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not 
to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to 
adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). PageID
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release date.” (ECF No. 2 at PageID 6.) The BOP FSA Time credit assessment for Petitioner 
says that his FSA Projected Release Date is July 16, 2026, with a Conditional Transition to 
Community date of March 8, 2025. (ECF 2-1 at PageID 13; see also Find an inmate., Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (showing Petitioner’s release date is July 16, 
2026) (inmate register number 57960-509) (last accessed June 3, 2026).) Petitioner does not 
request a corrected sentence calculation, although he claims he is being held in custody beyond 
his release date. (See ECF No. 2 at PageID 6.) 
Second, Petitioner alleges that his “FSA credits commenced the moment he was 
sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 because he was in BOP custody.” (Id.) 
Petitioner seeks immediate release to home confinement. (Id. at PageID 8.) 
LEGAL STANDARD 
For relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
“A necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief [to a petitioner] is a 
determination by the federal court that [their] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States.” Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Court Lacks Authority to Grant Petitioner’s Requested Relief 
Petitioner asks the Court to order the BOP to immediately release him to home 
confinement. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 8.) Petitioner’s claims are unavailing because the authority 
to order an inmate’s transition from prison rests exclusively with the executive, not judicial, 
branch of government. This Court has no statutory authority to order that Petitioner be released 
to home confinement. PageID
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Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a), “[a] person who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment . . . shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration 
of the term imposed, or until earlier release for satisfactory behavior pursuant to the provisions of 
section 3624.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a). “The BOP, not the court, is responsible for designating 
the place of a prisoner’s imprisonment.” United States v. Townsend, 631 F. App’x 373, 378 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)). The BOP’s “designation of a place of imprisonment ... 
is not reviewable by any court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Although a court may 
recommend placement in a community corrections facility, such a recommendation “shall have 
no binding effect on the authority of the Bureau under this section to determine or change 
the place of imprisonment of that person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); see also United States v. 
Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1991) (“While a judge has wide discretion in determining the 
length and type of sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to select the place where the sentence 
will be served. Authority to determine place of confinement resides in the executive branch of 
government . . . and is delegated to the Bureau of Prisons”) (quoting United States v. 
Dragna, 746 F.2d 457, 458 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
The BOP may place a prisoner in “prerelease custody” to afford the prisoner a reasonable 
opportunity to adjust to and prepare for reentry into the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). 
Congress has defined prerelease custody as home confinement or placement in a residential 
reentry center. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2). 
Although Congress has authorized the BOP to utilize either or both of these types 
of pre-release custody, it does not prescribe when one should be used rather than 
the other, nor does it mandate the use of home confinement. Instead, this is left to 
the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons, and there is no statutory requirement that 
any inmate be designated to home confinement for any portion of his sentence. 
Frierson v. Rardin, No. 2:24-cv-12456, 2025 WL 410072, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2025) 
(internal quotation omitted). “The prerelease custody statute does not give federal inmates an PageID
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enforceable entitlement to any particular form of prerelease custody and provides merely an 
authorization, rather than a mandate, for non-prison confinement at the end of a federal 
sentence.” Frierson, 2025 WL 410072, at *5. “Decisions regarding home confinement . . . as 
well as decisions regarding prison assignment are reserved to the Bureau of Prisons.”3 United 
States v. Mathews, No. 21-1697, 2022 WL 1410979, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022). As a result, 
“district court[s] lack[] authority to order [an inmate’s] immediate release” to home confinement. 
See United States v. Bravata, No. 22-1897, 2023 WL 6146991, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 2023) 
(affirming district court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for immediate release to home 
confinement).
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For the reasons explained above, the Court DISMISSES the § 2241 Petition WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. 
II. Appellate Issues 
A federal prisoner seeking relief under § 2241 need not obtain a certificate of 
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to challenge the denial of his petition. See Witham v. 
United States, 355 F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that § 2253 “does not require a 
certificate of appealability for appeals from denials of relief in cases properly brought under § 
2241, where detention is pursuant to federal process”). 
 
3 “[N]either the FSA nor the current version of § 3624(c) mandates that the BOP place prisoners 
in community corrections for any period of time. . . . [A] prisoner is neither entitled to nor 
guaranteed such placement [in a community facility] for any minimum amount of time.” United 
States v. Richards, No. 3:05-cv-0185, 2019 WL 2008572, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. May 7, 2019) 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), § 3621(b)). 
4 See also Kaiser v. Hollingsworth, Civ. No. 16-1288 (RBK), 2016 WL 6246308, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 25, 2016) (“Petitioner has no liberty interest in being placed in home confinement as 
opposed to being placed in an RRC”). PageID
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A habeas petitioner seeking to appeal must pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1913 and 1917. To appeal in forma pauperis in a § 2241 proceeding, the petitioner must obtain 
pauper status under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). Rule 24(a) provides that a party 
seeking pauper status on appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along with a 
supporting affidavit. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). If the district court certifies that an appeal would 
not be taken in good faith, or otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the petitioner 
must move to proceed in forma pauperis in the appellate court. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(4)–(5). 
Because the Court is without authority to grant Petitioner’s requested relief, the Court 
finds that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Court therefore CERTIFIES under 
Rule24(a) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and DENIES Petitioner leave to 
appeal in forma pauperis. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court cannot grant the relief sought in Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition. For these 
reasons, the Court DISMISSES the § 2241 Petition WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
SO ORDERED, this 8th day of June, 2026. 
s/Thomas L. Parker 
THOMAS L. PARKER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID
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