govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-3_26-cv-00734-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 
 
HECTOR CHAMALE XIQUIN, ) 
 ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) 3:26cv734 
 ) Electronic Filing 
LEONARD ODDO, MICHAEL ROSE, ) 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, ) 
TODD BLANCHE, ) 
 ) 
 Respondents. ) 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 Hector Chamale Xiquin ("petitioner") is an immigrant detainee presently held in 
Moshannon Valley Processing Center ("MVPC"). The Department of Homeland Security 
("DHS" and "respondent") seized petitioner in York, Pennsylvania, deemed him an "applicant 
seeking admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), commenced removal proceedings and 
subjected him to mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing. Petitioner seeks a 
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Among other things, he contends that his 
detention under § 1225 is improper and a determination as to release or detention pursuant to § 
1226 is required. In other words, he argues he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. For 
the following reasons, petitioner's writ will be granted to the extent it seeks such relief. 
 The court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held "in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States of America." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). "The 
Supreme Court [has] held that § 2241 confers jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to 
consider cases challenging the detention of aliens during removal proceedings." Bystron v. 
Hoover, 456 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) 
and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)). 

2 
 
 The petition sets forth the following factual background. DHS officials encountered 
petitioner in York on March 24, 2026. He stated that he is a Guatemalan national who entered 
the United States without formal inspection or admission by an immigration official. DHS 
officials subsequently arrested petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for lack of 
valid entry documentation and charged him with removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 
 After his arrest, petitioner told law enforcement that he had entered the United States 
approximately twenty years earlier at a location which he could not recall. DHS officials then 
transported petitioner to MVPC where he currently remains. 
Petitioner contends that respondent has mischaracterized him as "an applicant seeking 
admission" under § 1225. Instead, he maintains that because he entered the United States nearly 
two decades ago, has no criminal record and has long resided in the interior, § 1226 controls. In 
support, he relies on a growing consensus of judicial opinions rejecting respondent's position that 
all aliens present without being admitted are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. And 
in this regard petitioner relies on the Supreme Court's recognition that mandatory detention under 
§ 1225 generally applies only to aliens entering at the border or apprehended within close, 
temporal proximity thereto. But petitioner cannot properly be characterized as seeking 
admission under § 1225; instead, under long-standing interpretation and practice the 
government's ability to detain him assertedly is governed by the individualized assessment 
recognized in § 1226. 
 Respondent maintains that petitioner properly is classified as an applicant seeking 
admission under § 1225. From its perspective, any detainee who entered the country without an 
immigration official's approval is "seeking admission." It purportedly is immaterial whether the 
alien has been apprehended in the interior of the country or lived in the country for a significant 
period of time. Simply by virtue of never having been admitted by an immigration official, 

3 
 
respondent asserts that an alien actively is seeking admission until he or she is granted admission 
by an immigration official. 
 Given this backdrop, our central inquiry is whether an alien who is apprehended in the 
nation's interior after living there for a period of time actively is seeking admission under § 1225. 
We conclude that such an alien is not within the reach of that phase as used in the statute and that 
Congress authorized the detention or release of such individuals pursuant to an individualized 
assessment after a bond hearing under § 1226. This assessment is supported by the statutory 
text, the Supreme Court's teachings and guidance in the area, the protections of the Due Process 
Clause to those who have an established presence in the country, the last thirty years of executive 
and agency enforcement practices and the consensus of the judges in this District. 
 An overwhelming number of courts that have considered the matter have concluded that 
the plain text of the statutes brought into play by respondent's position actually supports 
petitioner's position. These courts have reasoned that the statutory scheme draws distinctions 
between those aliens who enter at a point of entry or are apprehended shortly after crossing the 
border and those who are found in the interior of the county after a meaningful passage of time. 
The primary source for recognizing this dichotomy is the plain text of the statutes in question. 
 Section 1225 states in relevant part: "An alien present in the United States who has not 
been admitted or who arrives in the United States. . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter 
an applicant for admission. . . [I]f the examining officer determines that an alien seeking 
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained 
for a proceeding under section 1229a[.]" 
Section 1226 states in relevant part: "[A]n alien may be arrested and detained pending a 
decision on whether alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in 

4 
 
subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General. . . may release the alien on 
bond. . . or conditional parole." 
 Respondent proffers recent decisions by the United States Ciurts of Appeals for the Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits which hold an alien lacking admission by an immigration official necessarily 
is "seeking admission" regardless of the individual circumstances underlying his or her presence 
in the United States. Interpreting § 1225 in this way, the Fifth Circuit found "the everyday 
meaning of the statute's terms confirms that being an 'applicant for admission' is not a condition 
independent from 'seeking admission.'" Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498, 502-
04 (5th Cir. 2026). Under this interpretation, the two terms are coterminous. In other words, an 
alien must be seeking admission if he or she has never been admitted. 
The Eighth Circuit followed suit: "we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the ordinary 
meanings of the phrases 'applicant for admission' and 'seeking admission' are the same." Avila v. 
Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 2026). The majority members of the panel further 
reasoned that the Supreme Court's teachings in Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. 281, 287 
(2018), did "not preclude the application of Section 1225 to aliens arrested in the interior. . . . 
While Jennings states that Section 1226 generally authorizes the Government to detain 'certain 
aliens already in the country,' id., this does not preclude other statutory provisions—such as 
Section 1225(b)(2)(A)—from also applying to such aliens." Avila, 170 F.4th at 1128. 
In contrast, the vast majority of district courts and more recently the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an 
"applicant for admission" who also is "seeking admission," and an alien who has been 
apprehended in the interior of the country long after entry and is awaiting adjustment of status 
based on a petition for cancellation of removal proceedings cannot be said to be "seeking 
admission." As a result, such an alien is not subject to mandatory detention under § 

5 
 
1225(B)(2)(A), but instead is to be considered for bond pursuant to an individualized inquiry 
under the discretionary authority reflected in § 1226. We agree. 
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Second Circuit opined: 
Today, although we part ways with two other circuits that have addressed this 
question, we join the overwhelming majority of federal judges across the Nation to 
consider [the government's position that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) 
applies] and conclude that the government's novel interpretation of the immigration 
statutes defies their plain text. That text makes clear that Section 1226(a) governs 
detention of noncitizens like Petitioner. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to such 
noncitizens, who are present in the United States after entering the country without 
inspection and admission, and who were not apprehended while entering the country or 
shortly thereafter. 
This result is dictated by the plain text of these provisions, and further confirmed 
by the statute's context, structure, history, and purpose. It likewise comports with the 
Supreme Court's established understanding of Sections 1225 and 1226. It reflects 
Executive Branch practice over thirty years and across five Presidential administrations. 
Moreover, it explains why Congress has never challenged that settled practice despite 
making numerous amendments to the immigration laws. Finally, even if the government's 
newfound interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) were plausible—and it is not—we 
would nonetheless reject it based on our obligation to construe these statutes in a manner 
that would avoid the serious constitutional questions attendant to what would be the 
broadest mass-detention-without-bond mandate in our Nation's history for millions of 
noncitizens. 
 
Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, -- F.4th --, 2026 WL 1146044, *2 (2d Cir. April 28, 2026). 
 In joining the decisions of over 370 judges nationwide,1 the Second Circuit decisively 
departed from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' statutory interpretations stating: 
the government's proposed statutory construction suffers from a fatal defect: it 
disregards the second requirement for this provision to apply, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) 
applies 'in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission' and provides for 
detention of 'an alien seeking admission.' It therefore only applies to a noncitizen who 
is both 'an applicant for admission' and who is 'seeking admission.' Petitioner may be 
an 'applicant for admission,' but he is not 'seeking admission.' 
 
 
1 As of February 12, 2026, 373 district court judges had agreed that the Section 1226 applies. 
See POLITICO Feb. 12, 2026 https://www.politico.com/news/2026/02/12/donald-trump-judges-
mandatory-detention-rulings-00778256. 

6 
 
Id. at * 5. The statutory definitions of "applicant for admission" and "admission" and the 
ordinary understanding of the term "seeking" confirm that "Section 1225(b)(2) therefore applies 
only to (1) noncitizens who are present and have not been admitted, and (2) are requesting (3) 
lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization." Id. at * 6. 
 Further, adoption of the government's position that an "applicant for admission" is a mere 
subset of the class of aliens "seeking admission" would render Congress' use of the latter term in 
§ 1225(b) superfluous. Had that been the intent of Congress, it could have achieved this result 
by omitting the term "seeking admission" altogether. Id. at * 8. But it chose to use both terms in 
that section of the statute and in doing so authorized ""bond for noncitizens who fit into only one 
category but mandate detention for noncitizens who fit into both." Id. at * 9. This 
"commonsense reading of the text in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) squares with the plain meaning of 
'seeking admission' and gives effect to each clause and word that Congress chose to write." Id. 
Understanding the text used in Sections 1225(b) and 1226 as drawing a distinction 
between applicants for admission and applicants seeking admission is the correct approach 
because the Supreme Court has told us that it is. In considering whether due process places 
constraints on the duration of detention under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), the Court in Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018), outlined the nature and scope of detention for "applicants 
for admission" as mandated in 1225 and contrasted the statutory directives governing that 
detention with the detention of aliens already in the county pending removal proceedings under 
§§ 1226(a) & (c). The Court considered "[t]he primary issue [as] the proper interpretation of §§ 
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c)." Id. at 289. 
In resolving whether Congress placed limitations on those individuals detained under § 
1225(b), the Court observed that in deciding "(1) who may enter the country and (2) who may 
stay here after entering," the Court explained that as to "applicants for admission" the decision-

7 
 
making pursuant to § 1225 "generally begins at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the 
Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible." Id. at 
287. In contrast, §§ 1226(a) and (c) govern the detention of certain groups of aliens "already in 
the country" pending the outcome of removal proceedings. Id. at 289. 
The Court ultimately held that "§§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) authorize detention until the end 
of applicable proceedings." Id. at 296. As to those aliens who are subject to detention under § 
1226(a), "[a]s long as the detained alien is not covered by § 1226(c), the Attorney General 'may 
release' the alien on 'bond ... or conditional parole.' § 1226(a). [And] Federal regulations 
provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention. 
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)." Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. 
As the Second Circuit aptly observed: 
the framework set forth in Jennings makes good sense in light of Congress’ overall 
approach to immigration detention. The statute creates a tiered scheme that makes detention and 
removal easier for noncitizens who have weaker legal claims and who are either particularly 
dangerous or about whom the government lacks information. Noncitizens who just arrived 
without documentation or who misrepresented themselves are subject to expedited removal and 
must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Noncitizens who snuck across the border less 
than two years ago may be treated the same way, but only if so designated by the Attorney 
General. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Noncitizens who present themselves to immigration officials 
at the border but are likely inadmissible for reasons other than a lack of documentation or 
misrepresentation must be detained, but they get full (not expedited) removal proceedings. Id. § 
1225(b)(2)(A). Finally, noncitizens who have been in the United States for more than two years 
get full removal proceedings, may be detained, and may be granted release on bond or 
conditional parole, id. § 1226(a), unless they have committed certain crimes, id. § 1226(c). Only 
that construction reads the detention and removal provisions as a “symmetrical and coherent” 
statutory scheme that fits “all parts into an harmonious whole.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 
Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 85. Jennings thus supports the tiered approach to detention that 
Congress mandated and that petitioner advances. 
 In contrast, the government's position would eliminate this tiered approach and run afoul 
of the longstanding recognition that once an alien has been present in the United States for a 

8 
 
substantial period of time, such an alien is entitled to more protections under the Due Process 
Clause. Id. at 86. In rejecting the argument that the government's position is supported by the 
"legal fiction" doctrine (which permits the government to treat an alien as still on the threshold) 
and its argument that the doctrine should apply regardless of the duration of time the alien has 
been present, the Second Circuit observed: "[u]nder settled Supreme Court precedent, 'aliens 
who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law." Id. (quoting 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (emphasis added by the 
Second Circuit)). "That is, 'once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, . . . 
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." Id. (quoting 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693). The government's interpretation of § 1225 "runs afoul of these 
fundamental principles." Id. 
 Additional aspects of the context and structure of §§ 1225 and 1226 undermine the 
government's position. The government's position reduces the reach of § 1226(a) to a narrow 
subset of applicants for admission, such as the detention of aliens who have overstayed their 
visas. But Congress chose to craft § 1226(a) more broadly, using the phrase "an alien," and 
reading it with the limitations the government's position would create is akin to ignoring the 
boundaries Congress drew in deciding the scope of its reach. Id. at 86-87. 
 Similarly, the government's position renders much of § 1226(c) superfluous. If its 
position were given effect, there would have been no need for the recent amendments through 
the Laken Riley Act, which eliminated the previously existing discretion under § 1226(a) with 
regard to aliens who have "committed a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c)(1)(A), or having engaged in terrorist activity, id. § 1226(c)(1)(D)." Id. at 87. But 
Congress recognized the need to reduce some of the discretion given the Secretary under § 

9 
 
1226(a) by removing certain categories of criminal offenders from the due process that § 1226(a) 
otherwise affords. Id. And reading § 1225(b)(2) as treating all applicants for admission as also 
seeking admission and outside the scope of § 1226(a) would render other sections of the 
statutory scheme unnecessary and meaningless and thus run afoul of the cannon against reading a 
provision in a manner rendering other parts of the statute pointless. Id. (citing Marx v. Gen. 
Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (the cannon against reading one provision of a statue 
to nullify another is at its strongest when the “interpretation would render superfluous another 
part of the same statutory scheme”) and Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 281 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A rudimentary principle of textual interpretation - so commonsensical 
that it scarcely needs citation - is that if one interpretation of an ambiguous provision causes it to 
serve a purpose consistent with the entire text, and the other interpretation renders it pointless, 
the former prevails.”)). 
 The past executive understanding and agency practices in the area likewise support 
petitioner's position. Five Presidential administrations consistently interpreted the provisions in 
question as drawing distinctions between aliens seeking to enter at the borders and those 
apprehended under circumstances temporally related thereto, and those who have more of a 
mooring to the nation and roots in their local communities. Id. at 91. Such a long lack of 
recognizing the newly claimed authority "is strong evidence that it does not exist." Id. at 92 
(quoting Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S. Ct. 628, 643 (2026); and Learning 
Res., Inc., 146 S. Ct. at 641 (plurality opinion) ("explaining that the 'breadth of authority' the 
government claims, coupled with its 'lack of historical precedent,' 'is a telling indication that the 
claimed power 'extend[s] beyond the President's legitimate reach'") (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). This is particularly telling here, given that agencies have strong incentive to 
maximize their own power and discretion. Id. (citing Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Lab., 

10 
 
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 119 (2022)). So when an agency has long 
failed to reach for a power and only changes its mind after many years, the complacency 
pursuant to a settled practice provides "persuasive evidence that the power was never conferred 
in the first place." Id. at 92-93 (citing Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 595 U.S. at 119). 
 Also, in the many amendments that occurred to the Illegal Immigrant Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act over these nearly thirty years, Congress never sought to correct or 
modified what had become the settled interpretation and agency practice. Id. And by subjecting 
only a small subset of criminal noncitizens to mandatory detention in the Laken Riley Act, 
Congress effectively blessed the established practice of considering all others for bond pursuant 
to an individualized basis. Id. "As with agency practice, 'Congress’ failure to repeal or revise 
the statute in the face of such administrative interpretation is persuasive evidence that that 
interpretation is the one intended by Congress." Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 
385 (1981) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) and citing 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 560 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Congressional silence 
in the face of administrative construction of a statute lends support to the validity of that 
interpretation.”). So the past executive and agency practice coupled with the lack of 
Congressional measures designed to correct that practice, despite multiple opportunities to do so, 
favors an interpretation that § 1225(b)(2) does not mandate detention for every applicant for 
admission regardless of individual circumstances placing them within the scope of § 1226(a). 
 And assuming a plain text analysis were to somehow fall short of answering the question 
at hand, crediting the government's interpretation would run the risk of creating constitutional 
challenges to the entire legislative scheme. "Under the constitutional-avoidance canon, when 
statutory language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation 
that raises serious constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alternative that avoids those 

11 
 
problems." Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 93 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286). 
"Importantly, '[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the 
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one 
construction,' and, otherwise, it 'simply has no application.'" Id. (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 
296). As emphasized above, petitioner's reading of "alien seeking admission" is the correct 
interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s plain text and therefore the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance has no immediate application. 
 But even assuming for the sake of argument that the government's position is a plausible 
one, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would render it the least appropriate choice. The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that individuals such as petitioner are protected by the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 ("A statute permitting indefinite 
detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem."). This is because 
once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process 
Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their 
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 210, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S. 
Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–598, 
and n. 5, 73 S. Ct. 472, 97 L. Ed. 576 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S 
.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); cf. Mezei, supra, at 212, 73 S. Ct. 625 (“[A]liens who have 
once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law”). 
Indeed, this Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final 
order of deportation, see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S. Ct. 977, 41 
L. Ed. 140 (1896), though the nature of that protection may vary depending upon status 
and circumstance, see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34, 103 S. Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 
21 (1982); Johnson, supra, at 770, 70 S. Ct. 936. 
 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94. And while Congress has the authority to direct the detention of 
aliens during the removal process, it has not granted the Attorney General the authority to hold 
such individuals in indefinite confinement. Id. at 696-97. 

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 Here, petitioner was arrested and detained as of March 24, 2026. He was charged with 
removal proceedings through the issuance of a notice to appear. The record lacks any additional 
details about the immediacy of those proceedings. Adopting the government's position would 
raise serious concerns regarding the potential unconstitutional infringement of petitioner's 
established liberty interests. 
Finally, all of the judges in this district to consider the matter have likewise rejected the 
respondent's reading of § 1225(b)(2) and adopted a statutory interpretation consistent with the 
one set forth above. See Calzado Diaz v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-458, 2025 WL 3628480 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 15, 2025) (Haines, J.) (rejecting government's novel interpretation of § 1225(a) and holding 
that "based on the Supreme Court's language in Jennings and the wording of §§ 1225 and 1226, 
the Court finds that § 1225 is tethered more closely to the border and § 1226 applies more readily 
to the interior of the country"), vacated as moot, Dkt. No. 22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2025) 
(emphasizing that the legal conclusions in the original opinion remain unchanged); Padilla 
Ventura v. Rose, No. 3:26-cv-65, Dkt No. 13 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2026) (Wiegand, J.) ("Petitioner 
asserts that he is subject to discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and not 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and, therefore, that he is entitled to a bond hearing. The 
Court agrees. Section 1226 applies to aliens who are “already present in the United States[,]” 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018), while the mandatory detention provision of § 
1225 governs detention of “applicants for admission” to the United States. Bethancourt Soto v. 
Soto, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025). The Court joins the 
overwhelming majority of district courts in holding that § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory 
detention provision of § 1225(b), applies to aliens similarly situated to Petitioner, who are not 
seeking admission at a port of entry but rather are already present in the country.); Aguirre-
Guevara v. Oddo, No. 3:26-cv-70 Dkt. No. 9 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2026 (Stickman, J.) (same); 

13 
 
Juarez Villagrez v. Noem, No. 3:26-cv-72, 2026 WL 545380 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026) (Ranjan, 
J.) ("Interpreting Section 1225(b)(2) to not apply to aliens already present in the country, and 
accused of no other crimes, avoids serious constitutional questions related to due process. The 
Court avoids those questions by adopting Petitioner’s and the majority’s view."); Sidahmed 
Ewah v. Oddo et. al., 2026 WL 1077694 at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2026) (Conti, J.) ("[T]he Third 
Circuit has not addressed this issue. The court joins the other judges in this district court in 
holding that § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b), applies to 
aliens similarly situated to Petitioner, who are not seeking admission at a port of entry but rather 
are already present in the country."). 
The undisputed facts of record demonstrate that petitioner is subject to detention under 
the sound exercise of the Secretary's discretion pursuant to § 1226(a) and entitled to an 
individualized bond hearing in conjunction therewith. DHS detained petitioner in York, 
Pennsylvania. Central Pennsylvania is indisputably not a border, port or place of entry. 
Furthermore, petitioner entered the country approximately twenty years ago. Twenty 
years extends well beyond the temporal proximity contemplated by § 1225 when defining 
"seeking admission." See, e.g., Zumba v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2753496 at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 
2025) ("the Court finds the structure of § 1225(b)(2) further indicates that it authorizes 
mandatory detention for noncitizens entering, attempting to enter, or who have recently entered 
the U.S., and does not encompass [aliens] who entered long ago . . . and have been residing in 
the U.S. for years.") (quoting Maldonado Vasquez v. Feeley, 2025 WL 2676082, at *13 (D. N.V. 
Sept. 17, 2025) (emphasis added)). These undisputed facts place petitioner squarely within § 
1226(a)'s discretionary scheme. 
The distinctions between an alien who has effectuated an entry into the United States and 
one who never has runs throughout immigration law. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. And once 

14 
 
such individuals have entered the country, the Due Process Clause provides various levels of 
protection, regardless of whether their entry and "presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, 
or permanent." Id. It is this temporal concept that delineates between those who are subject to § 
1225 and those whose detention is governed by § 1226. Aliens, like petitioner, who are "already 
present in the United States," are not subject to § 1225 detention because they cannot be said to 
be "seeking admission" as Congress used that term. And the constitutional avoidance doctrine 
eliminates any inkling of doubt as to the accuracy of this interpretation. 
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant petitioner's writ of habeas corpus in part 
and order the respondent to provide an individualized bond hearing that satisfies the fundamental 
requirements of due process. Appropriate orders will follow. 
Date: June 8, 2026 
 
 s/ David Stewart Cercone 
 David Stewart Cercone 
 Senior United States District Judge 
 
 
cc: Brendan T. Conway, AUSA 
 John H. Peng, Esquire 
 
 
 (Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail) 
 

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