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govinfo:USCOURTS-vtd-2_26-cv-00007-0
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
ESTATE OF JODY PIDGEON, )
JENNIFER PIDGEON, )
ADMINISTRATOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:26-cv-7
)
THE RUTLAND HOSPITAL, INC., )
D/B/A RUTLAND REGIONAL )
MEDICAL CENTER, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
The Estate of Jody Pidgeon, through Administrator Jennifer
Pidgeon, brings this action alleging, among other things,
medical malpractice resulting in Jody Pidgeon’s death at Rutland
Regional Medical Center (“RRMC”). The Complaint asserts five
state law causes of action and two claims (Counts I and II)
under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (“EMTALA”). Pending before the Court is
RRMC’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II for failure to state a
claim, and the remaining causes of action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the motion
to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Background
For purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, the facts in
the Complaint are accepted as true. The Complaint alleges that
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in February 2025, Jody Pidgeon suffered from several medical
conditions, including perforated bowel; chronic myelomonocytic
leukemia; atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular
disease; diabetes mellitus; and a respiratory syncytial virus
infection. He had been receiving treatment regularly at RRMC and
was insured by Medicare. RRMC is a hospital that accepts
payments from Medicare.
On February 8, 2025, Mr. Pidgeon went to the RRMC Emergency
Department and was admitted to the hospital. During his
hospitalization, RRMC employees urged him to enter hospice care
and to agree to a “do not resuscitate” (“DNR”) order. Mr.
Pidgeon initially agreed to a DNR, but later revoked his
consent.
While an inpatient at RRMC between February 8, 2025 and
February 10, 2025, Mr. Pidgeon suffered from infections and
episodes of delirium. On the morning of February 10, 2025, a
doctor at the hospital informed Mr. Pidgeon that he was going to
be discharged. Later that day, RRMC employees told Mr. Pidgeon
that he had to leave the hospital. Although he was having
trouble speaking, Mr. Pidgeon made clear that he wanted to stay.
A hospital employee placed him in a wheelchair and pushed him to
the exit of the RRMC Emergency Department. The Complaint alleges
that an RRMC employee then pushed him out the door.
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Mr. Pidgeon stood and tried to reenter the hospital, but
RRMC employees prevented him from doing so. At approximately
2:38 p.m. on February 10, 2025, an employee of the hospital
called the Rutland City Police Department (“RCPD”) asserting
that Mr. Pidgeon had been discharged and was “trespassing” by
failing to leave hospital grounds. RCPD then arrived at the
hospital and found Mr. Pidgeon sitting in a wheelchair in the
entrance to the RRMC Emergency Department, opposite members of
the hospital’s security team. According to the Complaint,
“[a]lmost the only thing Mr. Pidgeon could say in response to
questions from members of the hospital security team and the
RCPD officers was ‘help me.’” ECF No. 1 at 4.
Hospital employees told the police that Mr. Pidgeon was
faking, and was pretending to be unable to talk because he did
not want to leave. One RRMC employee prepared and signed a pre-
printed “no trespass” order and served it upon Mr. Pidgeon. The
hospital also provided Mr. Pidgeon with discharge instructions,
informing him that he should return the next day for treatment.
Hospital employees and police officers each told Mr.
Pidgeon to get out of his wheelchair. RCPD officers then lifted
him from the wheelchair, held his arms and walked him to his
vehicle in the Emergency Department parking lot. One officer
told Mr. Pidgeon he would be arrested if he returned to the
hospital. The police then left RRMC.
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Mr. Pidgeon remained in his vehicle, the windshield of
which was covered in snow. A hospital employee went to the
vehicle, removed the snow, and told Mr. Pidgeon he had to leave.
According to the Complaint, a different hospital employee “has
said that Mr. Pidgeon’s condition was such that he should not
have been made to operate a motor vehicle.” Id. at 5. Mr.
Pidgeon drove away, hitting at least two other cars while
leaving the parking lot. A hospital employee called the police.
RCPD officers found Mr. Pidgeon’s vehicle in a parking lot
a short distance from the hospital. The front of the vehicle was
in a snow bank. The vehicle did not have significant damage. Mr.
Pidgeon was not responsive. RCPD officers broke a window in the
vehicle and removed Mr. Pidgeon. The officers determined that he
was in an altered mental state, and at 3:19 p.m. called the
Rutland Regional Ambulance Service (“Ambulance Service”). EMTs
employed by the Ambulance Service arrived at the scene at 3:21
p.m.
At least one EMT found Mr. Pidgeon “hot to touch,” saying
he showed “signs of profound shock.” Id. at 6. The EMT concluded
that Mr. Pidgeon was septic, which the Complaint alleges is “a
life-threatening condition that occurs when the body’s immune
system reacts to infection.” Id. EMTs put Mr. Pidgeon in an
ambulance and transported him approximately one minute back to
RRMC, arriving at the hospital at 3:28 p.m.
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EMTs pushed Mr. Pidgeon, who was lying on a gurney, into
the hospital. His complexion was gray, his lips were dried and
cracked, and his stomach was distended. His body was covered
with dark purple sores, and thick, dark blood was coming from
his nose. His legs from the knees down were two to three times
their normal size, and there were open wounds on his shins and
feet.
RRMC employees told the EMTs they could not bring Mr.
Pidgeon into the Emergency Department. According to at least one
witness, Mr. Pidgeon was writhing in pain and unable to say much
more than “help.” At least one RRMC employee allegedly asserted
that Mr. Pidgeon was “faking it.” An EMT from the Ambulance
Service reportedly responded: “I guarantee you he’s not f-ing
faking it. He’s hot to the touch and he’s septic.” Id. The
Complaint alleges that RRMC health care providers nonetheless
refused or failed to provide Mr. Pidgeon with medical care. More
specifically, the Complaint alleges that Dr. Daniel Burton saw
Mr. Pidgeon in the hallway outside the Emergency Department but
“failed to do a proper assessment of Mr. Pidgeon and failed [to]
provide any care to Mr. Pidgeon.” Id. at 7.
One Ambulance Service EMT and one RRMC security guard tried
to provide Mr. Pidgeon with care while he was lying on the
gurney at the entrance to the Emergency Department. They then
took Mr. Pidgeon into the Emergency Department themselves, and
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an EMT attempted to provide him with oxygen. The EMT also placed
heart-monitor leads on Mr. Pidgeon’s body. According to the EMT,
the machine linked to the monitors immediately began alerting
with audible alarms. The EMT allowed the alarms to continue in
order to draw the attention of RRMC healthcare providers.
According to the EMT, “[n]o nurses came but Dr. Burton did stand
outside of the room without providing physical assistance.” Id.
An Ambulance Service EMT informed Dr. Burton that Mr.
Pidgeon’s condition was rapidly deteriorating. Dr. Burton
entered the room and asked Mr. Pidgeon if he wanted to be
intubated. Mr. Pidgeon, who had been struggling to speak, gave
an audible “yes.” Dr. Burton then left the room. After several
minutes, a different RRMC physician walked to the doorway,
looked at Mr. Pidgeon and “was visibly shocked.” Id. at 8. That
physician subsequently ordered RRMC employees to take Mr.
Pidgeon to a resuscitation room for treatment. While RRMC
Emergency Department personnel, including Dr. Burton, were
trying to intubate Mr. Pidgeon, another RRMC employee told them
not to intubate. Mr. Pidgeon died during the intubation process,
at approximately 4:48 p.m.
At 5:08 p.m., the RCPD received a call from someone at the
hospital. A detective arrived at the hospital at approximately
5:34 p.m. to begin an investigation. The detective reported that
“there were no visual signs of trauma due to the motor vehicle
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accident.” Id. at 9. On February 11, 2025, an autopsy report
identified the cause of death as “chronic myelomonocytic
leukemia” and “other significant condition” including bowel
perforation cause by an ingested toothpick. Id. The Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner ruled the manner of death was an
accident, identifying the ingested toothpick as the cause. Id.
The Chief Medical Examiner’s report also concluded that “[w]hile
the date of the injury is uncertain, the gross and
histopathologic appearance of this bowel perforation suggest a
more remote injury/perforation.” Id. at 9-10. The Complaint
alleges that the bowel perforation is a probable cause of one of
the infections Mr. Pidgeon experienced while an inpatient at
RRMC between February 8, 2025 and February 10, 2025.
The Complaint sets forth seven causes of action. Count I
brings a claim under EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, for failure to
stabilize Mr. Pidgeon before his discharge from the hospital on
February 10, 2025. Count II alleges a second EMTALA claim for
failure to provide an appropriate screening when Mr. Pidgeon was
returned to the hospital by ambulance. Counts III through VII
allege state law claims: intentional and/or reckless infliction
of emotional distress on Mr. Pidgeon (Count III); medical
malpractice for wrongful injury to Mr. Pidgeon before his death
(Count IV); medical malpractice for wrongful death (Count V);
intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress on
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Mr. Pidgeon’s wife, Jennifer Pidgeon (Count VI); and Jennifer
Pidgeon’s loss of consortium (Count VII).
Pending before the Court is RRMC’s motion to dismiss Counts
I and II for failure to state a claim, and to dismiss the
remaining state law causes of action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Discussion
I. Motion to Dismiss Standards
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual
allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. Romanova v. Amilus Inc., 138 F.4th 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2025). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Kaplan
v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 999 F.3d 842, 854 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The
Court’s charge in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ‘is merely to
assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the
weight of the evidence which might be offered in support
thereof.’” Jennings v. Hunt Companies, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 66,
69 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Eternity Glob. Master Fund Ltd. v.
Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is proper when “the
district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate” the plaintiff’s claim. Doyle v. Midland Credit
Mgmt., Inc., 722 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks
omitted). When a court has original jurisdiction over a claim,
as when a claim is brought pursuant to a federal statute, the
court also has “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court “may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c).
II. EMTALA
Enacted in 1986, EMTALA forbids “patient dumping, the
practice of refusing to provide emergency medical treatment to
patients unable to pay, or transferring them before emergency
conditions are stabilized.” Hardy v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp.
Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1999). The statute requires
that hospitals first provide an “appropriate medical screening
examination ... to determine whether or not an emergency medical
condition ... exists.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). If an individual
is determined to have an emergency medical condition, the
hospital must “stabilize” the condition before transferring the
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patient “outside [the] hospital’s facilities.” Id. §§ 1395dd(b)
and (c) (discussing stabilization and restrictions on transfer).
As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, the statute was intended to prevent
the practice of some hospital emergency rooms turning
away or transferring indigents to public hospitals
without prior assessment or stabilization treatment.
In enacting EMTALA, Congress was concerned with
widespread reports of emergency rooms “dumping”
indigent patients from one hospital to the next
without regard to the patients’ medical conditions.
Congress’ solution was to guarantee patient entry into
the medical system via mandatory appropriate medical
screenings and stabilization prior to transfer.
Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772–73 (11th Cir. 2002)
(internal citations omitted). “Although Congress was concerned
that the indigent and uninsured tended to be the primary victims
of patient dumping, EMTALA is not limited to these individuals.”
Torretti v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir.),
amended, 586 F.3d 1011 (3d Cir. 2009); see also id. (“any
individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a
hospital’s violation of the statute may bring a private civil
action for damages”).
“The legislative history of EMTALA makes clear the statute
was not intended to be a federal malpractice statute, but
instead was meant to supplement state law solely with regard to
the provision of limited medical services to patients in
emergency situations.” Harry, 291 F.3d at 773 (citations
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omitted). The Second Circuit similarly concluded that “EMTALA is
not a substitute for state law on medical malpractice [and is
not] intended to guarantee proper diagnosis or to provide a
federal remedy for misdiagnosis or medical negligence.” Hardy,
164 F.3d at 792 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
A. Failure to Stabilize
Count I alleges a failure to stabilize as required by 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1). Section 1395dd(b)(1) provides as follows:
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency
medical conditions and labor
(1) In general
If any individual (whether or not eligible for
benefits under this subchapter) comes to a hospital
and the hospital determines that the individual has an
emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide
either —
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the
hospital, for such further medical examination and such
treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical
condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical
facility in accordance with subsection (c).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
RRMC offers several arguments for dismissal of Count I. The
hospital first contends that the statute requires knowledge of
an emergency medical condition, and that it had no knowledge of
Mr. Pidgeon’s bowel perforation. RRMC also argues that
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Plaintiff’s claim does not apply to the time between February 8
and February 10 when Mr. Pidgeon was an admitted patient. The
Complaint states that the facts underlying Count I occurred
prior to Mr. Pidgeon’s discharge from the hospital on February
10, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 10.
At least one court in this Circuit has held that a
“hospital’s obligations under EMTALA end when the hospital
admits a patient for inpatient care.” Neeseman v. Mt. Sinai
West, No. 17-CV-1766 (LGS), 2018 WL 626358, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 2018) (dismissing EMTALA claim against hospital defendants
because the complaint did not allege that plaintiff was denied
emergency care) (citing cases). Neeseman explained that
“[a]lthough the Second Circuit has not addressed the issue, the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as well as district courts throughout
the country, have” applied that same holding. 2018 WL 626358, at
*4 (citing Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162,
1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1996)). Neeseman also cited the
relevant federal regulation, which states:
(i) If a hospital has screened an individual under
paragraph (a) of this section and found the individual
to have an emergency medical condition, and admits
that individual as an inpatient in good faith in order
to stabilize the emergency medical condition, the
hospital has satisfied its special responsibilities
under this section with respect to that individual.
42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2).
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Count I applies to the time period during which Mr. Pidgeon
was an admitted inpatient at RRMC. There is no allegation that
his admission on February 8, 2025 was in bad faith. He spent two
days in the hospital and was discharged. Plaintiff claims the
hospital failed to stabilize his condition.
As the federal regulation makes clear, once Mr. Pidgeon was
admitted after screening on February 8, the hospital had no
further obligation under EMTALA. See 42 C.F.R. §
489.24(d)(2)(i); see also Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1168 (“We hold
that EMTALA’s stabilization requirement ends when an individual
is admitted for inpatient care.”). He was not being “dumped” to
another hospital or refused care. To the extent his treatment
during that two-day period gave rise to a claim of medical
malpractice for failure to stabilize his condition, his remedies
lie in state law, not federal law. See Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1169
(“After an individual is admitted for inpatient care, state tort
law provides a remedy for negligent care. If EMTALA liability
extended to inpatient care, EMTALA would be converted into a
federal malpractice statute, something it was never intended to
be.”) (cleaned up)).
RRMC also moves to dismiss Count I because its staff had no
knowledge of Mr. Pidgeon’s emergency condition. There is no
dispute that RRMC did not know about the toothpick that had
perforated Mr. Pidgeon’s bowel.
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EMTALA’s stabilization requirement is triggered when “the
hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical
condition.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1). Courts have interpreted
this language as requiring “actual knowledge” of such a
condition. See, e.g., Torretti v. Main Line Hospitals, Inc., 580
F.3d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that statute requires “the
hospital actually knew of [plaintiff’s emergency medical]
condition”); Battle v. Mem. Hosp. at Gulfport, 228 F.3d 544, 558
(5th Cir. 2000) (“The duty to stabilize does not arise unless
the hospital has actual knowledge that the patient has an
unstabilized medical emergency.”); Cleland v. Bronson Health
Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268-69 (6th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting “the vague phrase ‘emergency medical condition’ to
mean a condition within the actual knowledge of the doctors on
duty”); see also Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139,
145 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that hospitals are not held
“accountable [under EMTALA] for failing to stabilize conditions
of which they are not aware, or even conditions of which they
should have been aware”). The Second Circuit has not addressed
this statutory provision.
In this case, RRMC staff believed that Mr. Pidgeon required
non-emergency medical care, as his discharge papers required him
to return the next day. With respect to any emergent medical
needs, however, RRMC did not perceive any such needs. In fact,
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at least one RRMC staff member accused Mr. Pidgeon of faking his
condition.
Plaintiff argues that actual knowledge of the underlying
condition is not required, and that the question is instead
whether the hospital knew that Mr. Pidgeon’s condition would
materially deteriorate without treatment. Under the statute,
however, the likelihood of “material deterioration” is a
criterion for determining whether the patient has been
adequately stabilized. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3). It does not
modify the requirement that, for EMTALA’s stabilization
provision to apply, a hospital must have determined the
existence of an emergency medical condition. 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(b)(1).
The facts alleged in the Complaint suggest that RRMC may be
liable for misdiagnosis – a claim that sounds in state law.
Despite treating Mr. Pidgeon in the hospital for two days,
hospital personnel did not “determine” that he had an emergency
medical condition. Id. Consequently, and because Mr. Pidgeon was
an admitted patient prior to his discharge, RRMC cannot be held
liable under EMTALA for failure to stabilize.
B. Failure to Screen
Count II alleges a failure to screen. The facts underlying
the claim occurred after Mr. Pidgeon returned to the hospital by
ambulance on the afternoon of February 10, 2025. According to
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the Complaint, he was brought to the hospital by Ambulance
Service EMTs at 3:38 p.m. He was ultimately taken to a
resuscitation room and died at 4:48 p.m. after an attempted
intubation.
RRMC first argues that, as with the failure to stabilize
claim, Count II fails because the Complaint alleges Mr. Pidgeon
was admitted to the hospital. RRMC’s citation to the Complaint,
however, references Mr. Pidgeon’s admission on February 8, 2025.
(ECF No. 8 at 7 (citing Complaint paragraph 15)). Count II
pertains to his return to the hospital by ambulance on February
10, 2025. See ECF No. 1 at 11 (Complaint paragraph 110).
Although the Complaint states that Mr. Pidgeon was brought into
the hospital on the afternoon of February 10 and taken to a
resuscitation room, it does not state that he was re-admitted.
Accordingly, and based solely on the allegations in the
Complaint, the Court will not dismiss Count II on the basis of a
hospital admission.
RRMC also argues that Plaintiff must show Mr. Pidgeon’s
treatment deviated from the hospital’s standard screening
procedure. “EMTALA’s requirement that individuals seeking
emergency care receive an ‘appropriate medical screening
examination’ obligates hospitals to ‘apply uniform screening
procedures to all individuals coming to the emergency room.’”
Jones v. Beth Israel Hosp., No. 1:17-CV-3445-GHW, 2018 WL
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1779344, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2018) (quoting Matter of Baby
K, 16 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 825
(1994)). “To prevail on a failure to screen claim, a plaintiff
must identify a ‘departure from standard screening procedures’
the hospital otherwise applies to patients.” Grenier v. Stamford
Hosp. Stamford Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-0970 (VLB), 2016
WL 3951045, at *2 (D. Conn. July 20, 2016) (quoting Fisher v.
New York Health & Hosps. Corp., 989 F. Supp. 444, 449 (E.D.N.Y.
1998)). RRMC submits that Plaintiff has failed to identify any
such standard procedures, and has failed to allege that hospital
staff treated Mr. Pidgeon in a way that was different from
others with the same medical condition(s).
Plaintiff asks the Court to apply common sense to the
question of protocol. The argument is that the hospital’s
standard procedures could not have called for denial of care to
a person who is delivered to the hospital by ambulance, clearly
in significant pain, while EMTs are urging treatment. The Court
agrees that such a protocol would not satisfy EMTALA’s
requirement of an “appropriate” medical screening. To the extent
actual protocols were in place, those may be revealed in the
course of discovery.
“EMTALA does not define ‘appropriate medical screening
examination’ except to say that the purpose of such a screening
is to identify an ‘emergency medical condition.’” Byrne v.
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Cleveland Clinic, 684 F. Supp. 2d 641, 651 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
Here, no such screening occurred. When EMTs urged hospital staff
to accept Mr. Pidgeon as a patient, at least some staff stood by
and declined to do so. The EMTs ultimately wheeled him into the
hospital, accessed monitoring equipment, confirmed his serious
condition, and again alerted hospital staff. RRMC allegedly
failed to address that condition in a timely manner, and Mr.
Pidgeon died approximately 70 minutes later.
RRMC argues that, at most, the Complaint presents a
question of delayed treatment, and that the delay in this case
was insufficient to give rise to a claim under EMTALA. The Court
disagrees. The Complaint alleges that when Mr. Pidgeon was
returned to the hospital via ambulance, the hospital refused to
screen him. Although EMTs effectively conducted the screening
themselves, accessing hospital equipment in order to objectively
demonstrate Mr. Pidgeon’s condition, their actions do not
necessarily relieve the hospital of its duty to screen. The
Complaint alleges a plausible claim of failure to screen, and
the motion to dismiss that claim is denied.
III. State Law Claims
The Court retains subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims that are “so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In this
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case, the remaining claims in the Complaint arise primarily out
of the hospital’s treatment of Mr. Pidgeon on February 10, 2025.
Those claims are directly related to the EMTALA failure to
screen claim alleged in Count II, and “form part of the same
case or controversy.” Id. The Court therefore retains
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law causes of action, and
the motion to dismiss those claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, RRMC’s motion to dismiss
(ECF No. 8) is granted in part and denied in part. Count I of
the Complaint is dismissed. RRMC’s motion to stay (ECF No. 14)
is denied as moot. The motion for extension of time to file a
discovery schedule (ECF No. 14) is granted, and the parties
shall submit a stipulated discovery order within 14 days of this
Opinion and Order.
DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 4
th
day of June 2026.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
Hon. William K. Sessions III
U.S. District Court Judge
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