govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cr-00290-5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
 
United States of America, 
 
v. 
 
Leterence Bembry, 
 
Defendant. 
 
________________________________/ 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
ORDER 
The United States charged Defendant Leterence Bembry with 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841 and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922. (Dkt. 1.) Defendant Bembry moved to 
suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop, arguing 
police had no reason to stop him. (Dkts. 23, 29, 31.) The Magistrate 
Judge issued a repor t, recommending denial of the motion. (Dkt. 119.) 
Defendant Bembry objects. (Dkt. 125.) The Court overrules his 
objections and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

2 
 
I. Background 
On September 16, 2022, Sergeant Nicholas Marinelli stopped 
Defendant Bembry after seeing the driver-side brake light on Defendant 
Bembry’s car was not working. (Dkt. 45 at 13.) When he approached the 
car, Defendant Bembry rolled down his window. ( Id. at 13.) Sergeant 
Marinelli immediately smelled “a very strong odor of unburnt marijuana 
coming from the vehicle” and saw an open beer in the cup holder. (Id. at 
13, 17.) Defendant Bembry provided a driver’s license bearing the name 
Michael Eugene Marcus Cole. (Id. at 16.) 
Sergeant Marinelli’s body camera captured the ensuing interaction. 
The officer asked Defendant Bembry to step out of the car, Defendant 
Bembry asked why he had to get out of the car, and the officer said “you 
got weed in the car and I can see the beer in the cupholder there.” 
(Dkt. 113 at 0:58–1:06.) Defendant Bembry then got out of the car. (Id.) 
Back by the police car, Sergeant Marinelli asked Defendant Bembry 
whether he had marijuana in the car. ( Id. at 1:45– 1:55.) Rather than 
answering, Defendant Bembry asked why the officer ha d stopped him, 
and Sergeant Marinelli answered, “I stopped you because your brake 
light’s out.” (Id.) Defendant Bembry denied that and motioned to his 

3 
 
illuminated taillights. ( Id. at 2:00.) The officer explained he was 
referring to the brake light that illuminate s when the driver hits the 
brake pedal. (Id. at 2:08.) Sergeant Marinelli said he intended to search 
the car after another officer arrived . ( Id. at 2:20.) Defendant Bembry 
denied having any marijuana in his car. (Id. at 3:00.) Sergeant Marinelli 
asked, “you sure nothing in the car ,” Defendant Bembry responded, “go 
ahead, you can search it, ” and the officer replied, “I know I can ‘cause I 
can smell it . . . .” (Id. at 3:33–3:42.) 
Officer Davis arrived on the scene. (Id. at 5:00.) The officers again 
asked Defendant Bembry if he had drugs in his car, and Defendant 
Bembry again asked why he had been stopped . ( Id. at 5:22 –5:27.) 
Sergeant Marinelli repeated: “just like I told you, because your brake 
light’s out.” (Id.) Sergeant Marinelli then offered to demonstrate the 
problem: “if you want, I’m gonna go and hit on the brake light and you 
can see what I’m talking about.” (Id. at 5:27–5:31.) Defendant Bembry 
responded: “please.” (Id. at 5:33.) 
Officer Davis’s body-camera captured the rear of the vehicle during 
the demonstration . (Dkt. 116 at 1:25 –1:30.) It shows that, when 
Sergeant Marinelli pressed the brake pedal, the brake light in the center 

4 
 
of the rear spoiler illuminated but the driver- side brake light did 
not— thus confirming Sergeant Marinelli’s contention that the brake 
light was not working. (Id. at 1:26.) Sergeant Marinelli said, “see that?” 
(Id. at 1:29.) Defendant Bembry did not respond. (Id.) 
Sergeant Marinelli returned to Defendant Bembry, told him to turn 
around, and placed him in handcuffs. ( Id. at 1:30 –1:55.) A t the same 
time, he signaled “69”—code for a weapon—to Officer Davis . (Id. at 1:41; 
Dkt. 45 at 18.) At an evidentiary hearing, Sergeant Marinelli explained 
that, when he leaned into the car to press the brake pedal, he saw a gun 
in the driver’s seat. (Dkt. 45 at 18– 19.) Sergeant Marinelli told 
Defendant Bembry he was under arrest f or possessing the firearm . 
(Dkt. 113 at 7:10–7:15.) 
At a second evidentiary hearing, Defendant Bembry presented 
testimony from an investigator who testified that neither the officer ’s 
so-called CAD report from the night nor the dispatch recording 
mentioned a faulty brake light. (Dkt. 99 at 41– 42.) Defendant Bembry 
also presented testimony from his mechanic (Kenneth Smith), who 
testified he replaced the car’s lights two days before and confirmed the 
brake lights were working. (Id. at 36.) 

5 
 
The Magistrate Judge concluded the United States presented 
evidence that Defendant Bembry ’s driver-side brake light was not 
working on the night of the stop and that Sergeant Marinelli stopped him 
because of that traffic infraction. (Dkt. 119 at 8.) She also concluded 
Officer Davis’s bodycam footage corroborated Sergeant’s Marinelli’s 
testimony. ( Id. at 9.) Although finding the mechanic credible and 
acknowledging the absence of any reference to the brake light in the CAD 
report, she concluded that evidence did not overcome the United States’s 
evidence that the brake light was out. She thus concluded Sergeant 
Marinelli reasonabl y believed Defendant Bembr y violated O.C.G.A. 
§ 40-8-25(b) by operating a vehicle with a non -functioning brake light. 
(Id. at 14–15.) So, she recommends denial of Defendant Bembry’s motion 
to suppress. (Id.) Defendant objects. (Dkt. 125.) 
II. Standard of Review 
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and 
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a 
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 
Fed.
 R. Crim. P. 59; Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 
1982) (per curiam). A district judge “shall make a de novo determination 

6 
 
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The 
district judge should “give fresh consideration to those issues to which 
specific objection has been made by a party .” Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of 
Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). For 
those findings and recommendations to which a party has not asserted 
objections, the court must conduct a plain error review of the record. See 
United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983). Parties filing 
objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation must identify those 
findings to which they object. Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 
(11th Cir. 1988). “Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be 
considered by the district court.” Id. 
III. Discussion 
A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United 
States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009). To justify a 
traffic stop , an officer must have a reasonable suspicion th e driver 
committed criminal activity . United States v. Campbell , 26 F. 4th 860, 
880 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 

7 
 
(2014)).1 Even minor traffic violations suffice. Id. C ourts assess 
reasonable suspicion from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 
police officer under the circumstances . See United States v. 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United 
States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A] court must 
examine the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether 
a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). “Upon 
a motion to suppress evidence garnered through a warrantless search 
and seizure, the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the search 
rests with the prosecution.” United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 
(11th Cir. 1983). 
 
1 Courts previously debated whether officers needed probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion for this type of stop. The Eleventh Circuit 
addressed this in Campbell, noting its prior statement in United States 
v. Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016) that, “[p]ursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment, police may stop a vehicle if they have probable cause 
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred” and the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809– 10 (1996) that 
“the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have 
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred .” See 
Campbell, 26 F. 4th at 880 n.15. The Eleventh Circuit, however, noted 
the Supreme Court in Heien “made clear that reasonable suspicion is all 
that is required.” Id. “[P]robable cause is sufficient, [but] only reasonable 
suspicion is necessary.” Id. 
 

8 
 
“To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth 
Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, 
giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community ’s 
protection.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60 –61. Under th e so-called Heien 
doctrine, a reviewing court can find an officer acted with a reasonable 
suspicion of unlawful behavior even if a police officer misunderstood the 
lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct so long as the officer’s 
misunderstanding was reasonable. United States v. Braddy, 11 F. 4th 
1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We need not determine whether [the police 
officer’s] interpretation of the relevant Alabama statutes is correct 
because, even assuming [the statute] does not apply to nonresident 
motorists, we find [the officer’s] contrary interpretation to be objectively 
reasonable.”). 
Defendant Bembry objects to both the Magistrate Judge’s 
conclusion that the United States presented evidence Sergeant Marinelli 
stopped him for having a faulty brake light and that such an observation 
(if correct) permitted the traffic stop. 

9 
 
A. Sergeant Marinelli Reasonably Believed the Brake 
Light Was Broken 
 
The Magistrate Judge credited Sergeant Marinelli’s testimony that 
he stopped Defendant Bembry after noticing a broken brake light. 
Defendant Bembry argues the Magistrate Judge clearly erred because 
“the weight of the objective record evidence and witness’s own 
admissions” contradict his testimony. (Dkt. 125 at 1.) He says Sergeant 
Marinelli’s testimony cannot “bear the evidentiary weight” the 
Magistrate Judge places on it. (Id. at 3.) He cites four things in support 
of this attack. 
First, he says the Magistrate Judge improperly credit ed Sergeant 
Marinelli’s testimony that the brake light was out because the witness 
gave “flatly contradictory testimony about when and how he made that 
observation across the two evidentiary hearings.” (Dkt. 125 at 3.) In the 
first hearing, Sergeant Marinelli testified he first noticed the light was 
not working when he was behind Defendant Bembry , they “slowed for 
traffic,” and the brake lights other than the driver’s brake light 
illuminated. (Dkt. 45 at 20.) A t the second hearing, he said “when I 
observed the brake light out, we were stopped, and once we started 
moving is when I initiated the stop.” (Dkt. 99 at 11 –12.) In the report 

10 
 
and recommendation , the Magistrate Judge noted this but concluded 
“any ‘inconsistency’ in the testimony regarding when Sergeant Marinelli 
first noticed the non -functioning brake light is not material given the 
credible, corroborated testimony that the driver-side brake light was not 
functioning at the time of the stop and the uncontroverted testimony that 
Sergeant Marinelli was behind Defendant Bembry in a position to see the 
rear of the car.” (Dkt. 119 at 10 n.5.) Defendant Bembry disagrees and 
argues th e Magistrate Judge was improperly “speculating ‘that both 
vehicles stopped in preparation for a turn, ’” which amounts to 
rehabilitating a witnessed “by constructing a third narrative that the 
witness himself never offered.” (Dkt. 125 at 3.) He characterizes this as 
“speculative reconciliation.” (Id. at 4.) 
The Court disagrees. For starters, the Court cannot find the alleged 
quote about the Magistrate Judge speculating that both vehicles stopping 
for a turn in the report and recommendation. It does not appear the 
Magistrate Judge did that, at least not in the written order. Instead, the 
Magistrate Judge explained any discrepancy was insufficient to outweigh 
her assessment of Sergeant Marinelli’s credibility as a witness in the 
light of the overwhelming evidence that the brake light was out—most 

11 
 
notably the evidence from Officer Davis’s body camera of Sergeant 
Marinelli demonstrating the non-functioning brake light. 
The Court agrees this real -time evidence is powerful. T he Court 
adds that Sergeant Marinelli identified a problem with the brake light 
the moment Defendant Bembry asked him why he had stopped him and 
repeated that explanation several times. Both cameras thus corroborate 
Sergeant Marinelli’s testimony that he stopped Defendant Bembry for 
driving with a broken brake light. The Court also notes no one confronted 
Sergeant Marinelli with this alleged discrepancy or even pointed it out to 
him so he could offer some reconciliation. The Court is not suggesting 
Defendant Bembry was required to do so. But in the absence of any effort 
to probe this issue, the Court— like the Magistrate Judge—does not find 
this apparent discrepancy sufficient to outweigh the significant evidence 
that the brake light was broken. 
Second, Defendant Bembry argues both v ideos contradict the 
Magistrate Judge’s factual finding that the brake light was not working. 
He says Sergeant Marinelli’s video shows “red illumination visible across 
the rear light assemblies,” suggesting this shows three working brake 
lights. (Dkt. 125 at 4.) He argues this evidence contradicts Sergeant 

12 
 
Marinelli’s claim the light was out and the Magistrate Judge improperly 
discounted this discrepancy by saying the police car’ s lights made it 
impossible to see whether the brake lights were illuminated. (Id. at 4– 5.) 
He says that, since this video “leaves the question open,” the United 
States has not carried its burden of proof. 
Not so. The video shows the rear of Defendant Bembry ’s car with 
three (seemingly) equally illuminated lights. But it was nighttime and 
Defendant Bembry had his headlights on, thus illuminating his rear tail 
lights. Brake lights —as everyone knows —becomes brighter when a 
driver hits the brake pedal. There is no evidence that, after stopping the 
car, Defendant Bembry kept his foot on the brake, rather than placing 
his car in park. So the Court agrees this video provides no evidence as to 
the functionality of the brake light. And that is exactly what the 
Magistrate Judge noted. 
The important evidence arises from Officer Davis’s body cam era 
when Sergeant Marinelli pushe d the brake pedal. Defendant Bembry 
says this video shows all three brake lights illuminated. (Dkt. 125 at 5.) 
As part of this, he references a moment in the hearing when the 
Magistrate Judge noted she saw “three red flashes” —according to 

13 
 
Defendant Bembry—meaning two side brake lights and the center brake 
light. (Id) The Magistrate Judge addressed this exact issue in the report 
and recommendation. She explained she made the statement while 
trying to understand what defense counsel was trying to show her and 
was referring to the three illuminated tail lights on the back of the car. 
(Dkt. 119 at 9 n.4.) She was not referring to brake lights. (Id. ) She 
further explained—unequivocally — that when she reviewed the video in 
chambers “it was clear to [her] that the red light on the driver’s side was 
a tail light that did not b ecome brighter when the brake pedal was 
depressed, unlike the center brake light that illuminated when the brake 
pedal was depressed.” (Id.) Defendant Bembry does not explain why this 
observation is inaccurate . And the Court — having watched the video 
several times—certainly sees that the rear brake light on the driver’s side 
of the car did not illuminate when Sergeant Marinelli pushe d the brake 
pedal and causes the middle brake light to illuminate. It is strange for 
Defendant Bembry to raise this objection without acknowledging the fact 
the Magistrate Judge addressed (and clarified) the exact issue. 
Third, Defendant Bembry contends the Magistrate Judge erred in 
dismissing the absence of contemporaneous documentation of the broken 

14 
 
brake light in the C AD report or the audio of Sergeant Marinelli’s 
interaction with dispatch. (Dkt. 125 at 5.) He says the Magistrate Judge 
“invert[ed] the burden of proof” in noting the absence of such 
documentation does not mean his lights were working. (Id.) Defendant 
Bembry insists the absence of this documentation suggests Sergeant 
Marinelli did not, in fact, stop him for having a broken brake light. No 
evidence supports that inference . No one testified an officer would 
typically include the basis for the stop in either the CAD report or the 
dispatch transmission. Defendant offered no evidence whatsoever about 
normal police procedure but seems to assume that detail would be 
included. And, the CAD report identifies the “Nature” of the event as “87 
Traffic Stop”—which (it seems) confirms the stop was for some type of 
traffic infraction. (Dkt. 114- 2 at 2.) The rest of the report seems to 
include extensive detail of the officers’ activities, like entering the license 
plate, the second officer ’s arrival, recovery of the gun from the car, a 
query of Defendant Bembry’s driving history, and (perhaps) his transport 
to jail. (Id.) In the absence of testimony as to the purpose of the report, 
what detail it should contain, and the interpretation of various codes 
contained therein, the Court rejects Defendant Bembry ’s unsupported 

15 
 
assumption that the report should have identified a broken brake light 
as the basis for the stop. The same is true of the dispatch recording, 
which is not even in evidence. 2 The Court agrees with the Magistrate 
Judge’s conclusion that—under this record — the absence of evidence is 
not evidence of absence. 
Finally, Defendant Bembry says the Magistrate Judge erred in 
concluding the mechanic’s credible testimony “cannot overcome Sergeant 
Marinelli’s credible account and the video evidence.” (Dkt. 125 at 6.) He 
insists, the mechanic’s testimony provides “positive unrebutted evidence” 
the brake light was working and prevents the Court from crediting 
Sergeant Marinelli and the video. (Id.) Again, the Court disagrees. Two 
things can be right. Smith may well have fixed (or thought he fixed) the 
brake light and it could have been broken two days later. So Smith’s 
testimony (even if credible) does not prevent the Court from also crediting 
Sergeant Marinelli’s credible testimony. And it does not require the 
 
2 Defendant Bembry simply asked the investigator if he listened to the 
call and whether anyone talked “about a faulty brake light,” without any 
information about what was said or whether a radio code could have been 
used, let alone testimony about whether an officer would typically 
provide that detail to dispatch. (Dkt. 99 at 42.) 

16 
 
Court to disregard its own observations that the brake light did not 
brighten when Sergeant Marinelli hit the brake pedal. 
The Court overrules Defendant Bembry ’s objection and adopts the 
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the United States met its burden of 
showing Sergeant Marinelli reasonably believed one of Defendant 
Bembry’s brake lights was not working when he initiated the traffic stop. 
B. Sergeant Marinelli Had a Reasonable Suspicion 
Defendant Bembry Violated a Traffic Law 
 
One Georgia law states that a driver may not operate a car unless 
it has at least one working brake light but, if equipped with two lights, 
both must be working. See O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25. Another states that a car 
must have a brake light on the rear that emits a light when the foot brake 
is pressed. See O.C.G.A. § 40 -8-26. Before the Magistrate Judge, 
Defendant Bembry argued that , read together, these statutes only 
require a driver to have two functioning brake lights and that, even if his 
driver-side brake light was out, he still had two functioning brake lights 
(one in the middle of the spoiler and one on the passenger side). (Dkt. 107 
at 11–12.) So, Defendant Bembry argues he did not violate Georgia law 
and Sergeant Marinelli had no reason to think otherwise. (Id.) 

17 
 
The Magistrate Judge rejected this argument, concluding that, 
even if Defendant Bembry’s interpretation of the law was correct, 
Sergeant Marinelli still had a good -faith, reasonable belief Defendant 
Bembry broke the law. (Dkt. 119 at 15.) In reaching this conclusion, the 
Magistrate Judge cited Georgia cases recognizing this potential conflict 
between the statutes and finding it reasonable for a police officer to 
believe a driver of a car with a broken brake light is violating Georgia 
law, even if the car still has two functioning brake lights. ( Id. at 12–14 
(citing Lancaster v. State, 582 S.E.2d 513 , 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“the 
fact that one of the brake lights on [the defendant’s] car was not 
functioning was, in itself, sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion of 
the illegal operation of his vehicle to authorize a traffic stop” even if 
officer was operating under incorrect legal theory) and State v. 
Cartwright, 764 S.E.2d 175 , 177 –78 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (officer acted 
with good -faith belie f defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40 -8-25(b) even if 
“the defendant’s actions were not a crime according to a techn ical legal 
definition or distinction determined to exist in the penal statute”)).) 
Defendant Bembry objects to this conclusion. He argues the 
“physical evidence unambiguously demonstrates” his driver -side brake 

18 
 
light was working, thus precluding any reasonable belief by Sergeant 
Marinelli that it was not. (Dkt. 125 at 7.) He also argues this evidence 
prevents the United States from relying on his mistaken belief under the 
Heien doctrine to legitimize the stop. Because the Court rejects 
Defendant Bembry ’s premise (that the brake light was working), the 
Court also rejects his argument. 
Defendant Bembry next argues Sergeant Marinelli conceded his 
understanding of the law was incorrect while testifying before the 
Magistrate Judge , thus pr eventing him from claiming any good -faith 
reliance on a reasonable mistake of law. (Dkt. 125 at 9.) This is a red 
herring. Sergeant Marinelli’s testimony in court when confronted by a 
lawyer with certain statutes and asked to reconcile the lawyer -assisted 
reading of the law with his prior understanding does not undermine his 
testimony as to his understanding while making the stop. What controls 
is his understanding at the time. And he testifies that, on the night of 
the stop, he believed Defendant Bembry was breaking the law by driving 
with a broken brake light. (Dkt. 45 at 13.) And, as the Magistrate Judge 
properly noted, Georgia courts have found his understanding reasonable 
despite any (apparent) discrepancy between the Georgia statutes. 

19 
 
(Dkt. 119 at 13– 14.) Finally, Defendant Bembry argues that “a correct 
reading of the statute” shows he did not, in fact, violate the law by driving 
his car with a broken rear brake light. But again, what matters is 
whether the officer reasonabl y believed h e had broken the law. The 
Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the Georgia court 
opinions to conclude he did. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation (Dkt. 119) and DENIES Defendant Leterence 
Bembry’s Motion to Suppress (Dkts. 23, 29, 31.)
3 
SO ORDERED this 5th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
3 The Magistrate Judge refused to address a motion to suppress 
statements Defendant Bembry raised in post- hearing briefs. T he 
Magistrate Judge made that decision because Defendant Bembry had not 
properly moved to suppress those statements and because the record did 
not reflect the exact statements he sought to suppress. (Dkt. 119 at 7 
n.3.) Defendant Bembry objects and insists the record shows he was in 
custody and Sergeant Marinelli admitted he never notified Defendant 
Bembry of his Miranda rights. (Dkt. 125 at 12 -13.) The Court agrees 
with th e Magistrate Judge’s determination that the issue was not 
properly raised and will address any Miranda-related issues at trial (and 
outside the presence of the jury). 
1 (1 1 (1 
MICH" KEL L. BROWN 

Passage view · GavelSight