govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-5_26-cv-00017-1

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
ENA L. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
CITY OF SOLEDAD, 
Defendant. 
 

 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO 
AMEND 
 
Re: ECF No. 4 
 
 
Pro se Plaintiff Ena L. Mitchell (“Mitchell”) brings this suit against Defendant City of 
Soledad (“City”)1 alleging that the City violated her constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments by towing her car, performing an unlawful safety inspection of her 
home, and requiring her to vacate the home. Notice of Removal, Ex. A (Amended Complaint), 
ECF No. 1-1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). Mitchell also alleges violations of the California Penal 
Code, the California Welfare and Institution Code, and attempted kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 
242. Before the Court is the City’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) (the “Motion”). Mot., ECF No. 4. Mitchell did not file an opposition or other pleading 
responsive to the City’s Motion. The City filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to its Motion on 
January 29, 2026, indicating that Mitchell failed to timely file an Opposition or Statement of Non-
 
1 The Notice of Removal clarifies that although Mitchell names two defendants in the caption of 
the Complaint, the City of Soledad is the proper entity to name in a suit brought against the 
Soledad Police Department. See Not. of Removal 3, (“Plaintiff names two defendants in the 
caption: THE CITY OF SOLEDAD (erroneously sued as “THE SOLEDAD POLICE 
DEPARTMENT”)). 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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Opposition, which was due on January 22, 2026. Notice of Non-Opp., ECF No. 19.2 
After carefully reviewing the Complaint and the City’s Motion, the Court finds this matter 
suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b). For the following 
reasons, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
The following factual background is taken from Mitchell’s Complaint, attached to the 
City’s Notice of Removal, and filed in Monterey Superior Court on November 26, 2025. Notice 
of Removal, Ex. A (Amended Complaint), ECF No. 1-1. 
On August 4, 2025, Mitchell’s 2009 Kia Spectra was towed from Mitchell’s driveway. 
Compl. 2. At the time, Mitchell was out of town, and she returned home on August 12, 2025, to 
find her vehicle and the contents she stored in it missing. Id. On August 18, 2025, Mitchell filed 
a police report regarding the stolen vehicle. Id. The next day, August 19, 2025, officers from the 
Soledad Police Department (“Police Department”) visited Mitchell’s home twice. Id. First, at 
9:20 AM, Sergeant Brian Solis and another officer from the Police Department arrived at 
Mitchell’s house. Id. at 2. Sergeant Solis informed Mitchell that the Kia had been towed 
consistent with his authorization. Id. Though Mitchell did not receive it, Sergeant Solis informed 
Mitchell that a letter had been sent to her home explaining why the Kia had been seized. Id. 
Sergeant Solis and three officers returned to Mitchell’s home at 12:00 PM for a second visit. 
During this visit, one officer pounded on the door and asked Mitchell to come out of the house, 
but she refused, instead stating that the Kia had been stolen and she wanted it returned. Id. at 3. 
While still in her house, Mitchell observed one officer walking toward the side of her house, while 
Sergeant Solis and the other two officers informed Mitchell that her house was condemned 
 
2 Mitchell did not file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the City’s Motion, however, 
after the City filed its motion, Mitchell moved to remand the case. ECF Nos. 7, 11, 15. In her 
motions, Mitchell asserts that the removal only serves as a method for the Defendant to dismiss 
this case “without merit.” Id. at 2. This suggests to the Court that the pro se party does not wish 
for the case to be dismissed, but the Court reminds the parties to follow the local and federal rules 
for all future motions. 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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because it did not have utility services. Id. Mitchell stopped receiving Soledad utilities in 2016 
following excessive charges and improper billing practices. Id. at 7. The officers placed two 
notices on Mitchell’s home and informed her that she needed to vacate it. Id. Mitchell refused to 
vacate the house. Id. at 3. Although Mitchell was unaware of it, at some point prior to the 
officers’ arrival, a notice had been placed on Mitchell’s door informing her that within 24 hours a 
warrant would be issued from the Superior Court of California authorizing inspection of the 
property. Id. at 7. Mitchell did not consent to an inspection. Id. 
On August 20, 2025, Mitchell submitted an online complaint to the Police Department. Id. 
at 3. Mitchell submitted a follow-up demand letter on August 25, 2025.3 Id. Mitchell received 
four responses from the Police Department, two by email and two by mail. Id. Each response 
indicated that the case was closed but did not provide a satisfactory explanation as to the results of 
the investigation. Id.; see also id. at 6. 
At some point after the Police Department towed the Kia, Sergeant Solis explained that 
two violations led to the towing. Id. at 5. First, Sergeant Solis annotated an orange sticker and 
placed it on the Kia’s windshield. The sticker indicated that the vehicle violated Soledad 
Municipal Code Section 10.04.055 and could not be parked on a public street for more than 
seventy-two hours. Id. Second, Sergeant Solis stated that the Kia was considered a nuisance and 
that this fact was reflected in the letter which Sergeant Solis said was sent to Mitchell’s house, but 
which she did not receive. Id. 
On August 27, 2025, the Police Department called Mitchell to inform her that she could 
pick the Kia up from a demolition shop but would need to pay a $3,000 storage fee. Id. at 3. 
On November 13, 2025, the Police Department executed a safety inspection of Mitchell’s 
house. Id. at 8. Mitchell, however, was not served with the inspection warrant signed by Judge 
Roberts of Monterey County Superior Court before between ten and fifteen officers entered her 
house. Id. During the execution of the warrant, the officers wore riot shields and had guns which 
 
3 Mitchell’s Complaint later states that she sent the demand letter to two Police Department emails 
on September 8, 2025. 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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they pointed at Mitchell. Id. The officers took Mitchell’s phone from her hand and removed her 
from the house. Id. They proceeded to perform a pat down of Mitchell despite her objections. Id. 
During the pat down, the officer removed Mitchell’s wallet from her pocket. At this point, an 
officer stated that Mitchell could see the warrant. Id. After approximately twenty to thirty 
minutes, the officers returned Mitchell’s phone to her, however she noticed that several photos and 
videos from between August 19, 2025, and November 13, 2025, were missing. Id. At the 
conclusion of the safety inspection, the officers informed Mitchell that she could not stay in the 
home, citing the lack of running water. Id. Later that evening, Officer Celaya texted Mitchell a 
list of necessary corrections and repairs. Id. 
On October 5, 2025, Mitchell had a portable work table delivered to her residence. On 
November 17, 2025, Mitchell learned that a police officer had confiscated the work table the day 
of its delivery. Id. at 9. The Police Department informed Mitchell that she could pick it up at the 
Police Department office. Id. Mitchell went to the office on November 18, 2025, to pick up the 
table, but it appeared that the box that the table was in had been opened and the table seemed to 
have been used. Id. 
B. Procedural Background 
On November 26, 2025, Mitchell filed a First Amended Complaint in Monterey County 
Superior Court. Compl. The City removed the action to this Court on January 2, 2026, after being 
served on December 3, 2025. Not. of Removal 3, ECF 1. The City filed the present Motion on 
January 8, 2026. ECF No. 4. Subsequently, on January 14 and 15, 2026, Mitchell filed three 
identical motions to remand to Monterey County Superior Court. ECF Nos. 7, 11, 15. This Court 
denied Mitchell’s motion to remand, finding that federal question jurisdiction exists over several 
of Mitchell’s claims, and that supplemental jurisdiction exists for the remaining claims not arising 
under federal law. See Remand Order, ECF No. 28. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with enough 
specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). If a 
complaint does not meet the Rule 8(a) standard, it may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 
appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable theory or sufficient facts to support a 
cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 
2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff 
must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” which requires “more than a sheer possibility that 
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The Court must “accept factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, 
“courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 67. 
Courts construe pleadings filed pro se more liberally than those drafted by lawyers. 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
106 (1976)). Still, the Court cannot “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 
pled.” Henry v. San Francisco Police Dep’t, No. 14-cv-01624-JSC, 2014 WL 59494840, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 727 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
If the Court concludes that dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper, it “should “grant 
leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 
1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The City contends that Mitchell fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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of (1) the Fourth Amendment; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause; and (3) the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and takings clauses. The City also argues that Mitchell’s 
state-law claims fail as a matter of law. First, the City argues that where Mitchell’s claims 
resemble state-law tort claims, they are barred because Mitchell does not allege compliance with 
the California Government Claims Act. Second, the City argues that Mitchell improperly relies 
upon criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 242 and provisions of the California Penal Code, 
because these statutes do not create civil causes of action. Third, the City argues that Mitchell 
does not allege facts establishing a claim under California’s elder financial abuse action. Finally, 
the City argues that Mitchell’s reference to “Federal and State Discriminatory Housing Practices” 
is wholly conclusory. The Court considers each of the City’s arguments for dismissal in turn. 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & Municipal Liability 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person” who, under color of law, 
deprives any other person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the 
United States. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Municipalities are 
“persons” under § 1983 and can be found liable for violating individuals’ Constitutional rights. 
Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 
690). The municipality, however, may only be held liable for its own illegal acts; “[i]t cannot be 
held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions.” Mitchell v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 600 F. 
Supp. 3d 1018, 1026–27 (N.D. Cal. 2022). “Liability may attach to a municipality only where the 
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through ‘execution of a government’s policy 
or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 
represent official capacity.’” Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 
A plaintiff may establish municipal liability pursuant to § 1983 in three different ways. 
Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). First, “the plaintiff may prove that a 
city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental 
policy or a ‘longstanding practice or custom’” constituting the local municipality’s standard 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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operating procedure. Id. (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). 
Second, the plaintiff may prove that the constitutional tort was committed by an official with final 
policy-making authority “and that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official 
governmental policy.” Id. “Third, the plaintiff may prove that an official with policy-making 
authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. at 
1346–47. State law determines whether an official has final policy-making authority. Id. at 1346. 
The City contends that Mitchell has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted 
because she does not plead municipal liability. Mot. 6. The City does not distinguish between the 
three possible Monell routes of municipal liability, instead arguing that Mitchell’s allegations 
“concern isolated, fact-specific events affecting only her [which] are insufficient as a matter of law 
to establish municipal liability.” Id. The Court agrees with the City that under any of the three 
possible routes, Mitchell has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish municipality liability here. 
The Court disagrees, however, that “isolated, fact-specific events” affecting only one individual 
are in all cases insufficient as a matter of law to establish municipal liability, rather, “proof of a 
single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless 
proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal 
policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. 
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (emphasis added). The Court considers which facts, if any, 
Mitchell alleges to support each of the three Monell routes for asserting liability against the City. 
First, Mitchell does not assert that the Police Department officers committed the alleged 
constitutional violations pursuant to a formal governmental policy or longstanding practice or 
custom constituting the Police Department’s standard operating procedure. In fact, she alleges 
instances of Police Department behavior that deviated from her understanding of typical 
procedures. See, e.g., Compl. 2 (stating that “no documentation was left at plaintiff’s home 
notifying plaintiff of why [the] vehicle was missing” and that this was inconsistent with the Police 
Department’s typical practice of leaving notices at the door). 
Second, Mitchell does not allege that any of the police officers involved in the towing of her 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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car or the inspection of her home were officials with final policy-making authority. See 
Warkentine v. Soria, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1297 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“Mere authority to exercise 
discretion while performing particular functions does not make the individual a final policymaker 
unless the decisions are final and unreviewable and are not constrained by the official policies or 
superior officials” (citing City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988))). Mitchell 
describes actions by Sergeant Brian Solis, Lieutenant Juan Santiago, Officer Celya and other 
officials or officers, but aside from a passing reference to “the fact that it was a senior police 
officer who allegedly committed the CRIMES with junior police officers in tow,” Mitchell does 
not consider the policymaking authority of the individuals involved. Compl. 11, see also 
Warkentine, 152 F. Supp. 3d. at 1297 (relevant to the policymaking inquiry are “statutes, 
ordinances, regulations, city charters, and other similar enactments” (citing Coming Up, Inc. v. 
City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 830 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). 
Third, because Mitchell has not alleged any of the officers involved have policy-making 
authority, she cannot allege that such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional action 
and the basis for it. 
Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss Mitchell’s § 1983 claims pursuant to 12(b)(6) is 
GRANTED. 
B. Mitchell’s State Law & Remaining Claims 
1. Government Claims Act 
“The California Government Claims Act [formerly known as the Tort Claims Act] requires 
a party seeking to recover money damages from a public entity or its employees to present a claim 
within six months after accrual of the claim to the entity before filing suit in court.” Allums v. Bay 
Area Rapid Transit, No. 25-cv-08837-LB, 2025 WL 3724142, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025) 
(citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2(a), 945). California Government Code section 911.2 provides 
that a claim that relates to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property 
must be presented to the Department of General Services’ Government Claims Program, as set 
forth in section 915, within six months after the accrual of the cause of action; claims relating to 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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any other cause of action must be presented within one year after the accrual of the cause of 
action. Cal Gov’t Code § 911.2; see also Rockwell v. Tuolumne County, No. 1:22-cv-00392-JLT-
EPG, 2023 WL 8806251, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2023). Presentation of a written claim and the 
rejection of the claim in whole or in part is a condition precedent to suit against a public entity. 
Mangold v. California Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). “Where 
compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required, the plaintiff must allege compliance or 
circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to” dismissal. Id. (quoting Snipes 
v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). 
The City contends that Mitchell’s allegations resembling state-law tort claims are barred 
because she does not allege compliance with the California Government Claims Act. Mot. 3–4. 
To the extent that Mitchell seeks to recover money damages from the City for state statutory tort 
claims, including elder financial abuse under California’s Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil 
Protection Act, Mitchell must allege compliance with the California Government Claims Act. 
Here, she has not, nor has she offered circumstances excusing non-compliance with the California 
Government Claims Act. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion and dismisses 
Mitchell’s state-law-based tort claims. 
2. Criminal Statutes 
Mitchell asserts four claims pursuant to the California Penal Code (sections 368, 136.1, 
487(d)(1), and 1407) and one claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. As the City notes, however, 
these criminal provisions provide no basis for civil liability. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 
1092 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Delaney v. Baker, 20 Cal. 4th 23, 33 (Cal. 1999) (noting that 
California Penal Code section 368 provides for criminal liability); Cal. Penal Code § 136.1 (“a 
person who does any of the following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison” (emphasis 
added)). Because these criminal statutes do not provide a basis for civil liability, Mitchell’s claims 
premised on these statutes fail as a matter of law. The Court GRANTS the City’s motion to 
dismiss these claims. 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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3. Housing Discrimination 
Mitchell alleges “housing discrimination violations,” but has not identified the statutory 
basis for her claim, nor has she alleged a discriminatory practice or otherwise asserted that she is a 
member of a protected class. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 12955 (identifying unlawful housing 
discrimination practices). The Court GRANTS the City’s motion to dismiss Mitchell’s claims 
premised on “housing discrimination violations.” 
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 
Finally, this Court must consider whether to grant leave to amend. “Dismissal without 
leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be 
saved by any amendment.” Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, 
a “district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is 
absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” 
Castillo v. City of San Jose, No. 24-cv-00701-SVK, 2025 WL 1370811, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 
2025) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
The City argues that Mitchell “cannot convert criminal statutes into civil causes of action, 
cannot impose municipal liability without alleging a policy or custom, and cannot overcome 
statutory bars to relief.” Mot. 8. The Court agrees that Mitchell cannot bring civil claims based 
on the cited criminal statutes, and therefore amendment to those claims would be futile. In light of 
Mitchell’s pro se status and because this will be her first opportunity for amendment before this 
Court, this Court will, however, grant leave to amend to allow Mitchell to replead all of her claims 
except for those alleging violations of the California Penal Code or attempted kidnapping under 
color of law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. See Castillo, 2025 WL 1370811, at *4 (“Indeed, district 
courts regularly give pro se litigants a second or third bite at amendment before determining that 
further attempts would be futile.”). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City’s Motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as 

 

ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 
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to all claims EXCEPT FOR those brought pursuant to California Penal Code sections 368, 136.1, 
487(d)(1), and 1407 and that alleging attempted kidnapping under color of law. Any amended 
complaint must be filed within 21 days of this Order. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 8, 2026 
 
 
EDWARD J. DAVILA 
United States District Judge 
 
 

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