govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-5_23-cv-00249-7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON 
 
SAMUEL HOLMES CASE NO. 5:23-CV-249-KKC 
Plaintiff,  
v. OPINION AND ORDER 
LEXINGTON-CJD, LLC d/b/a/ 
FREEDOM CDJR OF LEXINGTON 
 
Defendant. 
*** *** *** 
 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Samuel Holmes’ Motion to Certify Orders 
for Interlocutory Appeal and Request for a Stay. (R. 118.) For the following reasons, Holmes’ 
Motion is denied.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Holmes’ present Motion is the latest step in  a series of filings following the Court’s 
October 23, 2025 Order. That Order granted and  denied in part Defendant Lexington-CJD, 
LLC’s (“Freedom”) motion for summary judgment . (R. 82.) Specifically, it allowed Holmes’ 
breach of contract claims to proceed but gran ted summary judgment in favor of Freedom on 
all other counts, including fraud. (Id. at 15.) 
Holmes then moved for reconsideration of that Order, focusing exclusively on reviving 
the dismissed fraud claim. (R. 90.) His motion made explicit the importance of the fraud 
claim, noting that its dismissal “impacts possible settlement, the potential size of the verdict, 
and the possibility for a recovery proportionate to the cost of achieving it.” (Id. at 2.) His reply 
brief was even more direct, explaining that without fraud, his recovery would likely be 
limited, whereas a fraud claim could support punitive damages several times that amount, 
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making the case economically viable. (R. 92  at 25.) In other words, Holmes candidly 
acknowledged the financial incentive underlying his effort to preserve the fraud claim. 
The Court denied reconsideration on January 22, 2026. (R. 95.) Holmes then sought 
to reopen proceedings by moving to amend th e discovery deadline so he could file his own 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 96.) Once again, he emphasized that, without the 
dismissed claims, he was “bereft of the possi bility to recover any amount of punitive 
damages,” and stated that allowing him leav e to file was necessary to make the case 
worthwhile. (Id. at 2–3.) The Court granted leave to file the motion (R. 108), but ultimately 
denied it (R. 116). The Court then scheduled a te lephonic conference to address pretrial and 
trial dates. (R. 117.) Now, just over two w eeks before the conference, Holmes seeks a 
certificate of appealability for three of the Cou rt’s previous Orders in an effort to revive the 
fraud claim.   
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides for appeal only from “final decisions of the district 
courts of the United States.” Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), however, a district court may 
certify an order for interlocutory appeal if the following conditions are met: “(1) a controlling 
legal question is involved; (2) there is substant ial ground for difference of opinion regarding 
it; and (3) an immediate appeal would mate rially advance the litigation's ultimate 
termination.”  In re Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc. , 954 F.2d 1169, 1172 (6th Cir. 
1992) (citation and quotations omitted). “Rev iew under § 1292(b) is granted sparingly and 
only in exceptional cases.”  In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2002).  
III. ANALYSIS 
Holmes seeks certification of three Cou rt Orders: (1) the October 23, 2025, Order 
granting and denying in part Freedom’s motion for summary judgment (R. 82); (2) the 
January 22, 2026 Order denying his motion for reconsideration (R. 95); and (3) the May 7, 
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2026 Order denying his motion for summary judg ment (R. 116). (R. 118 at 1.) Additionally, 
Holmes seeks a stay of the proceedings until the Sixth Circuit can address the arguments. 
(Id.) 
 Before analyzing the § 1292(b) standard, Fr eedom makes a threshold argument that 
the appeal should be denied because it was made too late. (R. 119 at 4.) The Parties dispute 
the timeliness of Holmes’ filings. ( Compare R. 118 at 3 ‘There is no deadline for seeking 
certification . . .”, with R. 119 at 4 “Courts have 3 consistent ly treated delays exceeding two 
months as presumptively unreasonable.”.) The Court declines to make a technical ruling 
based on timeliness and will address Holmes’ motion on its merits.  
Turning to the merits, Holmes does not satisfy the first condition of § 1292(b). 
Certification is reserved for “exceptional cases,” and requires a controlling legal question as 
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 
345, 350 (6th Cir. 2002). Holmes does not identify an unsettled question of law. Instead, he 
challenges how this Court applied substantive evidentiary principles under Kentucky law to 
the federal summary judgment standard. Because both areas of law are settled, this is not 
an exceptional case warranting review. 
Holmes presents the following question for certification:  
The controlling question of law is whether a presumption established in the 
context of post-trial appellate review ma y be applied as a screening device at 
the summary judgment stage, and if so, how that presumption interacts with 
the summary judgment standard articulated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 
530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
(R. 118 at 4–5.) Specifically, Holmes suggest s that applying Kentucky’s presumption 
of innocence and honesty at the summary judgment stage conflicts with Liberty Lobby , 
because courts must draw all reasonable infe rences in favor of the nonmoving party. He 
asserts that applying the clear and convinci ng evidence standard simultaneously with the 
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presumption of honesty created an impermissibl e “stacking” effect. (R. 118 at 6.) However, 
this argument overlooks the very principle Liberty Lobby announced. 
To understand why Holmes’ proposed question does not warrant interlocutory review, 
it is necessary to place his argument with in the framework established by the Supreme 
Court’s summary judgment precedent. In 1986,  the Supreme Court issued three decisions 
that collectively define modern summary judgment practice. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317 (1986); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242; and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
In Celotex, the Court held that a defendant may obtain summary judgment by 
demonstrating that the plaintiff lacks evidence necessary to prove an essential element of his 
claim. 477 U.S. at 322–25. Once the moving party identifies the absence of proof, the burden 
shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with admissible evidence demonstrating the 
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. Put differently, Rule 56 permits a party to 
challenge whether its opponent can actually prove its case. 
Liberty Lobby addressed the next logical questio n: what quantum of evidence must 
the nonmovant produce in response? 477 U.S. at 254. The Court explained that the answer 
depends upon the substantive evidentiary burden applicable to the claim. Id. at 252. The 
issue before the Court was whether a judge evaluating summary judgment must consider the 
heightened clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applicable to actual malice claims under 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan . Id. at 254. The Supreme Court answered that question 
unequivocally in the affirmative. 
The Court held that “the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment . . . necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would 
apply at the trial on the merits.” Id. at 252. Thus, when a claim must ultimately be proven 
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by clear and convincing evidence, the su mmary judgment inquiry becomes whether a 
reasonable jury could find that burden satisfied. Id. at 254–55.  
As the Court further explained, “[t]hus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary 
burden.” Id. at 254. The Court emphasized that it would make little sense to ask whether a 
jury could reasonably find for a party withou t considering the standard that would govern 
the jury’s deliberations. “The question here is  whether a jury could reasonably find either 
that the plaintiff proved his case by the qua lity and quantity of evidence required by the 
governing law or that he did not.” Id. 
Far from supporting Holmes’ position, Liberty Lobby  forecloses it. The very issue 
resolved was whether a heightened evidenti ary standard may be incorporated into the 
summary judgment analysis. The Supreme Court held that it must be. 
Matsushita reinforced the same principle. See 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There, the 
Court held that when “the record taken as a wh ole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 
find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. Summary judgment is 
therefore appropriate when the evidence, viewed under the governing substantive standard, 
is insufficient to permit a rational jury verdict for the nonmovant. 
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly applied these principles. In Street v. J.C. Bradford 
& Co., the court reiterated that the substantiv e law defines what facts are material, any 
heightened evidentiary burden imposed by t hat law must likewise be satisfied by the 
nonmovant. 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).  As noted by the Sixth in White v. Turfway 
Park Racing Ass’n: 
Where the nonmoving party faces a heightened burden of proof, such as clear 
and convincing evidence, he must show in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment that he can produce evidence which, if believed, will meet 
the higher standard. 
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909 F.2d 941, 944 (6th Cir. 1990). Holmes’ contention  that this case bears no relation to the 
issue is misplaced. Although the facts of this case are distinct, the Sixth Circuit’s articulation 
of the relationship between the clear and convincing evidence and summary judgment 
standards is directly on point.  
Against this backdrop, Holmes’ proposed question does not identify an unresolved 
legal issue. The Supreme Court and Sixth Circu it have already answered it. Courts must 
evaluate summary judgment through the lens of the substantive evidentiary burden that 
governs the claim at trial. Because Kentucky  fraud claims require proof by clear and 
convincing evidence, that standard necessarily  informed this Court’s summary judgment 
analysis. 
This reasoning is precisely why Kentucky ’s presumption of innocence and honesty 
does not conflict with the federal summary ju dgment standard. Holmes characterizes the 
Court's analysis as imposing two independent burdens: first, a presumption that Freedom 
acted honestly; and second, a requirement that  he prove fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. (R. 118 at 6.) The Court, following Kentucky law, did not treat the doctrines as 
distinct in the manner alleged. 
Rather, the presumption of innocence and honesty is simply another way of expressing 
the heightened burden Kentucky law applies to  allegations of fraud. Kentucky courts have 
long recognized that fraud is never presum ed and must instead be established through 
evidence that clearly and convincingly  demonstrates intentional wrongdoing. See Goerter v. 
Shapiro, 72 S.W.2d 444, 445–46 (Ky. 1934); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold , 90 S.W.2d 
44, 49 (Ky. 1935). The presumption and the heig htened evidentiary burden operate toward 
the same end: both require proof sufficiently persuasive to overcome the law’s preference for 
interpreting ambiguous conduct as cons istent with honesty rather than fraud. See T.M. 
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Crutcher Laboratory v. Crutcher, 157 S.W.2d 314, 319 (1941) (quoting Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
v. Arnold, 90 S.W.2d 44, 49 (1935)).  
Accordingly, there is no “stacking” effect. The presumption does not add an additional 
layer of proof beyond clear and convincing evidence. It merely reflects Kentucky’s 
requirement that allegations of fraud have a higher burden of proof. Whether framed as a 
requirement that the plaintiff prove fraud by  clear and convincing evidence or as a 
requirement that the plaintiff overcome the presumption of honesty, the inquiry remains the 
same: has the plaintiff produced evidence from  which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
fraud occurred? See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).  
This Court previously answered that questio n in the negative. It found that Holmes 
failed to produce evidence from which a reaso nable jury could find, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that Freedom fraudulently falsified the mileage disclosures. (R. 82 at 11.) In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court did not weigh the evidence. Rather, consistent with 
Liberty Lobby , it examined whether the evidence identified by Holmes could satisfy the 
substantive evidentiary burden governing fr aud claims under Kentucky law. Having 
concluded that it could not, the Court granted summary judgment on the fraud claim. (R. 82 
at 11.) 
Holmes further argues that the cases cited for Kentucky’s presumption of honesty only 
apply the presumption at trial or during post-trial review. (R. 118 at 5.) He asserts that using 
the presumption as a “screening device” at summary judgment is improper. ( Id. at 4.) This 
argument misconstrues the effect and timing of legal presumptions.  If Holmes were correct, 
a fraud plaintiff would have to plead fraud with particularity in his complaint in accordance 
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) but would then receive the benefit of having the presumption ignored 
at summary judgment, only to have it reappear  at trial when the jury is instructed on the 
governing law. Liberty Lobby rejects exactly that kind of disconnect between the summary 
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judgment inquiry and the trial standard. Th e presumption of honesty is a substantive 
principle of Kentucky fraud law, not a proced ural rule triggered by a particular stage of 
litigation. Whether a court encounters the i ssue on summary judgment, at the directed-
verdict stage, or after trial, the underlying question remains the same: has the plaintiff 
produced evidence to satisfy the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard? Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. at 254. This Court previously concluded that he did not: 
Holmes does not point to sufficient evidence that Freedom’s conduct was 
intentional or reckless. There is no evid ence in the record, let alone clear and 
convincing evidence, that the erron eous mileage presented in the Purchase 
Packet was inserted intentionally or re cklessly. Similarly, Holmes does not 
present sufficient evidence as to ho w Freedom intentionally or recklessly 
distracted his attention, or suppressed vi tal details of the transaction in an 
effort to keep him from finding out the “actual” mileage. 
(R. 82 at 11.)  
The governing legal principles are settled. There is no substantial ground for 
difference of opinion warranting interlocutory review under § 1292(b), as Liberty Lobby 
directly resolves the question Holmes seeks to certify. Because the Court denies certification, 
it will further deny Homles’ request to stay the case.  
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Holmes’ Motion to 
Certify Orders for Interlocutory Review and Request for Stay (R. 118) is DENIED. 
This 8th day of June, 2026. 
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