govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_26-cv-00590-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
 
DIVENSON PETION, 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CAPTAIN PAPOOSHA and DIRECTOR 
OF SECURITY A. SANTIAGO, 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 3:26-cv-590 (OAW) 
 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
 
The plaintiff, Divenson Petion, is a pro se sentenced inmate who is in the custody 
of the Department of Correction (“DOC”) housed at Hartford Correctional Center 
(“HCC”).1 ECF No. 1. He brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two DOC 
employees: Captain Daniel Papoosha and Director of Security Antonio Santiago in their 
individual and official capacities. He seeks both damages and injunctive relief. 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts review complaints 
brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or against the officer or 
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the court must 
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, that 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from 
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). In 
accordance therewith, the court has reviewed all factual allegations in the complaint. 
 
1 The court may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 
161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). The publicly available information on the Connecticut DOC website shows that 
Plaintiff was sentenced on September 14, 2020. See “Connecticut State Department of Correction: 
Inmate Information,” available at https://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num= 
322706 (last visited June 8, 2026). 
 

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I. Allegations2 
 The court does not include herein all of the allegations from the complaint, but 
summarizes them for context. 
 Plaintiff represents that DOC has identified him as a gang member, and that he 
has separation profiles with so many other inmates that it is difficult for DOC to find a 
place to house him. At some point in the summer of 2025, Plaintiff alerted the appropriate 
authorities that he was no longer a gang member and wanted to participate in the “gang 
program”3 at the MacDougall -Walker Correctional Institution (“Walker”) due to his 
separation profiles with inmates and staff members at Corrigan Correctional Institution 
(“Corrigan”). Prison staff advised Plaintiff that it was up to Defendant Papoosha whether 
or not to grant the request. 
 Plaintiff suspected that Defendant Papoosha would be reluctant to grant his 
request because Plaintiff has an ongoing lawsuit against both Defendant Papoosha and 
Defendant Santiago. As of September 20, 2025, Plaintiff had not received a response to 
his request, and so he wrote an inmate request to both Defendants, reiterating his desire 
to participate in programming at Walker . In it, he explained that he had been “jumped” 
twice, that he was no longer a gang member, and that both Defendants were aware of 
his “issues” with inmates and staff members at Corrigan. He noted that if something were 
to happen to him at Corrigan, they would be liable for failing to protect him and for 
deliberate indifference to his safety. 
 
2 All factual allegations are drawn from the complaint and are considered to be true. 
3 The court gathers that this is a kind of rehabilitation program through which gang members may be 
reintegrated into the general population in prison. 

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 On September 25, 2025, Plaintiff was transfer red to the gang unit at Corrigan 
despite the obvious risk of harm. At Corrigan, he was placed in the same unit as some 
members of the rival gang Plaintiff and his friends attacked in March 2025. Plaintiff asked 
why he was being housed in the unit with inmate s with whom he had separation profiles 
and suggested it was a “set up.” Correctional staff allegedly expressed shock about 
Plaintiff’s housing assignment, acknowledging that something likely would happen to him. 
 Plaintiff had numerous conversations with the Corrigan Warden and Corrigan 
Intelligence Captain and other Intelligence correctional staff to ask why he was placed in 
a unit housing inmates with whom he has separation profiles. They all advised him that 
his placement was authorized by Defendant Papoosha and was out of their hands . 
Corrigan staff indicated that they were aware of Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendants, 
and that they believed his placement was retaliatory. Staff also informed Plaintiff that 
Defendant Papoosha had declined to place him in Protective Custody. Some of the staff 
indicated that Defendant Papoosha would not send Plaintiff to Protective Custody until 
something happened in the gang unit. 
 Ten days after his placement at Corrigan, Plaintiff was assaulted. 
On October 13, 2025, Plaintiff spoke about his situation with the Corrigan Deputy 
Warden and DOC Deputy Commissioner, who appeared to agree that Plaintiff should not 
be at Corrigan . The Deputy Commissioner stated that he disagreed with the actions of 
Defendant Papoosha and that he would intervene. 
On October 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendants for deliberately 
putting him in harm’s way. 
 

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II. DISCUSSION 
“Section 1983 provides a private right of action against any person who, acting 
under color of state law, causes another person to be subjected to the deprivation of rights 
under the Constitution or federal law.” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 
1999). “The common elements to all [Section] 1983 claims are: ‘(1) the conduct 
complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; 
and (2) the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” Lee v. City of Troy, 
520 F. Supp. 3d 191, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 
(2d Cir. 1994)). 
The court construes the complaint to state claims for violations of the Eighth and 
First Amendents. 
A. Personal Involvement 
In order to “hold a state official liable under [Secion] 1983, a plaintiff must plead 
and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the 
official . . . .” Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Wright v. 
Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) ( “It is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal 
involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an 
award of damages under § 1983.’”) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 
885 (2d Cir.1991)). “[T]here is no special rule for supervisory liability.” Tangreti, 983 F.3d 
at 618. Instead, Plaintiff “must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, 
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Id. (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). 

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Plaintiff has alleged facts about Defendant Papoosha’s conduct relevant to his 
claims, but he has not alleged facts describing Defendant Santiago’s conduct. Allegations 
that Plaintiff sent written inmate requests or grievances to Defendant Santiago are not 
sufficient to establish his personal involvement in a § 1983 constitutional claim. See 
Brown v. Laino , No. 24 -CV-06677, 2025 WL 3228035, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2025) 
(“[R]eceipt of letters or grievances, by itself, does not amount to personal involvement.” ) 
(quoting Mateo v. Fischer, 682 F. Supp. 2d 423, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ). Accordingly, the 
court must dismiss any claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Director 
Santiago. 
The court next considers whether Plaintiff has alleged any plausible claims against 
Defendant Papoosha. 
B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Health and Safety 
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to 
guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994) 
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 526 –527 (1984) ). Prison conditions that 
“involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain” constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, “which is applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344–45 (1981). 
To state a claim of deliberate indifference to health or safety due to unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement, an inmate is required to demonstrate an objective element and 
a subjective element. To meet the objective element, the inmate must allege that he was 
incarcerated under a condition or a combination of conditions that posed a substantial 
risk of serious harm to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To meet the 

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subjective element, an inmate must allege that the defendants possessed culpable intent; 
that is, that the defendants knew that he faced a substantial risk to his health or safety 
and disregarded that risk by failing to take corrective action. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
834, 837. Thus, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could 
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the 
inference.” Id. at 837. An allegation of “deliberate indifference entails something more 
than mere negligence,” though a plaintiff need not establish that the defendants 
intentionally caused a foreseeable harm. Id. at 835. 
Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to the Corrigan gang unit, where he was 
housed with members of the rival gang he had fought a few months earlier. For initial 
pleading purposes, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that his Corrigan placement exposed 
him to a serious risk of harm. Plaintiff’s allegations also support an inference that 
Defendant Papoosha was aware of the danger this housing assignment would pose, and 
that he disregarded that risk. Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed on his Eighth Amendment 
claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Papoosha in his individual capacity. 
C. First Amendment Retaliation 
To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must plausibly allege “(1) 
that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse 
action against [him or her], and (3) that there was a causal connection between the 
protected speech and the adverse action.” Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 40 (2d Cir. 
2019) (quoting Gill v. Pidlypchak , 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) ) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Second Circuit has instructed district courts to “approach prisoner 
retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action 

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taken against a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise not rising to the level 
of a constitutional violation —can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed 
retaliatory act.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) ( quoting Davis v. 
Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Protected speech or activity includes filing a lawsuit, an administrative complaint, 
or a prison grievance. See Brandon 938 F.3d at 40 (“The filing of prison grievances is a 
protected activity.”). The first element therefore clearly is satisfied. The court also finds 
that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he suffered adverse action when he was placed in 
the gang unit at Corrigan, where he faced a serious risk of harm from other inmates and 
was, in fact, assaulted after only ten days . Finally, at this early stage in the proceeding, 
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendant Papoosha placed him at Corrigan in 
retaliation for his ongoing lawsuit. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed on his First Amendment retaliation claims 
against Defendant Papoosha in his individual capacit y for further development of the 
record. 
 C. Official Capacity Claims 
 
To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendant Papoosha in 
his official capacity, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment , as Defendant 
Papoosha is a state employee. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). 
Plaintiff also seeks unspecified injunctive relief against Defendant Papoosha in his 
official capacity. Plaintiff may proceed against a defendant in their official capacity only 
to the extent that he seeks prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal 
law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155 -56 (1908); see also In re Deposit Ins. 

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Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] plaintiff may sue a state official acting in 
his official capacity —notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment —for ‘prospective 
injunctive relief’ from violations of federal law.”) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974)). But Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot as he is now housed at HCC. 
See Salahuddin v. Goord , 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that an inmate's 
transfer from a particular facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against officials at that facility) ; Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 
1983 )(“The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer 
be given or is no longer needed.”). Accordingly, any official capacity claims for injunctive 
relief are dismissed. 
 
IV. ORDERS 
For the foregoing reasons, the court enters the following orders: 
 The case may proceed on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims for damages against 
Captain Papoosha for an Eighth Amendment violation ( deliberate indifference to his 
safety), and a First Amendment violation (retaliation). 
All other claims are DISMISSED. Defendant Santiago is DISMISSED from this 
action, and the Clerk of Court is asked to please terminate him from the docket. 
Plaintiff has two options as to how to proceed in response to this Initial Review 
Order: 
(1) If Plaintiff wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted in his 
Complaint that have been dismissed, in order to attempt to state a viable claim, he 
may file an amended complaint by August 7, 2026. An amended complaint, if filed, 

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will completely replace the original complaint, and the court will not consider any 
allegations made in the original complaint in evaluating the amended complaint. 
The court will review any amended complaint after filing to determine whether it 
may proceed to service of process on any defendants named therein. 
(2) Alternatively, if Plaintiff wishes to proceed on the claims against Defendant 
Papoosha, he may file a notice on the docket on or before by August 7, 2026, 
informing the court that he elects to proceed with service as to the claims that 
survived initial review. 
If the court receives no response from Plaintiff by August 7, 2026, the court will 
presume that Plaintiff wishes to proceed on the Complaint as to the claims permitted to 
go forward in this order, and Plaintiff will have to show good cause if he seeks to amend 
the complaint in any manner in the future. 
 
 IT IS SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut, this 8th day of June, 2026. 
 
 /s/ 
OMAR A. WILLIAMS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 

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