govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_24-cv-09783-0

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
C.G., 
 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 24-9783 
 
OPINION 
 
 
ARLEO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff C.G. ’s (“Plaintiff”) request for 
review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of Administrative Law Judge Marguerite 
Toland’s (“ALJ”) decision regarding Plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits 
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits. For the reasons set forth in this 
Opinion, the Commissioner of Social Security ’s (the “Commissioner”) decision is VACATED 
and REMANDED for further proceedings. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g). The Commissioner’s application of legal precepts is subject to plenary review , but 
factual findings must be affirmed if the y are supported by substantial evidence. See Markle v. 
Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) . Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) PageID:
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(quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) ). This means “more than a mere 
scintilla, [but] it need not rise to the level of a preponderance.” McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). 
“[T]he substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones v. 
Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the standard places a significant limit 
on the district court’s scope of review: it prohibits the reviewing court from “weigh[ing] the 
evidence or substitut[ing] its conclusions for those of the fact -finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 
F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). Therefore, even if this Court would have decided the matter 
differently, it is bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence. See Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Fargnoli 
v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 35 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s 
decision, the Court must consider: “(1) the objective medical facts; (2) the diagnoses of expert 
opinions of treating and examining physicians on subsidiary questions of fac t; (3) subjective 
evidence of pain testified to by the claimant and corroborated by family and neighbors; and (4) the 
claimant’s educational background, work history, and present age.” Holley v. Colvin, 975 F. Supp. 
2d 467, 475 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d 590 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2014). 
B. The Five-Step Disability Test 
Under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), disability is defined as the “inability to engage 
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 mont hs.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A). To determine whether 
a claimant is disabled under the Act , the Commissioner applies a five-step test. 20 C.F.R. PageID:
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§ 416.920. First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in 
“substantial gainful activity.” Id . “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that is both 
substantial and gainful. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. “ Substantial work activity is work activity that 
involves doing significant physical or mental activities ” while “[g]ainful work activity is activity 
that you do for pay or profit.” Id. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then 
he or she is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Jones , 364 F.3d at 503. Alternatively, if the 
Commissioner determines that the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the 
analysis proceeds to the second step: whether the claimed impairment or combination of 
impairments is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 4 16.905(a). The regulations provide that a severe 
impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic 
work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimed impairment or combination of 
impairments is not severe, the inquiry ends and benefits must be denied. See id. 
 At the third step, the Commissioner must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the claimant suffers from a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If so, a 
disability is conclusively established and the claimant is entitled to benefits. Jones , 364 F.3d at 
503. If not, at step four, the Commissioner must decide if the claimant has the residual functional 
capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(e). If so, then the claim 
for benefits must be denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(3). 
At the fifth step, if the claimant is unable to engage in past relevant work, the Commissioner 
must ask whether “work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] 
can do given [his] residual functional capacity and vocational factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2). 
The claimant bears the burden of establishing steps one through four. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 
137, 146 n.5 (1987). The burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id. PageID:
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural History 
On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging an onset date of October 
15, 2020. Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”), ECF No. 5, at 298, 307. The claim was denied on 
July 19, 2022; it was denied again upon reconsideration on September 30, 2022. Id. at 305, 314, 
326, 335. 
On April 13, 2023, the ALJ held a hearing, during which Plaintiff and a vocational expert 
(“VE”) testified. Id. at 270–97. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. See id. at 
272. On January 3, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Claimant is not disabled 
within the meaning of the Act. See id. at 249–68. On August 22, 2024, the Appeals Council 
denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. See id. at 1–4. Plaintiff now appeals 
that decision. 
B. General Background 
Plaintiff was forty-nine years old at the time of the administrative decision. Id. at 274. He 
earned the General Educational Development (GED) diploma. Id. at 276. His past relevant work 
was driving a tractor trailer and tank truck. Id. at 293. He had a Class A certification, which 
allowed him to drive tanker trucks and those containing hazardous materials. Id. at 276. As part 
of that job, he needed to lift hoses full of oil that weighed between around 100 and 300 pounds. 
Id. at 276. He began experiencing back pain and eventually underwent fusion surgery in March 
2021 after more conservative treatment options failed. Id. at 278, 1030. Plaintiff had a revision 
surgery in November 2022 after a hole developed at the surgery site, causing him “living hell.” 
Id. at 256, 279. He testified that he lies down for most of the day because his back pain prevents PageID:
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him from sitting for more than half an hour, standing for more than a few minutes, or walking for 
more than twenty minutes. Id. at 281–83, 287–88. 
Plaintiff’s alleges disability due to back fusions, compressed disc, pinched nerves, interstitial 
cystitis, anxiety, and depression. Id. at 490. He also has a bladder condition. Id. at 284. 
C. ALJ Decision 
The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled at step five of the five-step disability analysis. 
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the 
relevant time period. Id. at 252. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 
impairments: lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, status post -interbody fusion from L4- S1, 
status post-revision surgery; sciatica; mild scoliosis; chronic prostatitis; obesity; a nd depressive 
disorder, anxiety disorder, and panic disorder without agoraphobia. See id. At step three, the ALJ 
found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met the severity of 
a listed impairment. See id. 
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had “the residual functional capacity to perform 
light work 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except . . . he would need a sit/ stand option.” Id. 
at 255. The ALJ concluded that “[h]e can stand/ walk for a total of up to [six] hours in an [eight]-
hour workday, but no more than 1 hour at a time. He would then need to sit or shift positions for 
up to [five] minutes every hour while remaining on task.” Id. In reaching this RFC determination, 
the ALJ evaluated the relevant medical evidence and considered Plaintiff’s subjective testimony 
of his pain and symptoms. See id. at. 255–61.
1 The ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform past 
relevant work. See id. at 261. 
 
1 The Commissioner has summarized the medical evidence in his brief. See ECF No. 13 at 5–7. PageID:
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At step five, the ALJ found, based on the testimony of the VE, that jobs that exist in 
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, such as office helper, 
photocopy machine operator, and merchandise marker. See id. at 261–62. The ALJ thus 
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. See id. at 262. 
III. ANALYSIS 
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s unexplained addition of limitations to the RFC 
determination warrants a reversal and remand. Second, he argues the ALJ violated 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1520c by not thoroughly discussing the medical opinions. The Court agrees that the ALJ’s 
failure to explain the limitations to the RFC determination warrants reversal and remand , but the 
Court believes that the ALJ sufficiently discussed the medical opinions. 
A. RFC Determination 
The RFC determination evaluates the most a plaintiff can do despite his limitations. 20 
C.F.R. § 416.945(a). “Although the evidentiary threshold for substantial evidence ‘ is not high,’ 
RFC determinations—including for findings regarding off -task time—must still be supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.” Amber W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 25-10250, 2026 WL 
822461, *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2026) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)). An 
ALJ’s explanation must be sufficiently detailed to permit “meaningful judicial review” of his 
conclusion. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving that an error harmed him. Shinseki v. Sanders , 556 U.S. 396, 409 
(2009). Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate how any alleged error “could have affected the PageID:
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outcome of his disability claim.” See Holloman v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
Here, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not appropriately explain Plaintiff’s off -task time 
limitations. ECF No. 8 at 7–8; ECF No. 14 at1–2. The Court agrees. “The ALJ must demonstrate 
why she chose a specific percentage of off -task time ‘rather than some other duration and 
frequency,’ particularly when ‘there is evidence in the record to the contrary.’” Amber W., 2026 
WL 822461, at *8 (citing Cosnyka v. Colvin, 576 F. App’x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2014)). Failure to 
explain her reasoning “makes it impossible for the reviewing Court to determine if the ALJ’s off-
task assessment is supported by substantial evidence without knowing the basis for the figure.” 
Amber W., 2026 WL 822461, at *8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ALJ 
concluded that Plaintiff can stand/walk for a total of up to six hours in a workday as long as he 
could “sit or shift positions for up to [five] minutes every hour while remaining on task.” T r. at 
255. 
The record evidence about Plaintiff’s physical condition is mixed. The state agency medical 
consultants, Dr. Mohamed Abbassi and Dr. James Orsini , both opined that Plaintiff could stand, 
walk, and sit with normal breaks for six hours in an eight -hour workday. See id. at 302, 322. 
Plaintiff testified that he could not sit for more than 30 minutes at a time and that after sitting for 
45 minutes in a car, his back was “throbbing” and he needed to lay down and take medication. Id. 
at 281–82. He also testified that he c ould not stand in place, but that he could take a 20- minute 
walk when his back is not hurting too badly. See id. at 282. Plaintiff testified that he doesn’t 
“even bother sitting much anymore” and prefers to “just lay on [his] left side.” Id. at 281. The 
ALJ notes that the Plaintiff’s statements “are inconsistent because his testimony, as well as reports 
throughout the evidence of record, indicate a higher level of functioning than alleged.” Id. at 256. PageID:
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But the ALJ does not discuss how the varied testimony and evidence regarding Plaintiff’s 
symptoms factored into her decision about how much off-task time he would need. 
Whether this was harmless error depends on the testimony of the VE. “Where evidence in 
the record—particularly from a VE —suggests that a higher percentage of off -task time would 
preclude a plaintiff from acquiring employment, an ALJ’s insufficient analysis of off -task time 
constitutes harmful error requiring remand.” Amber W., 2026 WL 822461, at *8. During the 
hearing, the ALJ asked the VE about an employer’s tolerance for being off-task at the jo b. The 
VE responded “[n]o more than 10% of the workday, which is no more than six minutes on the 
hour.” Tr. at 295. The ALJ asked the VE to confirm that “if this individual needed to lie down . . 
. or needed to take breaks that would amount to 15% of the workday in addition to normal breaks, 
they could not perform any of these jobs .” Id. at 295. The VE agreed. See id. The ALJ then 
asked whether there would “be any job that they could perform at 15% off -task” and t he VE 
responded that there would not be. Id. As such, here, the VE’s testimony suggested that a higher 
percentage of off-task time would preclude Plaintiff from acquiring employment. 
The ALJ is entitled to broad deference in her decision to credit the medical opinions and 
Plaintiff’s testimony. Izzo v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 186 Fed. Appx. 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2006). But 
her failure to explain the basis for her determination of the amount of off-task time with evidence 
from the record compels the Court to remand for further development of the record and additional 
analysis. See Lanigan v. Berryhill , 865 F.3d 558, 563 (remanding for the ALJ to “establish a 
logical connection between the evidence and his conclusion” with respect to off- task time). The 
need for such explanation is especially necessary here, where the Plaintiff’s potential need for an 
additional four minutes of break time per hour would render him disabled under the law. On 
remand, the ALJ should substantiate any conclusion as to the amount of off -task time with PageID:
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objective medical evidence and explain how the medical evidence, including tests or testimony 
from Plaintiff’s treating or consultative physicians, support or discredit his assessment of 
Plaintiff’s symptoms. 
B. Opinion Evidence 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also violated 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c by not thoroughly 
discussing the supportability or consistency of the medical opinions . The Court disagrees . The 
Commissioner must articulate how persuasive they find a medical opinion using several factors, 
the most important of which are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1). As 
to supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations 
presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative 
medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical 
finding(s) will be.” Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to consistency, “[t]he more consistent a medical 
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical 
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior 
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(2). An ALJ “need not reiterate 
the magic words ‘support’ and ‘consistent’ for each doctor.” Zaborowski v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 
115 F.4th 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2024). Rather, it is enough for an ALJ to state that a doctor’s opinion 
fit with the other evidence of the condition and its treatability or was otherwise consistent with the 
record. See id. 
Here, the ALJ discussed the supportability and consistency of the identical opinions by Dr. 
Mohamed Abbassi and Dr. James Orsini in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c . See Tr. at 
256–61, 302–303, 322–323. The ALJ found they were “persuasive, as they are supported by the 
objective and treating evidence of record, which demonstrates spinal impairments with persistent PageID:
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symptoms despite the claimant’s course of treatment, including physical therapy, injections, 
surgical intervention, and revision.” See id. at 260. Like in Zaborowski, the ALJ found the state 
agency medical consultant opinions supported by and consistent with the condition’s treatability 
evidence in the record. 115 F.4th at 640. The Court is satisfied that the ALJ articulated the 
supportability and consistency of the state agency medical consultant opinions as required by 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments challenge the ALJ’s acceptance of the state 
agency medical consultant opinions and the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to re -weigh the 
evidence. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff retained the RFC for light work based on the ALJ’s 
arbitrary determination of off-task time constitutes reversible error. The ALJ concluded, without 
explanation, that Plaintiff needed a five-minute break per hour. If the ALJ would have concluded 
that Plaintiff needed a nine-minute break per hour, the ALJ would have concluded that Plaintiff is 
disabled. Because the ALJ failed to explain the basis for his time limitation, the determination of 
the Commissioner is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 
Opinion. An appropriate order follows. 
Date: June 8, 2026 s/ Madeline Cox Arleo 
Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID:
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