govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-6_26-cr-10091-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No. 26-10091-JWB 
 
 
PATRICIA RODRIGUEZ, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is be fore the court on the government’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s order 
of release, and its motion for detention. (Doc. 14.) The cour t held a hearing on June 1, 2026. 
(Doc. 22.) For the reasons stat ed herein, the government’s mo tion for detention is GRANTED, 
the magistrate judge’s order of release (Doc. 21) is REVOKED, and Defendant is committed to 
the custody of the Attorney General of the United States pending trial. 
I. Facts 
Defendant was arrested on May 18, 2026, based on a criminal complaint charging her with 
two counts. (Doc. 1.) Count 1 charged that on January 16, 2026, Defendant did knowingly and 
intentionally distribute 50 grams and more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable 
amount of methamphetamine, a controlled substa nce. Count 2 charged that on May 14, 2026, 
Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute 400 grams and more of 
a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, a controlled substance. Both 
counts were in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a )(1), (b)(1)(B). On May 27, 2026, a grand jury 
returned an indictment against Defendant as to both counts. (Doc. 11.) The government proffered 
the following evidence in support. 

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An affidavit of a special agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) alleged 
that, on January 16, 2026, a Sedgwick County Sheriff’s Office detective working in an undercover 
capacity, together with an informant, arranged through a supply source to purchase a half kilogram 
of methamphetamine. At the prearranged location in Wichita, Kansas, Defendant arrived alone in 
a grey Chevy Impala; the underc over detective entered her vehi cle, paid her $1,900 in cash, and 
Defendant handed him a yellow drawstring bag cont aining a package wrapped in brown tape. 
Investigators followed the Impala—which was registered to Defendant—to her residence, and the 
detective identified Defendant as the seller based on his interaction with her during the transaction 
and a law enforcement photograph. The packag e weighed approximately 536 grams and field-
tested positive for methamphetamine. (Doc. 1 at 4–8.) 
With regard to the transaction th at forms the basis for Count 2, as proffered by the 
government at the June 1, 2026 hearing, the same undercover detective and informant arranged a 
second purchase from the same individual, on May 14, 2026, who advised that a kilogram of 
fentanyl was available in the Wichita area through a female and s ought $22,000 for it. Having 
previously identified Defendant from the Janu ary transaction, law en forcement established 
surveillance at Defendant’s residence and obser ved Defendant leave th e home carrying a teddy 
bear, get into a vehicle, and drive toward the prearranged meet location. When Defendant arrived 
and parked beside the vehicle she had been directed to approach, officers arrested her. Inside the 
teddy bear recovered from her car, officers found fentanyl powder, which the forensic laboratory 
determined to weigh approximately 1,003 grams. Following her arrest, law enforcement learned 
that Defendant has an immigration detainer lodged against her. 
 The government moved for a detention hearing. (Docs. 3, 7, 8.) On May 29, the magistrate 
judge held a detention hearing and ordered that Defendant be released pending trial under various 

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conditions. (Docs. 15, 21.) The government no w seeks revocation of the release order and an 
order that Defendant be detained pending trial. (Doc. 14.) 
II. Standard 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1), the government may seek review of a magistrate judge’s 
order of release. The district c ourt’s review of a magistrate judge ’s order of release is de novo. 
United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 616 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2003). A de novo evidentiary hearing, 
however, is not required. The dist rict court may either “start fr om scratch and take relevant 
evidence or incorporate the record of the proceedings conducted by the magistrate judge including 
the exhibits admitted.” United States v. Collier, No. 12-20021-09, 2012 WL 4463435, at *1 (D. 
Kan. Sept. 27, 2012) (citing United States v. Torres , 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991)). The 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to detention hearings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The court 
may allow the parties to present information by proffer, or it may insist on direct testimony. Id. 
 Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the court must order a de fendant’s pretrial release, 
with or without conditions, unless it “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and 
the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In making this determination, the court must consider the 
available information concerning: 
(1) The nature and circumstances of th e offense charged, including whether the 
offense . . . involves . . . a controlled substance . . .; 
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including- 
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, 
employment, financial resources, lengt h of residence in the community, 
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, 
criminal history, and record concer ning appearance at court proceedings; 
and 

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(B) whether, at the time of the curren t offense or arrest, the person was on 
probation, on parole, or on other releas e pending trial, sentencing, appeal, 
or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; 
and 
(4) the nature and seriousness of the da nger to any person or the community that 
would be posed by the person's release. 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
Authority to request detention in this matter arises from several subsections of the Bail 
Reform Act. Detention is authorized pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C). Moreover, there is a 
presumption of detention that applies in this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). See 
United States v. Walters , 89 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (D. Kan. 2000) (“A grand jury indictment 
provides the probable cause required by the statute to trigger the presumption.”). 
 The burden of production on Defendant to ove rcome the presumption is not a heavy one, 
but Defendant must produce some evidence. United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th 
Cir. 1991). Even if Defendant overcomes the presumption, it re mains a factor in the court’s 
detention decision. Id. The burden of proof remains with the government to show that no 
condition or combination of condi tions would reasonably assure th e accused’s presence in later 
proceedings and/or the safety of other persons and the community. United States v. Lutz, 207 F. 
Supp. 2d 1247, 1251 (D. Kan. 2002) (holding that the burden of persuasion regarding risk of flight 
and danger to community always remains with the government). The gove rnment must prove 
dangerousness to another person or the community by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1252 
III. Analysis 
The court next proceeds through each of the Bail Reform Act factors for pretrial detention. 
As explained below, the court finds pretrial detention to be appropriate in this case. 
A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
 In reviewing this factor, the court is to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense 

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charged. Both offenses involve controlled substances, and they involve substantial quantities—
more than 50 grams of methamphetamine and ove r 400 grams of fentanyl , as charged in the 
indictment. Fentanyl is an ex tremely dangerous drug; there ha ve been numerous cases in the 
Wichita community where people were severely hu rt or killed using fentanyl and families are 
routinely destroyed by both methamphetamine and fentanyl abuse. Further, the proffered evidence 
indicated Defendant kept the fent anyl in her home, con cealed in a teddy bear, in a residence she 
shared with six children, including an eight-, nine-, and ten-yea r-old. Storing a kilogram of 
fentanyl in a teddy bear in a home full of children is reckless and shockingly dangerous, and such 
conduct discounted the value of Defendant’s ties to those children, suggesting she posed more of 
a danger than a help to them. Therefore, because Defendant exposed her children to those risks, 
the presence of those children and other family ties do not weigh in her favor. This factor weighs 
in favor of detention. 
B. Weight of the Evidence 
 
The government’s proffer indicates the weight of the evidence is st rong. The evidence 
includes eyewitness testimony availabl e from persons involved in bo th transactions. As to the 
methamphetamine delivery, an undercover officer entered Defendant’s car, observed her, and 
received the drugs directly from her. As to the fentanyl delivery, law enforcement conducted aerial 
surveillance of Defendant’s home before she arrive d, and Defendant was arre sted at the scene in 
possession of drugs. The evidence against Defendant is substantial and this factor favors detention. 
C. History and Characteristics of Defendant 
As expounded upon in the June 1, 2026, heari ng, the court has he ard little about 
Defendant’s character beyond that she is in the country unlawfully and dealing drugs, and nothing 
reported reflected any physical or mental health history of conse quence. As to family ties, 

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although Defendant has family in the area, thos e ties were establis hed through her unlawful 
presence in the country. As to employment, Defe ndant’s work weighed against her because it is 
unlawful for her to work; her continued employme nt demonstrated a disregard for the law and 
undercut any expectation that she would abide by conditions of release. As to length of residence, 
the court acknowledged that the probation office indicated Defendant’s children are United States 
citizens, one of whom is approxi mately thirty years old, but he r unlawful presence negated the 
value of the length of residence. The bond report did not suggest any problem with drug or alcohol 
abuse. Defendant’s criminal hi story includes two failures to a ppear, which bore directly on the 
likelihood of her appearance and indi cated that she does not appear in court when directed to do 
so. Overall, this factor weighs in favor of detention. Finally, Defendant is incentivized to flee the 
jurisdiction of the court and cro ss the southern border into Mexi co because she has significant 
family in Mexico and is unable to legally work in the United States. Therefore, the court is 
concerned that Defendant is a flight risk. 
D. Danger to the Community 
Federal law commands the release of a person subject to conditions pending trial unless 
the court determines that the release will endanger the safety of another person or the community. 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The court’s “concern about safety is to be given a broader construction than 
the mere danger of physical violence. Safety to the community refers to the danger that the 
defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community.” United States v. 
Kroeker, No. 22-3092, 2022 WL 2610344, at *4 (10th Cir. July 8, 2022) (quoting United States v. 
Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
Taken as a whole, the court finds that th e available informati on concerning the § 3142 
factors shows by clear and convinc ing evidence that Defendant’s release would pose a danger to 

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the community. The court explained that, under Tenth Circuit authority, danger to the community 
is measured not by the risk of phy sical violence but by the risk of continued criminal activity to 
the detriment of the community. That risk is present here: De fendant remains in the country 
unlawfully and has been distributing large quantities of drugs, each to the community’s detriment. 
Further, Defendant has demonstrated a willingness to engage in that conduct even to the point of 
placing her own children at risk by keeping the fentanyl in her home. 
Accordingly, after consideration of all the factors outlined at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the court 
finds that Defendant has not overcome the rebutta ble presumption. However, even if Defendant 
were able to overcome this presumption, the court finds that there is no co mbination of pretrial 
release conditions that would reasonably assure her appearance. Accordingly, she cannot be 
released pending trial. 
IV. Conclusion 
THEREFORE, the government has carried its burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that there is no combination of condit ions that would reasonabl y assure the safety of 
others and the community if Defendant were releas ed pending trial. Further, the combination of 
Defendant’s potentially lengthy sent ence, family ties to Mexico, and inability to legally work in 
the United States render Defendant a flight risk. Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s order of 
release (Doc. 21) is thereby REVOKED and the government’s motion for de tention (Doc. 14) is 
GRANTED. 
Defendant Patricia Rodriguez is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General, 
pending trial, for confinement in a corrections f acility separate, to the extent practicable, from 
persons awaiting or serving sentences or being he ld in custody pending appeal. Defendant shall 
be afforded reasonable opportunity for private c onsultation with counsel and, upon an order of a 

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court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the government, the person in charge of 
the corrections facility in which Defendant is held shall deliver Defendant to a United States 
Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection with a court proceeding. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 5th day of June 2026. 
 __s/ John Broomes_______ 
 JOHN W. BROOMES 
 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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