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govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_26-cv-00522-0

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio · 2026-06-05

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:44:29

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
JOSE ROMULO RIVEROS LAMUS, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
TODD BLANCHE, in his capacity as 
Acting Attorney General of the United 
States, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
 
 

 
 Judge Michael R. Barrett 
 
 ORDER 
 
 
 
 This matter is before the Court on the petition for habeas corpus, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed by Petitioner Jose Romulo Riveros Lamus. (Doc. 1). 
Respondents have filed a return and response in opposition. (Doc. 4). 
 Petitioner, a citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States with his wife and 
daughter in August 2016 under a B-2 nonimmigrant visa. In March 2017, Petitioner 
applied for asylum and was granted permission to remain lawfully in the country 
until his application is decided. (Doc. 1, PageID 35). Since that time, Petitioner moved 
to Columbus, Ohio, obtained long-term gainful employment, purchased a home , and 
had another child. The record reflects that Petitioner’s asylum application has yet to 
be adjudicated. 
 In March 2026, Petitioner drove his younger child to a family member’s home 
before work and was subsequently stopped by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. ( Id., PageID 10). Respondents assert that “Petitioner 
was taken into custody as part of a targeted enforcement operation,” (Doc. 4, PageID 
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85), while Petitioner claims that Respondents did not believe his stated reason for 
being in the area and arrested him without cause, (Doc. 1, PageID 10). Respondents 
then initiated removal proceedings, alleging that Petitioner “remained in the United 
States beyond 12/20/2025, without authorization from . . . the Department of 
Homeland Security.” (Id., PageID 64). He remains in detention at the Butler County 
Jail on behalf of federal immigration authorities. 
 Following Petitioner’s request for a custody redetermination hearing, an 
Immigration Judge denied release in a one -sentence order stating that “[t]he Court 
finds Respondent to be a flight risk.” ( Id., PageID 37). The instant petition followed, 
with Petitioner arguing that his ongoing detention without a constitutionally 
adequate bond hearing violates both the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952. Respondents concede that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in 
Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 25-1965, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 13519 
(6th Cir. May 11, 2026) is controlling, but argue that th is petition is moot because 
Petitioner has already received the remedy requested. Alternatively, 
“In the context of an immigration bond hearing, district courts have 
jurisdiction to review [an] Immigration Judge’s discretionary bond denial only ‘where 
that bond denial is challenged as legally erroneous or unconstitutional.’” Diaz-
Calderon v. Barr, 535 F.Supp.3d 669, 676 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (quoting Lopez Reyes v. 
Bonnar, 362 F.Supp.3d 762 772 -73 (N.D. Cal. 2019)); see Hechavarria v. Whitaker , 
368 F.Supp.3d 227, 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that “a challenge may be based 
on the contention that the decisionmaker erred because the evidence itself could not—
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as a matter of law —have supported the adjudicator’s position,” or “it may be clear 
from the adjudicator’s opinion itself that he simply did not apply the correct standard 
to the facts.”). Because that is the case here, and because federal courts possess 
continuing jurisdiction to enforce grants of habeas relief, see Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 
346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010), the Court is satisfied of its own jurisdiction and the live 
nature of the petition.1 
Based upon the available record and the order of the IJ, Petitioner’s custody 
redetermination proceedings fell “woefully short of constitutional adequacy.” Diallo 
v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-CV-423, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118446, at *4 
(S.D. Ohio May 18, 2026). Although Respondents characterizes Petitioner as arguing 
“with no supporting evidence, that [the IJ’s order] contains an ‘inexplicable, 
unsupportable conclusion that he is a flight risk,’” (Doc. 4, PageID 86), neither the 
IJ’s order nor Respondents’ briefs contain any evidence that could be used to show a 
risk of flight by clear and convincing evidence. 
“A presumption of regularity is inapplicable if the proceedings, on their face, 
clearly reflect that DHS did not bear the appropriate burden of persuasion or that the 
IJ did not meaningfully considered less restrictive alternatives to detention.” Diallo, 
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118446, at *6. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, on or 
before June 12, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. EDT, Respondents shall either release Petitioner 
 
1 As it has in a number of cases, the Court declines to impose a prudential exhaustion requirement 
here, “both as a matter of ‘sound judicial discretion’” and in light of the “substantial constitutional 
question” presented by the petition. Garcia Gonzales v. Raycraft , No. 1:26 -CV-112, 2026 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 35094, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2026) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) 
and Lopez v. Barr, 458 F.Supp.3d 171, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2020)). 
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from custody or provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond hearing 
before an IJ. In the event of the latter: 
(1) Respondents shall provide a copy of this order to the IJ 
prior to any hearing; 
(2) the IJ shall have jurisdiction over the matter and be 
empowered to grant release. See Lopez -Campos, 2026 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13519, at *37-38; 
(3) Respondents shall bear the burden of persuasion of 
justifying Petitioner’s continued detention by adducing 
clear and convincing evidence on the record that 
Petitioner is either a flight risk or a danger to the 
community; 
(4) the IJ shall consider the evidence submitted by 
Petitioner, carefully weigh the nine relevant factors from 
Matter of Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37, 50 (B.I.A. 2006), and 
clearly explain all legal and factual conclusions; and 
(5) the IJ shall meaningfully consider , and explain , the 
suitability of less restrictive alternatives to detention 
(such as release on recognizance ), or if setting a 
monetary bond, Petitioner’s “ability to pay when setting 
any bond amount.” M.P.L. v. Arteta , No. 25 -CV-5307, 
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204541, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 
2025). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file a status report on 
or before June 15, 2026, to certify compliance with the Court’s ruling. The 
certification shall note whether and when a bond hearing was held, whether bond 
was granted or denied, and the reasons therefore. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ Michael R. Barrett 
 Michael R. Barrett 
 United States District Judge 
 
 
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