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govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-2_25-cv-00070-0
[1]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Alan Williams, et al., :
: Case No. 2:25-cv-00070
Plaintiffs, :
v. : Judge Graham
:
Ohio Department of Mental
Health and Addiction
Services, et al.,
: Magistrate Judge Jolson
:
:
:
Defendants. :
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 14. For the reasons
that follow, the Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs in this matter are Pastor Alan Williams (“Williams”) and the
LLCs he operates as residential facilities to benefit the homeless community 1
(“collectively, “Plaintiffs”). The Defendants in this matter are the Ohio Department
of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“ODMHAS”) and various employees of
ODMHAS (the “Employee Defendants”). Plaintiffs initiated this suit after ODMHAS
investigations and enforcement actions resulted in the loss of licenses to operate four
(4) residential facilities.
1 Namely, My Friends Place in Unity, LLC, My Brother’s Place II, LLC, and My Best Friends
Place, LLC.
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[2]
Plaintiffs claim that their constitutional rights were violated by the various
ways in which the investigations were tainted. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the
investigations were animated by prejudice against Williams’ race and religion and
the results were based on five (5) illegal searches conducted from February 24, 2021,
and September 19, 2022. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants planted,
destroyed, and concealed evidence “so as to convey the false impression that Mr.
Williams’ properties were unsafe and unfit for habitation.” Doc. 13, # 263.
An ODMHAS hearing was held on January 23, 2023, regarding whether to
revoke four (4) licenses to operate Plaintiffs’ facilities. Id. at 269. On May 30, 2023,
ODMHAS issued an adjudication order revoking all four (4) licenses. Id. Plaintiffs
appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, raising much of the same
arguments concerning the propriety of the investigations as he does in the instant
case. Doc. 3-2, # 216. The Court of Common Pleas ultimately affirmed the ODMHAS
order of May 30, 2023. Doc. 13, # 269. Plaintiffs again appealed, this time to the Court
of Appeals of Ohio’s Tenth Appellate District, and they left with the same result when
the appellate court affirmed the decision below. Id.
Plaintiffs filed the instant suit on January 27, 2025. In their Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiffs raise the following claims:
Count I: § 1983 Unlawful Religious Discrimination
Count II: § 1983 Equal Protection
Counts III-VII: § 1983 Illegal Search (based on alleged searches
conducted on February 24, 2021, June 9, 2021, December 28,
2021, February 4, 2022, and September 19, 2022, respectively).
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Count VIII: § 1981 Equal Rights Under Law
Count IX: § 1983 Due Process claim based on the administrative
hearing procedures.
Count X: § 1983 Due Process claim based on Defendants’
execution of the license revocation order before Plaintiffs
exhausted their appeals.
Count XI: Slander (raised only against Defendants ODMHAS and
Tina Nutter)
Count XII: Alleging the ODMHAS regulatory scheme is
unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.
Doc. 13.
Defendants filed the motion to dismiss currently before the Court, arguing for
dismissal based on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(1), and
based on Plaintiffs’ purported failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. Civ. R.
12(b)(6). Doc. 14. In their responsive pleading, Plaintiffs conceded that Defendant
ODMHAS should be dismissed from the suit, thus leaving only the individual
Defendants. Doc. 15, # 329.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss brought under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(1) argues that the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. A motion to dismiss brought
under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) argues that the operative complaint fails to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. In either case, the court is “[r]equired to construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and to accept the factual
allegations as true.” Leisure v. FBI of Columbus, Ohio , 2 F. App'x 488, 489 (6th Cir.
2001). However, the court is not required to credit a claimant’s “summary allegations
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[4]
or unwarranted legal conclusions.” Id. (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d
737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. , 534 U.S. 506,
122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) ). Plaintiff bears the burden of an affirmative
showing of jurisdiction, without which dismissal is required. See Walls v. Waste Res.
Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp. of Indiana , 298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936) ). “Although
typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L.
Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION
Under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
strips this Court of jurisdiction to review a final state court judgment. 2 Under Rule
12(b)(6), Defendants argue that certain claims are barred by res judicata, and that
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Court
discusses these arguments in turn.
I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Largely Evade the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ illegal search and seizure claims (Counts III-
VII) cannot be adjudicated by this Court pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as Defendants describe it, “is based on the negative
2 Defendants originally raised three (3) arguments under 12(b)(1), but two (2) of them applied
solely to Defendant ODMHAS, and thus they moot in light of Plaintiffs’ concession that the
Department should not be a part of this case.
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[5]
inference that, if appellate court review of [final judgments from the highest court of
a state] is vested in the U.S. Supreme Court, ” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), then
“federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” Doc. 14, # 299.
In determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, the Court must
look to “the source of the injury” alleged in the complaint. McCormick v. Braverman,
451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006) . The inquiry is whether the source of the injury is
the state court decision, in which case the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent
the district court from asserting jurisdiction, or if “there is some other source of
injury, such as a third party’s actions.” Id.
In the instant case, Defendants contend that the argument under Counts III -
VII of the SAC “is the exact same argument that [Plaintiffs] made” in the state court
proceedings, and which the state tribunals found unpersuasive. Doc. 14, # 300.
Therefore, Defendants argue, this Court is without jurisdiction over such claims
“because they seek appellate review of state court judgments.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that they are merely presenting an “independent claim, albeit
one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which
he was a party,” thereby negating the application of Rooker-Feldman. Doc. 15, # 330
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 293, 125
(2005)). In such circumstances—when a plaintiff “attempts to litigate in federal court
a matter previously litigated in state court”—the federal district court “may be bound
to recognize the claim - and issue -preclusive eff ects of a state -court judgment, but
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federal jurisdiction over an action does not terminate automatically on the entry of
judgment in the state court.” Id.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply here. Plaintiffs are not allegin g an injury with its source in a state court
judgment; rather, much like the claimants in Hohenberg v. Shelby County, Tennessee,
Plaintiffs here challenge “the allegedly wrongful actions and omissions that led to
their judgments, not the judgments themselves.” 68 F.4th 336, 340 (6th Cir. 2023) .
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks “actual economic and compensatory
damages,” “punitive damages,” “treble damages,” “statutory damages and fines,” and
attorney fees and costs (doc. 13, # 277), none of which “would amount to ‘review and
rejection’ of any of the judgments binding the claimants.” Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 341.
This is true regardless of whether Plaintiffs raised the same arguments in state court
and lost. Because such injuries alleged and the relief sought are not traceable to a
state court judgment, Plaintiffs’ re-run of arguments raised unsuccessfully in state
court may be barred by principles of res judicata, but not the jurisdictional bar of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
However, Plaintiffs also seek “injunctive relief to prevent further violations
and restore Plaintiffs’ licenses.” Doc. 13, # 277. Though not made explicit by the text
of SAC, such relief appears to be based on Count XII, which alleges that the
“regulatory scheme for revoking the license of Health care facilities is
unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Pastor Williams.” Id. at # 276. While
the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the claim itself ( see Hohenberg, 68 F.4th
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[7]
at 341 (holding Rooker-Feldman does not bar declaratory relief that plaintiffs’ rights
were violated)), the Court further finds that the requested injunction and license-
restoration tilt into Rooker-Feldman territory, where the Court cannot grant such
relief without effectively sitting in review of a state court judgment. See Lawrence v.
Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2008) (“claims seeking injunctive relief are barred
by Rooker–Feldman if they necessarily require the federal court to determine that a
state court judgment was errone ously entered. ”). Thus, the Court concludes that
Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument is well-taken to the narrow extent that it bars
the Court from issuing one form of relief sought by Plaintiffs.
II. Plaintiffs’ Claims in Counts I-X are Barred by Res Judicata.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res judicata based on
the preceding litigation in Ohio courts. Federal courts “look to the state’s law to assess
the preclusive effect it would attach to [the] judgment.” Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of
Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has
articulated the four (4) elements of claim preclusion in Ohio as follows:
(1) [A] prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the
same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second
action raising claims that were or could have been litigated
in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of
the previous action.
Hapgood v. City of Warren , 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997) . Defendants contend
that, over the course of Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal in the Franklin County
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[8]
Court of Common Pleas and their subsequent appeal to the Tenth District Court of
Appeals, all four (4) elements have been met. As to Counts I-X, the Court agrees.
a. The First, Second, and Fourth Elements are Satisfied as to Counts I-X
of the Second Amended Complaint.
Indisputably, there is a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction, satisfying the first element. See My Friend's Place in Unity v.
Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Servs. , 2024 -Ohio-3257, appeal not
allowed, 2024-Ohio-5340, 175 Ohio St. 3d 1532, 245 N.E.3d 791 . And there is no
dispute that this (“second”) action arises from the same transaction or occurrence,
satisfying the fourth element.
The second element requires the Court to consider whether this action involves
“the same parties[] or their privies” as the state court proceedings. Hapgood, 127 F.3d
at 493. Ohio courts “ have applied a broad definition to determine whether the
relationship between the parties is close enough to invoke the doctrine,” holding that
“‘a mutuality of interest, including an identity of desired result,’ may create privity.”
Kirkhart v. Keiper, 2004-Ohio-1496, ¶ 8, 101 Ohio St. 3d 377, 379, 805 N.E.2d 1089,
1092 (quoting Brown v. Dayton, 2000-Ohio-148, 89 Ohio St. 3d 245, 248, 730 N.E.2d
958, 962).
In the state court action, the appellants were My Friend’s Place in Unity, My
Brother’s Place, My Brother’s Other Place, and My Best Friend’s Place (collectively,
the “Facilities”). In the instant case, the Plaintiffs are the same, with the addition of
Williams, the owner and operator of the Facilities. On the other side of the v., only
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[9]
ODMHAS was named as a party during the state court proceedings, while the instant
action includes seven (7) employees of the Department as well, named in their official
capacities. Doc. 13. Williams and the Facilities plainly have mutuality of interest, as
do ODMHAS and its employees in their official capacities. See Heike v. Cent.
Michigan Univ. Bd. of Trs., 573 F. App'x 476, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2014) (official capacity
employees are in privity with their governmental entity employer) (citing cases).
Therefore, the Court finds that the parties of the instant action are identical to, or in
privity with, the parties of the state court proceedings, thus satisfying the second
element.
b. The Third Element is Satisfied as to Counts I-X of the Second Amended
Complaint.
The third element asks whether the instant claims “were or could have been
litigated in the first action. ” Hapgood, 127 F.3d at 493. The Sixth Circuit has
recognized that this element “concerns only the legal possibility of bringing the
disputed claims in the previous action. ” U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health
Network, 816 F.3d 399, 416 (6th Cir. 2016) . Under this standard, res judicata has
been applied when the rules of civil procedure for the prior forum would allow the
precluded claims, regardless of whether they were actually raised. See Doe ex rel. Doe
v. Jackson Loc. Schs. Sch. Dist. , 422 F. App'x 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2011) . On the other
hand, res judicata is not applicable to a claim which was not ripe when the previous
action was commenced. See Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 522
(6th Cir. 2011).
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[10]
In the instant case, the bulk 3 of Plaintiffs’ claims were or could have been
raised in the state court proceedings. Plaintiffs do not dispute that at least some of
the claims and issues before the court were previously raised in state court, but they
offer no colorable argument for why res judicata would not bar this Court’s
consideration of those matters. For example, while both the trial and appellate courts
conducted thorough analyses of the warrantless search and seizure claims, Plaintiffs
curiously claim that “none of their opinions cited the governing law or analyzed the
claims using the well -known standard for de termining if administrative searches
have exceeded their scope.” Doc. 15, # 333. In fact, both opinions cite controlling
precedent from the Supreme Court of Ohio in addition to the relevant statutes. See
My Friend's Place in Unity , 2024 -Ohio-3257 at ¶¶ 2 0-21 (citing authorities to
conclude that “holders of licenses for residential facilities consent to inspections by
[ODMHAS] when they apply for and maintain licenses to operate these facilities.”).
Whether these authorities provide the “well -known standard” to which Plaintiffs
refer is unclear, as Plaintiffs have not provided any authority for nor articulation of
such a standard.
Furthermore, t he allegations in the SAC make it clear that the previously
unasserted claims could have been raised by Plaintiffs as they pursued their appeal
in the Ohio courts. See doc. 13. Plaintiffs largely concede that the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas has jurisdiction to review the claims they raise for the first time in
the instant case. Doc. 15, # 332. See State ex rel. Schwarzmer v. Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-
3 The exceptions are Counts XI (slander) and XII (facial and as applied constitutional
challenge), which are discussed below.
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1246, 178 Ohio St. 3d 455, 459, (“The common pleas court is a court of general subject-
matter jurisdiction with power over ‘all matters at law and in equity that are not
denied to it. ’”) (quoting Saxton v. Seiberling , 48 Ohio St. 554, 29 N.E. 179 (1891) ).
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that certain claims were not ripe at the time of the
administrative appeal, and that, regardless, they were “not required to bring the
claims at that time,” pursuant to Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, No. 20-4051,
2021 WL 1881382 (6th Cir. May 11, 2021) . Doc. 15, # 332. Plaintiffs are incorrect in
both respects.
Start with the ripeness question. Plaintiffs argue that the “due process claims”
could not have been raised previously because they “involve [their] treatment in the
administrative hearing and on appeal,” and therefore “did not accrue until the state
court proceedings in which Plaintiffs’ rights were being violated were complete.” Doc.
15, # 333. But the due process claims raised in the SAC do not allege rights violations
in the state court proceedings. Of Counts I-X, the only claim that accrued after the
end of the administrative proceedings is Count X (due process) ,4 concerning the
allegation that Defendants wrongfully informed Plaintiffs’ residents of the license
revocation while Plaintiffs’ appeal was pending. Doc. 13, # 276 -77. Plaintiffs cite no
authority supporting a due process right to a stay of execution of an administrative
order during pendency of an appeal. Even assuming such a right exists, Plaintiffs
could have exercised that right by seeking to suspend the administrative order in the
Court of Common Pleas during the appeal, as provided by the Ohio Revised Code. See
4 The other due process claim, Count IX, concerns the fairness of the revocation hearing, an
issue which was litigated in the state court proceedings.
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[12]
Ohio Rev. Code § 119.12 .5 Defendants note that Plaintiffs raised these “exact same
facts” in a motion for contempt in the Court of Common Pleas, which denied the
motion. Doc. 16, # 355 (citing My Friend’s Place in Unity et al. v. Ohio Dept. of Mental
Health & Addiction Servs., Franklin County Court of Common Pleas docket Case No.
23-cv-004267); see also Buck, 597 F.3d at 816 (“Although typically courts are limited
to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take
judicial notice of other court proceedings without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment.”). Alternatively, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ theory of Count X
depends on a finding that the license revocation was itself wrongfully obtained , it
must fail, because res judicata precludes this Court from adjudicating that previously
litigated issue. See doc. 3-2, # 236 (Court of Common Pleas decision finding the license
revocation order was “supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and
is in accordance with law.”).
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Harrison v. Montgomery County for the proposition that
they did not need to raise all their claims in state court is misplaced. In Harrison, the
Sixth Circuit held , “if a plaintiff chooses to pursue an administrative appeal, claim
preclusion may bar a later attempt to seek the same relief.” 997 F.3d at 651. The
claimant in Harrison “did not pursue an administrative appeal,” which, the panel
explicitly acknowledged, “sets her case apart.” Id. Even though the Plaintiffs here
have indeed pursued an administrative appeal, and are now seeking the same relief,
5 Paragraph (E) states, “The filing of a notice of appeal shall not automatically operate as a
suspension of the order of an agency. If it appears to the court that an unusual hardship to
the appellant will result from the execution of the agency’s order pe nding determination of
the appeal, the court may grant a suspension and fix its terms.”
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[13]
they simply emphasize the Sixth Circuit’s “may” as if it were an escape hatch from
long-standing principles of res judicata. Doc. 15, # 333. The Court is not persuaded.
As a further distinction, much of the Sixth Circuit’s discussion in Harrison concerns
why the claims at issue could not be raised during the time of the administrative
appeal (for complicated and idiosyncratic reasons not present here).
The unique facts of Harrison do not alter the general rule that res judicata will
preclude a claim that could have been raised in a prior proceeding . Carroll v. City of
Cleveland, 522 F. App'x 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying res judicata where
claimants “ could have asserted each of the claims they raise here ” in prior
administrative appeal). Therefore, because Counts I-X of the SAC were or could have
been raised in state court, those claims are now precluded by res judicata.
III. Counts XI and XII Fail to State Claim s for Which Relief Can be
Granted.
Two claims escape the application of res judicata but nevertheless warrant
dismissal. In Count XI, Plaintiffs raise a common law slander claim solely against
Defendant Nutter, alleging that she “contacted other agencies and individuals and
intentionally made statements that she knew to be false in an ultimately successful
effort to drive Pastor Williams completely out of business .” Doc. 13, # 276. The SAC
is vague as to when any such statements occurred, alleging that Nutter made such
statements “throughout the time she oversaw the review of Plaintiffs’ licenses,” (id.)
and “during and after these events.” Id. at # 270. Without more, the Court cannot
determine when this claim accrued and thus cannot say that it could have been raised
previously. But the same vagaries that save the slander claim from the res judicata
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[14]
bar also doom the claim as inadequately pleaded. At no point do Plaintiffs identify
the content of the allegedly slanderous statements. See Mitchell v. Fujitec Am., Inc.,
518 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1092 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (to state a claim for slander or libel,
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts as to the content of the alleged statements).
Rather, Plaintiffs ’ allegations are entirely conclusory, which warrants dismissal
under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
In Count XII, Plaintiffs allege that ODMHAS’ “Regulatory scheme for revoking
the license of Health care facilities is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to
Pastor Williams.” Id. at # 276. Though Plaintiffs raised a facial and as -applied
constitutional challenge in state court, the claim currently before the Court is based
on Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), which had not been decided
before Plaintiffs appealed the administrative order. Therefore, Count XII could not
have been raised in the state court proceedings. Regardless , this claim is without
merit.
In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court recognized a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial for claims that are “legal in nature,” even when arising from a gency
enforcement of “novel statutory regimes.” 603 U.S. at 126, 139. At issue in Jarkesy
was whether the respondents were entitled to a jury trial based on the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s enforcement action seeking civil penalties for alleged
securities fraud. Id. at 115. The Supreme Court answered affirmatively: “ The SEC’s
antifraud provisions replicate common law fraud, and it is well established that
common law claims must be heard by a jury. ” Id. at 120. Furthermore, because the
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[15]
punitive nature of the civil monetary penalties sought were “legal in nature,” they
implicated the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as “a type of remedy at
common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Id. at 122-23 (quoting Tull
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987)).
Plaintiffs do not demonstrate how this reasoning applies to the facts of this
case. Rather, Plaintiffs simply argue that “prior to [Jarkesy], administrative regimes
like those in Ohio were understood to be perfectly legal ,” but that now it is possible
“to raise a claim that the system is unconstitutional for numerous reasons.” Doc. 15,
# 333 -34. Elsewhere in their briefing, in response to Defendants ’ argument that
Count XII is inadequately pleaded for failing to identify which statute or regulation
is alleg edly unconstitutional, Plaintiffs contend that they “are alleging the entire
structure is now illegal under [ Jarkesy].” Id. at # 339. For support, Plaintiffs allude
to Jarkesy’s “extensive attack” on “numerous aspects of administrative courts,
questioning their legitimacy more broadly.” Id.
The Court does not read Jarkesy to be the blank check Plaintiffs claim it to be.
Regardless, the Court agrees with Defendants that they “should not be expected to
guess which particular provision is the basis for the claim.” Doc. 14, # 318. Plaintiffs’
purported attack on “the entire structure” (doc. 15, # 339) simply does not “ state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
Therefore, dismissal is warranted for Counts XI and XII, and the Court need
not address the remaining arguments in Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Counts I-X, which
were or could have been litigated in the prior proceeding in state court, are precluded
on the basis of res judicata. Counts XI and XII fail to state a plausible claim to relief.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (doc. 13) is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: June 5, 2026
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