govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_26-cv-00509-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
LAZARO DAVID MUNOZ SOTO, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
 
 

 
 Judge Michael R. Barrett 
 
 ORDER 
 
 
 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Lazaro David Munoz Soto’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). 
Respondents have filed a return and response in opposition , (Doc. 9), and Petitioner 
has replied, (Doc. 10). 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, entered the United States in January 2024. He 
was inspected at the Calexico West Port of Entry and granted a two-year parole by 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5). (Doc. 1, 
PageID 61). Petitioner moved to Louisville, Kentucky, obtained employment 
authorization, and applied for status under the Cuban Adjustment Act, after which 
his removal proceedings were terminated by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). ( Id., 
PageID 67, 72, 74). As far as the Court is aware, that application remains pending 
with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). 
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 In December 2025, Petitioner was approached by a law enforcement officer at 
a gas station in Dayton, Ohio, who asked for identification. According to Petitioner: 
After running Petitioner’s information, the officer informed 
Petitioner that warrants allegedly existed for “Lazaro 
Davis Munoz Soto” arising from prior years predating 
Petitioner’s arrival in the United States. Petitioner 
immediately denied that the warrants pertained to him 
and explained that his name was “Lazaro David Munoz 
Soto,” not “Lazaro Davis Munoz Soto,” and that he had not 
entered the United States until 2024. 
 
Despite those explanations, Petitioner was arrested and 
transported to Montgomery County, Ohio for extradition 
proceedings. The allegations surrounding the warrants 
repeatedly changed during the proceedings. Authorities 
later asserted that a separate warra nt allegedly existed 
from Campbell County, Kentucky arising in March 2025. 
Petitioner consistently denied ever being present in 
Campbell County, Kentucky or engaging in any conduct 
associated with those allegations. Counsel for Petitioner 
contacted the Cam pbell County prosecutor’s office 
regarding the alleged warrant and was informed that the 
prosecutor could not definitively verify Petitioner’s identity 
in relation to the allegations. No Governor’s warrant was 
timely issued. Petitioner’s extradition proceedings 
ultimately expired after t he statutory period elapsed 
without lawful extradition documentation being secured. 
No criminal conviction resulted from those proceedings. 
 
(Id., PageID 5-6). 
 Nevertheless, Petitioner remained in custody in Ohio after Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) lodged an immigration detainer against him. In 
January 2026, Respondents assert that “Petitioner’s parole expired, and he returned 
to his status as an arriving alien, seeking admission.” (Doc 9, PageID 147). What 
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followed was the recommencement of removal proceedings by DHS and a series of 
filings and proceedings in which Respondents advanced contradictory claims and 
information. To date, it appears that Respondents have provided no evidence as to 
Petitioner’s alleged criminality, nor have they demonstrated that Petitioner’s parole 
was properly revoked at any time prior to its two-year expiration. 
 On April 24, 2026, the IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate his newly -
initiated removal proceedings. (Doc. 1, PageID 78). Then, on May 12, following the 
Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 25-1965, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13519 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026) , Petitioner moved for a custody 
redetermination hearing. However, on May 19, the IJ denied bond because “THE 
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION,” and “THE RESPONDENT IS AN ARRIVING 
ALIEN.” (Doc. 1, PageID 76). 
Petitioner remains in custody at the Butler County Jail on behalf of federal 
immigration authorities, and the length of his detention is approaching six months . 
He asserts that he is being held in violation of federal law and the Fifth Amendment, 
and asks the Court to grant habeas relief in the form of immediate release from ICE 
custody. ( Id., PageID 3). Respondents argue that Petitioner is an “arriving alien” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and is therefore subject to mandatory detention 
regardless of the Sixth Circuit holding in Lopez-Campos. Alternatively, Respondents 
argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that his 
detention does not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment in the first place. (Doc. 9, 
PageID 148). 
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II. STANDARDS OF LAW & ANALYSIS 
a. Administrative Exhaustion 
As an initial matter, Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
grant habeas relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative 
remedies. But Respondents’ own reasoning in support of applying a prudential 
exhaustion requirement undercuts the very argument they put forth . To the extent 
that any actual administrative review has occurred, it has not “allow[ed] the agency 
to correct its own mistakes,” and has instead further entrenched those mistakes. (Id., 
PageID 149). Moreover, if any party has “encourage[d] the deliberate bypass of the 
administrative scheme,” the record reflects that it was Respondents themselves. (Id.). 
 In any event , the Court has repeatedly addressed the issue of exhaustion in 
this context and rejected Respondents’ position, “both as a matter of ‘sound judicial 
discretion’” and in light of the “substantial constitutional question” presented by the 
petition. Garcia Gonzales v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-CV-112, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35094, 
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2026) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 144 
(1992) and Lopez v. Barr, 458 F.Supp.3d 171, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2020)). And apart from 
those considerations, the petition raises “non -frivolous constitutional challenges to 
an agency’s procedures.” Id. (quoting Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 
2006)). 
b. Statutory Framework 
 As for the statutory framework under which Petitioner is being held, the Court 
is puzzled by Respondents’ insistence that mandatory detention without bond is 
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required here by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) . The Sixth Circuit ’s opinion in Lopez-
Campos affirms the Co urt’s prior holding that “detention under § 1226(a) attaches 
where DHS encounters a noncitizen within the interior after admission or after a 
substantial period of continuous presence, whereas § 1225(b) applies only where the 
individual encountered is ‘seeking admissio n’ at the border or its functional 
equivalents.” Ortiz Gutierrez v. Raycraft , ___ F.Supp.3d ___, No. 1:26 -CV-69, 2026 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32801 , at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2026) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted); cf. Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25 -CV-10029, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
261199, at *29-30 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 17., 2025) (“Section 1182(d)(5)(A) . . . does not state 
that a noncitizen is returned to the ‘status’ they held upon their parole, that they 
revert to status as an ‘arriving alien,’ or that they must be detained.”). And the facts 
of this case do not distinguish it from the Court’s prior immigration detention cases 
to the extent that a different outcome is warranted. 
 Because Petitioner was inspected at the border and paroled into the interior of 
the country, he cannot now be an “arriving alien” who is “seeking admission,” such 
that he must be subjected to mandatory detention under Respondents’ interpretation 
of § 1225(b). Lopez-Campos, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 13519, at *25 ( “So a noncitizen 
who seeks such immigration relief is not ‘seeking admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)(A).”). 
Put another way, Respondents urge the Court to employ a reasoning that “produces 
an unjust and counterintuitive result,” and is “absurd in the facts and circumstances 
of this case.” Walizada v. Trump, No. 2:23-CV-768, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at 
*38-39 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025); see also Araque-Marquez v. Olson, No. 26-84-DLB, 2026 
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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64037, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2026) (collecting cases). Therefore, 
Petitioner falls under § 1226(a). 
c. Constitutional Question 
Respondents acknowledge that “Petitioner has great interest in freedom from 
unlawful confinement,” but then proceed to assert that “his confinement i s lawful” 
and he has “ample available process in current removal proceedings.” (Doc. 9, PageID 
154). However, as in prior cases, “it appears ‘the Government returns again and again 
to push the same theory uphill, only for courts to send it rolling back down again.’” 
Ortiz Gutierrez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32801, at *10 (quoting Rios Porras v. O’Neill, 
No. 25-6801, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263464, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025)). 
For the same reasons that the Court has propounded numerous times in 
substantially similar cases, Petitioner’s detention under the circumstances stands in 
direct violation of his due process rights. Azalyar v. Raycraft, 814 F.Supp.3d 926, 933 
(S.D. Ohio 2026) ; see Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976). And a lthough 
Petitioner also makes a compelling and well -supported argument as to the 
impropriety of Respondents’ premature termination of his parole without notice or an 
opportunity to respo nd, see, e.g., Ramirez Tesara v . Wamsley, 800 F.Supp.3d 1130, 
1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025), the Court need not reach that issue today because the other 
statutory and constitutional questions are dispositive. 
d. Remedy 
In all previous grants of habeas relief to civil immigration detainees to this 
point, the undersigned has ordered Respondents to either release a petitioner from 
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custody or provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing within a certain amount 
of time. See, e.g., Diallo v. Raycraft , No. 1:26 -CV-423, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, No. 1:26 -
CV-423, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118446 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 2026); Velasque Salazar 
v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 1:26-CV-245, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56674 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2026); Wali v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-CV-145, 2026 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36339 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2026) ; Garcia Gonzales , 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35094. But the Court is confronted with a complicating factor here: complete futility. 
Unlike other cases post-Lopez-Campos in which Respondents have affirmed 
that they will respect and adhere to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion when the Court orders 
a custody redetermination hearing , Respondents have done no such thing here. In 
fact, Respondents continue to argue that Petitioner is statutorily precluded from the 
relief normally available at a bond hearing, and the IJ has expressly flouted the Sixth 
Circuit’s authority by declining to find jurisdiction. Therefore, because anything short 
of release would almost certainly subject Petitioner “to the hardship of [ continued] 
mandatory detention without due process, ” Lopez-Campos, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13519, at *39, the Court may order release in accordance with its broad discretion “to 
dispose of habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice require .’” Hilton v. Braunskill, 
481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243). 
 
 
 
 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons , the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
GRANTED.1 Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from 
custody, subject only to the conditions, if any, that existed under Petitioner ’s prior 
parole. 
Respondents SHALL file a status report with the Court on or before June 8, 
2026, to certify compliance with this order. Furthermore, Respondents are 
ENJOINED from re -detaining Petitioner , absent exigent circumstances, without 
providing notice and a pre-deprivation hearing.2 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ Michael R. Barrett 
 Michael R. Barrett 
 United States District Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 As a result, the motion to dismiss filed by Respondent Butler County Sheriff is DENIED as moot. 
2 At any pre-deprivation hearing, Respondents shall bear the burden of proof and adduce clear and 
convincing evidence on the record that Petitioner is either a flight risk or a danger to the community, 
such that less restrictive alternative s to detention c ould not reasonably address the gov ernmental 
interest. 
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