govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_23-cv-02515-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
EDELMAN FINANCIAL ENGINES, 
LLC, et al.,
 
 Plaintiffs,
 
 v.
 
MARINER WEALTH ADVISORS LLC, 
 
 Defendant.
 
 
 
 
 

 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 This is a high-dollar dispute between two wealth advisory firm s. Defendant Mariner 
Wealth Advisors (“Mariner”) hire d away some financial planners from Plaintiffs Edelman 
Financial Engines, LLC and Edelman Financial Engines, L.P. (collectively “Edelman”). Many of 
the newly hired planners (“Depart ed Planners”) listed some Ed elman clients from memory upon 
starting their job with Mariner. They then rese arched publicly available information to contact 
their former clients and reached out to them. Edelman contends that its client information is a trade 
secret, that Mariner incentivized the Departed Pl anners to solicit its clie nts and benefited from 
their actions, and that Mariner thereby misappr opriated Edelman’s trade secrets. Edelman sues 
Mariner and asserts a Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) claim (the sole jurisdictional hook) and 
various state-law claims. Mariner moves for summary judgment. Doc. 122. Edelman moves for 
partial summary judgment on liability. Docs. 119 and 120. 
The briefing is extensive. But the Court begi ns and ends with one question: Has Edelman 
presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mariner misappropriated its trade 
secrets? The answer is no. Many aspects of the financial planning industry are confidential. And 
the identity of and information a bout a wealth advisory firm’s clients inherently has some value. 

2 
But confidential information with some value doe s not automatically equa te to a trade secret. 
Edelman fails to show that (1) its identified trade secrets are actual trade secrets; and (2) Mariner 
misappropriated them. No reasonable jury could find for Edelman on its DTSA claim. The Court 
grants Mariner’s motion for summary judgment and denies Edelman’s. The Court declines 
supplemental jurisdiction and does not reach any of the state-law claims. The pending Daubert 
motions (Docs. 113, 114, and 115) are denied without prejudice as moot. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. Predicate Factual Issues. 
 The Court starts with a predicate issue that is ancillary to the substance of the case but that 
has complicated the Court’s revi ew and frustrated resolution of the pending motions. Edelman 
uses some briefing tactics that are not in line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this 
district’s local rules. The Cour t notes two. First, Edelman at tim es fails to properly controvert 
Mariner’s facts or to support it s own with pinpoint citations to the record. Second, Edelman at 
other times misrepresents the evidence and even tries to modify it to fit Edelman’s narrative. 
Neither problem is a one-off; they appear th roughout Edelman’s briefing, to the point that the 
Court cannot excuse them. The Court addresses briefly each issue. 
 1. Failure to Properly Controvert or Support with Citation. 
 This district’s local rules requi re parties to “refer with particularity to those portions of the 
record” in setting forth disput ed or undisputed facts. D. Ka n. R. 56.1. Conclusory allegations, 
allegations unsupported by specific facts, and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact. See Colony Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Omer, 2008 WL 2309005, at *1 (D. Kan. 2008). 
Edelman sometimes refers only to the entirety of an exhibit to support a statement. There 
are instances where such approach may be appropria te (e.g., citing the entire ty of a contract to 

3 
support its existence), but the shortc omings in this case are different. See, e.g., Doc. 135 at ¶ 29 
(citing exhibits 144-153 in their entirety, which sp an nearly one hundred pages in total); ¶ 33 
(same); ¶ 30 (citing exhibits 99-114 in their entirety, which span mo re than fifty pages in total). 
Many of the exhibits are lengthy. And for some facts, Edelman cites no portion of the record 
whatsoever. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 36. Or it merely states without citation that a fact is disputed to the 
extent it suggests something unfavorable to Edelman. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 40, 42, 53, 54, 59, 60, 61, 
64-67. It is not the Court’s role to scour the record for evidence to support Edelman’s position. See 
Freebird Commc’ns, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Roberts, 2019 WL 5964583, at *1 (D. Kan. 2019) 
(citing examples). 
The record is voluminous. For Edelman’s own summary-judgment motion alone, Edelman 
submitted more than 700 pages of unsealed ma terials and more than 1,700 pages of sealed 
materials. Edelman did not file the exhibits i ndividually as contemplated by this district’s 
administrative guidelines section IV.B. Instead, Edelman filed th em in packets of documents 
ranging from three hundred pages to more than one thousand pages per file. This, too, complicated 
review. The Court nevertheless ha s reviewed the record. But where Edelman fails to provide a 
pinpoint citation, the Court did not undertake a deta iled review to determine whether the exhibit 
supports Edelman’s position. 
 2. Misrepresentation and Attempted Modification. 
 The Court found instances where Edelman purportedly summarized what a piece of 
evidence said. But when the Court reviewed the ev idence in the record, the evidence did not say 
what Edelman represented. The following example is illustrative. Edelman states, “The record 
clearly indicates that Mariner di rected the Departed Planners to create the re-constructed client 
lists.” Doc. 135 at ¶ 43; see also Doc. 120 at ¶ 27. But the depos ition transcript excerpts that 

4 
Edelman cites do not indicate that Mariner directed the Departed Planners to create the client lists. 
The Court reviewed every citation referenced by Edelman in its response to Mariner’s paragraph 
43 and did not find a single Depart ed Planner who testified that Mariner directed him “to create 
the re-constructed client lists.” Edelman’s misstatement of the record is frustrating and causes the 
Court to question all Edelman’s representations th at material facts are ge nuinely disputed. And, 
unfortunately, this is not the onl y time the Court discovered th e same problem. The Court notes 
other instances as relevant throughout this memorandum and order. 
The Court also notes what may be Edelman’s most egregious misstep: the improper use of 
an errata sheet and corresponding declaration to substantively c ontradict deposition testimony 
given under oath while counsel was present. Ede lman’s corporate representative, Bryan Clark, 
testified about an entity that is not a party to this case, Financial Engines Advisors, LLC, or “FEA.” 
Clark then “corrected” his testimony via an erra ta sheet and a declaration. In doing so, he made 
material changes to his deposition testimony. Mariner developed a chart, and the Court includes a 
few excerpts from the chart to illustrate the problems: 
Clark Deposition Testimony Clark Declaration or Clark Errata 
He is employed by FEA. Mariner SJ Br. Ex. 
M, Edelman (Clark) Dep. Tr. 43:11-22, 
43:22. 
“I am only employed by Edelman Financial 
Engines, LLC.” Clark Errata 42:17-18. 
 
“I have been employed at Edelman Financial 
Engines, LLC since 2016.” Clark Errata 
43:22. 
Fees were paid by FEA to the Departed 
Planners. Ex. M, Clark Dep. Tr, 112:10-15. 
“The Departed Planners were paid by Edelman 
Financial Engines, LLC.” Clark Errata, 
112:15. 
 
“All of these planners are exclusively 
employed and compensated by EFE LLC.” 
Clark Decl. ¶ 2. 
 
Doc. 145 at 4-5. 

5 
This is not the proper use of an errata sheet or declarati on. The Court is justified in 
disregarding the content of both. See Eucalyptus Real Est., LLC v. Innovative Work Comp Sols., 
LLC, 676, F. Supp. 3d 938, 945-48 (D. Kan. 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 1631228 (10th Cir. Apr. 16, 
2024) (declining to consider errata’s material changes to testimony). But, in the end, this improper 
tactic is immaterial because the Court does not r each the primary issues addressed via the errata 
sheet (i.e., which entity is the proper party to bring these claims). 
 B. Undisputed Facts. 
 The Court now turns to the undisputed facts. Both parties contend they are entitled to 
summary judgment on one or more issues. A court faced with dueling summary-judgment motions 
views each motion separately and construes the fact s they present in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. United States v. Sup. Ct. of N.M. , 839 F.3d 888, 906-07 (10th Cir. 2016). 
With this standard in mind, the following facts are uncontroverted except where otherwise noted.1 
 1. The Parties’ Investment Advisory Businesses. 
 The parties and their affiliates are generally in the same business: they are wealth advisory 
firms that provide investment a dvisory and wealth management services. There are nuances in 
which entities register with the SEC, pay adviso rs, and enter into client contracts. But broadly 
speaking, the parties are busine ss competitors who compete to attract productive and effective 
financial planners to build th eir business and assets under ma nagement (“AUM”). AUM is the 
total market value of the investments held by a portfolio manager or investment company on behalf 
of clients. 
 
1 Both Edelman and Mariner, to one degree or another, incorporate facts or argument from its own summary-
judgment motion into its response to the other’s motio n. This approach improperly circumvents page limits 
imposed by the Court and local rules. It is also inconsis tent with Tenth Circuit instruction to view each motion 
separately. The Court therefore does not countenance these statements. The Court has done its best to review the 
facts presented by each motion, evaluate whether they are properly controverted, and present them in a 
consolidated form here. 

6 
 Edelman touts its “lead genera tion program” as unique. Edelman generates client leads for 
its financial planners. This allows planners to focus on client service rather than marketing. 
Edelman submitted a purported fi ve-year marketing budget to de monstrate how much it pays 
annually to develop its client list. The summary document appears to be a budget for the years 
2020 through 2024. Bryan Clark testified that Edelman spends close to $40 million per year 
generating leads for its planners. Most clients that the Departed Planners served at Edelman were 
from Edelman-generated leads. 
Mariner has its own lead generation program. Mariner routinely hires advisors based on a 
need to handle leads generated by that program. Mariner has grown its AUM substantially since 
2019, mostly from acquisitions and a ffiliations with advisors w ho were previously employed by 
firms other than Edelman. 
2. The Departed Planners. 
 Edelman employed the followi ng financial planners: Mike Horne, Joseph Azzopardi, 
Kevin Garvey, Brian McGuire, John Geilfuss, Se th Kelly, Jacob Mercer, Mike Borgatti, Ronald 
Newton, and Walter Varian. Each left Edelman to work for Mariner between 2021 and 2025. Each 
Departed Planner entered at least one written ag reement with Edelman that included restrictive 
covenants. The covenants vary in form, but they prohibited solicitation of Edelman’s clients for at 
least twelve months. Some also prohibited acce pting Edelman’s clients for the same duration. 
Nevertheless, Edelman’s clients can terminate their relationships with Edelman or a planner at any 
time and for any reason. 
 3. Mariner’s Recruitment. 
 Some of the Departed Pla nners reached out to Mariner about potential employment. 
Mariner initiated communi cation with others. Mariner regula rly communicates with advisors 

7 
associated with other firms who may be interest ed in joining Mariner. Mariner has considered 
recruiting from about 155 advisory firms (including Edelman) within the past five years. 
 Mariner does not require planners hired from other firms to bring or to attempt to bring 
clients whom they serviced at a prior firm. More specifically, Mariner did not require the Departed 
Planners to bring or to attempt to bring clie nts with them. Mariner did, however, incentivize 
Departed Planners to bring clie nts with them by entering a “P urchase Agreement” with them. 
Mariner bought the Departed Planners’ goodwill with Edelman clients in exchange for a bonus of 
1.5X to 2X the net revenue generated by those c lients if they moved their business to Mariner 
during the first eighteen to tw enty-four months of the De parted Planners’ employment. 2 And 
Mariner requested and usually r eceived a copy of the Departed Planners’ agreement(s) with 
Edelman, which included restrictive covenants. The Departed Planners in fact agreed to inform a 
potential employer about their obligations under the agreements. 
 Mariner uses a document called “Due Diligen ce Questionnaire for Lift Outs” during the 
recruitment process. The questionnaire asks the ca ndidate for the “fee schedule” used for clients. 
It also asks the candidate to describe any varian ces if the fee schedule varies. Mariner does try to 
learn generally about a candidate’s field experience, including how much AUM the candidate has 
serviced. But Mariner does not ask for or receive client-s pecific information. Edelman’s attempt 
to show otherwise is disingenuous and insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Edelman repeatedly cites three instances in which it insists that Departed Planners Garvey, 
Geilfuss, and Varian provided cl ient-specific fee information to Mariner. But none of the 
 
2 Edelman characterizes this as Mariner incentivizing the Departed Planners to breach their non-solicitation 
agreements. But the non-solicitation agreements range in length from twelve to fifteen months. So it was not 
automatic that the Departed Planners would have to solicit former clients during the prohibited period to earn a 
bonus. Many planners still had between three and twelve months after expiration of the non-solicitation period 
during which they could solicit former clients without risk of breaching their non-solicitation agreement. 

8 
documents cited connect a fee rate to a particular client or account. Garvey and Geilfuss gave 
Mariner their Planner Compensation Statement (the “BRAC report”). Garvey’s BRAC report 
includes certain fee rates billed to clients. But it is not client-specific. Geilfuss’s BRAC report, 
which is photographed from his co mputer, is cut off on the edge so it does not show the fee rate. 
And the spreadsheet Varian provided Mariner is not client-specific. The spreadsheet appears to 
show fees paid year-to-date, line-by-line. The fees are listed by “Reg T ype,” i.e., “Individual,” 
“IRA Rollover,” “Roth,” and “Individual Retirement Account.” The spreadsheet does not contain 
any identifying information to connec t numbers or rates to clients. Suffice it to say, the exhibits 
found at Doc. 120-3 at 396-412 and Doc. 120-4 at 525-552 do not create a genuine issue of material 
fact over whether Mariner asked for or received client-specific information. 
 Some Departed Planners shared general in formation about Edelman’s fee schedule during 
recruitment discussions. But Mariner did not use the information.
3 Mariner requested and received 
information about the Departed Planners’ compen sation with Edelman to determine offers of 
employment.4 And Mariner requested and received information regarding the amount of AUM and 
 
3 Edelman contends that this fact is disputed. Edelman maintains that “Mariner used this information to compete 
with Edelman and ensure that its fee schedule was as good as or better than the Edelman fee structure so that 
Edelman clients would move their assets to Mariner.” Doc. 135 at ¶ 32. But Edelman’s citation to the record for 
this point does not support this statement. Departed Pl anner Azzopardi testified that he gave a former Edelman 
401(k) client a fee schedule that was lower than Mariner typically charged for 401(k) clients. Azzopardi was able 
to get Mariner’s approval for the fee schedule and keep th e client’s fee the same. He also testified in the next 
sentence (not cited by Edelman) that he did not explain to Mariner why he wanted the fee applied to the client. 
Doc. 120-2 at 25. 
4 Edelman contends that this fact is disputed. Edelma n maintains that “Mariner also used the information to 
determine whether the ‘litigation costs’ it would face fr om executing its unlawful scheme were outweighed by 
the financial upside of obtaining the Departed Planners’ Edelman clients and their AUM.” Doc. 135 at ¶ 33. 
Again, Edelman’s citation to the reco rd does not support this statement. The evidence cited shows that Mariner 
established a “litigation risk rating” for prospective new hires. It also shows that Mariner asked about threatened 
and ongoing litigation, as well as Edelman’s past reacti on to individuals leaving its employ. But the evidence 
does not make the bridge Edelman says it does—i.e., that Mariner used compensation information to conduct a 
litigation cost-benefit assessment. 

9 
number of clients serviced “for Mariner to gain a better understanding of their industry experience, 
which information Mariner did not use for any other purpose.”5 Doc. 123 at 19. 
4. Resignation from Edelman and Onboarding with Mariner. 
 The Departed Planners did not take any of Edelman’s documents or ESI upon resigning. 
Neither have they used any of Edelman’s documen ts or ESI in their employment with Mariner. 
All the Departed Planners but Borgatti did, however , type the names of clients they could recall 
from memory into a “Smartsheet” Excel document. They then used publicly available resources 
to find contact information for the clients. Th e Departed Planners other than Geilfuss (and 
Borgatti) used the Smartsheets to track their contact with clients to inform them of their new 
employment. But Mariner did not direct Departed Planners to record client names in a Smartsheet 
or require them to do so. Likewise, Mariner did not direct the Departed Planners to solicit or accept 
business of any prior client and did not condition employment on such a requirement.
6 
 5. Former Client Communication. 
 Mariner directed the Departed Planners othe r than Horne and Azzopardi not to solicit the 
former clients, but instead to (1) inform th e client of their new employment and contact 
information, (2) respond factually to any questions, and (3) have no further contact if the client did 
not want further contact. Five fo rmer Edelman clients have signed affidavits indicating that their 
experience was generally consistent with this practice. 
 
5 Edelman contends that the record “i ndicates that Mariner asked for this information to determine if the Departed 
Planner was worth the litigation risk.” Doc. 135 at ¶ 35. Again, the evidence Edelman cites shows that Mariner 
assessed litigation risk in its hiring decisions. But it does not show that Mariner asked for information about AUM 
and the number of clients serviced to determine whether a Departed Planner was worth the litigation risk (and not 
only to gain a better understanding of the Departed Planner’s industry experience). 
6 Edelman contends Mariner did, in fact, require the Departed Planners to use the Smartsheets and solicit business 
from former clients because “Mariner methodically created a recruiting system that intentionally incentivized the 
Departed Planners to breach their restrictive covenants and bring, or attempt to bring, clients they serviced at 
Edelman to Mariner.” Doc. 135 at ¶¶ 29, 39, & 43. As the Court previously noted, this statement is not an accurate 
representation of the evidence cited in support. 

10 
 6. Alleged Trade Secrets. 
 Most of the Departed Planners developed a list of the names of some prior clients from 
memory. They then looked up contact information on those clients, sometimes using independent 
knowledge about the client to filt er out incorrect matches. But the only way Mari ner ultimately 
received client-specific informat ion was from the clients themselves if they chose to move to 
Mariner. Mariner only obtained client-specific information about AUM, investment positions, and 
fees charged by Edelman from the clients themselves if they became Mariner clients. 
II. STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “n o genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party 
bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shif ts to the nonmovant to demonstrate that 
genuine issues remain for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 
586-87 (1986). Courts applying this standard view the facts and any reasonable inferences in a 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co. , 41 F.3d 567, 
569 (10th Cir. 1994). “An issue of material fact is genu ine if a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Federal law authorizes a civil action fo r the misappropriation of trade secrets. 
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b). To establish a DTSA claim, a plaintiff must show “( 1) the existence of a 
trade secret; (2) the acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret without consent; and (3) that 
the individual acquiring, using, or disclosing the trade secret knew or should have known the trade 
secret was acquired by improper means.” API Americas Inc. v. Miller , 380 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 

11 
1147-48 (D. Kan. 2019). The Court addresses below wh ether Edelman has sufficient evidence to 
create a jury question about the existence of a trade secret and about the misappropriation of any 
such trade secret. Edelman does not.7 
 A. Existence of Trade Secrets. 
The first requirement for a misappropriation claim is the existence of a trade secret. 
Edelman has shifted positions on wh at its purported trade secrets are during the case. It appears 
that Edelman has now settled on two: (1) “the cumulative list of the names of nearly 1,000 
confirmed Edelman clients with confirmed assets to invest and the Departed Planners’ knowledge 
of those clients,” and (2) “non-public informatio n regarding specific Edelman fees and AUM of 
the clients serviced by the Departed Planners.” Doc. 135 at 24, 26. 8 The DTSA defines “trade 
secret” to include: 
all forms and types of financial, business, sc ientific, technical, 
economic, or engineerin g information . . . [p rovided that] (1) the 
owner must have “taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret,” and (2) the information must derive 
“independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not bein g readily ascertainable through 
proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value 
from the disclosure or use of the information[.]” 
 
Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. v. Hooper , 134 F.4th 1078, 1087 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)). The plaintiff bears the burd en of identifying its tr ade secrets and showing 
they exist. Id. at 1088. The plaintiff must use sufficient particularity in describing its alleged trade 
 
7 The parties spent much time debating whether FEA (not a pa rty) is the owner and real party in interest to bring 
Edelman’s claims. Mariner contends that FEA is a necessary and indispensable party and that FEA, not Edelman, 
owns the purported trade secrets at issue. This argument has some appeal and raises some interesting issues. But, 
in the end, it does not impact the outcome. The Court decides the case on other grounds. 
8 Despite the way Edelman addresses the purported trade secrets in its response to Mariner’s motion for summary 
judgment, Edelman states in its reply brief to its own motion that it has not abandoned any trade-secret theories. 
Doc. 142 at 2, n.1. But this is inconsistent with Edelma n’s treatment of its alleged trade secrets in response to 
Mariner’s summary-judgment motion. Mariner moved for summary judgment on all Edelman’s asserted trade 
secrets. Edelman narrowed its response to two and has thereby waived arguments as to any other trade secrets. 

12 
secrets to ensure that the defendant has “‘concrete identification to prepare a rebuttal.’” Id. (quoting 
InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2020)). Whether a trade 
secret exists is generally a question of fact. ATS Grp., LLC v. Legacy Tank & Indus. Servs. LLC , 
407 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2019) (citations omitted). 
A customer list can meet the definition of a trade secret. BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi , 
96 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (D. Kan. 2000), rev’d on other grounds , 80 F. App’x 619 (10th Cir. 
2003). But a mere list of customer names, even including their a ddresses, may no t always be a 
trade secret. Id. The determination requires a “fact-intensive inquiry” into the contents of the list. 
Id.9 One consideration is whether the list contains detailed information such as “purchasing 
patterns, sales volumes and payment histories.” Id. The list can be written or memorized; there is 
not a discernable difference in trade secret protection for tangible lists versus memorized lists. See 
Masimo Corp. v. True Wearables, Inc., 2022 WL 17083396, at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (“Although 
[Defendant] believes that whatever he could remember in his head from his time with Plaintiffs 
became his . . . this belief is contrary to trade secret law.”); Tribal Behavioral Health LLC v. 
Reeves, 2022 WL 2290563, at *11 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“[T]rade secret protection does not depend on 
whether the [customer] list misappropriated is in written form or memorized.” (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
The Court first addresses how Edelman has de fined its trade secrets. Then it turns to 
Edelman’s efforts to keep its information secret and the info rmation’s independent economic 
value. 
 
 
9 Summary judgment may still be proper under some circumst ances even though trade secrecy is an issue of fact. 
Snyder v. Beam Techs., Inc., 147 F.4th 1246, 1257 (10th Cir. 2025). 

13 
1. Edelman’s Identified Trade Secrets. 
The Court begins with pinni ng down the two trade secrets Edelman claims Mariner 
misappropriated. As noted, Edelman has the burden to identify them. 
a. Client Lists. 
The first is Edelman’s client list of “confir med Edelman clients with confirmed assets to 
invest and the Departed Planners’ knowledge of those clients.” This is not a written compilation 
of client information or data th at the Departed Planners took wh en they resigned. This is not a 
recreated “master list” that the Departed Planner memorized before resigning. Indeed, there is no 
evidence that Edelman has a “master list” at all. The only evidence before the Court is that each 
Departed Planner (except for one ) recreated from memory an in complete and disparate list of 
clients he had serviced with Edelman. Edelman has not shown that each list included every client 
of each planner; it appears that each individual list was a partial client list. The initial lists were 
only names. That is the extent of the content. 
The Departed Planners then researched through public sources to find contact information. 
In some instances, their independent memory of a client’s location or other personal information 
they obtained via a personal relationship with the client may have helped. But the list itself had no 
other information. There is no evidence that the Departed Planners intentionally memorized their 
lists or took other action before leaving Edelman that would give them an advantage over someone 
else trying to locate contact information. And the fact that the clients had confirmed assets to invest 
makes this list no different from any other client or customer list; a client or customer by its very 
nature is assumed to have both an interest in the product or service and the ability to pay for it. 
 

14 
b. Non-Public Fee and AUM Information. 
The second alleged trade secret is more difficult to define: “ non-public information 
regarding specific Edelman fees and AUM of the clients serviced by the Departed Planners.” It is 
unclear to the Court where Edelman is drawing the line between public and non-public 
information. Clients know (or c ould readily ascertain) the fees they are charged, and they know 
their own AUM. This is information they are capa ble of giving another fi nancial planner at any 
time. There is no evidence that Edelman’s clients were prohibited from sharing information about 
the services Edelman provided them, the types of accounts and balances serviced, and the fees they 
incurred. And Edelman has not produced evidence that the Depa rted Planners gave Mariner 
specific information about fees charged a particular client (by name) or the AUM that any 
particular client had (by name). The contours of this alleged trade secret are murky. 
2. Reasonable Measures to Maintain Secrecy. 
With these contours of the two alleged trade secrets in mind, the Court considers whether 
each constitutes a trade secret under the law. Th e Court first looks at whether Edelman took 
reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its client lists and its non-public AUM and fee 
information. What qualifies as “r easonable” is fact-dependent. Snyder, 147 F.4th at 1256. But 
reasonableness requires more diligence than “normal business precautions.” Id. (citation omitted). 
An entity’s property right is extinguished if it discloses its trade secret to individuals who are not 
obligated to protect its confidentiality. Id. (citation omitted). An entity that fails to take measures 
to prevent sharing of a purported trade secret risks losing protection. Id. 
There are a few problems with Edelman’s ef forts that apply to both categories of 
information. First, Edelman has produced eviden ce that it requires its financial planners to sign 
restrictive covenants or confiden tiality agreements. But this leav es a group of other employees 

15 
with the same access unconstrained. Edelman has not produced evidence that customer service 
associates (“CSAs”) are subject to the same types of agreements de spite access to the same 
information. Mariner’s attorney asked Clark, “Does Edelman ente r into agreements with CSAs 
that have restrictive covenants?” Clark answered that he did not know. Mariner stated this as an 
undisputed fact, and Edelman respon ded, “Disputed to the extent this factual allegation is meant 
to suggest that any of the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable.” Doc. 135 at ¶ 75. 
Edelman did not cite any evid ence in support. Mariner also argued in its summary-judgment 
motion that Edelman failed to show that it restricted CSAs’ use of client information after leaving 
Edelman. Edelman did not addre ss it. Edelman does try to point to nonspecific information, but 
none of it establishes that CSAs had confidentiality agreements or restrictions. Edelman has come 
forward with no evidence that CSAs were contractually obligated to protect the confidentiality of 
Edelman’s alleged trade secrets. See Snyder, 147 F.4th at 1256 (finding failure to take reasonable 
measures when the individual claiming ownership of the alleged trade secret did not require those 
with access to sign confidentiality agreements). 
The second way Edelman has failed to show that it protects its confidential information is 
its frequent failure to pursue legal remedies. Edelman’s damages expert stated that there were 
“additional planners who have departed” Edelman and breached their agreements. The record 
shows that about 74 other planners have left employment and breached their agreements with 
Edelman beyond those considered by Edelman’s e xpert. Edelman took legal action against 42 of 
those planners. Even in this case, Edelman did not seek injunctive relie f against eight of the 
Departed Planners. This selective enforcement of Edelman’s alleged trade-secret rights shows a 
lack of reasonable protective meas ures. It also suggests that th e information at issue does not 
constitute a trade secret at all. See Alamar Biosciences, Inc. v. Difco Lab’ys, Inc., 1995 WL 912345, 

16 
at *6 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (granti ng summary judgment on trade secret claim under California law 
because the plaintiff’s “failure to bring suit” established that the plaintiff “did not take reasonable 
steps to protect its trade secrets”). 
There is also further evidence that Edelman sp ecifically failed to protect what it calls its 
“non-public information about AUM and fees.” Edelman contends this confidential information 
was contained in the two BRAC reports of Garvey and Geilfuss and in an email from Varian. But 
none of these documents connect or disclose fees or compensation associated with specific clients. 
And Edelman does not dispute that its planners can generally disclose their compensation to a 
potential new employer. See also Progressive Prods., Inc. v. Swartz , 258 P.3d 969, 978 (Kan. 
2011) (determining under Kansas law that price lists were not trade secrets because customers had 
access and could freely communicate how much they were paying). Edelman has also publicly 
disclosed some AUM information in various c ourt cases. And some Edelman advisors have 
disclosed AUM and numerical clie nt information on their LinkedI n profiles without apparent 
policing or objection by Edelman. 
Edelman emphasizes its efforts to restrict internal access to client information. 10 Clark 
testified that Edelman does not let planners download information from the system. Specifically, 
Edelman does not let planners download the inform ation in its BRACS system or its Salesforce 
system, where Edelman keeps all of its client information. And each planner can only see the 
information of his or her own clients in Salesforce. 
 
10 Edelman cites testimony of Robert Blakley about secu rity protocol, but Blakley’s testimony is related to 
protecting the data of Edelman’s financial systems including “general ledger, accounts payable, accounts 
receivable, collection, bank accounts, and compensation systems.” Doc. 120-2 at 279. For these systems, Blakley 
testified that Edelman uses multifactor authentication, password, and encryption to maintain security and ensure 
confidentiality. Id. at 279-81. But Edelman cites these protective measures as applying to client information and 
AUM. Edelman’s representation of Blakley’s testimony is inaccurate. 

17 
Edelman’s effort falls short. Edelman again does not address the access of CSAs to the 
same information as the planners. And Edelman makes no effort to show how these measures are 
any more than “normal business precautions.” See Snyder, 147 F.4th at 1256. No reasonable jury 
could find that Edelman took reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its client lists and its 
non-public AUM and fee information. 
 3. Independent Economic Value. 
 The next problem is that Edelman has not marshaled evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could find that its alleged trade secrets have independent ec onomic value. Firs t, the partial 
client lists were simply that: a partial list of clients compiled from me mory. The lists did not 
include client preferences, investment positions, or other identif ying information that might give 
the list more value. See, e.g., All W. Pet Supply Co. v. Hill’s Pet Prods. Div., Colgate-Palmolive 
Co., 840 F. Supp. 1433, 1438 (D. Kan. 1993) (client list included purchase patterns, sales volumes, 
and payment histories). Independent economic value exists where (1) secrecy provides a 
“competitive advantage or economic benefit to the information’s owner,” and (2) a plaintiff shows 
the “time, effort, or expense” required to create a list or model. See Double Eagle Alloys, Inc., 134 
F.4th at 1093-94 (noting that the plaintiff failed to provi de information about the time, effort, or 
expense involved in creating a pricing model); Dodson Int’l Parts, Inc. v. Altendorf, 347 F. Supp. 
2d 997, 1011 (D. Kan. 2004). They were partial lists of people with whom the Departed Planners 
had worked. 
Edelman tries to paint the content of the partia l client lists as much more than that. But 
there is no evidence that would s upport the conclusion that a discre te and partial collection of a 
Departed Planner’s client’s names had independent economic value. The only evidence Edelman 
has in support is testimony that a few Departed Planners used their knowledge a bout certain 

18 
Edelman clients to track down contact informat ion from public sources wh en it otherwise might 
have been more difficult. 11 But Edelman has not cited any aut hority suggesting that a bare and 
partial list of names becomes a trad e secret under these circumstances. Compare EIS Ultimate 
Holding, LP v. Huset , 2024 WL 4472008, at *13-14 (D. Colo. 2024) (finding that the plaintiff 
adequately identified its custom er lists as trade secrets when the lists included the “clients or 
potential clients, contact persons at those firms, and contact information (e.g., phone numbers and 
email addresses) for those contact persons,” along with additional confidential information in some 
instances) with AssuredPartners of Arizona LLC v. Barrios , 2026 WL 482385, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. 
2026) (distinguishing client contact information on a former employee’s cell phone from a client-
list-plus-more). 
Likewise, Edelman’s budget for advertisin g and its call center is not the proper 
measurement for the economic value of the par tial client lists. The summary document Edelman 
submitted appears to be a five-year marketing budget for the years 2020 through 2024. Doc. 119-2 
at 47-48. It is unauthenticated, does not have a date of creation or creator noted, does not 
demonstrate actual spent dollars, and does not connect dollars to client names or financial planners. 
It does not demonstrate the expense, time, or difficulty of obtaining its client names, specifically, 
much less the expense, time, or difficulty of obtain ing a single client’s name or a small subset of 
those names. And it does not reflect expense for client development pre-2020. Of the ten Departed 
Planners, six of them began employment with Edelman well before 2020 (ra nging from 2012 
through 2017). Clark testified that Edelman spends close to $40 million per year generating leads 
for its planners. Doc. 120-2 at 254. But this testimony appears to reflect what Edelman spent at the 
 
11 This is not a case where the Departed Planners had or, perhaps more importantly, gave Mariner additional 
information about the names they remembered. It is Mariner that Edelman seeks to hold responsible. Any 
information Mariner eventually obtained about Edelman’ s former clients came only as a result of the clients 
voluntarily giving it to Mariner. 

19 
time of Clark’s deposition. It does not necessarily represent historical practice or what Edelman 
spent for the leads on the particular clients whose names appear on the lists the Departed Planners 
created. Edelman’s evidence does not demonstrate the independent economic value of these lists. 
 Edelman also contends that the non-public AUM and fee information have independent 
economic value. But as the Court has already obs erved, there is no evidence that Mariner sought 
or received non-public AUM and fee information. In any event, even if the Court were to accept 
that Garvey and Geilfuss’s BRAC reports and Varian’s spreadsheet c ontained non-public AUM 
and fee information, Edelman has not shown that the information of three planners at one point in 
time has independent economic value. It is unclear to the Court how the information from Garvey, 
Geilfuss, and Varian would “confer[] some type of competitive advantage or economic value to 
the information’s owner.” Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. , 134 F.4th at 1093. Neither has Edelman 
presented any evidence of the time, effort, and cost to develop the AUM and fee information. 
 Edelman bears the burden to show that a trade secret exists. It has shown that it has lists 
and numbers that it does not want given to comp etitors. Edelman has offered some evidence of 
how it tries to protect its information. And it has offered some evidence of how valuable it believes 
its information is. But it has not shown anything th at takes the identified information out of the 
realm of mere confidential information and into the realm of a federal trade secret. Edelman fails 
to create a triable jury question over whether it has identified trade secrets. 
B. Misappropriation of Alleged Trade Secrets. 
Edelman has not identified evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that a trade 
secret exists. But, even if it had, Edelman fails to show Mariner’s misappropriation. 
Section 1839(5)(A) defines “misappropriation,” in part, as the “acquisition of a trade secret 
of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by 

20 
improper means.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A). The focus of this analysis is not whether the planners 
acquired trade secrets improperly. It is on whether Mariner improperly acquired trade secrets. See 
Allergan, Inc. v. Revance Therapeutics, Inc. , 2024 WL 38289, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (“[I]f a 
plaintiff shows that a defendant merely acquired (without also using or disclosing) the plaintiff’s 
trade secret(s), then indeed the plaintiff must show that the defendant did so by ‘improper means.’” 
(emphasis added)). 
 Improper means “includes theft, bribery, misr epresentation, breach or inducement of a 
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or es pionage through electronic or other means.” 
Id. § 1839(6)(A) (emphasis added). Th erefore, if Mariner induced a breach of a duty of secrecy, 
the acquisition was by improper means. See Nat’l City Bank, N.A. v. Prime Lending, Inc. , 737 F. 
Supp. 2d 1257, 1267 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (“Nevertheless, Prime used improper means to acquire 
the information: it induced National City’s out going employees to breach their agreements to 
maintain confidentiality.”). 
 Edelman contends that Ma riner acquired Edelman’s trad e secrets by improper means by 
incentivizing and inducing the Departed Planners to breach their confidentiality and noncompete 
agreements so Mariner could solicit Edelman’s clients. 
 The problem is Edelman is collapsing its alleged trade se cret with its restrictive 
covenants.12 The trade secret underl ying this theory is th e partial client list. 13 And there is no 
evidence that Mariner engaged in improper acquisition or use of that trade secret. See Snyder, 147 
F.4th at 1253. Edelman submitted no evidence that Mariner directed the Departed Planners to 
 
12 Edelman highlights that Mariner offered a bonus for clients who moved their business to Mariner. But the alleged 
trade secret is the client list itself. And there is no evidence that Edelman induced the Departed Planners to create 
the list. 
13 Edelman also claims misappropriation of its non-pub lic fee and AUM information. But again, Edelman has not 
produced evidence that the Departed Planners gave Mariner any of this specific information about a particular 
client. 

21 
create the spreadsheets. Edelman submitted no evidence that Mariner received any client-specific 
information from the Departed Planners. Edelma n submitted no evidence that Mariner used any 
client-specific information provi ded by anyone other than the clie nts themselves. The Departed 
Planners testified that Mariner did not require them to create the partial lists or to bring clients with 
them. Instead, Mariner provided a two-year compensation guaranty, regardless of any client list or 
whether any clients followed the Departed Planne rs. One Departed Planner did not even create a 
list (Borgatti), and another only brought his father (Geilfuss’s fa ther followed him to Mariner 14). 
There is a dearth of evidence that Mariner acqui red any trade secrets (a ssuming they existed) by 
improper means. Summary judgment in favor of Mariner is warranted on the DTSA claim on this 
alternate basis. 
IV. REMAINING STATE-LAW CLAIMS 
Mariner asks the Court to dismiss the state-law claims for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction if the Cour t grants summary judgment on Edelma n’s DTSA claim. Doc. 123 at 51. 
The DTSA claim is the only federal claim in th e case and Edelman does not allege diversity 
jurisdiction. The Court grants summary judgment to Mariner on that claim, a nd the only claims 
that remain for trial ar e brought under state law. The only wa y the Court maintains jurisdiction 
over the state-law claims is by exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them. 
A court has discretion to exer cise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that 
derive from “a common nucleus of operat ive fact” as a pending federal claim. City of Chicago v. 
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Courts consider 
whether the values of judicial economy, convenience, and fairne ss would be served by asserting 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 781 
 
14 This may appear to be hyperbole. It is not. The father of one of the Departed Planners followed his son to Mariner. 

22 
(10th Cir. 2013). But a district court may declin e supplemental jurisdiction when the claims over 
which it had original jurisdiction have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3); see, e.g., Exsum v. 
U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2004); Heffington v. Derby United Sch. Dist. 
260, 2011 WL 5149257, at *3 (D. Kan. 2011). Courts are cautious about exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over state-law claims. Notions of comity and federalism weigh in favor of state courts 
trying their own lawsuits. Villalpando ex rel. Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth. , 65 
F. App’x 683, 688 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Declining supplemental jurisdiction is a 
matter within a court’s discretion. See Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs , 582 F.3d 1155, 1172 
(10th Cir. 2009). 
Edelman’s state-law claims arise out of the same common nucleus of operative fact as the 
federal claims. But beyond that f act, there is little reason to ma intain jurisdiction. The remaining 
claims are better resolved by a state court. Kansas has a vested interest in interpreting and applying 
its own choice-of-law guidance and principles of liability. There are several issues that have been 
raised by the pending motions relating to the Depa rted Planners’ restric tive covenants, which 
state’s law applies to some of them, and how that impacts their enforceability. Notions of comity 
support allowing Kansas courts to address these matters. 
Concerns of convenience and fairness also we igh in favor of dismissal. Edelman took a 
chance by filing in federal court based on allegations that the Court characterized as “thin” nearly 
two years ago. Doc. 35 at 8. Disc overy is complete. A state court will only need to resolve the 
remaining state-law issues that have been briefe d. It can then proceed directly to trial without 
significant delay. And Mariner ha s specifically asked the C ourt to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction. 

23 
The Court therefore declines supplemental jurisdiction and does not reach the merits of any 
state-law claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Edelman blurs the line between what information is confidential with some value and what 
information is a trade secret under the DTSA. On the surface, Edelman’s theory is facially 
attractive and the narrative is initially appealing. But when the layers are peeled back, it becomes 
clear that Edelman has no evidence that Mariner misappropriated a trade secret. Edelman asserts 
federal trade-secret protection for something that does not exist on its own. And Edelman’s 
position is the quintessential sl ippery slope; it potentially federalizes every case involving 
restrictive covenants an d would render such covenants unnece ssary because federal trade secret 
law (with its three-year statute of limitations and enhanced penalties) would apply any time a 
former employee remembered a client name (even if the name was a frie nd, a father, or another 
blood relative) and made contact. See McKesson Med.-Surgical Inc. v. Micro Bio-Medics, Inc. , 
266 F. Supp. 2d 590, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“To hol d otherwise, would subject every former 
employee who elects to call on customers he prev iously called upon with the former employer to 
a lawsuit for ‘trade secret’ violation because it is likely, in all those situations that, the former 
employee would be aware of the needs of these customers whic h he/she learned about during 
employment with the previous employer.”); 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d) (DTSA statute of limitations). 
Congress did not paint the DTSA with such broad strokes. 
 THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS that Mariner’s motion for summary judgment 
(Doc. 122) is GRANTED. The Court grants judg ment in Mariner’s favo r on Edelman’s federal 
trade secrets infringement claim. Edelman’s remaining state-law claims are DISMISSED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

24 
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that Edelman’s motion for partial summary judgment 
(Docs. 119, 120) is DENIED. 
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that the pending Daubert motions (Docs. 113, 114, 
and 115) are denied without prejudice as moot. The Court will address the various pending motions 
to seal by separate order. 
The case is closed. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 Dated: June 5, 2026 /s/ Holly L. Teeter 
 HOLLY L. TEETER 
 U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T J U D G E 

Passage view · GavelSight