govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-3_26-cv-00736-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
ELDIIAR ZHUMAEV, ) 
 ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-736 
 ) 
LEONARD ODDO et al., ) 
 ) 
 Respondents. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Presently pending before the Court is a counseled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”) ( Docket No. 1). Petitioner Eldiiar Zhumaev 
(“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Kyrgy zstan, entered the United States in October 2022 as a 
nonimmigrant B-2 visitor with authorization to remain in the United States for a temporary period 
not to exceed April 7, 2023, but who remained in the United States beyond that permitted date. 
(Docket Nos. 1, ¶¶ 1, 3, 20 -21; 7-1; 7-2). Petitioner’s visa was revoked in May 2023. ( Docket 
No. 7-1 at 3). On or about April 3, 2026, Petitioner was apprehended in Pennsylvania, he was 
issued a Notice to Appear, and he was detained at the Moshannon Valley Proc essing Center. 
(Docket Nos. 1, ¶¶ 1, 4, 26; 7-1; 7-2). On April 14, 2026, Petitioner had a bond hearing and an 
immigration judge denied bond, finding that Petitioner was a flight risk. (Docket Nos. 1, ¶¶ 31-
32; 1-2; 7-1). Petitioner reserved his right to appeal that bond denial decision. ( Docket No. 1, 
¶ 33). This Petition followed. Respondents, through counsel, filed a Response to the Petition, and 
Petitioner filed a Reply. ( Docket Nos. 7, 8). In essence, Petitioner seeks a declaration that his 
continued detention is unlawful, and further seeks immediate release from ICE custody, or 
alternatively, to be provided with a prompt, constitutionally adequate custody hearing at which the 

 
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Government shall bear the burden of justifying continued detention. The Petition is now ripe for 
disposition. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Petitioner is challenging the legality of his ongoing detention by contending that his bond 
hearing unconstitutionally required him to bear the burden of proving release is warranted. See 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(h)(3); 1236.1(c)(8); Matter of Salas Pena, 29 I. & N. Dec. 173, 174 (BIA 2025); 
Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). 
Section 1226(a) authorizes the Attorney General to arrest and det ain an alien “pending a 
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). As 
long as the alien is not covered by Section 1226(c) (applying to those who fall within one of the 
enumerated categories of criminal offenses and terrorist activities), the Attorney General “may 
continue to detain the arrested alien” or “may release the alien on . . . bond . . . or conditional 
parole[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). “Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally 
permissible part of that process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
The Attorney General, through the Department of Homeland Security’s district director, 
makes an initial custody determi nation as to whether an alien should be detained pending 
completion of removal proceedings, or whether the alien should be released on bond. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.1(c). If the district director denie s bond and the alien is not subject to an administratively 
final order of removal, the alien may seek release by requesting an initial bond redetermination 
hearing before an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1003.19.1 The alien may appeal 
an immigration judge’s decision on a bond redetermination to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
1 If denied bond, an alien subsequently can request an additional bond redetermination hearing before an 
immigration judge, but only “upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially since the prior 
bond redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). 

 
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(“BIA”). See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3). The BIA’s decision to detain or release an arrested alien on 
bond is discretionary and generally is not subject to judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) 
(providing that the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of § 1226 
shall not be subject to review, and stating that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by 
the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or 
denial of bond or parole”). 
Here, Petitioner has been provided a bond hearing before an immigration judge who denied 
release by finding Petitioner to be a flight risk. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 5). That decision is appealable 
to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(7), 1003.19(f). Petitioner has not pursued such an appeal 
but instead has filed the instant Petition challenging the constitutionality of the burden of proof set 
forth in the applicable regulations and the immigration judge’s application of that legal standard 
to the evidence presented at the hearing . However, “various provisions of the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act ( “INA”)] limit an alien’s ability to collaterally attack (challenge) ongoing 
immigration proceedings through habeas.” Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 
(3d Cir. 2026) (per curiam). Notably, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) provides: 
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including 
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory 
provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to 
remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall 
be available only in judicial review of a final o rder under this 
section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall 
have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 
or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of 
such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or 
nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or 
fact. 
 

 
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8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 2 This statutory provision “strips the District Court of jurisdiction” and 
requires the alien to “wait to raise his claims until he files a petition for review (PFR) of a final 
order of removal.” Khalil, 164 F.4th at 273 (indicating that detention is an “‘action taken’ as a part 
of . . . removal proceedings,” and applying § 1252(b)(9) to conclude that legal challenges to both 
removal and detention pending removal proceedings “arise from” that action or proceeding and 
are inextricably linked to it such that these challenges may be reviewed meaningfully on a PFR). 
In this Court’s considered judgment, the Petition seeks judicial review of questions of law 
and fact inextricably linked to and arising from an action taken or proceeding brought to remove 
Petitioner from the United States, including the application of the Due Process Clause to th e 
regulatorily established burden of proof applied by the immigration judge when evaluating 
evidence presented (or not presented) at the bond hearing afforded to Petitioner pursuant to Section 
1226(a). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The Court concludes that it is precluded from adjudicating questions of law and fact arising 
from the burden of proof applied by the immigration judge’s bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(9). Therefore, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. 
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order: 
 
AND NOW, this 5th day of June, 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Eldiiar 
Zhumaev’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Docket No. 1) is 
DENIED. 
 
 
2 See also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 

 
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The Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed. 
 
/s/ W. Scott Hardy 
W. Scott Hardy 
United States District Judge 
cc/ecf: All counsel of record 

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